congressional research service report hypersonic weapons

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Congressional researchers identify key questions in America’s hypersonic race

Congressional research service report could shape lawmaker questions on hypersonics at next hearing, from funding to command and control issues..

Hypersonic missile defense raises key questions for lawmakers on investment, the Congressional Research Service says. (Graphic by the Center for Strategic and International Studies)

WASHINGTON: The bottom-line question for Congress about Pentagon plans for hypersonic missile defense is whether the approximately $250 million being spent by the Pentagon to develop systems — a sum that potentially could balloon into the billions over time — is warranted by either the threat or the current status of US technologies to counter them, according to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service.

“Is an acceleration of research on hypersonic missile defense options both necessary and technologically feasible? Does the technological maturity of hypersonic missile defense options warrant current funding levels?” the CRS report, “Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress” asks.

In particular, the report from the independent congressional think tank points to concerns about the capability of current military command and control (C2) networks and decision-making processes to ensure fast enough response — a problem that is supposed to be addressed by the Defense Department’s Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) strategy that, as of today, remains to be substantiated.

The brief report [ PDF ], published in late January, does not attempt to answer those question or others it identified, but it could frame lawmakers’ inquiries of top military officials next time they appear for hearings about plans to counter to hypersonic threats.

Targeting What Threats?

Over the past year or so, there has been a growing debate within the Defense Department about the balance between spending on defense against adversary hypersonic missiles and offensive hypersonic weapons being developed by the US military services.

Key congressional and US military leaders have been increasingly apoplectic about Russian and especially Chinese progress in developing long-range hypersonic missiles — including those that could possibly carry nuclear weapons.

The CRS report notes that Russia “reportedly fielded its first hypersonic weapons in December 2019, while some experts believe that China fielded hypersonic weapons as early as 2020.” The US isn’t expected to field its own hypersonic weapon until next year, despite some $2.5 billion in current investment in offensive systems by the various military services.

Victoria Samson of Secure World Foundation and a long-time missile defense analyst suggested that in the race to catch up, the US isn’t fully considering how it’s running the race.

“I get the sense that a lot of what is driving US interest in it is that China and Russia are working on their own program,” Samson told Breaking Defense. “Of course what peer adversaries are investing in should be a consideration for US officials, but it should not be the sole driver, and the United States does not need to do a one-for-one type of investment strategy.”

This illustration depicts the Defense Advanced Research Products Agency’s (DARPA) Falcon Hypersonic Test Vehicle as it emerges from its rocket nose cone and prepares to re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere. DARPA has conducted two test flights of the vehicle; in the second, in 2011, the HTV reached a speed of Mach 20 before losing control. (Image courtesy of DARPA)

The skepticism isn’t just outside government. In September Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said he wasn’t “satisfied with the degree to which we have figured out what we need for hypersonics — of what type, for what missions.”

There are additional complications in decision-making due to the fact that hypersonic missiles can be configured to carry both nuclear and conventional missiles — including the ever-thorny political issues around nuclear deterrence. This makes it somewhat difficult to determine where exactly investments should be made. 

Though the CRS report notes the fiscal 2020 defense authorization act compels the Missile Defense Agency to “develop a hypersonic and ballistic missile tracking space sensor payload,” that agency is actually bound by law to constrain its targeting capabilities to only nuclear threats from rogue states North Korea and Iran. Thus, if the rationale for increased spending on new hypersonic missile defense systems is to counter their not-so-impressive capabilities, rather than those of Russia or China, then that raises issues around whether such programs as MDA’s Glide Phase Interceptor are warranted.

On the other hand, if, as others argue , the real threats are from conventional Chinese and Russian hypersonic missiles that can be used against tactical assets like ships at sea and overseas bases, then perhaps instead investment by the military services in non-strategic defenses and offensive hypersonic missiles of their own are more important. But those efforts also face a number of unanswered questions.

For example, it is unclear that DoD has a strategy, plan and/or capabilities to coordinate salvos of long-range strike weapons, including offensive hypersonic missiles, being developed by the various military services to target Chinese and Russian launch facilities as part of their plans for future all-domain operations. Those development programs already have piqued inter-service rivalry.

Command And Control: A Missing Linchpin

Another pointed question from the new report: “Does DOD have the enabling capabilities, such as adequate command and control architectures, needed to execute hypersonic missile defense?”

Lawmakers should be quizzing Pentagon leaders, the report suggests, about whether DoD’s multiple and stovepiped missile defense C2 systems used by MDA, the military services and the battlefield commanders at the various combatant commands can process data quickly enough allow timely response.

CRS’s analysis quoted from a 2019 issue brief from the American Foreign Policy Council.

That brief stated [ PDF ]:

“The development of complete countermeasures to offset the hypersonic threat will likely require not only detection capabilities, but also a hybrid approach of kinetic interceptors and other non-kinetic means as well as an entire new command and control architecture capable of processing data quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming hypersonic threat – a far cry from the current reality.”

This problem also was flagged by the Missile Defense Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in its February study, “Complex Air Defense: Countering the Hypersonic Missile Threat.”

CSIS found that the speed and data ingestion capacity of current computer processing systems underpinning current C2 networks are already unable to handle the vast amounts of data coming in from various sensor platforms, nor can they adequately share that information in time for commanders to make decisions.

“The speed of hypersonic weapons leaves little time for computing a fire control solution, communicating with command authorities, and completing an engagement,” the CSIS reported explained. However, the study found that current computer systems simply can’t handle the job.

“Presently, various combatant commands cannot process the substantial majority of collected radar, flight test, or shared intelligence data—challenges that motivated the Department of Defense’s Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) program,” the report said.

There also is a need for software-based decision-making tools powered by artificial intelligence and machine learning to assist commanders in visualization of the threats in near-real time and speed decision-making about responses, CSIS noted — tools for which combatant commanders, led by Northern Command head Gen. Glen VanHerck , already are clamoring.

While MDA is working on to modernize its own Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) network, senior MDA officials also have been clear that JADC2 will be critical to hypersonic missile defense.

But so far, not so much progress has been made in developing and implementing the kind of modern data-sharing standards and platforms foundational to JADC2. Part of that problem is reluctance by the individual services to move away from their own bespoke (and expensive) C2 networks.

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Congressional research service reports on conventional weapons systems.

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• Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process , updated January 4, 2024
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• The Arms Trade Treaty , CRS In Focus, updated July 24, 2023
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• F-35 Alternate Engine Program: Background and Issues for Congress , January 10, 2011
• U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems , January 3, 2011
• U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients, 2003-2010 , December 16, 2011
• Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2003-2010 , September 22, 2011
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• Conventional Arms Transfers in the Post-Cold War Era , September 28, 1993
• Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1985-1992 , July 19, 1993
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A short history of US hypersonic weapons testing

By Kelsey D. Atherton

Posted on Jul 20, 2022 3:01 PM EDT

5 minute read

The middle of July saw a whopping three successful hypersonic missile tests by the United States—tests of missiles designed to go at least five times the speed of sound. On July 13, DARPA announced the successful test of the Operational Fires (OpFires) missile at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. Also on July 13, the Air Force announced a successful test of the booster for the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), used in a flight off the California coast. And on July 18, Raytheon announced the second successful flight test of its Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) hypersonic missile for the Air Force.

While the first human-made objects to reach Mach 5 were launched in the 1940s, there has absolutely been a recent uptick in missiles built to go that fast. The other new aspect is that, while in the past hypersonic speeds were a feature of other weapons, today nations such as the United States, China, and Russia are specifically developing weapons to travel at this speed. “Hypersonic” has become a category term for the development of very fast and maneuverable weapons. 

To illustrate how we got to this hypersonic moment, below is a timeline of military hypersonic milestones, starting with ballistic rockets.

1944: Hypersonic descent

German V-2 rockets reached a speed of Mach 4.3 in ascent, and then became hypersonic in descent, clearing Mach 5 as they struck targets in England . The V-2 was the first long-range ballistic missile. With a range of about 200 miles, it carried a one-ton warhead. It was built using concentration camp labor, a process in which at least 10,000 people in those camps died. It was designed by Wernher von Braun, who would go on after the war to have a long career designing ballistic missiles for the US Army and rockets for NASA.

1949: Hypersonic ascent

A rocket launch called Bumper 5 was the fifth in a series of tests at White Sands. The Bumper series tested a kind of two-stage rocket built by putting one rocket on top of another. The rocket on top for the Bumper tests was a sounding rocket, or a small rocket designed to carry instruments into the upper atmosphere to collect data. For the base and booster, Bumper used a V-2 rocket, which functioned as the first stage, allowing the sounding rocket to reach a speed of Mach 6.7 and an altitude of 250 miles.

1959: Hypersonic weapon deployed

The Atlas was the first intercontinental ballistic missile fielded by the United States. Its life in service was short, with the missiles recalled from active duty in 1965. Atlas set the template for many ballistic-trajectory hypersonic weapons to follow. With a range of between 6,400 and 9,000 miles, Atlas could arc up into space and then continue its ballistic trajectory back towards Earth, reaching Mach 21 as it did so. 

Developing Atlas meant designing special heat shielding to ensure that the missile and its thermonuclear payload arrived intact to the target, as the friction and heat from traveling through air at such great speeds could damage the weapon and render it less useful. Today, the US still deploys Minuteman III ICBMs , which are hypersonic missiles like Atlas, but because they travel at detectable ballistic arcs they are not what policymakers or military planners refer to as “ hypersonic weapons .”

1980: Hypersonic glide maneuvering

Much of the hypersonics research of the 1960s and 1970s was focused on vehicles that carried people , from the X-15 rocket plane to the proposed and never finished Dyna-Soar space plane . This crewed vehicle research led to the development of “lifting body” vehicles, most famously the Space Shuttle , in which the body of the plane would generate lift at hypersonic speeds (as it glided back towards Earth) the way wings work at subsonic speeds. 

When it comes to weapons development, one of the bigger hypersonic efforts built on this “lifting body” research and created the Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MaRV). The Air Force tested the Advanced MaRV in 1980 , and it demonstrated the ability of a warhead-carrying reentry vehicle to change its flight pattern at high speed , allowing it to hit targets beyond the initial arc of ballistic trajectory. That maneuverability is crucial to the modern field of hypersonics. Advanced MaRVS were mounted on Pershing II missiles , before those missiles were withdrawn from service as part of an arms control treaty between the United States and the USSR in 1987.

1998: Joint hypersonic scramjet test

The Kholod was an experimental design, Soviet in origin, that ended up being tested by both the United States and the Russian Federation in a project of mutual research. Scramjets take in air at supersonic speeds, then combine it with fuel, ignite the fuel, and express the injected fuel out a back nozzle. To get to supersonic speeds, the Kholod needed to ride on the tip of an anti-air missile. In a 1998 test in Russia with NASA involved, the Kholod reached Mach 6.5 .

2010: X-51 WaveRider ushers in modern hypersonics 

Building on previous scramjet knowledge, the Air Force tested the Boeing-built X-51 Waverider from 2010 to 2013 . For these tests, the WaveRider was attached to a cruise missile that was carried aloft by a B-52 bomber . The missile worked as a first stage, with the WaveRider accelerating from there to at least Mach 5.

2011: Too fast for thick skin 

In October 2011, DARPA lost contact with its Falcon Hypersonic Test Vehicle 2 nine minutes into flight. A report published in April 2012 concluded that traveling at Mach 20 wore through its protective outer coating, damaging the ability of the vehicle to self-correct in flight. 

2014: Advanced hypersonic failure

In a 2014 test at the Kodiak Island launch facility in Alaska, the Army’s Advanced Hypersonic Weapon failed. Later investigations revealed the flaws to be in the launch vehicle , not the hypersonic weapon itself. 

September 2021: HAWC

In September 2021, DARPA first tested the Raytheon-built version of the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept , which reached speeds at or exceeding Mach 5. Then again in March 2022, DARPA tested the version of the HAWC built by Lockheed Martin and Aerojet Rocketdyne. In July 2022, Raytheon successfully flew its version of HAWC a second time. 

October 2021: Glide vehicle

In October 2021, China demonstrated an object launched partially into orbit that crashed back down at hypersonic speeds. It was most likely a glide vehicle known as a “ fractional orbital bombardment system ,” a kind of trajectory that can cross the globe without the high arc and sharp descent of a traditional ballistic missile.

May 2022: ARRW

In a test off the coast of California, the Air Force launched an Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon. This test checked the bare minimum of boxes for a successful flight: It detached successfully, its engine started, and it reached Mach 5, all feats that previous tests of the ARRW had failed to achieve. In July 2022, the ARRW again hit its mark.

July 2022: OpFires

In testing at White Sands, DARPA successfully deployed and launched an Operational Fires missile from a Marine Corps logistics truck using Army artillery controls. The intent of the program is to have a hypersonic weapon that can be fired from standard available trucks, hitting targets at speed and range that cannot be safely reached by aircraft.

Watch a video of OpFires below: 

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Drag race: hypersonic threats are slow enough for US missile defenses

A key motivation driving the development of hypersonic weapons, which glide through the atmosphere at more than five times the speed of sound, is the desire to counter missile defenses. Evading terminal defense interceptors would allow these weapons to destroy missile- and air-defenses early in a conventional conflict, opening routes of attack for other weapons. It would also allow hypersonic weapons to pose a serious threat to ships.

A recent article , citing defense officials, warns that “Even the most advanced US warship in the South China Sea could be defenseless against a hypersonic attack.” In contrast, a March Pentagon press statement says that “Aegis ships equipped with the sea-based terminal [defense] capability can now engage some hypersonic threats.”

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What’s the reality? With prospects of a hypersonic revolution pushing U.S. spending and strategy, it is important to understand what hypersonic weapons can and can’t do.

Our recent analysis of hypersonic weapons and hypersonic defense looks at the physics of missile interception and shows that in contrast to common claims, hypersonic weapons can be intercepted by existing terminal defenses.

The hypersonic weapons currently being developed by the US, Russia, and China for conventional uses have maximum speeds below about Mach 10-12. We show that the atmospheric drag on these weapons as they glide and dive to targets on the ground will slow them enough that they can be intercepted by defenses like advanced versions of the Army’s Patriot PAC-3 and the Navy’s Aegis SM-6.

This vulnerability was illustrated when Ukraine used PAC-3 to shoot down multiple incoming Russian Kinzhal missiles, despite their maneuvering flight at hypersonic speeds.

This means that ships are less vulnerable to hypersonic attack than is frequently claimed. Ship-based radars could detect approaching hypersonic weapons at distances of many hundreds of kilometers, which is more than adequate to fire interceptors at them. Ships with interceptors similar to advanced PAC-3 and SM-6 systems should therefore be able to defend themselves from the hypersonic weapons currently being developed.

This finding is supported by a Missile Defense Agency animation showing a carrier group using ship-based interceptors against hypersonic weapons. The video shows a ship-based interceptor like SM-6 engaging hypersonic weapons detected by the ship’s radar.

Developing faster hypersonic weapons could help a country evade current interceptors, but would raise new problems. Faster flight through the atmosphere would lead to much more intense heating of the vehicles, which remains the fundamental challenge in designing these weapons.

And at the same time, countries will be working to develop increasingly fast and maneuverable interceptors to engage the next generation of hypersonic weapons their adversaries might develop.

Our analysis also shows that hypersonic weapons’ ability to maneuver during their glide phase—around defended regions, for instance—is typically exaggerated and comes at a significant cost.

The very high speeds of these weapons means they require very large aerodynamic forces to turn. Generating these forces increases drag and can significantly reduce the speed and range of the weapon.

As an example, consider a Mach 10 weapon that turns by 30o to avoid overflying a particular location and then turns back by 30o to its original direction of flight. Under reasonable assumptions, the drag during this turn would reduce its speed from Mach 10 to about Mach 6 and reduce its total glide distance to less than 60% of the distance it could have flown with no turns.

Adding an engine, like a scramjet, could reduce the loss of speed and range during maneuvers, but adding an engine and fuel would increase the weapon’s size and mass, requiring a significantly bigger booster to launch it. Since scramjets are not a mature technology and operating them is notoriously complicated, powered hypersonic systems will likely be less reliable and more expensive than boost-glide weapons.

Ballistic missiles also fly at hypersonic speeds, and flying them on depressed trajectories can deliver missiles in equal or shorter times than hypersonic weapons, without the heating problems. Ballistic missiles delivering warheads that can maneuver in the atmosphere (using maneuverable reentry vehicles, or MaRVs) can use similar guidance technologies and have similar accuracy as hypersonic weapons. MaRVs can also use lift as they reenter the atmosphere to maneuver and re-target over hundreds of kilometers.

In general, MaRVs launched by ballistic missiles on depressed trajectories out-perform hypersonic weapons in many scenarios. A recent analysis by the Congressional Budget Office predicts they would be a third less expensive than hypersonic weapons.

The hypersonic arms race is likely to increase tensions and military spending internationally without enhancing national or global security. Hypersonic weapons do not live up to many of the grandiose claims about their performance, and there are better options for gaining the capabilities they do offer. The United States needs to take a more realistic view of these weapons and the billions of dollars it is spending on them.

David Wright is a visiting scholar in the Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy in the Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has a PhD in Physics.

Cameron Tracy is a research scholar in the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He has a PhD in Materials Science and Engineering.

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Trending topics, report to congress on hypersonic weapons.

The following is the July 11, 2019 Congressional Research Service report, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress.

From the report

The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As current Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable “responsive, long range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.

Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, to the growing interest in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a number of hypersonic weapons programs and are expected to field an operational hypersonic glide vehicle— potentially armed with nuclear warheads—as early as 2020. The United States, in contrast to Russia and China, is not currently considering or developing hypersonic weapons for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.

The Pentagon’s FY2020 budget request for all hypersonic-related research is $2.6 billion, including $157.4 million for hypersonic defense programs. At present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not have approved either requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans. Indeed, as Assistant Director for Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets.

As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions about the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and arms control.

Potential questions include the following:

• What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost- effective means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint operational doctrine and concepts?
• Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an acceleration of research on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile defense options both necessary and technologically feasible?
• How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?
• Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities?

Download the document here .

U.S. Naval Institute Staff

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• Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service report on Hypersonic Weapons, background and issues for Congress
• Assessing the Influence of Hypersonic Weapons on Deterrence Deterrence Research Task Force deep dive into more fully understanding the link between technological innovation and strategic deterrence.
• Hypersonic Weapons Primer AFPC’s Defense Technology Program launched its Strategic Primer initiative to educate Congressional staffers and the general public about technologies that affect U.S. national security.
• Hypersonic Weapons - A Technological Challenge for Allied Nations and NATO? This draft report offers a brief overview of the current state of hypersonic weapons development, including key technology and actors.Your Rapporteur also discusses possible implications of the development and deployment of hypersonic weapons for NATO and NATO Allies.
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• Hypersonic Weapons and Strategic Stability Hypersonic weapons – in particular, hypersonic boost-glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles – are rapidly becoming a reality. China, Russia, the United States and several other countries are pursuing these weapons. Some may carry nuclear warheads.
• Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation Hypersonic missiles—specifically, hypersonic glide vehicles and hyper-sonic cruise missiles—are a new class of threat able to penetrate most missile defenses and to further compress the timelines for a response by a nation under attack. Such missiles are being developed by the United States, Russia, and China. Their proliferation beyond these three nations could result in lesser powers setting their strategic forces on hair-trigger states of readiness and more credibly being able to threaten attacks on major powers.
• Defense Primer Hypersonic Boost Glide Weapons Congressional Research Service report on Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons
• Hypersonic Missile Defense Congressional Research Service report on Hypersonic Missile Defense
• Hypersonic Weapons and Escalation Control in East Asia Article from Strategic Studies Quarterly analyzing evolution of American and Chinese hypersonic weapons and their use in a potential conflict
• Hypersonic Weapons in the Indo-Pacific Region Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security primer on hypersonic weapons use in the Indo-Pacific region.

The United States, Russian Federation, and People's Republic of China are racing to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons capable of defeating traditional deterrents in an effort to change the nature of the current strategic balance. Both China and Russia have unveiled glide vehicles and cruise missiles with hypersonic capabilities and have implemented them into their forces already. For the Chinese, the DF-ZF is a hypersonic glide vehicle mounting the Dongfeng-17 cruise missile; the Russians utilize the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched, nuclear capable cruise missile with a claimed speed of over Mach 10. The Russian Strategic Missile Forces also employ a hypersonic glide vehicle known as the Avangard. The United States is currently testing and preparing to field an answer to its adversaries hypersonic capabilities.

Defense Advanced Research Products Agency's (DARPA) Falcon Hypersonic Test Vehicle (HTV)

(Photo Credit: U.S. Army)

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The  updated Congressional Research Service report  for “Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress” was published on July 9, 2021 . The summary of the  report  as follows.

Hypersonic Weapons

The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.

Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, to the advances in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a number of hypersonic weapons programs and have likely fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles— potentially armed with nuclear warheads. Most U.S. hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.

The Pentagon’s FY2022 budget request for hypersonic research is $3.8 billion—up from $3.2 billion in the FY2021 request. The Missile Defense Agency additionally requested $247.9 million for hypersonic defense. At present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not have approved either mission requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans.

Indeed, as Principal Director for Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets.

As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions about the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and arms control. Potential questions include the following:

• What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint operational doctrine and concepts?
• Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an acceleration of research on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile defense options both necessary and technologically feasible?
• How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?
• Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities?

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Yemen's Houthi rebels fire 'Palestine' missile at Israel that resembles Iran's hypersonic weapon, report says

• Houthi rebels in Yemen launched a solid-fuel missile, the "Palestine," at Eilat, Israel, AP reported.
• The missile resembles Iran's Fattah missile that can reach hypersonic speeds.
• The Houthis claim the missile is "locally made," per AP, though defense experts are doubtful.

Houthi rebels in Yemen said they had fired a new solid-fuel missile called the "Palestine" at the southern Israeli city of Eilat on Monday.

The missile is believed to be able to fly at hypersonic speeds and resembles one unveiled by Iran earlier this year, the Associated Press reported.

The attack did not result in any damage or injuries, per AP.

Footage released Wednesday appeared to show a missile, which Houthis claimed to be the Palestine, with a warhead painted in the style of the Palestinian keffiyeh scarf , being raised to firing position and then launched.

Pro-Palestinian supporters around the world have taken to wearing the chequered keffiyeh as a sign of solidarity with the embattled people of Gaza. The enclave has been subjected to an eight-month military campaign by Israel that has killed over 36,000 people, according to the Hamas-run health authorities. It was triggered by the October 7 terrorist attacks in southern Israel by Hamas that killed 1,200 people, mostly civilians.

⚡️WATCH: The AnsarAllah military media published footage of the launch of the “Palestine” ballistic missile - locally made in Yemen - in its first operation against an israeli military target in Eilat. It is a long-range solid fuel ballistic missile. pic.twitter.com/Ts2KEav4Ax — Arya - آریا 🇮🇷🏴 (@AryJeay) June 5, 2024

Most Houthi attacks have been targeting ships in the Red Sea corridor with missiles and drones as part of a campaign that aims to put pressure on Israel and the West over the war in Gaza. Strikes by the US and UK have raised the stakes in recent months.

Israel's port city of Eilat sits on the Gulf of Aqaba, whose waters connect to the Red Sea, has been targeted 53 times since October 7, according to according to the US Congressional Research Service, per The Jerusalem Post.

According to the Arms Control Association , a Washington DC-based think tank, solid-fuel missiles "require less maintenance and preparation time" than liquid-fuel missiles because "solid-propellants have the fuel and oxidizer together, whereas liquid-fueled missiles must keep the two separated until right before deployment."

The Houthis claim the missile is "locally made," per the AP, though they are unlikely to be able to construct this level of advanced weapon, defense experts say.

Fabian Hinz, a weapons expert at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, wrote on X that the Palestine missile reassembled the Iranian-developed Fattah 1 and the Kheybarshekan 2, both solid-fuel missiles.

Iran unveiled the Fattah last year. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed the missile could achieve speeds of Mach 15 - 15 times the speed of sound—and had a range of 870 miles.

Missiles that travel more than five times the speed of sound are considered "hypersonic." According to a UK government research briefing, hypersonic missiles' speed, maneuverability, and altitude "may challenge existing missile defenses."

"So far, the ballistic missiles used by the Houthis against Israel appear to all have been less advanced liquid propellant missiles without terminal guidance," Hinz wrote on X.

"While we cannot say for sure what exact version the 'Palestine' corresponds to, we can say with high certainty that it is an advanced and precision-guided IRGC-developed solid propellant missile provided by Iran," the expert said.

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Congressman Matt Gaetz Applauds House Passage of FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act

Washington, D.C.  — As a member of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), U.S. Congressman Matt Gaetz (FL-01) applauds today’s final passage of the FY 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) by the U.S. House of Representatives. The FY 2025 NDAA includes numerous important provisions for Florida's First Congressional District, including $240 million in funding, $191 million of which is specifically for military construction—the largest amount secured by any member.

Before the FY 2025 NDAA heads to the President's desk to be signed into law, the Senate must pass its version of the NDAA. Members from both the House of Representatives and Senate will then have to work on a final version of the NDAA in a conference committee, before it heads to the president’s desk to be signed into law.

Prior to the floor consideration of the NDAA, Rep. Gaetz filed an amendment to require the Department of Defense to reinstate and provide backpay to U.S. service members discharged from the military for failing to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. Despite Rep. Gaetz’s efforts to obtain a waiver from the Rules Committee to allow the amendment to be made in order, the waiver was blocked, preventing him from bringing it to a vote.

However, Rep. Gaetz was able to offer his amendment to prohibit the transfer of cluster munitions to other countries. Unfortunately, the amendment failed on a 134-286 vote.

Included in the NDAA, Rep. Gaetz secured $98.5 million for the Advanced Helicopter Training System Hangar at NAS Whiting Field for TH-73 helicopters used by the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard to train pilots. Additionally, Rep. Gaetz secured a provision directing the Secretary of the Navy to implement a plan for repair or replacement of Hanger 3260B on NAS Pensacola that suffered damage by Hurricane Sally.

Additionally, Rep. Gaetz secured $42 million to maximize the testing capability of the Eastern Gulf Test & Training Range (EGTTR) and gaps in funding. The committee adopted Rep. Gaetz’s amendment to get the EGTTR fully operational again for hypersonic missile testing in the nearly 120,000 square miles of overwater airspace.

In response to the U.S. House of Representatives passing the NDAA, Rep. Gaetz issued the following statement:

“Today, I proudly exercised the voice of Northwest Florida and voted YES on the FY 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), a critical piece of legislation that provides funding for our military. This bill is a huge victory for Northwest Florida's military mission and further cements our reputation as the premier location for military training in the United States. I successfully secured $240 million in funding, $191 million of which is specifically for military construction—the largest amount secured by any member. As we move forward, I remain committed to advocating for our nation's dedicated service men and women, many of whom reside in our communities. By passing this year’s NDAA in the House, Congress reinforces our commitment to refocusing our military on its mission of ensuring a stronger and safer nation,” said Rep. Matt Gaetz.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON NDAA INCLUSIONS SECURED BY REP. GAETZ:  

• Requirement for the Secretary of the Navy to implement a plan for repair or replacement of the hangar that houses the Blue Angels.
• $98.5 million to continue building the Advanced Helicopter Training System Hangar at NAS Whiting Field.
• $49.8 million to construct a four-story Weapons Technology Integration Center at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB).
• $16.9 million to construct a multi-level facility to house the 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing headquarters and a separate facility to accommodate the 36th Electronic Warfare Squadron at Eglin AFB.
• $16.5 million for the construction of Hurricane Restoration Consolidated (A) School Dorm at NAS Pensacola to house and provide protection to students during severe storms.
• $9.6 million to construct an Air Force Research Laboratory Munitions Directorate HC- BLACKFYRE Advanced Weapons Experimentation Complex at Eglin AFB.
• $12 million to modernize the infrastructure of the EGTTR.
• $30 million to maximize EGTTR’s testing capability, accelerate deliverables, and address key short-term and non-hypersonic related funding gaps.
• $7 million to fund realistic high-fidelity targets for testing and training advanced 5th and 6th generation weapons, aircrew, and aircraft to enable end-to-end weapons testing against realistic threat systems.
• Elimination of the ban on entering the military for testing positive for marijuana use.
• Requirement for the implementation of a strategy to lease dormitory/housing for unaccompanied service members and authorize funds for those leases.
• Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) reform with respect to treatment of criminal records to make it easier for individuals not charged with crimes to have their records cleared.
• Requirement for UCMJ’s courts-martial jury to require unanimous jury verdicts for military trials be implemented in 2025 instead of in 2027.
• Requirement for the DoD to study the use of fish skin grafts for wound care.
• Requirement for the DoD to study prevalence of PTSD and TBI in explosive ordnance disposal.
• Report on Test Range Deception Capabilities.
• Implement a force protection protocol for U.S. Navy Ships being worked on in port.
• Pilot program to improve soldier survivability during airborne operations.
• Assured access to Space Common Operating Picture.
• Exemption under the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 for certain activities that may result in incidental take of the Rice’s whale, allowing DoD to resume important weapons testing in the EGTTR.  

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