argumentative essay about the 19th amendment

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Course: US history   >   Unit 7

The nineteenth amendment.

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• The Nineteenth Amendment to the US Constitution was ratified on August 18, 1920. It declares that “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”
• The amendment, which granted women the right to vote, represented the pinnacle of the women’s suffrage movement, which was led by the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA).
• In their decades-long struggle for female enfranchisement, women’s rights advocates met with strong opposition from anti-suffrage activists.

The women’s suffrage movement

Opposition to women’s suffrage, what do you think.

• For more on the Seneca Falls Convention, see Sally McMillen, Seneca Falls and the Origins of the Women’s Rights Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
• Ellen Carol DuBois, Woman Suffrage and Women’s Rights (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 10.
• Corrine M. McConnaughy, The Woman Suffrage Movement in America: A Reassessment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 2-3.
• For more on the anti-suffrage movement, see Anne Myra Benjamin, Women Against Equality: A History of the Anti-Suffrage Movement in the United States from 1895 to 1920 (Raleigh, NC: Lulu Publishing Services, 2014).
• For more on the women’s rights movement, see Eleanor Flexner and Ellen Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman’s Rights Movement in the United States (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1996).

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Harvard Journal of Law & Gender

A student-edited feminist publication of Harvard Law School

The 19th Amendment at 100: Modern Challenges

By Nicole Williamson*

August 2020 marks one hundred years since the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment granting women the right to vote in the United States. As stated quite simply in the Amendment’s text , “the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” These foundational words ushered in a new era of women’s rights in the United States, as enfranchisement further empowered women to voice their concerns and seek office. Yet women’s suffrage was hardly accomplished by a unified female voice; indeed, the movement was fractured and exclusionary in effectuating its goals. Today, the question of voting rights remains a similarly controversial and divided issue fraught with racial and political tension. On the eve of this momentous centennial, it is imperative to our modern voting rights debate to understand how the Nineteenth Amendment came to be, who was left behind, and what barriers still frustrate full female enfranchisement.

Securing the Right to Vote

Most historical accounts of women’s suffrage begin with the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848, from which Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony launched a decades-long struggle to secure women’s right to vote. These women , along with figures such as Lucy Stone, and later, Carrie Chapman Catt and Alice Paul, helped raise national consciousness of women’s rights and unleashed a rallying cry that would drive the movement towards its ultimate success.

Though grade-school lessons depict a coherent, impassioned rise to victory, a more accurate historical narrative warps this idyllic image. When the proposed Fifteenth Amendment sought to enfranchise black males, white women suffragists rose up in protest, dividing the movement into two camps polarized on the issue of race : “those who felt that Black men needed the vote even more than women, and those who were unwilling to postpone woman suffrage for the sake of Black males.” [1] After this division — and even as the movement more generally excluded the voices of women of color — black women continued to seek membership in the “mainstream” white feminist movement. At the same time, black suffragists coalesced into parallel black civic groups advocating for women’s right to vote. [2] For black women, the barriers were two-fold: a simultaneous fight against racism and sexism. By 1918, when the movement stood at the precipice of winning its hard-fought battle, white women again confronted this racial divide: including black women in the folds of the Nineteenth Amendment risked turning away Southerners, putting the Amendment’s passage at risk. [3] Securing the right to vote thus involved more than the enfranchisement question itself — it required determining who should be included and how soon. These questions were not initially evaluated with an eye towards equality.

Ultimately, the Nineteenth Amendment did enfranchise black women, granting voting rights on equal footing with white women. On the day of ratification, the victory was one secured for all women.

  Yet for black women, this victory was short-lived. Less than a decade after enfranchisement under the Nineteenth Amendment, southern black women found themselves stripped of political power and effective voting rights. [4] By 1940 only 3 percent of voting-age black men and women in the South were registered to vote , a result of the widespread racial violence and intimidation campaign launched by white southerners under Jim Crow. By 1964, 43 percent of black southerners were registered to vote , a hard-won improvement amid increasing violence. Despite the Nineteenth Amendment’s symbolic political victory, for black women the ability to vote came instead by way of the Civil Rights Movement and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 , which secured full voting rights over forty years after initial legal enfranchisement. Thus, though the Amendment was a clear victory for women, its ratification did not immediately benefit all women — many, like southern black women, struggled for years to exercise their rights.

Modern-Day Challenges: Who is Still Left Behind?

  As the nation faces an increasingly diverse voting pool, with racial and minority groups projected to become a majority of the population in 2043, it is more crucial than ever before to protect voting rights for women, and in particular women of color. We must therefore assess: where do we currently stand on voting rights, and what barriers impede full rights and representation?

  Fundamentally, women have made enormous leaps in terms of voter turnout in recent years. Women constitute the majority of registered voters, and since 1980 have voted at higher rates than men in presidential elections. Indeed, since President Obama’s election in 2008, black women have had the highest voting rates of the total female population age 18 or older, voting at 66.1 percent, compared to 64.5 percent of non-Hispanic white women.

Yet challenges remain turnout-wise. For example, Hispanic women and Asian women vote at much lower rates — 33.9 and 32 percent , respectively. White voters are still far more likely than any other group to be “consistent” voters, with lower “continued voter engagement” among minority communities . Generationally, young adults are also far less likely than their senior counterparts to vote — 28 percent versus 74 percent in the 2018 election .

What depresses minority turnout? One major driver of disenfranchisement has increasingly become voter identification laws. Studies on the impact of ID laws, which require certain standards of identification in order to vote, demonstrate that “women, especially low-income, older, minority, and married women,” are most vulnerable to these stringent new laws. Women generally have more trouble than men presenting proper identification, in part because marrying or divorcing often involve name changes that make it harder to present multiple, matching forms of identification. In terms of race, Black and Hispanic Americans are generally three times more likely to be told that they lack the identification needed to vote. Even more commonly, one in ten Americans has trouble taking off work in order to vote – a rate even higher amongst Black or Hispanic Americans (16%) than White Americans (8%). There are clear barriers that make it harder for women and people of color to vote, demonstrating that even today, women of color still face major impediments to exercising full voting rights first granted over one hundred years ago under the Nineteenth Amendment.

  Despite the significant barriers to political rights posed by voter ID laws and similar devices, many don’t view voting issues in the same light. White Americans “are far less likely than black and Hispanic Americans to express concerns about eligible voters being denied the right to vote,” with only one quarter of white Americans finding denial of the right to vote to be a serious issue , compared to nearly two thirds of black and Hispanic Americans. Moreover, there is a marked divide along partisan lines, with conservatives viewing voter fraud as much more pressing than voter disenfranchisement, a paramount concern for liberals. Sharp political divides have framed how Americans see our political and electoral system, in the end calling attention away from the pressing issue of disenfranchisement — and ultimately, leaving vulnerable populations unable to exercise their rights.

Politics aside, the question of enfranchisement touches on our most fundamental rights under the Constitution. As Justice Ginsburg wrote in her Shelby v. Holder  dissent , “[race discrimination and the right to vote are] the most constitutionally invidious form of discrimination, and the most fundamental right in our democratic system.” While partisan factions may vie for the chance to control the national narrative, what is most at stake is individual voices and their representation in our democracy. The Nineteenth Amendment granted the right to vote regardless of sex — and going forward, this right must be protected for all women, especially for minority women whose voting rights are most at stake today.

*Nicole Williamson is a 3L at Harvard Law School

[1] Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, African American Women in the Struggle for the Vote, 1850-1920,  at 8.

[2] Black female leaders on voting rights included Harriet Tubman, Sojourner Truth, Ida B. Wells, Mary Church Terrell, Ella Baker, Rosa Parks, and Angela Davis, amongst many other inspirational women.

[3] Terborg-Penn at 11.

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The first amendment, interpretation & debate, the nineteenth amendment, matters of debate, common interpretation, did the nineteenth amendment modify the fourteenth, what the fourteenth and nineteenth amendments changed for women.

by Nancy Gertner

Senior Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School

by Gail Heriot

Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law

In the early days of the Republic, states typically limited the right to vote to “freeholders”—defined as persons who owned land worth a certain amount of money.  It was thought that, among other things, property-less individuals had no stake in the community or might be inclined to vote for profligate spending, since they were not subject to property taxes. Still, land was cheap, and the qualification level was usually set low, so a large majority of free, adult males could vote.

It is easy to slip into believing that if white men’s voting rights were limited, voting rights for women and racial minorities must have been utterly unthinkable. But the truth is more complex. Most blacks were slaves, owned by their white masters, and could not vote. Several states,  however, allowed otherwise-qualified, free blacks to vote. Most women couldn’t vote.  But in a significant number of locations, otherwise-qualified women voted in local elections and town meetings. New Jersey was perhaps the most interesting case for women. The 1776 New Jersey constitution provided that “all inhabitants” of legal age who met the property and residency requirements were entitled to vote. It is unclear whether this was originally intended to include women. But a 1790 state election law used the phrase “he or she,” thus clarifying the law.

Alas, New Jersey’s early experiment with women’s suffrage didn’t last.After a few hotly contested elections in which rampant voter fraud was alleged, there were calls to tighten voter qualifications. In 1807, amid allegations that men dressed as women had been going to the polls to cast a second ballot, the right of women to vote in New Jersey was withdrawn. If there was much opposition to this act of disfranchisement, history has failed to record it.

Over the course of the next few decades, property qualifications for men were gradually eliminated, with the notable exception of Rhode Island, which did not eliminate property qualifications for foreign-born citizens until 1888. The country as a whole was on the path toward universal manhood suffrage. In contrast, women’s suffrage was rarely taken seriously. An exception was Elizabeth Cady Stanton who, at the historic Seneca Falls Convention in 1848, sought to propose a resolution stating, “Resolved, that it is the duty of the women of this country to secure to themselves their sacred right to the elective franchise.” Lucretia Mott counseled against it, telling her, “Why Lizzie, thee will make us ridiculous.”

That does not mean that women’s issues were wholly neglected in the first half of the nineteenth century.  Instead, reformers focused on securing for married women the right to own and control property independently of their husbands, to enter into contracts and to sue and be sued—precious rights single women already had. Prior to Seneca Falls, the movement had achieved success in Mississippi, Maryland, Michigan, and Arkansas. The celebrated New York Married Women’s Property Act had passed a few months before the convention.

Despite Mott’s misgivings, Stanton introduced her resolution at Seneca Falls, and it passed (albeit by only a small majority). As Stanton put it, “I persisted, for I saw clearly that the power to make laws was the right through which all other rights could be secured.”

Not much progress was made during the years immediately before and after the Civil War. The country was occupied with other things— including the passage and ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, which attempted to secure the rights of the recently-freed slaves. But the election of 1872—the first Presidential election since the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment —was a call to action for some. Susan B. Anthony among others argued that the recently-ratified Fourteenth Amendment ’s Privileges or Immunities Clause gave all women the right to vote. Women had always been citizens; when the Fourteenth Amendment made it clear that no citizen should be denied the privileges and immunities of citizenship, that conferred on women the right to vote, she argued.

When Anthony tried to vote, to her surprise, she was permitted to do so. Her victory was, however, short-lived. Two weeks after the election she was arrested for illegal voting. Despite her argument about the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment, she was convicted. Meanwhile, in Missouri, Virginia Minor had also attempted to register to vote, but had been refused. She launched her own lawsuit also citing the Fourteenth Amendment. In Minor v. Happersett , 88 U.S. 162 (1875), the Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding that while women were citizens within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, citizenship alone did not confer the right to vote.

At that point, the women’s suffrage movement changed its strategy and began to advocate a constitutional amendment specifically focused on a woman’s right to vote.

Out on the western frontier, however, the movement was succeeding at the territorial level. The Wyoming Territory’s constitution was the first to guarantee women the right to vote.

When Wyoming applied for statehood, Congress initially balked. But the Wyoming legislature stood its ground and cabled back to Congressional leaders, “We will remain out of the Union one hundred years rather than come in without the women.” Congress eventually relented, and before the turn of the century, there were four women’s suffrage states—Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, and Idaho.

Members of Congress who worried Wyoming’s example would be difficult for other states to resist were right. After a number of false starts, the Nineteenth Amendment, with language modeled after the Fifteenth Amendment, passed the U.S. House of Representatives on May 21, 1919, and the Senate two weeks later. By then, fifteen states provided full voting rights to women, including New York and Michigan. Another group gave them partial voting rights (such as the right to vote in municipal elections or primaries).  Only seven states barred women from voting entirely.

Ratification was nevertheless hard fought. Tennessee was the state that put the Amendment over the top in a 49-47 nail-biter vote in the Tennessee House of Representatives. The decisive vote was cast by 24-year­ old Harry Burn, who had intended to vote against, until he received his mother’s letter urging him to “be a good boy” and vote for ratification.

The individually-authored essays in this series are supposed to point out the disagreements in interpretation. But perhaps the most remarkable thing about the Nineteenth Amendment is how relatively non-controversial it has been. Apart from the quixotic effort to nullify its ratification in   Leser v.   Garnett , 258 U.S. 130 (1922), things have been quite tranquil.  We revere those who worked hard to make it possible, but little time is spent worrying about how it should be interpreted.

Perhaps that shouldn’t be surprising. Adding women hugely expanded the electorate. A funny thing happens when new voters come along: Politicians start caring about their views. When politicians see that roughly half their constituents are women, they start caring immensely.

The Nineteenth Amendment is relatively straightforward. It states that the “right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” It then gives Congress the power to enforce that guarantee by “appropriate legislation.” Not surprisingly, the Amendment has generated little in the way of controversy in the courts.  

Some scholars, like Yale law professor Reva Siegel, have suggested novel arguments as to how the Nineteenth Amendment can be used to influence the law beyond its text (and beyond the issue of voting). Novelty is considered a virtue in scholarly writing. But it is not usually a virtue when it comes to actual interpretations of the Constitution by the courts. 

The United States is a federal republic. Its Constitution lays out the institutional framework by which decisions are to be made at the national and state levels. Particularly through its amendments, it protects individuals from government overreach by drawing lines beyond which its national and state governments may not go. But as a governing document, the Constitution derives its legitimacy from the fact that it has been agreed to by the nation’s citizens through their elected representatives. A truly “novel” interpretation—one that is neither embedded in the text as it was understood at the time nor logically deduced from the text—is thus illegitimate, because it was not agreed to. This is especially so when an interpretation reduces the power of voters to resolve issues by the processes of representative democracy and places that power in the hands of the courts instead.

Siegel’s argument is that the reasons the Nineteenth Amendment was passed should influence how we interpret the Fourteenth Amendment . In particular, Siegel points to two arguments sometimes advanced by the Amendment’s opponents: (1) that women’s suffrage was incompatible with the institution of the family as the most elemental unit of governance and hence an attack on it; and (2) that issues of suffrage should be left to the states. Siegel argues that the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment was a rejection of those arguments and an acknowledgement that the family can and does work injustices on women that need to be addressed and that the federal government should have a broad role in addressing those concerns. Certainly not everyone will agree with her that the Nineteenth Amendment’s adoption implicitly acknowledged those points. But she goes further by arguing that this supposed acknowledgement has constitutional significance: The rest of the Constitution—in particular the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause—should be read in light of it.

What does she mean by that? As I interpret Siegel, she means two things, one of which would probably be quite limited in its effect and the other of which could potentially be quite radical. First, Siegel believes that interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause in light of the Nineteenth Amendment would put the Supreme Court’s already-existing case law on sex discrimination on a stronger historical footing than it would otherwise be. It is generally acknowledged that while the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment intentionally used very general language for the Equal Protection Clause, their primary concern was with race discrimination. Siegel argues that the Nineteenth Amendment can be seen as justifying the Supreme Court’s decision in cases like Craig v. Boren (1976) to make sex a special (though more limited) concern of the Equal Protection Clause.

Second, Siegel contends that the arguments for the Nineteenth Amendment authorize the courts to go beyond formal equality under the law and instead allow the federal government (presumably by either Congress or the courts) to re-shape state law as it applies to family so as to make it more favorable to women. Put differently, Siegel’s approach would allow courts to do more than just strike down laws that are not “sex-neutral” laws. They could strike down laws that apply equally to men and women if women are somehow disadvantaged by them relative to men.

How far could this be taken? That is unclear. Consider, for example, the fact that mothers are more likely to be the custodial parent of a child than fathers. Could a federal court make itself the arbiter of whether the child support formula used by a state is sufficiently generous, even if the formula is formally sex-neutral? Could it make itself the arbiter of whether a state’s rules about the age of consent are fair?

What is clear is that the state legislators who ratified the Nineteenth Amendment had no reason to believe that they were modifying the meaning Fourteenth Amendment in any way. They thought they were guaranteeing citizens the right to vote regardless of sex and giving Congress the tools it needed to make good on that guarantee. That’s a big deal. And it’s the only deal that was agreed to.

There has been little disagreement about the meaning of the Nineteenth Amendment itself. But some scholars have argued that the history surrounding the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment should be applied to the interpretation of equal protection in the Fourteenth.  The theory is that the Fourteenth and the Nineteenth Amendments, read in tandem, serves to broaden the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to gender-based rights not otherwise included in case law.   

The language of the Nineteenth Amendment is specific—“the right of citizens . . . to vote shall not be abridged . . . on account of sex”—but the context in which that debate about suffrage took place went beyond the suffrage. Opponents claimed that giving women the vote would harm the institution of marriage. The family was the unit of governance in the public sphere, within which the man was the undisputed head. The structure of that unit was enforced through coverture laws—prohibiting women from owning property on their own. Since women were already represented through their husbands they didn’t need an independent voice. These arguments had succeeded in blocking women’s suffrage as part of the Fourteenth Amendment; indeed, the Amendment included the only reference in the Constitution to “male citizens.” But the success of the Nineteenth Amendment represented a change in the way women were viewed in both the public and private spheres, a change which some would argue, affects how the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws should be interpreted.

The Fourteenth Amendment raises a different challenge—general language but a history focused only on African Americans. Unlike the Nineteenth Amendment, its language is inclusive—“all persons born or naturalized in the U.S.” are citizens, and no state shall deprive any “person” of the equal protection of the laws. The debate surrounding its passage was focused on the rights of the formerly enslaved, not the rights of women. Nevertheless, by the 1970s courts interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to include a ban against gender discrimination. In Frontiero v. Richardson (1973), Justice Brennan (delivering the plurality’s opinion) reasoned that gender discrimination was analogous to racial discrimination—both sex and race are immutable characteristics, independent of ability, as a result of which, both women and African Americans have suffered discriminatory treatment.

It is surely not unusual for courts to try to interpret the Constitution’s language, particularly given its very general language. The words don’t interpret themselves; judges have to give content to the provisions, looking at the language together with their context and history. There are obviously limits to this exercise; a judge can’t choose any interpretation he or she wants. But those limits derive from precedent, from legal history, from the traditions of the common law.

In this case, the limitations in the Court’s deriving women’s civil and political rights from the general language of the Fourteenth Amendment soon became clear. Comparing race and gender discrimination, Justice Powell, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) stated that “the perception of racial classifications as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history that gender-based classifications do not share.” That analysis led the Court to use different tests to evaluate race and sex discrimination. While government acts that discriminate on the basis of race are subject to searching inquiry—“strict scrutiny”—acts that discriminate on the basis of gender are subject to “intermediate scrutiny”; some gendered laws may pass constitutional muster, some may not. And a framework that looked only at formal equality—treating women equally with men when they are similarly situated—had difficulty in evaluating differences, even when those differences played a role in discrimination—when men and women were not similarly situated because of familial roles, pregnancy, or domestic violence. 

Some scholars, notably Reva Siegel of Yale Law School, have argued that the general language of the Fourteenth Amendment should be read alongside the debates surrounding the Nineteenth. She argues that together these Amendments address more than formal equality, but apply to a range of practices that contribute to women’s subordination. Her approach, however, would require reexamining decades of sex discrimination law.  

A second approach to address gender equality is to campaign for separate constitutional reform that would explicitly recognize gender rights, an Equal Rights amendment. Such an approach recognizes that the United States Government has never made an express commitment to ensure gender equality beyond suffrage and advocate in favor of constitutional amendment to fill this lacuna. This approach is championed by feminist groups, prominently including the National Organization for Women. The goal of such an amendment would be to reconfigure our nation’s commitment to eliminating gender discrimination beyond the framework of the existing law.

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19th Amendment Analysis

Origins of the 19th amendment.

The Seneca Falls Convention of 1848, led by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, was a pivotal event in the history of women's rights in America. It marked the initial organized push for women's suffrage and challenged existing notions about the social and legal barriers placed on women.

The Declaration of Sentiments, primarily written by Stanton and signed by 100 attendees, was one of the most significant outputs from this meeting. Drawing inspiration from the Declaration of Independence, it asserted that women should be granted the same rights and privileges as men, including the right to vote.

Many pioneers in the suffrage movement, such as Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass, began their advocacy efforts following the Seneca Falls Convention. These efforts expanded despite resistance, legal hurdles, and societal expectations that women should remain within their domestic spheres.

Post-Civil War, suffrage discussions intertwined with racial and civil rights movements. The passage of the 14th and 15th amendments, which gave Black men the right to vote but disregarded all women, further galvanized leaders like Stanton and Anthony. Though efforts to advocate for universal suffrage occasionally caused divisions within suffrage groups and between other civil rights movements, they highlighted the interconnected nature of the fight for equal rights.

Alice Paul took resolute measures to refocus national attention on the suffrage movement by organizing the 1913 parade in Washington, D.C., which famously upstaged President Woodrow Wilson's inauguration. This, along with other strategic demonstrations and insistence on debates around women's central roles in American society, pushed public perception towards the need for constitutional change.

The formation of persistent demands by activists across diverse backgrounds ultimately pressured the government to adopt the 19th Amendment in 1920. The journey from the Seneca Falls Convention to this monumental change underscores a complex intersection of advocacy, strategy, and negotiations among various human rights activists striving for a common goal. These events remodeled public consensus on women's roles in democracy and further established ongoing movements for broader social justice causes across America.

Legislative Journey of the 19th Amendment

Introduced to Congress in 1878 by Senator Aaron A. Sargent, a Republican from California, the proposal for what would become the 19th Amendment asserted that women should have the same voting rights as men. Initial reactions ranged from dismissive amusement to outright hostility, and the amendment languished in congressional committees for years, reflecting prevailing social norms that relegated women primarily to domestic roles.

Despite numerous setbacks, advocates for women's voting rights persistently pushed for recognition both at the state and national levels. Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, several states and territories began extending the vote to women, setting precedents that helped reshape the national dialogue around suffrage. The passage of women's suffrage in various states, particularly in Wyoming in 1869 and Utah in 1870, served as essential early milestones, demonstrating the practical applications of enfranchising women to the rest of the country.

As the United States entered World War I, the roles of women in society began to change drastically, with many taking on traditionally male jobs and responsibilities in support of the war effort. This demonstration of capability and commitment prompted a shift in the public and political perception of women's roles in society. President Woodrow Wilson, formerly a skeptic of women's suffrage, became a vocal supporter in this context, underscoring their indispensable contributions to the nation during turbulent times.

The renewed vigor, influenced significantly by the societal shifts during the war, led suffrage leaders like Carrie Chapman Catt and Alice Paul to redouble their efforts. Catt's pragmatic and moderate lobbying efforts complemented Paul's more radical strategies, such as organizing protests and hunger strikes. This multifaceted approach gradually increased pressure on lawmakers, necessitating legislative acknowledgment of the suffrage movement.

After many years of advocacy and public protest, the House of Representatives passed the amendment on May 21, 1919, followed by the Senate on June 4, 1919. Finally, after the requisite number of states ratified the amendment, it was certified on August 26, 1920. The ratification of the 19th Amendment was a significant landmark in American history, culminating from relentless campaigning, advocating, and demonstrating by countless individuals across several decades.

Racial and Ethnic Exclusions

Despite the sweeping statements of the 19th Amendment, which theoretically granted voting rights to all American women, its practice unfurled a more complex and discriminatory landscape. The broader ramifications and exclusionary practices against women of color, Native American women, and other minority groups highlight significant gaps in the Amendment's implementation.

Even after the ratification of the 19th Amendment, numerous states enforced laws and policies that effectively barred many African American, Native American, and other minority women from voting. These women faced systemic hindrances such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and varying forms of bureaucratic red tape, which predominantly white women did not. Segregation and racially discriminatory tactics in voting practices, predominantly in the Southern states under Jim Crow laws, kept a significant portion of these women disenfranchised.

Native American women also contended with particular obstacles, as many were not considered U.S. citizens until the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924. Even so, numerous states concocted legal stipulations that continued to block Native Americans from voting, circumnavigating the provisions aimed at expanding their rights.

Additionally, Asian American women endured their distinctive struggles due to highly restrictive immigrant laws and policies. Barred from becoming citizens until legislative changes starting in the mid-20th century (with the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act and subsequent Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952), their right to vote was inaccessible for decades.

The intersectional struggle was even more pronounced for these groups as they fought for gender equality and had the additional burden of overcoming racial and ethnic oppressions. The journey towards true electoral inclusivity required further legislative action and civil rights advocacy, culminating in additional changes like the Voting Rights Act of 1965. This watershed legislation eliminated many of the legal barriers at the state and local levels that had prevented African Americans from exercising their right to vote as provided under the 15th and 19th Amendments.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was pivotal in bridging many of the gaps left by the 19th Amendment nearly half a century earlier. It outlawed the discriminatory practices that had been used to disenfranchise African American voters and provided the federal oversight necessary to enforce the rights supposedly guaranteed by earlier amendments. While this acted as a corrective measure, it also illuminated the omissions and half-measures taken in the original framings of these constitutional amendments.

While the 19th Amendment was a monumental achievement in the quest for women's suffrage, its initial effectiveness was marred by intersecting racial and ethnic inequalities. Its legacy, freighted with both progress and significant shortcomings, led to further legal reforms needed to align the country closer to its foundational ideals of justice and equality for all. This continual evolution reflects a broader American narrative where aspirational ideals often confront complicated realities, requiring persistent advocacy and reform to fully realize these principles.

Impact of World War I on Women's Suffrage

Amidst the turmoil of World War I, the position of American women experienced transformative change. While men committed to combat overseas, women filled jobs left vacant, maintained households in the absence of spouses, and actively participated in war-support activities. Their widespread involvement led to positive societal and economic shifts.

Throughout the conflict, employment dynamics diversified, and women assumed roles formerly occupied by men, from manufacturing armaments to handling pivotal positions in communications and management sectors. This period showcased the adaptability and capability of women and their fundamental indispensability in preserving national stability.

Moreover, the voluntary efforts of women in fostering wartime initiatives—such as managing canteens, enlisting in the Red Cross, and partaking in bond drives—broadly recast public perceptions of their societal roles. Stories of women's bravery and sacrifice permeated societal channels, moving the needle on previously held reservations about women's capacities in essential decision-making processes.

This newfound visibility spurred shifts in attitudes among both civilians and political figures. President Woodrow Wilson, influenced by these displays of patriotism and leadership of women, evolved from skeptic to proponent of women's suffrage. His support helped catalyze a change in sentiment among other resistant lawmakers. Wilson's eventual stance— we have made partners of the women in this war and they should be partners in all the work of peace —was indicative of a broader governmental acknowledgment of women's equal stake in American citizenship. 1

Crucially, the alignment of pro-suffrage views with nationalistic attitudes surrounding the war effort entered suffrage into government discussions as a reward—with practical and moral consideration—for women's substantial wartime contributions. This unifying dialogue served as a vital contributor to the War's aftermath discourse regarding legislation recognizing women's rights.

Paradoxically, women's wartime efficiency inadvertently hastened popular and legislative support for policies minting equal suffrage rights, carrying the fight for the 19th Amendment toward its eventual ratification in 1920. The vital correlation between wartime contributions by American women and the accelerated momentum for their suffrage rights offers invaluable historical insight into how external challenges, such as wars, have provoked internal evolution in societal structures and constitutional rights.

World War I didn't merely catalyze pivotal shifts in military and foreign policies but also indelibly shaped the pathway for gender equality in American voting rights, demonstrating how women's visible roles during critical periods can refract through the lens of national emergency to morph entrenched political viewpoints.

Examining this integral narrative fosters a deeper understanding of American constitutional ethos, reflecting how foundational advocacies and sacrifices transform abstract rights into normative societal principles, aligned with broader narratives of democracy and equality as enshrined within the Constitution—with the 19th Amendment as both a product and a testament to these evolving national values.

Key Figures in the Suffrage Movement

Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton stand as prominent figures in the women's suffrage movement, their names nearly synonymous with the effort to secure voting rights for women. However, their efforts were complemented and enriched by other passionate activists.

Susan B. Anthony, born into a Quaker family with a strong bent for social justice, turned her energies to the cause of women's rights in the mid-19th century. After establishing the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA) with Elizabeth Cady Stanton in 1869, Anthony traveled the country tirelessly, delivering speeches, petitioning Congress, and even taking the bold step of voting illegally to challenge the laws barring women from the polls. 2 Her arrest and trial for this act garnered substantial public attention, bolstering the visibility of the suffrage movement.

Elizabeth Cady Stanton, as a co-founder of the NWSA and an author of its philosophical backbone, wove activism with intellectual leadership. Her articulation of the injustices faced by women in the seminal work, Declaration of Sentiments, presented at the Seneca Falls Convention, served as a rallying cry that endured through the decades-long fight for suffrage. 3 Stanton's writings and speeches helped frame the legal and moral arguments that underpinned the movement.

Beyond these figures stood other vital advocates such as Ida B. Wells-Barnett , a journalist and outspoken suffragist and civil rights activist whose courage in the face of racism and sexism fortified the broader movements for equality. Wells co-founded the National Association of Colored Women's Clubs and participated actively in the suffrage marches, though she often encountered segregation within the movement itself. Her insistence on confronting both gender and racial discrimination marked crucial intersections in advocacy, pushing the suffrage movement to confront its own shortcomings around inclusivity.

Each of these leaders leveraged their unique capabilities and circumstances toward a unified goal—extending democratic rights to women through the ballot box. Their strategic demonstrations, persuasive rhetoric, and ability to mobilize grassroots support were imperative in swaying public opinion and legislative action toward the eventual ratification of the 19th Amendment.

Understanding the roles of these pivotal figures highlights a broader spectrum of strategies and philosophies that coalesced in the fight for women's suffrage. The interplay of their combined initiatives exemplifies a nuanced tapestry of activism that was necessary to achieve electoral reforms. It underscores that personal courage, collaborative spirit, and an unwavering commitment to justice were the driving forces behind this monumental amendment that reflected democracy's true scope and extended its promise to more citizens of the nation.

The ratification of the 19th Amendment affirms the nation's commitment to broadening democratic participation and equality.

• Wilson W. Address to the Senate on the Nineteenth Amendment. 1918.
• DuBois EP. Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an Independent Women's Movement in America, 1848-1869. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; 1999.
• Wellman J. The Road to Seneca Falls: Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the First Women's Rights Convention. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press; 2004.

Nineteenth Amendment :

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

The Supreme Court has not decided many cases interpreting the Nineteenth Amendment . 1 Footnote In the 1922 case Leser v. Garnett , the Supreme Court rejected Maryland voters’ arguments that the Nineteenth Amendment had not become part of the Constitution. 258 U.S. 130, 136–37 (1922) (rejecting, among other arguments, Maryland voters’ contention that the people of a state could deprive the state’s legislature of the power to ratify the Nineteenth Amendment by enacting state constitutional provisions that limited suffrage to men). See also Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 127–30 (1922) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to rule upon a taxpayer’s challenge to the procedures by which the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified). The Fairchild plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the Secretary of State from proclaiming the ratification of the amendment and the U.S. Attorney General from enforcing it. Id. In the only significant case addressing the Amendment’s effect, Breedlove v. Suttles , the Court upheld a Georgia law that required state residents between the ages of twenty-one and sixty to pay a poll tax. 2 Footnote 302 U.S. 277, 279–80 (1937) , overruled by Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668–69 (1966) . The law exempted women who did not register to vote from paying the tax. 3 Footnote Breedlove , 302 U.S. at 279–80 . The law also exempted blind people from paying the tax. Id. However, men between twenty-one and sixty years of age were required to pay the tax, regardless of whether they registered to vote. 4 Footnote See id.

A twenty-eight-year-old male who sought to register to vote challenged the law as a violation of the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendment s. 5 Footnote Id. at 280 . The Court acknowledged that the Nineteenth Amendment protected men’s voting rights in addition to women’s. 6 Footnote Id. at 283 . However, the Court determined, without much elaboration, that the tax did not deny or abridge a man’s right to vote on account of his sex. 7 Footnote Id. at 283–84 . The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment ’s Equal Protection and Privileges or Immunities Clauses. Id. at 282 .

Almost three decades later, in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections , the Supreme Court overruled Breedlove , determining that imposing a poll tax on voters in state elections violated the Fourteenth Amendment ’s Equal Protection Clause. 8 Footnote 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) . The Twenty-Fourth Amendment , ratified in 1964, prohibits the federal and state governments from conditioning a U.S. citizen’s right to vote in federal elections on payment of a poll tax or “other tax.” See Amdt24.1 Overview of Twenty-Fourth Amendment, Abolition of Poll Tax. The Court held that conditioning a voter’s participation in state elections upon payment of a poll tax discriminated against prospective voters based on their wealth. 9 Footnote Harper , 383 U.S. at 668–70 ( “[W]ealth or fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.” ). However, in Harper , the Court did not revisit Breedlove 's Nineteenth Amendment holding.

Since Breedlove , the Supreme Court has occasionally referenced the Nineteenth Amendment when resolving claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment ’s Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. For example, when striking down Georgia’s county-unit system for tabulating votes in state primary elections as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment ’s Equal Protection Clause, the Court suggested that the Nineteenth Amendment stands for “political equality” and illustrates the concept of “one person, one vote.” 10 Footnote E.g. , Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) . See also Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553, 561–62 (1923) (striking down a federal law that set a minimum wage for women employed in the private sector as a violation of the Fifth Amendment ’s substantive due process guarantee of liberty to contract and noting “the great . . . changes which have taken place . . . in the contractual, political and civil status of women, culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment ” such that differences between women and men had “come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point” ), overruled by W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) .

In a later equal protection case involving the Virginia Military Institute’s “male-only” admission policy, the Court traced its application of heightened scrutiny to official actions that deny “rights or opportunities based on sex,” in part, to the history of sex discrimination that preceded the Nineteenth Amendment ’s recognition of women’s suffrage. 11 Footnote United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) ( “Today’s skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of [a history of sex discrimination] . . . . Through a century plus three decades and more of [American] history, women did not count among voters composing ‘We the People’; not until 1920 did women gain a constitutional right to the franchise.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Since the 1970s, the Fourteenth Amendment ’s Equal Protection Clause has played a role in combating gender discrimination by subjecting gender-based classifications to intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g. , Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976) . See also Amdt14.S1.8.8.3 General Approach to Gender Classifications.

Although the Court has occasionally referenced the Nineteenth Amendment in its opinions, a number of questions concerning the Amendment’s scope remain unresolved. For example, it is unclear whether a successful Nineteenth Amendment claim requires a showing of intentional gender-based discrimination 12 Footnote See Jones v. Governor of Fla. , 15 F.4th 1062, 1067–68 (11th Cir. 2021) . and how far Congress’s Section 2 enforcement power extends. 13 Footnote See, e.g. , Richard L. Hasen & Leah M. Litman , Thin and Thick Conceptions of the Nineteenth Amendment Right to Vote and Congress’s Power to Enforce It , 108 Geo. L.J. 19th Amend. Special Edition 27, 50 (2020) .

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Guest Essay

The 19th-Century Club You’ve Never Heard of That Changed the World

By Jon Grinspan

Dr. Grinspan is a curator of political history at the Smithsonian’s National Museum of American History and the author of “ Wide Awake : The Forgotten Force That Elected Lincoln and Spurred the Civil War.”

George Kimball was ready for war as soon as the first brick hit his head.

The 20-year-old printer was listening to an abolitionist lecture in Boston’s Bowdoin Square during the 1860 presidential campaign, when a pro-slavery throng tried to shut it down. Kimball was prepared, present as part of a torch-bearing, black-clad bodyguard called the Wide Awakes, who beat the brick-throwers back using their torches as clubs.

As Kimball walked home, blood in his eyes, he wanted “war declared at once.” Years later, having fought his way through from Bull Run to Gettysburg to Petersburg, he still considered that Boston brickbat, “as much a casus belli as was the firing upon Fort Sumter.” For him, it was the embattled right to publicly protest slavery that sparked the conflict — a fight over free speech brought on the war.

Today, our starkest political debates often turn on similar questions of public speech and public violence. Across diverse conflicts, from college campuses to the Capitol’s steps, we keep asking where the line is between heated words and aggressive deeds. Though framed as a legal question concerning the First Amendment, more often it’s a conundrum for our political culture.

In a democracy, how far is too far?

It’s a question that fueled America’s bloodiest war. The Civil War was fought over slavery (anyone who says it wasn’t is just wrong). But how did American slavery, which began in 1619, spark a conflict in 1861? How did a long-running debate turn into a shooting war? Where, exactly, was that dynamic moment when an argument became a fight?

George Kimball’s Wide Awakes help make sense of it all. That half-forgotten movement provides a missing link between the election and the war. In the presidential campaign of 1860, hundreds of thousands of diverse young Americans joined companies of Wide Awakes, marching in militaristic uniforms, escorting Republican speakers, fighting in defense of antislavery speech. Their grass-roots rising helped elect Abraham Lincoln as president but also began the spiral into war.

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