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Famine and Forced Relocations in Ethiopia 1984-1986

Salvadoran Refugee Camps In Honduras 1988

Somalia 1991-1993: Civil War, Famine Alert and a UN “Military-Humanitarian” Intervention

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The Hunting and Killing of Rwandan Refugees in Zaire-Congo: 1996-1997

War crimes and politics of terror in Chechnya 1994-2004

MSF and North Korea 1995-1998

MSF and the Rohingya 1992 - 2014

MSF and Darfur 2003-2009

• Open access
• Published: 11 May 2018

The Syrian conflict: a case study of the challenges and acute need for medical humanitarian operations for women and children internally displaced persons

• Rahma Aburas 1 ,
• Amina Najeeb 2 ,
• Laila Baageel 3 &
• Tim K. Mackey   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-2191-7833 3 , 4 , 5  

BMC Medicine volume  16 , Article number:  65 ( 2018 ) Cite this article

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After 7 years of increasing conflict and violence, the Syrian civil war now constitutes the largest displacement crisis in the world, with more than 6 million people who have been internally displaced. Among this already-vulnerable population group, women and children face significant challenges associated with lack of adequate access to maternal and child health (MCH) services, threatening their lives along with their immediate and long-term health outcomes.

While several health and humanitarian aid organizations are working to improve the health and welfare of internally displaced Syrian women and children, there is an immediate need for local medical humanitarian interventions. Responding to this need, we describe the case study of the Brotherhood Medical Center (the “Center”), a local clinic that was initially established by private donors and later partnered with the Syrian Expatriate Medical Association to provide free MCH services to internally displaced Syrian women and children in the small Syrian border town of Atimah.

Conclusions

The Center provides a unique contribution to the Syrian health and humanitarian crisis by focusing on providing MCH services to a targeted vulnerable population locally and through an established clinic. Hence, the Center complements efforts by larger international, regional, and local organizations that also are attempting to alleviate the suffering of Syrians victimized by this ongoing civil war. However, the long-term success of organizations like the Center relies on many factors including strategic partnership building, adjusting to logistical difficulties, and seeking sustainable sources of funding. Importantly, the lessons learned by the Center should serve as important principles in the design of future medical humanitarian interventions working directly in conflict zones, and should emphasize the need for better international cooperation and coordination to support local initiatives that serve victims where and when they need it the most.

Peer Review reports

The Syrian civil war is the epitome of a health and humanitarian crisis, as highlighted by recent chemical attacks in a Damascus suburb, impacting millions of people across Syria and leading to a mass migration of refugees seeking to escape this protracted and devastating conflict. After 7 long years of war, more than 6 million people are internally displaced within Syria — the largest displacement crisis in the world — and more than 5 million registered Syrian refugees have been relocated to neighboring countries [ 1 , 2 ]. In total, this equates to an estimated six in ten Syrians who are now displaced from their homes [ 3 ].

Syrian internally displaced persons (IDPs) are individuals who continue to reside in a fractured Syrian state now comprising a patchwork of government- and opposition-held areas suffering from a breakdown in governance [ 4 ]. As the Syrian conflict continues, the number of IDPs and Syrian refugees continues to grow according to data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This growth is continuing despite some borders surrounding Syria being closed and in part due to a rising birth rate in refugee camps [ 5 , 6 ]. This creates acute challenges for neighboring/receiving countries in terms of ensuring adequate capacity to offer essential services such as food, water, housing, security, and specifically healthcare [ 4 , 7 , 8 ].

Though Syrian refugees and IDPs face similar difficulties in relation to healthcare access in a time of conflict and displacement, their specific challenges and health needs are distinctly different, as IDPs lack the same rights guaranteed under international law as refugees, and refugees have variations in access depending on their circumstances. Specifically, there are gaps in access to medical care and medicines for both the internally displaced and refugees, whether it be in Syria, in transit countries (including services for refugees living in camps versus those living near urban cities), or in eventual resettlement countries. In particular, treatment of chronic diseases and accessing of hospital care can be difficult, exacerbated by Syrian families depleting their savings, increased levels of debt, and a rise in those living in poverty (e.g., more than 50% of registered Syrian refugees in Jordan are burdened with debt) [ 9 ].

Despite ongoing actions of international humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to alleviate these conditions, healthcare access and coverage for displaced Syrians and refugees is getting worse as the conflict continues [ 4 , 10 ]. Although Syria operated a strong public health system and was experiencing improved population health outcomes pre-crisis, the ongoing conflict, violence, and political destabilization have led to its collapse [ 11 , 12 , 13 ]. Specifically, campaigns of violence against healthcare infrastructure and workers have led to the dismantling of the Syrian public health system, particularly in opposition-held areas, where access to even basic preventive services has been severely compromised [ 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 ].

Collectively, these dire conditions leave millions of already-vulnerable Syrians without access to essential healthcare services, a fundamental human right and one purportedly guaranteed to all Syrian citizens under its constitution [ 4 ]. Importantly, at the nexus of this health and humanitarian crisis are the most vulnerable: internally displaced Syrian women and children. Hence, this opinion piece first describes the unique challenges and needs faced by this vulnerable population and then describes the case study of the Brotherhood Medical Center (the “Center”), an organization established to provide free and accessible maternal and child health (MCH) services for Syrian IDPs, and how it represents lessons regarding the successes and ongoing challenges of a local medical humanitarian intervention.

Syria: a health crisis of the vulnerable

Critically, women and children represent the majority of all Syrian IDPs and refugees, which directly impacts their need for essential MCH services [ 18 ]. Refugee and internally displaced women and children face similar health challenges in conflict situations, as they are often more vulnerable than other patient populations, with pregnant women and children at particularly high risk for poor health outcomes that can have significant short-term, long-term, and inter-generational health consequences [ 10 ]. Shared challenges include a lack of access to healthcare and MCH services, inadequate vaccination coverage, risk of malnutrition and starvation, increased burden of mental health issues due to exposure to trauma, and other forms of exploitation and violence such as early marriage, abuse, discrimination, and gender-based violence [ 4 , 10 , 19 , 20 ]. Further, scarce medical resources are often focused on patients suffering from acute and severe injury and trauma, leading to de-prioritization of other critical services like MCH [ 4 ].

Risks for women

A 2016 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) report estimated that 360,000 Syrian IDPs are pregnant, yet many do not receive any antenatal or postnatal care [ 21 , 22 ]. According to estimates by the UNFPA in 2015, without adequate international funding, 70,000 pregnant Syrian women faced the risk of giving birth in unsafe conditions if access to maternal health services was not improved [ 23 ]. For example, many women cannot access a safe place with an expert attendant for delivery and also may lack access to emergency obstetric care, family planning services, and birth control [ 4 , 19 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 ]. By contrast, during pre-conflict periods, Syrian women enjoyed access to standard antenatal care, and 96% of deliveries (whether at home or in hospitals) were assisted by a skilled birth attendant [ 13 ]. This coverage equated to improving population health outcomes, including data from the Syrian Ministry of Health reporting significant gains in life expectancy at birth (from 56 to 73.1 years), reductions in infant mortality (decrease from 132 per 1000 to 17.9 per 1000 live births), reductions in under-five mortality (from 164 to 21.4 per 1000 live births), and declines in maternal mortality (from 482 to 52 per 100,000 live births) between 1970 and 2009, respectively [ 13 ].

Post-conflict, Syrian women now have higher rates of poor pregnancy outcomes, including increased fetal mortality, low birth weights, premature labor, antenatal complications, and an increase in puerperal infections, as compared to pre-conflict periods [ 10 , 13 , 25 , 26 ]. In general, standards for antenatal care are not being met [ 29 ]. Syrian IDPs therefore experience further childbirth complications such as hemorrhage and delivery/abortion complications and low utilization of family planning services [ 25 , 28 ]. Another example of potential maternal risk is an alarming increase in births by caesarean section near armed conflict zones, as women elect for scheduled caesareans to avoid rushing to the hospital during unpredictable and often dangerous circumstances [ 10 ]. There is similar evidence from Syrian refugees in Lebanon, where rates of caesarean sections were 35% (of 6366 deliveries assessed) compared to approximately 15% as previously recorded in Syria and Lebanon [ 30 ].

Risks for children

Similar to the risks experienced by Syrian women, children are as vulnerable or potentially at higher risk during conflict and health and humanitarian crises. According to the UNHCR, there are 2.8 million children displaced in Syria out of a total of 6.5 million persons, and just under half (48%) of Syrian registered refugees are under 18 years old [ 1 ]. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) further estimates that 6 million children still living in Syria are in need of humanitarian assistance and 420,000 children in besieged areas lack access to vital humanitarian aid [ 31 ].

For most Syrian internally displaced and refugee children, the consequences of facing lack of access to essential healthcare combined with the risk of malnutrition (including cases of severe malnutrition and death among children in besieged areas) represent a life-threatening challenge (though some studies have positively found low levels of global acute malnutrition in Syrian children refugee populations) [ 24 , 32 , 33 , 34 ]. Additionally, UNICEF reports that pre-crisis 90% of Syrian children received routine vaccination, with this coverage now experiencing a dramatic decline to approximately 60% (though estimating vaccine coverage in Syrian IDP and refugee populations can be extremely difficult) [ 35 ]. A consequence of lack of adequate vaccine coverage is the rise of deadly preventable infectious diseases such as meningitis, measles, and even polio, which was eradicated in Syria in 1995, but has recently re-emerged [ 36 , 37 , 38 ]. Syrian refugee children are also showing symptoms of psychological trauma as a result of witnessing the war [ 4 , 39 ].

A local response: the Brotherhood Medical Center

In direct response to the acute needs faced by Syrian internally displaced women and children, we describe the establishment, services provided, and challenges faced by the Brotherhood Medical Center (recently renamed the Brotherhood Women and Children Specialist Center and hereinafter referred to as the “Center”), which opened its doors to patients in September 2014. The Center was the brainchild of a group of Syrian and Saudi physicians and donors who had the aim of building a medical facility to address the acute need for medical humanitarian assistance in the village of Atimah (Idlib Governorate, Syria), which is also home to a Syrian displacement camp.

Atimah (Idlib Governorate, Syria) is located on the Syrian side of the Syrian-Turkish border. Its population consisted of 250,000 people pre-conflict in an area of approximately 65 km 2 . Atimah and its adjacent areas are currently generally safe from the conflict, with both Atimah and the entire Idlib Governorate outside the control of the Syrian government and instead governed by the local government. However, continued displacement of Syrians seeking to flee the conflict has led to a continuous flow of Syrian families into the area, with the population of the town growing to approximately a million people.

In addition to the Center, there are multiple healthcare centers and field hospitals serving Atimah and surrounding areas that cover most medical specialties. These facilities are largely run by local and international health agencies including Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Medical Relief for Syria, and Hand in Hand for Syria, among others. Despite the presence of these organizations, the health needs of IDPs exceeds the current availability of healthcare services, especially for MCH services, as the majority of the IDPs belong to this patient group. This acute need formed the basis for the project plan establishing the Center to serve the unique needs of Syrian internally displaced women and children.

Operation of the Center

The Center’s construction and furnishing took approximately 1 year after land was purchased for its facility, a fact underlining the urgency of building a permanent local physical infrastructure to meet healthcare needs during the midst of a conflict. Funds to support its construction originated from individual donors, Saudi business men, and a group of physicians. In this sense, the Center represents an externally funded humanitarian delivery model focused on serving a local population, with no official government, NGO, or international organization support for its initial establishment.

The facility’s primary focus is to serve Syrian women and children, but since its inception in 2014, the facility has grown to cater for an increasing number of IDPs and their diverse needs. When it opened, facility services were limited to offering only essential outpatient, gynecology, and obstetrics services, as well as operating a pediatric clinic. The staffing at the launch consisted of only three doctors, a midwife, a nurse, an administrative aid, and a housekeeper, but there now exist more than eight times this initial staff count. The staff operating the Center are all Syrians; some of them are from Atimah, but many also come from other places in Syria. The Center’s staff are qualified to a large extent, but still need further training and continuing medical education to most effectively provide services.

Though staffing and service provision has increased, the Center’s primary focus is on its unique contribution to internally displaced women and children. Expanded services includes a dental clinic 1 day per week, which is run by a dentist with the Health Affairs in Idlib Governorate, and has been delegated to cover the dental needs for the hospital patients . Importantly, the Center facility has no specific policy on patient eligibility, its desired patient catchment population/area, or patient admission, instead opting to accept all women and children patients, whether seeking routine or urgent medical care, and providing its services free of charge.

Instead of relying on patient-generated fees (which may be economically prohibitive given the high levels of debt experienced by IDPs) or government funding, the Center relies on its existing donor base for financing the salaries for its physicians and other staff as well as the facility operating costs. More than an estimated 300 patients per day have sought medical attention since its first day of operation, with the number of patients steadily increasing as the clinic has scaled up its services.

Initially the Center started with outpatient (OPD) cases only, and after its partnership with the Syrian Expatriate Medical Association (SEMA) (discussed below), inpatient care for both women and children began to be offered. Patients’ statistics for September 2017 reported 3993 OPD and emergency room visits and 315 inpatient admissions including 159 normal deliveries and 72 caesarean sections, 9 neonatal intensive care unit cases, and 75 admissions for other healthcare services. To better communicate the clinic’s efforts, the Center also operates a Facebook page highlighting its activities (in Arabic at https://www.facebook.com/مشفى-الإخاء-التخصصي-129966417490365/ ).

Challenges faced by the Center and its evolution

The first phase of the Center involved its launch and initial operation in 2014 supported by a small group of donors who self-funded the startup costs needed to operationalize the Center facility’s core clinical services. Less than 2 years later, the Center faced a growing demand for its services, a direct product of both its success in serving its targeted community and the protracted nature of the Syrian conflict. In other words, the Center facility has continuously needed to grow in the scope of its service delivery as increasing numbers of families, women, and children rely on the Center as their primary healthcare facility and access point.

Meeting this increasing need has been difficult given pragmatic operational challenges emblematic of conflict-driven zones, including difficulties in securing qualified and trained medical professionals for clinical services, financing problems involving securing funding due to the shutdown of banking and money transferring services to and from Syria, and macro political factors (such as the poor bilateral relationship between Syria and its neighboring countries) that adversely affect the clinic’s ability to procure medical and humanitarian support and supplies [ 40 ]. Specifically, the Center as a local healthcare facility originally had sufficient manpower and funding provided by its initial funders for its core operations and construction in its first year of operation. However, maintaining this support became difficult with the closure of the Syrian-Turkish border and obstacles in receiving remittances, necessitating the need for broader strategic partnership with a larger organization.

Collectively, these challenges required the management committee and leadership of the Center to shift its focus to securing long-term sustainability and scale-up of services by seeking out external forms of cooperation and support. Borne from this need was a strategic partnership with SEMA, designed to carry forward the next phase of the Center’s operation and development. SEMA, established in 2011, is a non-profit relief organization that works to provide and improve medical services in Syria without discrimination regarding gender, ethnic, or political affiliation — a mission that aligns with the institutional goals of the Center. Selection of SEMA as a partner was based on its activity in the region; SEMA plays an active role in healthcare provision in Idlib and surrounding areas. Some other organizations were also approached at the same time of this organization change, with SEMA being the most responsive.

Since the Center-SEMA partnership was consummated, the Center has received critical support in increasing its personnel capacity and access to medicines, supplies, and equipment, resulting in a gradual scale-up and improvement in its clinical services. This now includes expanded pediatric services and the dental clinic (as previously mentioned and important, as oral health is a concern for many Syrian parents and children). The Center also now offers caesarean deliveries [ 41 ]. However, the Center, similar to other medical humanitarian operations in the region, continues to face many financial and operational challenges, including shortage of medical supplies, lack of qualified medical personnel, and needs for staff development.

Challenges experienced by the Center and other humanitarian operations continue to be exacerbated by the ongoing threat of violence and instability emanating from the conflict that is often targeted at local organizations and international NGOs providing health aid. For example, MSF has previously been forced to suspend its operations in other parts of Syria, has evacuated its facilities after staff have been abducted and its facilities bombed, and it has also been subject to threats from terrorist groups like the Islamic State (IS) [ 42 ].

The case study of the Center, which evolved from a rudimentary medical tent originally located directly in the Atimah displacement camp to the establishment of a local medical facility now serving thousands of Syrian IDPs, is just one example of several approaches aimed at alleviating the suffering of Syrian women and children who have been disproportionately victimized by this devastating health and humanitarian crisis. Importantly, the Center represents the maturation of a privately funded local operation designed to meet an acute community need for MCH services, but one that has necessitated continuous change and evolution as the Syrian conflict continues and conditions worsen. Despite certain successes, a number of challenges remain that limit the potential of the Center and other health humanitarian operations to fully serve the needs of Syrian IDPs, all of which should serve as cautionary principles for future local medical interventions in conflict situations.

A primary challenge is the myriad of logistical difficulties faced by local medical humanitarian organizations operating in conflict zones. Specifically, the Center continues to experience barriers in securing a reliable and consistent supply of medical equipment and materials needed to ensure continued operation of its clinical services, such as its blood bank, laboratory services, operating rooms, and intensive care units. Another challenge is securing the necessary funding to make improvements to physical infrastructure and hire additional staff to increase clinical capacity. Hence, though local initiatives like the Center may have initial success getting off the ground, scale-up and ensuring sustainability of services to meet the increasing needs of patients who remain in a perilous conflict-driven environment with few alternative means of access remain extremely challenging.

Despite these challenges, it is clear that different types of medical humanitarian interventions deployed in the midst of health crises have their own unique roles and contributions. This includes a broad scope of activities now focused on improving health outcomes for Syrian women and children that are being delivered by international aid agencies located outside of the country, international or local NGOs, multilateral health and development agencies, and forms of bilateral humanitarian assistance. The Center contributes to this health and humanitarian ecosystem by providing an intervention focused on the needs of Syrian women and children IDPs where they need it most, close to home.

However, the success of the Center and other initiatives working to end the suffering of Syrians ultimately relies on macro organizational and political issues outside Atimah’s border. This includes better coordination and cooperation of aid and humanitarian stakeholders and increased pressure from the international community to finally put an end to a civil war that has no winners — only victims — many of whom are unfortunately women and children.

Abbreviations

the Brotherhood Women and Children Specialist Center

Internally displaced persons

Maternal and child health

Medecins Sans Frontieres

Non-governmental organizations

Outpatient department

Syrian Expatriate Medical Association

United Nations Population Fund

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

The United Nations Children’s Fund

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Aburas, R., Najeeb, A., Baageel, L. et al. The Syrian conflict: a case study of the challenges and acute need for medical humanitarian operations for women and children internally displaced persons. BMC Med 16 , 65 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12916-018-1041-7

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Article contents

Humanitarian intervention and international security.

• Taylor B. Seybolt Taylor B. Seybolt Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.217
• Published in print: 01 March 2010
• Published online: 22 December 2017

Humanitarian intervention is the use of military intervention in a state to achieve socioeconomic objectives, such as keeping people alive and communities functioning by providing basic necessities, without the approval of its authorities. There are three eras of humanitarian intervention: the entire time up to the end of World War II, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War period. These three eras are distinguished by differences in the structure of the international system. Ultimately, the Western intellectual tradition of just war is the foundation for contemporary international law governing armed conflict. It is grounded in natural law, which recognizes the right of sovereigns to use force to uphold the good of the human community, particularly in cases where unjust injury is inflicted on innocents. Eventually, a diverse body of literature on humanitarian intervention has developed. The contemporary debate focuses on the long-standing disagreement between positive law and natural law about coercive intervention. Political scientists use realist and constructivist paradigms to analyze the motives of intervening states and to argue for or against the practice. Proponents favor humanitarian intervention on the basis of legitimacy and the consequences of nonintervention. Opponents argue against intervention on the basis of illegitimacy, practical constraints, and negative consequences. Meanwhile, skeptics sympathize with the humanitarian impulse to help civilians but are troubled about methods and consequences.

• humanitarian intervention
• military intervention
• international law
• natural law
• coercive intervention
• constructivism
• sovereignty

Introduction

Humanitarian intervention lies at the intersection of realism and liberalism, where power and the material interests of states meet human rights and the responsibilities of sovereignty. Military intervention for avowed humanitarian purposes has been common since the end of the Cold War and has re-energized the debate about when states can and should use military force. The literature on humanitarian intervention re-examines long-held ideas about the relationships between state sovereignty and human rights, between politics and ethics, between peace and justice. This re-examination has led to a discernible shift in the balance of opinion over the past two decades from the primacy of state sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention to an emphasis on human rights and the effort to find an agreed threshold for legitimate intervention.

Humanitarian intervention – more accurately, humanitarian military intervention – is “military intervention in a state, without the approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing [or ending] widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants” (Roberts 1993 :429). The essential characteristics of humanitarian intervention are the use of military means in a contentious political environment to achieve socioeconomic objectives: to keep people alive and communities functioning by providing basic necessities, such as physical security, food, and water. In most cases, humanitarian intervention leads to explicitly political endeavors of post-conflict reconstruction, nation-building, and democratization. These longer term objectives seek to address the causes of the humanitarian crisis and prevent additional violence and suffering. Humanitarian intervention does not include military extraction of foreign nationals or emergency relief operations by aid organizations without the involvement of foreign military units.

The literature on humanitarian intervention is driven by events and policy debates, rather than by theoretical arguments. Is it legitimate to intervene with force to protect people and keep them alive? If it is, what is the threshold for intervention? Who should intervene? How can such interventions succeed and what can go wrong? Answers to these questions are firmly grounded in enduring intellectual positions on moral obligation, international law, state sovereignty, and human rights. They run the gamut from strict prohibition on intervention to advocacy for action. The literature also engages new debates about appropriate roles for international organizations and nongovernmental actors in international affairs.

The following section of this essay provides a broad overview of the literature by identifying the central issues at stake, pointing out the richly diverse disciplines that inform the debate, and indicating the weaknesses in the literature taken as a whole. The next section summarizes the intellectual foundations of “just war” and state sovereignty as they relate to humanitarian intervention. In the rest of the essay, the contemporary literature’s strong orientation toward policy is recognized, and work is discussed as being in favor of humanitarian intervention, opposed to it, or sympathetic but skeptical about its efficacy.

Overview of the Literature

Historically minded accounts identify three eras of humanitarian intervention: the entire time up to the end of World War II (pre- 1945 ), the Cold War ( 1945–90 ), and the post-Cold War period ( 1991 –present) (Murphy 1996 ; Barnett 2008 ). The three eras are distinguished by differences in the structure of the international system. As the distribution of power has changed, so has the frequency of humanitarian intervention. The attention of scholars and policy analysts has followed suit: little was published on the topic before and during the Cold War, but with the activism of the present era, there is a striking jump in the number of publications.

For most of the twentieth century , neither states nor intergovernmental organizations engaged in humanitarian intervention. Two world wars and the collapse of empires during the first half of the century provided ample opportunities for humanitarian action, but governments understandably were preoccupied with power transitions and the demands of statecraft. After World War II, the bipolar balance of power gave geo-strategic significance to all military interventions. In that context, a strong presumption in favor of state sovereignty and nonintervention dampened the threat of superpower war and the potential for humanitarian interventions. Consequently, the topic received little attention as a subject of study.

Humanitarian intervention became a popular academic subject in the 1990s, in direct response to changes in the international system and the behavior of a few governments. The end of the Cold War in 1989 created a permissive environment in which military action by Western powers no longer contained the danger of escalation to a catastrophic international war with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. The end of the bipolar balance of power also freed the United Nations (UN) Security Council from the reciprocal vetoes of the two superpowers and allowed it to become much more active. In this “new world order,” as the immediate post–Cold War period was known, Western governments, with authorization from the UN Security Council, launched interventions to protect and provide aid to civilians in northern Iraq in 1991 , Somalia in 1992 , and Bosnia in 1992 . The number of publications on humanitarian intervention shot up in 1992 and has remained high ever since.

During nearly two decades of sustained attention, a diverse body of literature has developed from the contributions of lawyers, philosophers, political scientists, humanitarians, military officers, and policy analysts. Each of these fields brings its own intellectual perspective to the topic. The unusual range of expertise is useful for understanding the multifaceted principles and practices of humanitarian intervention. Unfortunately, the intellectual diversity has not led to much innovative and interdisciplinary work. With a few exceptions (Damrosch 1993 ; Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003 ), authors from different fields talk past one another, resulting in a theoretically underdeveloped body of literature.

To the extent that there is a shared conceptual framework, it can be found in the legal and normative work that comprises the majority of publications on humanitarian intervention. The contemporary debate is a variation of a long-standing disagreement between positive law and natural law about coercive intervention. Legal positivists base their arguments on written documents and place a high value on precedent. They focus on the stability of the international system and contend that state sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention must prevail (Arend and Beck 1993 ). Advocates of natural law base their arguments on moral reasoning and place a high value on actions judged to be ethically sound. They focus on the ethical treatment of humankind and contend that the rights of people trump the rights of states (Teson 1988 ).

Running parallel to this debate, political scientists use realist and constructivist paradigms to analyze the motives of intervening states and to argue for or against the practice. Realists emphasize the risks and costs of these “optional” interventions, while constructivists discuss the role of norms in changing the motives for intervention (Posen 1996 ; Crawford 2002 ; Finnemore 2003 ). Constructivists also write about the consequences of inconsistency; that is, intervention in some humanitarian crises and not in others. A separate strand in the political science literature draws on institutionalism to highlight the weaknesses and strengths of the UN and its role in the international system (MacFarlane and Khong 2006 ).

Pragmatism is the hallmark of publications on the military aspects of humanitarian intervention. Some authors concentrate on tactics and practices to improve the outcome of military interventions from a humanitarian perspective. Most, however, anchor their analysis in the common understanding that military action is used in the pursuit of political goals (Mockaitis 2004 ). Traditionally oriented authors argue that the military should not be involved in humanitarian operations that weaken the military’s ability to protect strategic national interests (Schmitt and Donnelly 2007 ).

The politicization and militarization of aid are anathema to humanitarians. Literature from their quarter is rooted in the principles of impartiality, neutrality, independence of action, and assistance given on the basis of need alone, all of which become corrupted by political and military interests. These principles are the conceptual foundation from which humanitarian authors argue for one of two things: to improve the outcomes of interactions with military actors, or to return to the separation of humanitarian from political and military action (Minear 2002 ; Terry 2002 ).

Despite its broad range of intellectual perspectives, the literature is dominated by just two methodological approaches. Lawyers and ethicists use rational argumentation based on legal precedents and normative principles, illustrated by reference to empirical examples. Case studies are the method of choice for political scientists, military analysts, humanitarian practitioners, and policy analysts. There is virtually no quantitative analysis or formal modeling.

Most of the good case studies delve deeply into a single country to provide case-specific analysis and rich secondary material (Clarke and Herbst 1997 ). Some authors, mostly political scientists, use case studies to test competing hypotheses against empirical evidence by using process tracing, multiple congruence procedures, or structured comparison (Lischer 2005 ). Unfortunately, the majority of the literature lacks methodological rigor. A good many authors selectively draw on cases to support their arguments and use limited evidence to make sweeping generalizations.

The literature is notable for repeated reference to a limited number of countries. Studies of the pre-World War II era look at the British effort to end the slave trade, the attack on the Barbary pirates, and intervention in Algeria. The three Cold War era cases always cited are East Pakistan ( 1971 ), Cambodia ( 1979 ), and Uganda ( 1979 ). In the post–Cold War period, the five core cases are northern Iraq after the Gulf War ( 1991 ), Somalia ( 1992–5 ), Bosnia ( 1992–5 ), Rwanda ( 1994 ), and Kosovo ( 1999–2000 ). Four cases that are often cited but have not received as much attention are Haiti ( 1994 ), Liberia ( 1990–7 ), Sierra Leone ( 1997–2005 ), and East Timor ( 1999–2000 ). Underrepresented cases include Burundi ( 2003–6 ) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo ( 1999 –present). Darfur, Sudan ( 2004 –present) is a constant reference point in the policy literature but, as an ongoing event, it has not been the subject of much social science research.

Despite methodological limitations, the breadth of intellectual contributions ensures that the literature on humanitarian intervention remains vibrant. The most comprehensive bibliography on the subject contained over 3,600 entries in March 2009 . Reflecting the range of disciplinary approaches and the complexity of humanitarian intervention in practice, the printed version of the bibliography divides entries among 12 categories. The online version offers a list of 30 keywords (ICISS 2001 , 2009 ).

A simpler, three-part categorization in the following sections draws attention to the core issues of legitimate thresholds, methods, and consequences. Proponents favor humanitarian intervention on the basis of legitimacy and the consequences of nonintervention. Opponents argue against intervention on the basis of illegitimacy, practical constraints, and negative consequences. Skeptics sympathize with the humanitarian impulse to help civilians but are troubled about methods and consequences.

The Evolution of Humanitarian Intervention

The Western intellectual tradition of just war is the foundation for contemporary international law governing armed conflict. It is grounded in natural law, which sees proper behavior in international politics as being governed by precepts that can be known by reason and are binding on all rational beings. Chief among these precepts is that natural rights accrue to people simply by their being human. Natural law recognizes the right of sovereigns to use force to uphold the good of the human community, particularly in cases where unjust injury is inflicted on innocents (Chesterman 2002 ; Nardin 2002 ; Bellamy 2004 ).

Christian theologian Thomas Aquinas developed the ethical framework in the thirteenth century , building on the earlier work of Saint Augustine. Often interpreted as a license to intervene on behalf of people subjected to erroneous religious beliefs, the just war tradition guided kings and princes for about 400 years until political and intellectual developments brought about a profound shift toward positive law. In the early seventeenth century , Hugo Grotius sought to rein in Europe’s constantly fighting princes by arguing that natural law allows intervention to protect innocents, but does not require it. Indeed, natural law prescribes mutual forbearance, for the first concern of sovereigns and all human beings is self-preservation. Grotius, however, allowed for the possibility of a sovereign using force to punish crimes against natural law, even if the misdeeds were committed by another sovereign against his own people on his own territory (Walzer 1977 ; Nardin 2002 ).

The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 ushered in a period of peace in Europe, after the Thirty Years’ War, by placing positive law and the idea of mutual forbearance before natural law and the idea of justified intervention. This enabled the development of the modern international system, with the sovereign state as the ordering principle of power and nonintervention as the central norm (Smith 1999 ). The tenets of political realism fit neatly within the sovereign state system. Based on Thomas Hobbes ’s conception of sovereignty as supreme authority, and Niccolò Machiavelli’s emphasis on the sovereign amassing power to realize his interests, state behavior is – and ought to be – driven by pursuing the state’s own interest, which demands acting on the basis of relative power, not ethical ideals.

The realist paradigm has prevailed for the past few centuries, but has been challenged by cosmopolitan arguments based on natural law. Among the most significant of these, for the topic of humanitarian intervention, is A Memory of Solferino , Henry Dunant’s ( 1986 ) account of caring for wounded soldiers at the final battle of Italian unification in 1859 . Dunant’s call “to form relief societies for the purpose of having care given to the wounded in wartime by zealous, devoted and thoroughly qualified volunteers” led to the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC pioneered concerted humanitarian action for victims of war on the basis of international law (ICRC 2004 ).

Following World War II, the historical tension between inviolable state sovereignty and the obligation to respect and protect individual rights was built into the new institutions at the center of the international system. On one hand, the primacy of positive law and the prohibition on the use of force, except in defense of a sovereign state, are the core ideas in the Charter of the United Nations. On the other hand, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, also an essential document of the UN, declares rights for people. During the Cold War, this tension usually was resolved in favor of state sovereignty over human rights, nonintervention over intervention, and international peace over justice (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996 ; Danish Institute of International Affairs 1999 ). Even three cases that authors cite in retrospect as humanitarian interventions – India’s invasion of East Pakistan that led to the independent state of Bangladesh ( 1971 ), Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia that overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime ( 1978 ), and Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda that overthrew Idi Amin ( 1979 ) – were justified at the time on national security grounds. Self-defense as a reason for the use of force better reflected the dominant normative and legal ideas of the time (Wheeler 2000 ; Finnemore 2003 ).

The quest to find a balance between peace and justice led to the revival of just war precepts. The essential modern text is Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars ( 1977 ). Walzer emphasized the limits of the legitimate use of military force. In most cases, he argued, the nonintervention principle should prevail, but he did not adhere to a strict legalist paradigm. Arguing “against realism” that communal liberty and human rights have greater intrinsic value than state sovereignty, Walzer highlighted the principles of just cause and reasonable prospects of success. “Humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of success) to acts ‘that shock the moral conscience of mankind’” (Walzer 1977 :107).

India’s intervention in East Pakistan sparked a debate among a small number of legal scholars and ethicists. Franck and Rodley asked ( 1973 :275), “Is the Bangladesh incident to be seen as creating a new common law, one which accords priority to human rights and self-determination over the norms of international conduct, including legal restraints on the unilateral use of force?” Seeking to uphold the primacy of state sovereignty, they argued that the incident did not contain the basis for a definable, workable, or desirable change in international law. None of the UN conventions on human rights, they argued, allows for unilateral military enforcement (Franck and Rodley 1973 ). Writing after the Vietnamese and Tanzanian actions, German legal scholar Helmut Rumpf expressed alarm at the erosion of the nonintervention principle in the name of an ever-expanding set of “universal” human rights. He argued that nonintervention must be the basis of international law but, foreshadowing future arguments about the limits of sovereignty, he allowed that intervention might be justified if a state wantonly violated basic human rights (Rumpf 1981 ).

Arguing strongly in favor of humanitarian intervention, Teson ( 1988 ) took the position that international law is based on judgments about what is right and wrong, as is national law, and therefore is inherently normative. Drawing on the natural law tradition, Teson argued that the rights of states are derived from the rights of individuals: states do not have autonomous moral standing independent of their populations. A government that substantially violates the human rights of its people forfeits its domestic and international legitimacy. In such circumstances, military action is morally allowed to end egregious suffering and oppression (Teson 1988 ).

Before the Cold War drew to a close, the post–World War II emphasis on legal positivism and the realist conviction that military power should be used solely in the pursuit of national interests began to give way to natural law arguments and a cosmopolitan belief in universal moral principles and rights (Wheeler 2000 ). While it remained the majority position, insistence on strict adherence to the principle of nonintervention did not allow its adherents to engage with recurrent questions of theoretical and practical importance. Are states’ rights always morally and legally superior to individual rights, or are there circumstances in which states forfeit certain rights in favor of individual rights? How should governments address this tension inherent in the UN Charter? Can a meaningful distinction be made between legal and legitimate action? If states engage in humanitarian intervention, should they be condemned or instead have their actions held to high standards of judgment? These and similar questions pushed themselves to the top of the agenda at the beginning of the 1990s. Answers were shaped by events during the ensuing decade, especially interventions in Iraq in 1991 and Kosovo in 1999 .

Immediately following the 1991 Gulf War – a traditional conflict in which a coalition of states drove the Iraqi military out of Kuwait – the United States encouraged the Shia population in Iraq’s southern marshlands and the Kurdish population in the northern plains to rebel against Saddam Hussein . A substantial portion of the Iraq military had survived the war and Saddam used it to crush the rebellions. The Shia received no assistance during or after their uprising and suffered severe retaliation. The Kurdish rebellion enjoyed initial success, but the Iraqi military regained control, killed as many as 20,000 Kurds and Turkomans, and drove hundreds of thousands of people toward Iran and Turkey. Turkey refused to honor its refugee asylum obligation, stranding about 400,000 people in cold mountain passes. Western governments were reluctant to intervene but rapidly changed their stance when Turkey, a member of NATO, called for help, and televised images of dying Kurds began to tarnish the shine of the recent Gulf War victory. Claiming authority to act under UN Security Council Resolution 688, France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States launched Operation Provide Comfort, the first humanitarian intervention of the post–Cold War era (Seybolt 2007 ).

The rescue operation was a turning point. It was seen widely as a triumph of human rights over tyranny, as recognition of the UN’s central role in conferring legitimacy on military intervention, and as proof that military means could achieve humanitarian ends. Conveniently, military action also served the interests of the great power states and the cost was relatively low. The line between cosmopolitanism and realism blurred. The egregious violation of human rights had become an offense against ethical norms of the society of states, and powerful countries saw it in their interest to do something about it (Donnelly 2002 ).

UN Security Council Resolution 794, authorizing intervention in Somalia in 1992 , established that humanitarian crises could constitute “a threat to international peace and security,” thereby meeting the requirement of Article 2(4) for the use of force. The legal precedent for humanitarian intervention, however, was not advanced significantly by Somalia or subsequent cases, because each case was declared to be “exceptional” and not the beginning of a new legal rule. The exceptionalism of humanitarian intervention was pushed further by the 1999 NATO intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to protect ethnic Albanians in the province of Kosovo from the Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic. NATO violated international law when it used military force in Kosovo without authorization from the Security Council (where Russian and Chinese vetoes would have ruled out military action). Consistent with evolving state practice, alliance members offered an ethical justification for the action but they did not provide a legal defense. The lack of legal justification and the opposition of many states to humanitarian intervention suggest that the practice is far from being established in customary international law, even if there is a trend toward accepting the use of force on moral grounds in exceptional cases (Hilpold 2001 ; Farrell 2005 ).

Humanitarian Intervention Proponents

Proponents of humanitarian intervention tend to be constructivists who argue that states’ interests must be investigated, not assumed. Interests change as norms evolve, leading to changes in states’ actions (Finnemore 2003 ). From the constructivist point of view, military action to save the displaced Kurds demonstrated that the norm of human solidarity had developed to the point where powerful states saw it as in their interest to act. Proponents of humanitarian intervention applaud the intervention in Kosovo as evidence of a shift from inviolate state sovereignty toward the protection of human rights.

Proponents refute the legal positivist notion that nonintervention is the right approach to international relations. They advocate forceful intervention to protect innocents, and see the realist preference for supremacy of state sovereignty over human rights as morally untenable. Many proponents welcome a new era in which international actors increasingly are willing to intervene in response to human rights abuses (Chopra and Weiss 1992 ; Weiss 1994 ). Others give credence to humanitarian intervention by emphasizing its historical precedence instead of its novelty (Knudsen 1997 ; Bass 2008 ).

The strongest proponents hold that state behavior ought to be driven by moral concern and respect for certain universal principles. They begin from the cosmopolitan proposition that all people have inalienable rights. Drawing on Walzer’s work, they contend that governments, as moral agents, have an obligation to respect those rights. When a government violates the basic human rights of its population to the point of being morally abhorrent, it should no longer be protected by international law. Outsiders have a responsibility to rescue the victims of tyranny and anarchy, if the victims want to be rescued and it can be done at a reasonable cost (Teson 2001 ). “There are circumstances under which one is ethically bound to use force as a last resort to stop a greater evil” (Malazogu 2003 :127).

Proponents are confronted with the argument that natural law can lead to the abuse of humanitarian intervention rhetoric by strong states to pursue selfish national interests. The United States, for example, claimed humanitarian motives for its 2002 invasion of Iraq. Russia claimed humanitarian motives for its 2008 intervention in Georgia. Proponents respond that the misuse of humanitarian rhetoric can be controlled by understanding that natural law and positive law are complementary. “Natural law provides a common way of thinking about the morality of war, while legal positivism acts as a vital break on abuse” (Bellamy 2004 :144). The best way to find the appropriate balance is through collective deliberation – a process of negotiated consent that confers legitimacy on the decision to intervene (Donnelly 2002 ; Barsa 2005 ) Governments engage in collective deliberation when they seek approval from the UN Security Council, as they did, for example, in Somalia ( 1992 ), Bosnia ( 1992 ), Rwanda ( 1994 ), and East Timor ( 1999 ). This multilateralism simultaneously constrains the abuse of power and legitimizes the use of force.

Proponents recognize that the Security Council will not always approve military intervention, even in response to atrocities, because of the veto power of the five permanent members and the resistance of many smaller states to the erosion of the nonintervention principle. This recognition divides proponents into three positions on the importance of UN Security Council authorization. The first group, positivist by inclination, insists that Security Council authorization is necessary. The UN Charter forbids the use of force except in self-defense or as authorized by the Security Council. Unauthorized use of force weakens the UN, opens the door to great power adventurism, and delegitimizes humanitarian intervention (Thakur 2006 ).

The second group strongly prefers Security Council authorization but says that other multilateral bodies, such as the UN General Assembly or a regional intergovernmental organization, have legal authority to approve an intervention if the situation is dire and the Security Council does not authorize action (Wheeler 2000 ; ICISS 2001 ).

The third group prefers Security Council authorization but argues that humanitarian intervention can be legitimate even if does not comply with international law. The commission established to investigate NATO’s attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over the matter of Kosovo caused a small sensation when it concluded that the action was illegal but legitimate on the basis of extreme humanitarian need (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000 ). A few authors go as far as to argue that unilateral humanitarian intervention should be considered legal as well as legitimate if it addresses severe human rights abuses and intergovernmental organizations are paralyzed and unable to stop the abuse (Benjamin 1992 ).

Multilateralism is the preferred method of intervention because it bolsters legitimacy by serving as a check on the military activities of a single state (Hoffman 1995/6 ). In the early 1990s, the quest for legitimacy led a number of writers to call for the building of a capable UN military (Connaughton 1992 ; Mazarr 1993 ). After observing the poor record of UN military efforts in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, analysts questioned the wisdom of relying on UN forces in hostile environments. Reliance on states, however, raises suspicion about motives and activities (Danish Institute of International Affairs 1999 ). When France set up Zone Turquoise in south-western Rwanda at the end of the 1994 genocide, it asked other states to be involved. The only other troop contributor was France’s ally Senegal, which did little to assuage suspicion that France’s intention was to rescue its erstwhile allies in the genocidal Rwandan government (Des Forges 1999 ). In other cases, such as the Australian-led intervention in East Timor in 1999 , multilateral intervention has dampened charges of neocolonialism.

Nowhere is the suspicion of political motives stronger than among humanitarian aid organizations. Yet, in the early 1990s, some aid organizations came out as proponents of humanitarian intervention in the new world order. They strenuously called for military help to address the famine in Somalia because violence and banditry prevented effective aid operations. Virtually all aid organizations now consider that to have been a grave mistake. The fundamental humanitarian principles of delivering aid on the basis of need, independence, impartiality, and neutrality all rest on the idea that humanitarian action is separate from politics and the competition for power (Sphere Project 2004 ). Experiences from Somalia to Afghanistan have reinforced this point of view. Aid organizations recognize that they can sometimes benefit from military intervention in cases of ongoing violence, but they seek a strict division of labor such that the military creates a secure environment and stays away from humanitarian relief activities.

In contrast to humanitarian practitioners, the strongest proponents of humanitarian military intervention say that the gravest political mistake is the failure to intervene in places where the world knows there are mass atrocities (Weiss 2004 ). The lack of intervention often is attributed to the failure of political will. Since humanitarian crises usually happen in countries that are not strategically important for the great powers, there is little political motivation to accept the risks and pay the costs of intervention (Hoffman 1995/6 ). A second explanation is that intervention is not feasible in many cases. No one called for humanitarian intervention in the Russian province of Chechnya, despite massive civilian suffering during the war. A third explanation – that there simply is not agreement on when humanitarian intervention is allowed or expected – returns to the debate on the conditions for the legitimate use of force.

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan brought that debate to the forefront of diplomatic discussion and analysis after the NATO-led military operation in Kosovo in 1999 . In his “Millennium Report” to the General Assembly, Annan challenged states to find a balance between the principles of state sovereignty and humanity: “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?” (ICISS 2001 :vii).

Annan’s challenge led to the publication by an independent commission, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), of The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS 2001 ), which has become the centerpiece of the humanitarian intervention literature. The report changed the nature of the debate by predicating state sovereignty on the protection of basic human rights. It emphasized that sovereignty confers responsibilities as well as rights. In particular, the commission argued, a government must safeguard the lives of people on its territory. If a government does not or cannot fulfill that responsibility, other governments, authorized by the UN, have the right to act, including to use military force as a last resort (ICISS 2001 ).

The UN has been the main forum for discussing the implications of reconceptualizing sovereignty as responsibility. The Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change recognized in 2004 “the emerging norm that there is an international responsibility to protect [civilians][…]in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law…” (United Nations 2004 ). The concept of the responsibility to protect was included in the Secretary-General’s report In Larger Freedom in preparation for the General Assembly’s World Summit (United Nations 2005b ). On the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the UN, the largest ever gathering of heads of state endorsed the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document , which contained two extraordinary paragraphs regarding the responsibility to protect. The leaders committed to:

use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means […] to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations […]. (UN 2005 )

Timely and decisive collective action, in accordance with Chapter VII, is UN diplomatic parlance for military intervention without the consent of the sovereign government. The heads of state, in other words, put their signatures to a fundamental challenge to the positivist concept of state sovereignty. The idea that governments and, if they fail, other international actors have a responsibility to protect people from four types of atrocities also has won supporters among those analysts who are sympathetic to humanitarian intervention but skeptical about its application on political and normative grounds (e.g. Thakur 2006 ).

To summarize the proponent position, there is a fair amount of agreement on when to intervene, a narrow but opposing set of answers on who should do it, and little thought given to how to intervene. Since the publication of The Responsibility to Protect report, proponents have coalesced around a modern interpretation of just war principles. The report sets out the principles of just cause and right authority as threshold criteria for military action, and the principles of proportionality, last resort, right intention, and reasonable prospects of success as “other precautionary criteria.” The Outcome Document is more specific when it defines just cause as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Right authority, according to the report, rests with the UN Security Council (ICISS 2001 ; United Nations 2005a ).

The remaining disagreement among proponents about who should intervene is between those who continue to favor UN-led interventions and those who believe that experience has shown that humanitarian objectives are better served by state led coalitions authorized by the UN. In either case, governments must show the political will to contribute troops and equipment. As Kurth ( 2005 ) and others point out, governments willing to risk their troops do not have the military capacity to intervene without considerable help from others; governments that do have the capacity are rarely willing to risk their troops. Moreover, the United States, the most capable of intervening, has undermined its legitimacy by fighting the war in Iraq (MacFarlane et al. 2004 ; Kurth 2005 ).

Proponents have not addressed in a serious and sustained way difficult questions about how military force can be used for humanitarian ends. When writers sympathetic to the humanitarian argument engage the question of how to intervene, they tend to move into the camp of skeptics, discussed below.

Humanitarian Intervention Opponents

Scholars and policy analysts who oppose humanitarian intervention make strong arguments that the practice is normatively indefensible, does not conform to international law, does not advance the interests of the intervening states, and is ineffective.

The broadest critique of humanitarian intervention is really an argument against the current international order. According to this perspective, the discourse on intervention is unable to move beyond a limited focus on decision-making because it fails to examine the liberal internationalist context in which humanitarian emergencies take place. Humanitarian intervention is a problem-solving approach that ignores the “economic statism” that leads to humanitarian crises and simply seeks to restore the international order that gave rise to the conflict in the first place (Pawlowska 2005 ).

Less radical writers also pay close attention to international context, often with emphasis on power imbalance. They argue that humanitarian intervention is a variant of colonial depredation: it is an instrument of strong states’ domination over weak ones. European and North American governments choose the targets of intervention according to their strategic interests. The involvement of the UN Security Council does not help, as the Council is “less than representative” and gives a handful of states inordinate influence through the veto provision (Ayoob 2001 ). In addition to being patently discriminatory, forcible intervention encourages violence. Any intervention eventually will provoke local opposition (Roberts 1993 ).

Opponents’ third criticism is that military intervention is not appropriate or necessary. Violence was an essential part of the process that established political order in the West. On one hand, we should expect there to be violence as new, weak states struggle to impose their authority. On the other hand, when a state is overly oppressive and abuses its population, the people, through the principle of self-determination, have a right to use violence against the government. That right does not extend to actors outside the state, who are not subject to the abuse. Intrastate violence, even with refugee flows, does not constitute a threat to international peace and security (Walzer 1977 ; Ayoob 2001 ). Adam Roberts makes the point that those who are concerned about justice should not underestimate the power of patient promotion of human rights. The principle of nonintervention reduces the risk of war, respects the differences between societies, and allows for the development of rights within societies rather than imposing them from outside (Roberts 1993 ).

Opponents make a similar argument based on international law: the UN Charter fundamentally prohibits humanitarian intervention; self-defense is the only unambiguous justification for the use of force. “[A]s a legal concept […] humanitarian intervention is incoherent – any ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention amounts not to an asserted exception to the prohibition of the use of force, but to a lacuna in the enforceable content of international law” (Chesterman 2002 :2). Arguments that humanitarian intervention is compatible with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter are not persuasive, opponents say. Even when international law is not enforceable for practical reasons, the prohibition on the use of force remains. In extremis, a state invalidates its sovereignty when it perpetrates atrocities against its citizens, but it is up to the people to exert their right of self-determination (Chesterman 2002 ).

These normative and legal objections are bolstered by an array of pragmatic arguments against humanitarian intervention. First, humanitarian intervention attempts to do the impossible. Effective humanitarian action necessitates understanding the limits of humanitarianism: it is beyond the competence of humanitarianism to advance the cause of human rights, contribute to conflict resolution, and promote social justice. It is delusional to imagine that an ambitious peace and justice agenda can be met by using force, simply because humanitarian imperatives are matched with just war principles. Historically, national militaries fight wars to win not merely to secure humanitarian access for aid workers. Western countries, the most militarily competent to carry out interventions, continue to view humanitarian action as an instrument to achieve self-interested objectives. It is not reasonable, therefore, to expect military practice to reflect the ideal of moral universalism (Rieff 2005 ).

For most realists, the problem is not that humanitarian action is instrumental for achieving self-interested objectives, but just the opposite. They worry that interventionist countries lose touch with their national interests. In the early post–Cold War years, when liberal internationalists saw great potential to do good in internal conflicts by working through the unshackled UN, realists cautioned that the “new interventionism” could grow out of hand “until the United States and the United Nations ultimately take on tasks for which they are ill-prepared, leaving themselves embroiled in numerous internal conflicts without the will or resources to bring peace to any” (Stedman 1993 :2). The Clinton administration did exactly that by treating US foreign policy as “social work.” Three failed military interventions in the peripheral countries of Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti, in its first year in office, dominated the foreign policy agenda of President Clinton’s entire first term and prevented the United States from focusing on its vital interests (Mandelbaum 1996 ).

In addition to distracting governments from national interests, opponents say that humanitarian intervention is inherently difficult and likely to fail. At best, even a large military force can do only a little good (Posen 1996 ). When political leaders commit themselves to humanitarian intervention, they must recognize that they are engaged in a military operation where one or more armed parties do not consent to a foreign military presence. They should be ready for a fight, as experiences in Somalia, Bosnia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo show. Intervening troops attempt to deter attacks on civilians and aid operations, or to compel gunmen to stop attacks after they have begun (a harder task), but the attempt often fails. When deterrence fails, interveners must choose between standing by as atrocities occur (like the Dutch UN battalion in Srebrenica, Bosnia) and using deadly force against the attackers (like the Australians in East Timor). According to this view, intervening forces should be able to dominate the battlefield in order to attain their objectives quickly with as few casualties as possible. Dominating the battlefield almost always requires significant air and ground forces and a large logistical infrastructure to support them (Seybolt 2007 ). Rarely have governments committed the necessary resources for short-term success, much less for the complex phase of rebuilding shattered societies.

While realist opponents see danger to national interests when militaries get involved in humanitarian efforts, recent practice has turned this around, and has confirmed the worst fears of humanitarian opponents. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the US government considered humanitarian work to be “a force multiplier” – a term usually used for things that confer military advantage, such as a good intelligence system or a strong logistics train. Using humanitarian aid for political ends in a conflict zone was an explicit objective of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that American and allied troops first established in Afghanistan in 2002 . Military personnel, with some civilians, staff PRTs with the aim of improving local governance and doing quick impact development projects to win hearts and minds (Perito 2005 ).

Many humanitarian practitioners argue that the economic development activities of military personnel in PRTs challenge the humanitarian principles of impartiality, operational neutrality, and independence. There is only weak evidence to suggest that the principles are challenged, according to a study by an author sympathetic to the humanitarian view, but the purposes the principles are meant to serve – safety and access – have suffered. Politically motivated attacks on humanitarian workers in Afghanistan and Iraq increased and the amount of coordination with humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) decreased, making aid operations less efficient (Harmer 2008 ).

Finally, opponents contend that the concept of the responsibility to protect is untenable. Its critical weakness is that reaction to atrocities has been framed as coercive protection that can be undertaken without the consent of the host government. Preventive measures and noncoercive persuasion have been ignored. This interpretation demands an international protection capability that does not now exist and cannot realistically be expected. The case of Darfur highlights the operational and strategic shortcomings of the concept. The African Union Mission in Sudan and its successor, the UN–African Union Mission in Sudan, lack the ability to protect civilians. Worse, their deployment distorted the negotiation process and made resolution of the conflict more difficult (De Waal 2007 ).

Humanitarian Intervention Skeptics

Skeptics support humanitarian intervention on moral grounds but they caution that there are myriad problems to be addressed. The international lawyers who belong to this category distinguish themselves from opponents of intervention by finding contextual legal justification for action in the face of atrocity. Most skeptics – writing from political, military, and humanitarian points of view – focus on the unintended consequences and pragmatic difficulties of intervention. They do not, however, conclude that humanitarian intervention should be avoided. Instead skeptics seek to understand the circumstances under which it is more likely to succeed by devoting most of their attention to questions of who should intervene and how.

Most troubling for skeptics are the unintended negative consequences of intervention. Humanitarian intervention can exacerbate the conflicts whose consequences it seeks to address by distorting local economic markets, feeding militants and their families, creating spoilers, empowering warlords, and providing incentives for future conflict (Macrae and Zwi 1994 ; Anderson 1999 ; Maley 2002 ; Terry 2002 ; Kuperman 2005 ). Governments and aid organizations can begin to address these problems by recognizing that humanitarian intervention is a political activity. This recognition is only part of the solution, for it is deceptively difficult to understand the political context of these complex conflicts (Lischer 2005 ).

Writers in this category tend to let others debate the normative and legal questions, but they do not entirely ignore the issues. Some scholars argue that international law provides no ground for initiating military action to protect human rights, as noted in the preceding section. The two documents that are the basis for international humanitarian law protect individuals during war but do not allow war for the purpose of protection. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide for protection and care of wounded, sick, and imprisoned soldiers during war. The Additional Protocols of 1977 extend similar legal protection to civilians (ICRC 2005 ). It can be argued that the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights allow for humanitarian intervention, but they exist in the context of prohibitions on the use of force contained in the UN Charter (Heinze 2004 ).

To resolve this problem, skeptics take a natural law approach and turn to normative and moral arguments in addition to legal analysis. In doing so, some scholars find room for intervention in a contextual reading of the UN Charter. They argue that international law is constantly changing in response to the behavior of states and nonstate actors. Existing law, therefore, is not a decisive barrier to illegal actions, if those actions are aimed at reforming international law in such a way that it rectifies serious injustice supported by the current legal system (Buchanan 2003 ; Franck 2003 ; Stromseth 2003 ; Heinze 2004 ; Farrell 2005 ). Other scholars contend that making unilateral humanitarian intervention legal would do more harm than good, although using force “to end grave humanitarian crises can hardly be disapproved of morally” (Hilpold 2001 :467).

Most skeptics are concerned about legality and legitimacy for their instrumental role in making humanitarian intervention effective (or ineffective). They contend that intervention must be seen to be legitimate if it is to succeed over the long term (Lahneman 2004 ). In this regard, the UN plays an irreplaceable role. It is the centerpiece of a rules-based system of international relations. For weak countries, the most important rule is the prohibition on intervention, yet many developing countries are not absolutely opposed to intervention in all situations. Rather, they are concerned with double standards and selective intervention by powerful states against weak ones. Collective action through the UN – the only entity that can authorize the use of force on behalf of the collective of states – constrains the use and possible abuse of humanitarian intervention (Hoffman 1995/6 ; Thakur 2006 ).

While authorization by the UN Security Council is widely agreed to be important, if not essential, there are different views among skeptics about which actors in the international system ought to carry out the intervention. Disagreement centers on whether the UN has the ability to conduct military operations in countries where foreign troops are not welcome, or whether it should authorize intervention by coalitions of states.

In the wake of several disastrous experiences in the 1990s, the UN Secretariat itself recognized the many shortcomings of UN peace operations in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. The “Brahimi Report,” as it is known, posited “the key conditions for the success of future complex operations are political support, rapid deployment with a robust force posture and a sound peace-building strategy” (United Nations 2000a :1). It went on to observe that UN operations had rarely achieved the first condition and had virtually never achieved the second and third conditions. The report recommended that the UN radically overhaul its peace operations, from developing coherent strategies, to authorizing realistic mandates, drawing up robust military doctrine, and creating headquarters support for its ad hoc deployments (United Nations 2000a ). A follow-up study by the primary authors of the UN document found “clear progress in implementing a majority of reforms recommended by the Panel” (Durch et al. 2003 :xv). The UN has fielded a number of new operations since the publication of the Brahimi Report. Most of them have been fairly successful, but the few that have been deployed in challenging environments, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Darfur, Sudan, have had mixed records at best.

Optimism in some quarters notwithstanding, a number of authors have argued that states should take the lead in situations where there is not broad consent because military coalitions under the command of a lead country are inherently more capable than UN-led operations (O’Hanlon 1997 ; Oudraat 2000 ; Lahneman 2004 ). They contend that the UN ought to lead operations in permissive environments, but that states remain the interveners of choice in nonpermissive environments, where not all armed actors have consented to intervention. To succeed in a hostile environment an intervener must act quickly, devote considerable military strength to the effort, and be willing to risk soldiers’ lives. The UN has trouble meeting these requirements. They are best met when humanitarian and political interests are at stake, as they usually are in state-led operations. The pragmatic perspective holds that political motives for intervention are to be sought, not avoided, as long as they are compatible with humanitarian objectives (Seybolt 2007 ).

Critics of UN-led military operations recognize that state-led interventions are not a panacea; they operate under a number of constraints. The leaders of industrialized countries – which have the capabilities to lead coalition military operations – strongly desire to avoid having their soldiers killed. They believe that their constituents will not support a military adventure to save the lives of strangers at the cost of the lives of fellow citizens. The US decision to leave Somalia in 1993 after losing 18 soldiers supports this belief. Research indicates, however, that leaders can build support for humanitarian action when they persuade the public of its merit (Kull and Destler 1999 ). The Australian government continued to see popular support for action after it warned of the likelihood of losing military personnel when it led the 1999 intervention in East Timor. No Australian troops were killed so the strength of the support was not tested.

At a deeper level, caution comes from an implicit moral contract between democratic governments and their military personnel that rests on shared assumptions about the ends to which national militaries will be used, namely the protection and advancement of vital national interests (Cook 2000 ). While Western governments occasionally are willing to put their soldiers in harm’s way, their overriding concern is force protection rather than civilian protection. This puts them at a disadvantage against adversaries who are not as risk averse. The effectiveness of humanitarian intervention is limited as a result (Gray 2002 ).

Military operations to protect civilians and aid organizations are different enough from standard military operations that they require specialized doctrine and skills. Skeptics increasingly are paying attention to the problem that neither national militaries nor the UN have appropriate doctrine for how to protect people during conflicts, particularly when the people are the intended targets of violence. No matter how legitimate an intervention is deemed to be, or how willing political leaders are to pay the costs of military engagement, no operation is likely to succeed if the military units on the ground do not have the appropriate doctrine, training, and equipment to do the job. Readiness can be improved through preparation, planning, and training, but it requires overcoming institutional inertia (Chayes and Chayes 1999 ; Holt and Berkman 2006 ).

Skeptics point out equally challenging considerations on the humanitarian side. During the post–Cold War period, peace operations – both UN- and state-led – have evolved into ever more complex efforts to rebuild social, economic, and political systems. Humanitarian intervention increasingly is not just about stopping the dying. It is also about addressing the causes of violence and attempting to create the conditions for stable peace. As part of this effort, international organizations and NGOs have taken on functions that would be done by the government in a well-functioning state, such as providing health care and policing. These efforts often founder because external actors have a poor understanding of the complex situations in which they work; they have insufficient capabilities to address the myriad needs; and they lack patience to complete long-term processes of institutional development (Farer 1996 ; Maley 2002 ; Donini et al. 2004 ).

The current stage of development of the responsibility to protect concept can be seen as a summary of the skeptical position on humanitarian intervention. Military intervention to prevent or end mass atrocities is legitimate. It should be limited to extreme cases and should be the last resort after all nonmilitary means have been considered and rejected as inadequate. The UN must authorize intervention to prevent individual states from abusing the rhetoric of humanity to promote selfish national interests. Within this basic framework, each particular case will pose difficult questions about how to intervene successfully, avoid unintended consequences, and create the conditions for reconstruction and social rehabilitation.

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• United Nations (2005b) In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All . Report of the Secretary-General. At http:/daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/PDF/N0527078.pdf?OpenElement , accessed Feb. 2009.
• Walzer, M. (1977) Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations . New York: Basic Books.
• Weiss, T. (1994) Triage: Humanitarian Interventions in a New Era. World Policy Journal 11 (1), 1–10.
• Weiss, T. (2004) The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era. Security Dialogue 35 (2), 135–53.
• Wheeler, N. (2000) Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Links to Digital Materials

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. At http:/globalr2p.org/ , accessed May 2009. The mission of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect is to promote and catalyze international action to help countries prevent or halt mass atrocities. In collaboration with associated centers throughout the world, the Global Centre conducts, coordinates, and publishes research on refining and applying the R2P concept.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). At www.icrc.org/ , accessed May 2009. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the Geneva Conventions and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. It directs and coordinates the international activities conducted by the Movement in armed conflicts and other situations of violence.

Journal of Humanitarian Assistance . At http:/jha.ac/ , accessed May 2009. The journal promotes the exchange of new ideas, previously unpublished research, and the critical write-up of field experience by field workers and researchers in humanitarian assistance. It offers the humanitarian assistance community the opportunity to receive and provide rapid public feedback on cutting-edge ideas.

Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group. At www.odi.org.uk/programmes/humanitarian-policy-group/default.asp , accessed May 2009. The Humanitarian Policy Group is one of the world’s leading teams of independent researchers and information professionals working on humanitarian issues. It is dedicated to improving humanitarian policy and practice through a combination of high quality analysis, dialogue, and debate.

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI). At https:/pksoi.army.mil/ , accessed May 2009. PKSOI is the US military’s center of excellence for improving military, civilian agency, international, and multinational capabilities and execution at the strategic and operational levels. The Stability Operations Lessons Learned Management System (SOLLIMS) allows military and civilian organizations to engage in a collaborative process for the collection, analysis, dissemination, and integration of lessons learned.

ReliefWeb. At www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc100?OpenForm , accessed May 2009. ReliefWeb is the world’s leading online gateway to information on humanitarian emergencies and disasters. Designed specifically to assist the international humanitarian community in effective delivery of emergency assistance, it provides timely, reliable, and relevant information as events unfold, while emphasizing the coverage of “forgotten emergencies” at the same time.

The Sphere Project. At www.sphereproject.org/ , accessed May 2009. The Sphere Project is three things: a handbook containing the humanitarian code of conduct, a broad process of collaboration, and an expression of commitment to quality and accountability. The project’s goal is to improve the quality of assistance to people affected by disaster and to improve the accountability of states and humanitarian agencies to their constituents, donors, and the affected populations.

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Best Practices Section. At www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/ , accessed May 2009. The goal of the Best Practices Section is to develop and support a culture of best practices in UN peacekeeping. It assists in the planning, conduct, management, and support of peacekeeping operations by learning from experience, problem solving, and transferring best practices in UN peacekeeping.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). At www.unhcr.org/ , accessed May 2009. The UNHCR is mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. As the premier refugee agency, it provides material aid for civilians, does technical legal work assisting asylum seekers, and helps to shape international humanitarian law. The UNHCR also provides resources for refugee policy research and evaluation.

Acknowledgments

Daniel Carik , Megan Carniewski , Pam Daley , Peace Medie , and Corey Sczechowicz provided valuable assistance by summarizing numerous books and articles. Their hard work made this essay possible.

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Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention in the 21st Century

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Humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect

Eglantine Staunton: France, humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect, Manchester University press, Manchester, 2020, 201 pp, ISBN: 978-1-5261-4240-5

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This book offers a thorough study of France’s evolving relationship with humanitarian intervention and the duty or responsibility to protect (R2P) norms over several decades. Spanning the presidencies of Mitterand, Chirac, and Sarkozy, the book traces France’s role as a norm entrepreneur in promoting humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, its subsequent exclusion from R2P negotiations in the early 2000s, and its later efforts to promote and implement R2P after its formal adoption. The book is organised chronologically, with parts exploring France’s method in discrete time periods. This structure successfully shows how France’s stance has changed in response to changing global norms and events.

The author’s central argument is that France’s association with humanitarian intervention and R2P has been complex and multifaceted. The book highlights France’s historic commitment to human rights promotion stemming from its self-perception as the “homeland of human rights”. It also demonstrates how France’s colonial legacy and desire to maintain global power have led to tensions, with its interventions being perceived as neo-colonialist by some. The book makes several key contributions. Firstly, it offers a thorough case study of how France has grappled with humanitarian intervention over many years. This helps highlight the challenges of executing R2P and humanitarian norms in practice. Secondly, the book gives a nuanced viewpoint on R2P by acknowledging its promise while also examining its selective implementation. Furthermore, the historical method provides useful insights into norm evolution and diffusion in international relations.

The book also makes important contributions by showing the interconnectedness between local norms and foreign norm promotion. It shows how France’s view of itself as an upholder of human rights shaped its foreign agenda. The book also shows the tensions forming when Universalist norms based on colonialism are pushed globally. This complicated interplay between domestic identity, colonial heritage, and changing international norms offers theoretical insights into state behaviour.

Additionally, the book’s structure and historical method allow it to follow long-term norm development. By splitting the analysis into separate time periods, the book can show slow changes in norms that may be imperceptible in short-term studies. Examining France’s stance from the 1990s onwards reveals how humanitarian action has remained debated and controversial. This helps us understand norms as continually changing rather than fixed things.

While the book produces useful insights into norm evolution and spread, engaging more deeply with research from critical IR theorists could improve this analysis.

Although the book successfully utilises original sources and uses a clear chronological format, there are several ways the analysis could be strengthened. The study’s narrow focus on France limits knowledge of how other nations have shaped norms on humanitarian action. Expanding the focus to compare France with other powers interested in R2P projects, such as the US, would provide useful comparative insights.

The book would also benefit from increased engagement with academic debates on humanitarian action and R2P. Situating the book’s points within key works by scholars such as Anne Orford, Alex Bellamy, and Ramesh Thakur would allow deeper theoretical analysis. Furthermore, comparing France’s stance to other big cases of humanitarian intervention that took place concurrently, like Kosovo, could give additional context.

While the historical structure reveals broad norm shifts, the analysis may be improved by exploring French domestic politics more deeply. Examining government debates, political speeches, public opinion polls, and protests regarding interventions could uncover more complicated motives beneath state actions. Additionally, studying different views within the French government—such as from the military, Foreign Ministry, or development agencies—could show institutional debates that shape policy.

From a methodological viewpoint, the book rests heavily on textual analysis of government documents, the UN decisions, media, and secondary literature. Incorporating different sources could improve the study. Conducting talks with French officials and ministers involved in these cases could provide more clear insights into decision-making processes. Analysing statistical data on the effects of French measures may also bolster reviews of their success.

While the opening chapter grounds the study in famous IR theories, these frameworks fade in later empirical parts. Ensuring the theory ideas presented initially stay embedded in the historical analysis would strengthen the consistency.

Overall, this book offers an important investigation into France’s engagement with humanitarian intervention norms. It offers a useful foundation and opens several avenues for future study. It represents a useful case study of how France has managed to change norms surrounding humanitarian action. The historical method provides insights into norm evolution and spread, while the critical viewpoint unpacks the practical difficulties of performing R2P regularly and successfully. Although additional theoretical views and more recent cases could improve the analysis, the book nonetheless offers an insightful examination of France’s multifaceted association with humanitarian ideals. This will prove useful for scholars and politicians looking to understand the promise and dangers of R2P implementation.

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Local humanitarian action in practice - Case studies and reflections of local humanitarian actors

• British Red Cross
• Humanitarian Leadership Academy

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New publication launched: Local Humanitarian Action in Practice – Case Studies and Reflections of Local Humanitarian Actors

December 6th, 2017, London – The Humanitarian Leadership Academy and the British Red Cross have released a new publication: “Local Humanitarian Action in Practice: Case Studies and Reflections of Local Humanitarian Actors”, which highlights successes and the unique challenges faced by local humanitarian actors. The publication is launched over a year after the Grand Bargain commitments were affirmed by the international community.

Agreed at the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, the Grand Bargain commits donors and aid organisations to allocate global humanitarian funding by at least 25% to local humanitarian responders by 2020, remove barriers to partnerships, and provide multi-year funding for institutional capacity to ensure continuity in humanitarian response.

The case studies highlight the experiences of 10 national and local humanitarian organisations across Central and South Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and South and South-East Asia that have led or managed humanitarian response. These local actors operate in areas that are highly vulnerable to recurrent natural and climate-induced disasters, instability, civil conflict, and other emergencies.

The publication affirms what is being recognised by international and local organisations, that locally-led responses have critical advantages. These include better access to and deeper connections with affected people and local structures; greater understanding of the relevant geopolitical and cultural context; and a clearer view of what needs to be done in response to a crisis.

In the foreword, Dr. Jemilah Mahmood, IFRC Under Secretary-General and Chair of the Academy, emphasises the need to “play to the to the strengths of each actor and building complementarity and an appropriate balance between local, national, and international humanitarian assistance. It also means respecting local actors, working with local actors based in principled partnerships, and focusing our collective efforts on ensuring strong, sustainable, relevant, effective local organisations.”

These views are echoed throughout the case studies. Mr. Esteban Masagca, Executive Director of People’s Disaster Risk Reduction Network (PDRRN) in the Philippines says: “External assistance should be directed towards enhancing the survivors’ indigenous coping strategies and local capacities, and that any intervention should be based from a thorough understanding of the situation of a particular community and that there is no single prescribed strategy that can apply to all.”

Local actors featured reiterated that change must happen at all fronts. As Mr. Belal Hossain, Director for Disaster Risk Management of the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society notes, “Lasting impact requires a change in the mindset of the government and the population, including those affected by crises. But this will not happen overnight.”

Despite successes demonstrated by the case studies, the study reveals that in many situations, these same actors continue to face obstacles to greater autonomy and sustainability. In many countries, local humanitarian actors still find barriers to locally-led humanitarian response, such as access to secure and predictable funding, local actors being regarded as service delivery providers, and reluctance of some international agencies to invest in capacity strengthening and long-term partnerships. The study notes that challenges from the international aid mechanism, which maintains control on how support from the international community is provided and how resources are distributed.

Ms. Halima Adan, Programme Manager at Save Somali Women and Children in Somalia emphasises: “Sustainability is not yet a reality in Somalia. Long-term partnerships need to be pursued to help rebuild trust and deliver better services through mechanisms such as consortium based approaches and multi-year funding, with elements of capacity-development.”

Through these case studies, the research hopes to influence institutions at the global level to actively involve local actors in policy-making and implementation of global humanitarian aid.

With the increasing shift to a resilience approach, the study demonstrates how local humanitarian actors are finding ways to introduce innovations, such as the effective use of technology and cash programming for early warning-early action, improved sustainability through private sector collaboration, social enterprise development and provision of technical service, and an ambition to establish a pool of future local humanitarian aid professionals.

Ms. Pansy Tun Thein, Executive Director of the Local Resource Center in Myanmar closes: “To do things differently, international actors must learn to work with the local actors; they must learn to trust and give them opportunities to take the lead where relevant, as they know the country context and understand the culture.”

Local humanitarian actors are not just ready to lead the way—they are already doing so. To make the Grand Bargain commitments a reality, it is time for the international community to step up and invest their resources where they can make the biggest difference.

Humanitarian Leadership Academy media contact: Anne Garçon, Communications Officer 020 3884 7715 | [email protected]

About the Humanitarian Leadership Academy

The Humanitarian Leadership Academy is a global learning initiative set up to facilitate partnerships and collaborative opportunities to enable people to become more resilient in the face of disaster and give them the training and skills to respond to crises in their own countries. The Academy is opening a network of centres reaching out to vulnerable communities in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Europe. The Academy has a digital learning platform – Kaya – which provides training to over 43,000 humanitarian volunteers and professionals.

For more information go to: www.humanitarianleadershipacademy.org Visit our digital learning platform: www.kayaconnect.org Follow us on: Twitter , Facebook , LinkedIn

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Global Models, Victim Disconnect and Demands for International Intervention: The Dilemma of Decoloniality and Transitional Justice in Sri Lanka

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Farah Mihlar, Global Models, Victim Disconnect and Demands for International Intervention: The Dilemma of Decoloniality and Transitional Justice in Sri Lanka, Journal of Human Rights Practice , 2024;, huae024, https://doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/huae024

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This article uses Sri Lanka as a case study to impel engagement of decoloniality with transitional justice. It identifies gaps in the literature critical of transitional justice, specifically structural interpretations of power hierarchies, state-centrism and disregard of ethnicity and religion. It thereby uses a decolonial analytical lens on empirical findings from Sri Lanka’s failed transitional justice process to identify and understand continuing colonial power structures, including epistemic coloniality. The empirical findings offer three new insights. First, an ideational, structural and procedural disconnection between victims and the global transitional justice model is noted. The article traces how victim positioning and this disconnection were disregarded in favour of an internationally authoritative, credible and universal model of transitional justice. Second, the ethno-religious challenges to transitional justice, which include its reliance on the state as a neutral provider of justice, are highlighted. The third finding, however, on victim demands for greater international involvement, presents a dilemma to future decolonial consideration of transitional justice. Despite only using decoloniality as an analytical tool, the article nevertheless demonstrates the need for deeper reform, including at the epistemic level, for transformation to occur within the field.

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Libya, NATO Intervention 2011

The case studies presented in “How does law protect in war?” are based on open-source information. The discussions that follow are developed in partnership with academia. Neither the information contained in the case studies nor the discussions necessarily reflect the opinions of the ICRC or of the authors of “How does law protect in war?”. By continuing on this website, you agree to its terms and conditions .

• Armed conflicts subjects to foreign intervention
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Case prepared by Alexandra Hansen, Law, student at the Universities of Basel and Geneva (Switzerland), under the supervision of Professor Marco Sassòli and Ms. Yvette Issar, research assistant, both at the University of Geneva.

  N.B. As per the  disclaimer , neither the ICRC nor the authors can be identified with the opinions expressed in the Cases and Documents.  Some cases even come to solutions that clearly violate IHL. They are nevertheless worthy of discussion, if only to raise a challenge to display more humanity in armed conflicts.  Similarly, in some of the texts used in the case studies, the facts may not always be proven;  nevertheless, they have been selected because they highlight interesting IHL issues and are thus published for didactic purposes.

A. Libya: The Forgotten Victims of NATO Strikes

 [ Source: Report by Amnesty International, "Libya: The Forgotten Victims of NATO Strikes", AI INDEX: MDE 19/003/2012, 19 March 2012, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE19/003/2012/en/ , footnotes omitted]

  INTRODUCTION

 [...]

 [1] On 19 March 2011 several member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including the USA, the UK and France, launched a military campaign with air and naval strikes against Colonel Mu’ammar al-Gaddafi’s forces. The strikes were launched pursuant to UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1973 (2011) of 17 March 2011, which authorized member states “to take all necessary measures (…) to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” and introduced a “no fly zone” above Libya. The National Transitional Council (NTC), the emerging new authority which by then controlled eastern Libya, had called for and fully supported the imposition of a no-fly-zone and international military action against al-Gaddafi’s forces.

 [2] On 23 March 2011 allied forces announced they were in control of Libyan air space, after having disabled Libya’s air force. Also on 23 March 2011 NATO decided to enforce the no fly zone and on 31 March 2011 it assumed control of all military operations conducted by its member states inside and around Libya under the name “Operation Unified Protector”. According to NATO, the seven-month air and sea military campaign comprised more than 9,700 strike sorties and destroyed over 5,900 military targets.

 [3] In the pursuit of its military objectives NATO appears to have made significant efforts to minimize the risk of causing civilian casualties, including by its use of precision guided munitions, and in some cases by conducting strikes at night and issuing prior warnings to inhabitants of the areas targeted. NATO officials have repeatedly stated their commitment to making efforts to avoid harming civilians in the context of “Operation Unified Protector”.

 [4] However, scores of Libyan civilians who did not directly participate in hostilities were killed and many more injured as a result of NATO strikes. Regrettably more than four months since the end of the military campaign, NATO has yet to address these incidents appropriately, including by establishing contact and providing information to the victims and their relatives about any investigation which might have been initiated.

 [5] In January and February 2012 Amnesty International delegates visited several locations of NATO airstrikes in or near Tripoli, Zlitan, Sirte and Brega where civilian casualties had been reported. They inspected the damage and remains of munitions, interviewed survivors and other witnesses and obtained copies of death certificates of victims. Amnesty International has documented a total of 55 named civilians, including 16 children and 14 women, who were killed in airstrikes in Tripoli (5), Zlitan (3), Majer (34) Sirte (9) and Brega (4). Twenty other civilians were reportedly killed in NATO strikes in Brega (2), Surman (13) and Bani Walid (5) according to UN experts, international NGOs and journalists who also carried out on-site investigations. Additional incidents of civilian casualties have been reported to have occurred in circumstances where it has been difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians. For example, Amnesty International was told by residents in Sirte that on 15 September 2011, NATO strikes killed several members of al-Gaddafi forces in their two vehicles, as well as more than 40 civilians, most of whom had rushed to the scene after the first vehicle was struck.

 AIRSTRIKES ON HOMES

  [6] Dozens of civilians have been killed in NATO airstrikes on private homes in residential and rural areas where Amnesty International, UN experts, other international NGOs and journalists found no evidence of military objectives at the strike locations at the time of the strikes. In one incident, in Majer (Near Zlitan, west of Misratah), NATO claimed that the site was deliberately struck as a legitimate target, but failed to provide evidence that the site was being used for any military purpose at the time it was targeted, in an attack that cost the lives of 34 civilians, including eight children and eight women. Amnesty International’s investigations into this and other incidents indicate that private homes may have been struck by mistake - possibly due to wrong intelligence, erroneous GPS coordinates or weapons system malfunction. In another incident, in Sirte, relatives of an army officer, three women and four children, were killed in their home in an attack which seemingly targeted their visiting relative.

 [7] Amnesty International is concerned that insufficient precautions were taken in attacks that targeted possible combatants staying at civilian homes. When planning an attack against a combatant, knowledge of the presence of several civilians inside the targeted house should rule out proceeding, as such circumstances are likely to result in an attack that is disproportionate. NATO should have applied particular high standards of precautionary measures when targeting civilian homes.

 TRIPOLI, 19 JUNE 2011

  [...]

 [8] On 19 June 2011 at about 1.30 am the home of Mukhtar al-Gharari, located in a densely built-up area of the Souq al-Juma’a district of Tripoli, was struck, killing five family members and injuring eight others. [...] Surviving members of the family told Amnesty International that 18 family members were sleeping in the house at the time of the attack and that those who were killed had been sleeping on the upper floor.

 [9] In a letter to the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (ICIL) of 23 January 2012, NATO referred to the above incident and acknowledged the possibility that “an errant weapon had caused such casualties”.

 ZLITAN, 4 AUGUST 2011

 [10] On 4 August 2011 at about 6.30am the home of Mustafa Naji al-Morabit, in Zlitan west of Misratah, was struck, killing his 37-year-old wife [...] and two of his three children [...] as well as injuring his 60-year-old mother [...]. According to information provided by Mustafa Naji al-Morabit to Amnesty International, a nearby house (approximately 50 meters away) had been used, until 1 August 2011, for meetings by military officers. Because they feared that the nearby house may be attacked by NATO, Mustafa Naji al-Morabit and his family had not been sleeping in their own home. They remained in the house during the day as it was common belief that NATO strikes were carried out at night. As opposition fighters were closing in on the area, the owner of the nearby house and others who had been meeting there fled by 2 August 2011, leaving the front gate wide open – a sign that they were not going to return. The al-Morabit family decided that it was therefore safe to return to their home and slept in their home for the first time on the night between 2 and 3 August 2011. The night passed without incident and the nearby house remained abandoned and the al-Morabit family again slept in their home the following night (between 3 and 4 August 2011), but the house was struck in the early hours of that morning.

 [11] In its 15 February 2012 letter to the ICIL, NATO referred to the above incident stating that the site was in fact struck on 4 August 2011, because it had been identified as “a senior regime commander’s command and control node located within a residential property”. Based on its examination of the site, interviews with witnesses and satellite images the ICIL found that “evidence suggests NATO hit the wrong building (and) that those killed were civilians”. Amnesty International reached the same conclusions.

 MAJER, 8 AUGUST 2011

 [12] On the evening of 8 August 2011 two houses were struck in Majer (near Zlitan, west of Misratah). Munitions remnants found at the site contain the marking: “for MK82 bomb”, an air-delivered munition which, according to Amnesty International’s information, was used by participating forces in Operation Unified Protector in numerous other strikes. According to members of the family who survived the attack, 34 civilians, including eight children and eight women, were killed and several were injured in three separate attacks.

 [13] The first strike was launched shortly after 11pm and killed five women and seven children in the home of Ali Ali Hamed Gafez, where his immediate family and other relatives displaced by the conflict were staying. [...]

 [14] A subsequent strike, shortly after, killed 18 men, including several family members, who rushed to the house [...] to rescue the victims. Surviving members of the Gafez and al-Ja’arud families told Amnesty International that they had not been aware of the presence of any persons or of any activities near their homes which might have explained the attacks.

 [15] According to NATO’s Operational Media Update one military facility and one communication system were hit in the vicinity of Zlitan on 8 August 2011. In a media interview several days after the incident, the commander of the NATO operation was quoted as justifying the strikes on allegedly legitimate targets “that contained mercenaries, a command centre and 4x4 vehicles modified with automatic weapons, rocket launchers or mortars”. He further denied claims of the Libyan authorities that 85 civilians were killed in the incident, but acknowledged that he could not rule out that the strikes caused civilian casualties.

 [16] In a 15 February 2012 letter to the ICIL, NATO referred to the above incident stating that “these buildings had been identified as being used as staging area for regime forces”. Based on its examination of the site as well as satellite images of the area during the period of attack, the ICIL found “no evidence (…) that the site had a military purpose. Amnesty International reached the same conclusions.

  SIRTE, 16 SEPTEMBER 2011

 [17] On 16 September 2011, at about 6pm several strikes were carried out on a large apartment building, comprising some 90 apartments, in Sirte. At least two residents were killed in two apartments in different parts of the building. [...] [A] mother of two, was killed as she, her husband [...] and their two young daughters were in their apartment on the fifth floor of the building. The two girls and their father sustained light injuries. Another resident [...] was killed in the strikes. His father [...] told Amnesty International that it is not clear whether other residents were killed in the strike, as it has not been possible to establish how many residents were in the building at the time of the strikes. Many residents had fled the building in the days prior to the strike and the others, as well as many of the city’s inhabitants, fled after the attack (the city remained under siege until the capture and killing of Colonel al-Gaddafi in the town’s outskirts on 20 October 2011). Most residents had still not returned by February 2012, when Amnesty International visited the area. The bodies of the two victims were only recovered in mid-January 2012.

 SIRTE, 25 SEPTEMBER 2011

  [18] On 25 September 2011 at about 4am, an airstrike against the home of Salem Diyab, in Sirte, killed four children and three women [...]. It is not clear whether another relative, Mosbah Ahmed Diyab, a Brigadier-General in al-Gaddafi’s forces who lived in another area of the city, was in the house at the time of the attack. According to surviving relatives he had visited earlier that evening and may or may not have been in the house at the time of the NATO attack. If this civilian house was targeted because it was believed that Mosbah Ahmed Diyab was present, NATO should have made sure it had information on the presence of any civilians there. The fact that at least seven civilians were in the home should have been reason enough to cancel or delay the attack out of concern that it would have been disproportionate.

  APPLICABLE LAW

 [19] NATO’s military actions in Libya had to comply with the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) applicable in international armed conflict. IHL contains the rules and principles that seek to protect anyone who is not directly participating in hostilities: notably civilians and anyone, including those who were previously participating in hostilities, who are wounded, have surrendered or been captured, or otherwise incapacitated. It sets out standards of humane conduct and limits the means and methods of conducting military operations. Its central purpose is to limit, to the extent feasible, human suffering in times of armed conflict.

 [20] The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977 are among the principal IHL instruments. Many of the specific rules included in these treaties form part of customary IHL and are thus binding on all parties to any type of armed conflict, including on armed groups. Violations of many of these rules can constitute war crimes. All of the principles and rules cited in this briefing are part of customary international law and are binding on all parties to an armed conflict.

 [21] The following fundamental principles of IHL (which have been codified in Protocol I of 1977 as specific rules governing the conduct of hostilities) appear particularly relevant for assessing the civilian casualties caused by NATO strikes, namely:

 (1) The principle of distinction requires that the parties to a conflict “shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives” ( Article 48, Protocol I ). Article 51(2) spells out unambiguously that the “civilian population as such as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.” In addition to direct attacks on civilians, IHL also prohibits indiscriminate attacks, which are those “of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinctions,” ( Article 51(4), Protocol I ).

 (2) The principle of proportionality prohibits disproportionate attacks which are those “which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” ( Article 51(5), Protocol I ).

 (3) The principle of precaution requires that “constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects” ( Article 57(1), Protocol I ); and that “all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects” ( Rule 15, Customary IHL Study, Vol I; Rules, ICRC ).

 [22] Article 57(2) of Protocol I specifies necessary precautions including that: everything feasible must be done to verify that targets are military objectives; means and methods of attack must be selected with a view to minimizing harm to civilians and civilian objects; the proportionality of a planned attack must be assessed; an attack must be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent it is wrongly-directed or disproportionate; and effective advance warning must be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. Where it is unclear whether an object is used for military purposes, “it shall be presumed not to be so used.” ( Article 52(3), Protocol I ).

 [23] Carrying out direct attacks on civilians, indiscriminate attacks resulting in death or injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects, or a disproportionate attacks (i.e. knowing that the attack will cause excessive incidental civilian loss, injury or damage in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated) constitute war crimes. ( Rule 156, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, ICRC ).

  CONCLUSION

  NATO must be transparent about investigations and provide adequate reparations.

 [24] Amnesty International is concerned that no information has been made available to the families of civilians killed and those injured in NATO strikes about any investigations which may have been carried out into the incidents which resulted in death and injury.

 [25] On 5 March 2012 Amnesty International wrote to NATO requesting information on any steps taken to investigate the incidents documented above and any other reports where it appears that NATO attacks resulted in the death of, and injury to, civilians. Further the organization called on NATO, if these investigations have not yet taken place, to take all necessary measures to ensure that independent, impartial and thorough investigations are conducted without further delay, that the findings be publicly disclosed, and that adequate reparation be afforded to all victims of any violations and their families.

 [26] On 13 March 2012 NATO responded to Amnesty International stating that “While NATO did everything possible to minimize the risk to civilians, in a complex military operation that risk cannot be reduced to zero. NATO deeply regrets any harm that may have been caused by those air strikes”. The letter did not provide any information about the specific attacks raised by Amnesty International in its letters or details of any investigation into deaths of civilians. Furthermore, NATO appeared to suggest that it had limited means and responsibility to conduct investigations into reports of civilian casualties caused in NATO strikes. The letter states that NATO “has had no mandate to conduct any activities in Libya following OUP’s (Operation Unified Protector) termination on 31 October 2011”. However, NATO did not take any steps to conduct on site investigations into reports of death and injury of civilians resulting from its strikes in areas which had come under the control of the new Libyan authorities (the NTC) prior to 31 October 2011 and which were thus safely accessible. All the survivors and relatives of those killed in NATO strikes interviewed by Amnesty International said that they had never been contacted either by NATO or by the Libyan NTC.

 [27] Moreover, the end of its mandate to conduct operations in Libya does not prevent NATO from investigating the conduct of its own forces, notably the bases on which orders were given to launch specific attacks, the measures taken to verify the accuracy of the information it received about the targets and the precautions taken to minimize the potential risk to civilians.

 [28] In its letter, NATO also contends that the Libyan authorities “have the primary responsibility for responding to any possible local request for investigations and claims”. However, the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to conduct investigations into suspected violations that occurred in its jurisdiction does not absolve NATO members of their obligation to redress any violations of IHL that its forces have committed, including by paying compensation to the victims as required by Article 91 of Protocol I. NATO cannot fulfil this obligation without properly investigating attacks in which civilians were killed or injured.

 [29] NATO should clarify which measures it took to ensure adherence to the rules of IHL in carrying out these particular attacks, particularly with regard to distinction, proportionality and precaution. Wherever sufficient admissible evidence of any violations of IHL is found, those responsible should be brought to justice.

 [30] The NTC, for its part, should also promptly initiate its own investigation into all reported cases of killings and injury to civilians which resulted from NATO strike so as to ensure justice and reparation for victims and their families.

 [31] The stated purpose of NATO’s military operations in Libya, which were carried out at the request of and with the full support of the NTC, was to protect the civilian population from grave human rights violations which were being perpetrated by the former regime with impunity. It is imperative that both NATO and the NTC take the necessary measures to ensure that there is no impunity for any violation of international humanitarian law which may have been perpetrated in the course of NATO’s operations. To this end the necessary investigations must be carried out without further delay.

 B. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya

[ Source: Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, A/HRC/19/68, 8 March 2012, Human Rights Council, Nineteenth Session, Agenda item 4, Human rights situation that require the Council's attention, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A.HRC.19.68.pdf , footnotes omitted]

  Summary

  [1] In emergency session, the Human Rights Council on 25 February 2011 established the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya and gave it the mandate “to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in Libya, to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible, to make recommendations, in particular, on accountability measures, all with a view to ensuring that those individuals responsible are held accountable”.

 [2] The Commission conducted its investigations applying the international legal regimes dictated by the situation. It concluded that international crimes, specifically crimes against humanity and war crimes, were committed by Qadhafi forces in Libya. Acts of murder, enforced disappearance, and torture were perpetrated within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. The Commission found additional violations including unlawful killing, individual acts of torture and ill-treatment, attacks on civilians, and rape.

 [3] The Commission further concluded that the thuwar (anti-Qadhafi forces) committed serious violations, including war crimes and breaches of international human rights law, the latter continuing at the time of the present report. The Commission found these violations to include unlawful killing, arbitrary arrest, torture, enforced disappearance, indiscriminate attacks, and pillage. It found in particular that the thuwar are targeting the Tawergha and other communities.

 [4] The Commission concluded that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted a highly precise campaign with a demonstrable determination to avoid civilian casualties. On limited occasions, the Commission confirmed civilian casualties and found targets that showed no evidence of military utility. The Commission was unable to draw conclusions in such instances on the basis of the information provided by NATO and recommends further investigations.

 [5] The interim Government faces many challenges in overcoming a legacy of more than 40 years of serious human rights violations and deterioration of the legislative framework, judicial and national institutions. It has nevertheless expressed a commitment to human rights and has taken positive steps to establish mechanisms for accountability. The government is gradually restoring the judiciary by reopening courts and recalling judges, and there has been some progress in the transfer of detainees to central government control.

 III. The Commission’s findings

  H. North Atlantic Treaty Organization

  1. Introduction

 83. On 17 March 2011, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1973 which authorized “all necessary measures” to “protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” short of a “foreign occupying force.” On 19 March 2011 military forces from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States began attacks. On 31 March 2011, NATO assumed command of all offensive operations.

 2. Findings

 84. NATO aircraft flew a total of 17,939 armed sorties in Libya, employing precision guided munitions exclusively. NATO told the Commission that it had a standard of “zero expectation” of death or injury to civilians, and that no targets were struck if there was any reason to believe civilians would be injured or killed by a strike. NATO also told the Commission that the majority of munitions employed used delayed fusing to minimize collateral effects and that it also employed the minimum-sized munitions necessary to achieve the objective. NATO also provided warning to the population in the form of leaflets and radio broadcasts.

 85. The Commission took account of claims by the Qadhafi Government in regard to civilian casualties, but subsequent testimony from former regime members and others, as well as its own interviews at the sites, confirmed to the Commission that the Government deliberately misstated the extent of civilian casualties. In one case, the Commission received a credible report of Libyan forces moving the bodies of children from a hospital morgue and bringing them to the site of a NATO airstrike.

 86. Despite precautions taken by NATO as described above, the Commission notes incidents of civilian deaths and damage to civilian infrastructure. Amongst the 20 NATO airstrikes investigated, the Commission documented five airstrikes where a total of 60 civilians were killed and 55 injured. The Commission also investigated two NATO airstrikes which damaged civilian infrastructure and where no military target could be identified.

 87. The single largest case of civilian casualties from a NATO airstrike in Libya took place in the town of Majer on 8 August 2011 where the Commission found NATO bombs killed 34 civilians and injured 38. After the initial airstrike killed 16, a group of rescuers arrived and were hit by a subsequent attack, killing 18.

 88. Of the five targets where the Commission identified civilian casualties, four were termed command and control (C2) nodes or troop staging areas by NATO. The Commission saw no physical evidence of this during its site visits. Witnesses also denied that the sites had military utility. NATO told the Commission that “the regime was using civilian rather than military structures in support of military action”. Assuming this to be the case, the Commission remains concerned about the resulting civilian harm.

  3. Conclusions

  89. The Commission found NATO did not deliberately target civilians in Libya. For the few targets struck within population centres, NATO took extensive precautions to ensure civilians were not killed. However, there were a small number of strikes where NATO's response to the Commission has not allowed it to draw conclusions on the rationale for, or the circumstances of the attacks. The Commission is unable to conclude, barring additional explanation, whether these strikes are consistent with NATO's objective to avoid civilian casualties entirely, or whether NATO took all necessary precautions to that effect. NATO's characterization of four of five targets where the Commission found civilian casualties as “command and control nodes” or “troop staging areas” is not reflected in evidence at the scene and witness testimony. The Commission is unable to determine, for lack of sufficient information, whether these strikes were based on incorrect or out-dated intelligence and, therefore, whether they were consistent with NATO's objective to take all necessary precautions to avoid civilian casualties entirely.

 V. Assessment and findings

 1. Introduction

 116. The Commission benefited from a far greater availability of information than was the case for its first report, primarily because it was able to spend a significant amount of time on the ground and because witnesses were more willing to provide information in the knowledge that the Qadhafi government was no longer in power. As with its first report, however, the quality of the evidence and information obtained by the Commission varied in its accuracy and reliability. The Commission maintained the cautious approach it adopted for its first report, while recalling that its evidentiary standard is less than that required for criminal proceedings.

 4. NATO

 122. NATO conducted a highly precise campaign with a demonstrable determination to avoid civilian casualties. For the most part they succeeded. On some limited occasions the Commission confirmed civilian casualties and found targets that showed no evidence of military utility. The Commission was unable to draw conclusions in such instances on the basis of the information provided by NATO and recommends further investigations.

Determining a Successful Humanitarian Intervention

Deciding whether or not to engage in a humanitarian intervention is a weighty decision on any national leader, with many contextual factors at play that can sway the process. The influence of national interests, of course, are often the top priorities for policymakers regarding any foreign policy decisions. However, in the event of a humanitarian crisis where intervening would not directly further any national interests, and humanitarian concerns are the only rationale, is success still possible? This paper will attempt to determine whether or not humanitarian interventions should only be undertaken when the aims of such an operation coincide with the national interest. If an intervention is only feasible/successful when national interests are at stake, it would obviously be wholly counterproductive to conduct such an operation without the necessary condition being present. However, if national interests are not a necessary condition for a successful humanitarian intervention, then following humanitarian impulses could potentially prove a productive instinct to follow. Determining whether or not humanitarian intervention is only feasible and/or successful when national interests are at stake demands assumptions regarding multiple concepts. First and foremost, “humanitarian intervention” is a politically loaded term utilized at the behest of great powers for their aims. Similarly, the “national interest” is itself an equally varying concept that can be altered depending on contextual factors. Finally, the aims of any particular operation are naturally different, and humanitarian interventions do not all have the same goals. Along the same lines, feasibility depends on a variety of factors.

Defining humanitarian intervention

First and foremost, the phrase “humanitarian intervention” refers to a vague concept that is too often weighted with political implications. Humanitarianism as a term, utilized in the context of modern human rights, is relatively new, yet the mentality associated with humanitarianism has existed for far longer. [1] The modern age of humanitarian intervention began with the end of the Cold War, as geostrategic interests rooted in realpolitik became less pressing compared to humanitarian concerns. [2] The precise scope of what comprises a humanitarian intervention remains hotly debated as well; some scholars would include the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in that category, [3] while others would exclude them from such a characterization. [4] Since the national interest was the justification for these two examples, gaining an objective understanding of what humanitarian interventions actually are is vital before one can analyze them with any precision.

Seybolt describes four main forms of humanitarian intervention: assisting in the delivery of aid, providing protection to aid operations, protecting the injured party, and militarily defeating the aggressor. None are mutually exclusive from any others, and these types should be perceived as a continuum in the order listed where the difficulty in enforcement increases. [5] Naturally, the level of political will necessary also increases along the same lines. Although the tactics may differ, the motives for intervention remain constant: the desire to address a humanitarian crisis underway. For the purposes of this analysis, primary focus will be on humanitarian interventions intended to address the final two goals.

Interventions, as a military strategy, are intended to compel state actors to cease certain types of actions that would otherwise result in intolerable human rights violations. While it need not actually involve the use of force, the credible threat of force is necessary for coercion. Additionally, only parties external to the events can carry out an intervention, often characterized today as taking place under the auspices of the “international community.” [6] This is usually formalized via a mandate from an international body, such as the United Nations.

The international community, however, is an agglomeration of various states with their own national interests, and therefore the political agendas of each must be taken into account. The actions of the international community is driven by the national interests of each country involved, and it is misleading to talk of “international will”. [7] From this perspective, humanitarian interventions can be best understood through the realist theory of international relations, as the interests of individual nation-states are pertinent in terms of determining the overall effects of such interventions.

Defining national interest

Good defines the national interest as “a rough guide to, and a negative restraint on, decision and action.” One of the key characteristics of the national interest is that it represents a varying perception depending on the actor; within the United States, the national interest as described by the Pentagon will almost certainly vary compared to the State Department. [8] Therefore, an objective, relatively static “national interest” does not necessarily exist, at least beyond the most basic interests of self-preservation and growth. While we could reduce our definition of national interests to those obvious aspects which, if left untended, potentially threaten the very integrity of the state, this would limit our realm of analysis. National interests encompass far more, and the term “humanitarian intervention” would not be employed if the national interest at stake was the intervening party’s continued existence. Instead, we should consider that national interests are essentially what policymakers perceive them to be. Joseph Nye makes the insightful claim, “in a democracy, the national interest is simply what citizens, after proper deliberation, say it is.” [9] In a similar vein, Jakobsen stated that, “state interests are what states ‘think them to be’”. [10] The malleability of the concept permits its use in a wide variety of situations, depending on the political aims of the state. More importantly, however, the perception of the national interest is limited by the fact that actors have finite information available to them at any particular point in time, and so the national interest can shift rapidly as additional information becomes available.

Because of the impermanent definition of the national interest, making judgments as to whether or not national interests increases the chance of success for a humanitarian intervention must be theorized. The realist perspective in international relations would regard purely altruistic humanitarian intervention as a fantasy; nation-states involve themselves in interventions when it suits their interests rather than out of a regard for humanitarian concerns. [11] However, the interests of nation-states span far beyond material concerns, and the public image of a state, for example, can be as valuable an asset as any military force. National interests span multiple levels, however, and while purely humanitarian concerns may be a national interest as defined by the public, such concerns occupy the last rung in the hierarchy. [12] Therefore, while humanitarian interests could theoretically fall under the umbrella of “national interests”, they will be excluded from our definition.

Determining success

If one wants to be as succinct as possible, the general consensus among scholars is that success in any case of humanitarian intervention is defined by having saved lives that would have been lost in the absence of the intervention. [13] Humanitarian interventions take several forms described above, each with its own metrics of success, but theoretically this is always the desired goal. While the moral value of this determinant is self-evident, this is also an abstract metric to use, since it demands knowledge of how many people would have perished in the absence of intervention. While attempting to determine how many people would have died in a hypothetical scenario that never actually took place is in itself a complicated undertaking, even the more tangible statistics, such as population figures, can be elusive in conflict zones due to the chaos that reigns. To determine the figure, Seybolt describes a four step process to determine the number of lives saved due to an intervention, [14] which has the capability of being able to objectively measure success for humanitarian interventions. Using this measurement, there are five main humanitarian interventions that can be declared successes: Haiti in 1994, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, East Timor in 1999, and Sierra Leone in 2000, though only a few (primarily Haiti and East Timor [15] ) can be considered completely successful. Each was undertaken primarily by a state actor, rather than any international institutions. [16] 

The success of a particular humanitarian intervention operation additionally depends recognition of the source of the problem, and engaging in the proper intervention type to neutralize it. The failure to treat the source of a humanitarian crisis, only addressing the symptoms, is obviously bound to result in failure. A better definition of success would, therefore, also include having eliminated the original cause of the humanitarian crisis. For the purposes of this analysis, however, Seybolt’s methodology will be utilized for determining successful humanitarian interventions based on quantitative figures.

Determining feasibility

The feasibility of any humanitarian intervention depends on the efficacy of the political authority in charge. The most cohesive decision-making entities in the international realm are, of course, nation-states; multilateral organizations such as the UN, while bearing a larger amount of legitimacy, cannot muster the same qualitative military edge. Considering the requisite features of a military force being used in cases of humanitarian interventions, which often are required in the most remote regions of the globe, the nation-state carrying out such an operation must have a fully modernized, currently available and highly mobile military. [17] Only a select few, primarily Western states fulfill these requirements. From this perspective, feasibility is wholly dependent on whether or not one state out of this very select subset is willing to commit itself to such a task. In the context of a single state, feasibility can be further broken down into two main constituent parts: military and political feasibility. [18]

In regards to political feasibility, rallying public support for wars has become increasingly difficult in a post-Cold War era, as the number of credible threats to the integrity of Western states has dwindled drastically. Governments are unlikely to engage in an intervention without sufficient public support. Due to this fact, humanitarian discourse has become the primary legitimizing force for foreign interventions, particularly by the United States. [19] Utilizing this form of rhetoric to gain public support for military action is, therefore, absolutely necessary to ensure political feasibility, regardless of the actual intentions.

On the international front, political feasibility also rests on the consensus within the UN Security Council. Despite the framework of realism which posits that nation-states behave in the manner that will benefit themselves, which would appear to favor unilateral military action, the normative perception in the international system is that interventions require the legitimation of the highest international bodies. Without a solid pretext for intervention, it is improbable to achieve unanimity amongst the members of the council, as it will likely impact the interests of one of the permanent members. [20] The invocation of the national interests of all parties, therefore, substantially increases the chances of their acquiescence to the intervention. Feasibility, however, will not by extensively analyzed in this study due to the fact that, considering this definition of the term, it is impossible to measure both feasibility and success of a particular humanitarian intervention since an infeasible operation will not be conducted. To carry out comprehensive case studies determining the feasibility of humanitarian interventions, examples of interventions that never took place would need to be taken into account. In order to focus upon the question of whether national interest affects the potential for success, only operations which have been conducted, and are therefore “feasible”, can be judged as to whether or not they were conducted successfully.

Case studies

By closely examining the associated factors for each intervention and determining the level of national interest by the intervening parties involved, we can determine whether or not there is a relationship between national interest and success in humanitarian interventions through a theory-testing sample case study. [21] The hypothesis to be tested is that humanitarian interventions are successful (dependent variable) when national interests are at stake (independent variable). While an exhaustive analysis of all humanitarian interventions to date is beyond the scope of this paper, we will analyze five prominent cases from the 1990s. East Timor, Bosnia and Kosovo were cited above as examples of success in conducting a humanitarian intervention, while Somalia and Rwanda are considered examples of failure.

Utilizing Seybolt’s methodology, the estimate given is that the intervention by INTERFET in East Timor saved approximately between five to ten thousand lives and reduced casualties in the crisis to a little over one thousand in total. [22] This clearly meets the definition of success that we defined earlier. Beyond this numerical metric, however, the aim of the TNI was to make East Timor so chaotic as to be virtually ungovernable, and the intervention certainly thwarted this goal. The most important player in INTERFET, the most effective arm of the intervention, was the Australians. The Australians had a number of interests in East Timor that fall under the scope of “national interests”, particularly in the realm of security and economics. Any breakdown of effective governance on the island would have had significant ramifications for Australia, such as increasing refugee flows and disruptions in joint Australian/Indonesian administered petroleum reserves. [23] These factors make it abundantly clear that national interests were at stake in the East Timor intervention.

The initial UNPROFOR operations were lackluster at best in containing the emerging crisis in Bosnia. While tens of thousands of lives were lost, UNPROFOR was unable or unwilling to confront the actual source of the humanitarian crisis, and saved a comparatively smaller “thousands” of lives. Once NATO become intimately involved in the conflict through Operation Deliberate Force, the number of lives lost dropped dramatically. [24] The strategic advantage that NATO forces granted to Bosniak-Croat forces brought a swift end to the conflict. These facts make it clear that while the UN effort can be considered a failure, the NATO operation was fully successful. James Baker explicitly stated in regards to the US role in the Bosnian crisis, “We’ve got no dog in this fight.” US national interests, from a realist perspective, were virtually absent. The counterargument that the reputation of the US was at stake was not taken seriously by the government. [25] As our definition of national interest is based on what policymakers perceive them to be, no national interests were present in this case.

The fact that the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo spanned four separate NATO operations, each of which could be considered separately as a success or failure, means it is not simple to characterize the entirety of the Kosovo intervention as a pure success or failure. While the bombing campaign by Operation Allied Force did not directly save any lives, two of the other three branches can be credited with saving thousands while only hundreds of lives were lost. The final branch, that of KFOR, likely saved more lives than the 700 Serb and Roma citizens that were killed, but it is impossible to know even approximately how many. While not a complete success, the number of lives saved can place the Kosovo intervention in that category. While the United States, the primary player in Kosovo intervention, lacked any direct economic or political interests in Kosovo, the integrity of NATO as a cohesive alliance was at stake. [26] European NATO members had much more pressing interests at stake due to their geographic proximity to the crisis. Considering the importance of the alliance to the United States, and the potential confrontation within the organization that would have ensued had the United States not taken part, the Kosovo crisis became a more pressing national interest, according to our definition of the term, than it would have otherwise been.

The multiple UNOSOM operations, combined with UNITAF and Operation Provide Relief in Somalia between 1991 and 1995 saved approximately 22,000 lives in total. Over the course of the crisis, however, a combined approximate figure of 125,000 lives were lost. [27] This wide gap between the number of lives saved and lives lost, and particularly the fact that the number of lives lost outpaced the number saved during the period of intensive intervention, classifies this case as a failure. The US strategic loss in the Battle of Mogadishu cemented perception of the whole US operation as a failure in the public imagination as well. US interests were considered minimal in the case of Somalia, particularly compared to the simultaneous crises that were taking place across the continent. The end of apartheid in South Africa, and the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars had far more effect on US interests. [28] Somalia was economically disconnected from the US, it is geographically distant, and the former US military base at Berbera was dismantled earlier due to obsolescence. [29] Rwanda

Rwanda is generally considered the prime example of a failure to intervene properly, and the numbers clearly reflect this perception. Despite the relatively large numbers saved by the four intervention missions in Rwanda, the 500,000 to 800,000 who died over the course of the crisis grossly outstrips that figure. [30] Based on these figures, Rwanda is objectively a failure. US apathy to the situation was visible from the outset, and the only concern was that US nationals were evacuated from Rwanda. [31] The case of Somalia loomed large over the decision process, where US soldiers had quite visibly failed to accomplish their goals. Terming the crisis as a genocide was avoided, as it would mandate action by the US government. [32] Therefore, the United States took extraordinary measures to avoid involvement.

While the data collected implies that national interest is not necessarily a requisite feature of a successful humanitarian intervention, it is clear that when national interests are at stake, success is likely to occur. However, the absence of national interests, defined in realist terms, should not dissuade a state from conducting humanitarian interventions. Our data shows that success can certainly result without major national interests. While this is a small- n case study, the trend appears to be that the rate of success is higher when national interests are at stake. This may be due to the fact that states spend more effort resolving problems that directly affect their national interests, since such situations have more immediate ramifications than other humanitarian crises. Therefore, when conducting an intervention in which national interests are not directly at stake, the intervening state should still be willing to commit all necessary resources to properly handle the situation.  The lack of national interests should not be used as a rationale for limiting the extent of an intervention; the state should be willing to endure a significant amount of pain in the process. Without a willingness to sacrifice military assets and personnel in pursuit of the goals of an intervention, the potential for success is drastically reduced. Looking back on historical cases of humanitarian intervention, this appears to be the most effective paradigm available. Committing insufficient resources to complete the task at hand is likely to result in failure, so based on this fact, abstaining from intervention entirely would be preferable. Refraining from intervention would save the meager resources that would have been devoted to a doomed operation.

Works cited

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Bellamy, Alex J., and Nicholas J. Wheeler. “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics.” The Globalization of World Politics , 2008, 522–38.

Cotton, James. “‘Peacekeeping’ in East Timor: An Australian Policy Departure.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 3 (1999): 237–46.

Finnemore, Martha. “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention.” The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics 153 (1996). http://users.metu.edu.tr/utuba/Finnemore.pdf.

Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene, and Kristin E. Kosek. “Why Humanitarian Interventions Succeed or Fail The Role of Local Participation.” Cooperation and Conflict 40, no. 4 (2005): 363–83.

Good, Robert C. “The National Interest and Political Realism: Niebuhr’s ‘debate’ with Morgenthau and Kennan.” The Journal of Politics 22, no. 04 (1960): 597–619.

Hak, Tony, and Jan Dul. “Theory-Testing with Cases.” In Encyclopedia of Case Study Research , by Albert Mills, Gabrielle Durepos, and Elden Wiebe. 2455 Teller Road,  Thousand Oaks  California  91320  United States: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2010. http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/casestudy/n346.xml.

Heinze, Eric A. “The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy: Rwanda and Darfur Compared.” Political Science Quarterly 122, no. 3 (2007): 359–83.

Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?” Journal of Peace Research , 1996, 205–15.

Kurth, James. “Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities.” Orbis 50, no. 1 (2007): 87–101.

Nye, Joseph S. “Redefining the National Interest.” Foreign Affairs 78 (1999): 22–35.

———. “The American National Interest and Global Public Goods.” International Affairs 78, no. 2 (2002): 233–44.

ÓTuathail, Gearóid. “Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the United States’ Response to the War in Bosnia.” Political Geography , Special Issue Dedicated to Saul B. Cohen, 21, no. 5 (June 2002): 601–28. doi:10.1016/S0962-6298(02)00009-4.

Seybolt, Taylor B. Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure . Oxford University Press, 2007.

Simms, Brendan, and David JB Trim. Humanitarian Intervention: A History . Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Western, Jon. “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the US Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia.” International Security 26, no. 4 (2002): 112–42.

[1]     Brendan Simms and David JB Trim, Humanitarian Intervention: A History (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 2–5.

[2]     Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and Kristin E. Kosek, “Why Humanitarian Interventions Succeed or Fail The Role of Local Participation,” Cooperation and Conflict 40, no. 4 (2005): 364.

[3]     James Kurth, “Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities,” Orbis 50, no. 1 (2007): 87.

[4]     Alex J. Bellamy and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” The Globalization of World Politics, 2008, 16–18.

[5]     Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure (Oxford University Press, 2007), 93.

[6]     Mohammed Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,” The International Journal of Human Rights 6, no. 1 (2002): 83.

[7]     Ibid., 88.

[8]     Robert C. Good, “The National Interest and Political Realism: Niebuhr’s ‘debate’ with Morgenthau and Kennan,” The Journal of Politics 22, no. 04 (1960): 597.

[9]     “The American National Interest and Global Public Goods,” International Affairs 78, no. 2 (2002): 237.

[10]   “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?,” Journal of Peace Research, 1996, 206.

[11]   Bellamy and Wheeler, “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” 6.

[12]   Joseph S. Nye, “Redefining the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 78 (1999): 26.

[13]   Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention, 30.

[14]   Ibid., 32–36.

[15]   Gizelis and Kosek, “Why Humanitarian Interventions Succeed or Fail The Role of Local Participation,” 365.

[16]   Kurth, “Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq,” 92.

[17]   Ibid., 90.

[18]   Jakobsen, “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN,” 207.

[19]   Bellamy and Wheeler, “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” 17.

[20]   Kurth, “Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq,” 100.

[21]   Tony Hak and Jan Dul, “Theory-Testing with Cases,” in Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, by Albert Mills, Gabrielle Durepos, and Elden Wiebe (2455 Teller Road,  Thousand Oaks  California  91320  United States: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2010), 7–10, http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/casestudy/n346.xml.

[22]   Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention, 90.

[23]   James Cotton, “‘Peacekeeping’ in East Timor: An Australian Policy Departure,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 3 (1999): 244.

[24]   Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention, 68.

[25]   Gearóid ÓTuathail, “Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the United States’ Response to the War in Bosnia,” Political Geography, Special Issue Dedicated to Saul B. Cohen, 21, no. 5 (June 2002): 616, doi:10.1016/S0962-6298(02)00009-4.

[26]   Nye, “Redefining the National Interest,” 34.

[27]   Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention, 60.

[28]   Jon Western, “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the US Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia,” International Security 26, no. 4 (2002): 134.

[29]   Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics 153 (1996): 2, http://users.metu.edu.tr/utuba/Finnemore.pdf.

[30]   Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention, 78.

[31]   Eric A. Heinze, “The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy: Rwanda and Darfur Compared,” Political Science Quarterly 122, no. 3 (2007): 364.

[32]   Ibid., 366.

Written by: Michael McCall Written at: Leiden University Written for: Nivi Manchanda Date written: December 2015

Further Reading on E-International Relations

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• Walking a Fine Line: The Pros and Cons of Humanitarian Intervention
• How Successful Has the UN Been in Maintaining International Peace and Security?
• How Important is Neutrality in Providing Humanitarian Assistance?
• Horizontal Partnership for Gender-responsive Localisation of Humanitarian Aid
• Morality, Media and Memes: Kony 2012 and Humanitarian Virality

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Expert Commentary

Intervening in Syria and the humanitarian case: What does the research say?

2013 review of research papers relevant to any potential intervention in the Syrian conflict, with particular emphasis on the notion of "responsibility to protect."

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License .

by Alexandra Raphel, The Journalist's Resource September 12, 2013

This <a target="_blank" href="https://journalistsresource.org/politics-and-government/intervening-syria-humanitarian-purposes-research-say/">article</a> first appeared on <a target="_blank" href="https://journalistsresource.org">The Journalist's Resource</a> and is republished here under a Creative Commons license.<img src="https://journalistsresource.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/cropped-jr-favicon-150x150.png" style="width:1em;height:1em;margin-left:10px;">

The possibility of a Russian-backed deal on chemical weapons disarmament for Syria through the United Nations Security Council has, for the moment, stayed the hand of the United States and its allies .

If no deal is reached, however, military intervention remains a distinct possibility. As detailed in a 2013 United Nations’ report , testimony from survivors of the August 21 attack and physical evidence point to the use of chemical weapons. The report doesn’t assign responsibility, but the sophistication of the weapons used and the size of the attack clearly suggest that government forces were the source.

In terms of a potential chemical weapons deal, the closest historical precedent is the successful dismantling of Libya’s weapons of mass destruction programs in the mid-2000s. For perspective on any potential weapons-inspection mission in Syria, see the paper “Who Won Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy,” from Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock of Duke University. A 2006 Congressional Research Service report, “Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction,” has details of that effort. According to the Pew Research Center, the American public is heavily in favor of this diplomatic direction.

But even prior to the use of chemical weapons, Syria was a humanitarian disaster: The U.N. estimates the death toll at more than 100,000, with some 2 million refugees displaced.

What do history and social science suggest about the potential consequences of a Western-led attack on the Assad regime? Would intervention hasten the end of the conflict or make matters worse, particularly for non-combatants? Could the very threat of intervention serve to deepen the conflict, or would threats help deter violence?

While Libya is generally seen as a success, the outcome of other interventions appear to be significantly less positive. A 2011 study published in Political Research Quarterly , “Does Foreign Military Intervention Help Human Rights?” examines the effects of foreign military interventions on human-rights grounds in 145 countries from 1981 to 2001. “The empirical evidence offers robust support for the assertion that supportive and neutral military interventions deteriorate the level of respect for physical integrity rights,” writes the author, Dursun Peksen of the University of Memphis. “Supportive intervention is likely to increase the predicted probability of extrajudicial killing by 103 percent. Neutral interventions … increase the predicted probability of extrajudicial killing by 130 percent.” Peksen concludes:

As military intervention becomes a counterproductive policy tool instigating more human-rights abuses, the target state will likely experience more violence, humanitarian disasters, and other instabilities given the inherent link between the respect for human rights and the maintenance of peace and security.

What about the “responsibility to protect”?

Over the last three decades, there have been a number of international interventions with humanitarian aims. Sometimes they have taken the form of U.N. peacekeeping operations. For data and analysis of these efforts, see the 2013 study “United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel Commitments, 1990-2011,” published in Conflict Management and Peace Science . Other interventions include Operation Allied Force, NATO’s bombing of Kosovo in 1999, which is being considered as a model for the current Syrian conflict. At the time President Bill Clinton articulated his support for the Kosovo strikes using humanitarian language, explaining that, “ending this tragedy is a moral imperative.”

However, some research indicates that caution is necessary when intervening on human-rights grounds. In “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” a 2013 paper published in International Security , Alan Kuperman of the University of Texas challenges “conventional wisdom” about the conflict and suggests how, on a number of points, intervention made matters worse. The essay explores a central idea: “Humanitarian intervention risks backfiring by escalating rebellion, both in the country where it is conducted and beyond. This is because it encourages substate groups to believe that by violently provoking state retaliation, they can attract intervention to help achieve their political objectives, including regime change.” Kuperman concludes:

Overall, NATO intervention significantly exacerbated humanitarian suffering in Libya and Mali, as well as security threats throughout the region. The only apparent benefit is that Libyans have been able to vote in democratic elections, but the elected government has little authority in a country now controlled by dozens of tribal and Islamist militias accountable to no one. NATO intervention increased the duration of Libya’s civil war by approximately six times, and its death toll by seven to ten times.

The potential role of “moral hazard”

The idea that R2P could create incentives for rebellions to grow worse and opposition fighters to take more risks — assuming they will ultimately be “bailed out” by outside intervention — was the subject of a 2011 study by Paul D. Williams of George Washington University and Alex J. Bellamy of Griffith University (Australia). The result, “On the Limits of Moral Hazard: The ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ Armed Conflict and Mass Atrocities,” was published in the European Journal of International Relations .

The authors find that “there is no empirical evidence to support the general contention that victims’ groups bring genocide upon themselves, and  …  moral hazard theory’s view of provocation is arbitrarily focused on the moment of rebellion and ignores the historic and strategic context in which political pressure builds before intra-state armed conflict erupts.” They conclude that the “empirical evidence relating to the frequency, duration and severity of rebellions and genocidal violence contradicts moral hazard theory’s conclusion that R2P is a remote cause of genocide.”

However, a 2011 study published in the journal Civil Wars , “Mainstreaming the Responsibility to Protect in Peace Operations,” offers concrete suggestions for better implementing the R2P through peace operations. The authors, Bellamy and Charles T. Hunt of the University of Queensland, state that interventions must be “designed, planned and resourced with a clear understanding of the threats to civilian populations and what it will take to address their needs.” They note in their conclusion:

There are at least three major areas in which an [R2P] lens could be brought to bear in order to strengthen the capacity of peace operations to protect populations from genocide and mass atrocities: (1) developing protection and atrocity-specific doctrine; (2) translating doctrine into training; and (3) ensuring that risks are properly assessed and missions given appropriate mandates and capabilities.

Are humanitarian interventions effective?

Similarly, in “Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace Operations on Violence against Civilians,” published in Civil Wars in 2010, Lisa Hultman of the Swedish National Defense College examines the effect of peace operations in countries experiencing ongoing armed conflicts. Her findings also caution against certain kinds of direct interventions: “There is no strong evidence that the behavior of governments is affected by peace operations: in general, there is no significant dampening effect of peacekeepers on the level of violence carried out by governments.” Furthermore, “when peacekeepers are present, the level of violence against civilians by rebel groups is in fact higher than when no peacekeepers are present.”

Not all studies are dismissive of interventions. In a 2013 American Journal of Political Science article, “The Road to Hell? Third-Party Intervention to Prevent Atrocities,” Andrew H. Kydd and Scott Straus of the University of Wisconsin-Madison describe a situation much like the one ongoing in Syria: A government and rebel group fight, the government commits atrocities, and a third party may intervene to stop the violence and abuse. They argue that, under the right circumstances, “a well-crafted intervention regime can reduce the expected level of atrocities and so be counted as welfare improving overall.”

David R. Davis of Emory University and Amanda Murdie of Kansas State University make a similar point in a 2010 Human Rights Quarterly article, “Problematic Potential: The Human Rights Consequences of Peacekeeping Interventions in Civil Wars.” They note that “peacekeeping interventions are not the magic solution to end human rights abuses in states with a history of civil war,” but there is also “great potential of specific actions within peacekeeping missions” to protect human rights.

Options for action

Military action aside, another outstanding question remains: What is the best way for the international community to help the people of Syria? In 2011, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School published a working paper, “Improving the Protection of Civilians in Situations of Armed Conflict,” that suggests methods for increasing the protection of civilians during violent conflict. With input from representatives of the military, the United Nations, NGOs, and academia, the paper lays out recommendations for the two main mechanisms by which civilians are protected in conflict zones: peacekeeping operations, and monitoring and investigation activities.

Others have been making the case that given the high costs associated with military interventions, more preventive measures should be taken earlier. In a Foreign Affairs article, “The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention: The Hard Truth About a Noble Notion,” Benjamin A. Valentino of Dartmouth argues:

Washington should replace its focus on military intervention with a humanitarian foreign policy centered on saving lives by funding public health programs in the developing world, aiding victims of natural disasters, and assisting refugees fleeing violent conflict.

He cites the costs — monetary and otherwise — of military interventions, including: “aiding defenseless civilians has usually meant empowering armed factions claiming to represent these victims, groups that are frequently responsible for major human rights abuses of their own.” Furthermore, “even if the ends of such actions could be unambiguously humanitarian, the means never are. Using force to save lives usually involves taking lives, including innocent ones.”

Keywords: war, Syria, chemical weapons

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Alexandra Raphel

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Humanitarian Interventions

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The intervention in Afghanistan in comparison to conflicts like Rwanda , Kosovo, and Iraq ****

The concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ is linked to the concept ‘human security’. If we accept the concept of ‘human security’, ‘security’ cannot be reduced to ‘state security’. ‘Security’ is also about the ‘securing the people’ in a state. For example, if one state slaughters an ethnic minority in the name of ‘state security’, the international community may carry out a ‘humanitarian intervention’ to save the lives of this minority. Genocide is unacceptable to international law, and the UN can decide whether a specific mass killing is considered genocide. The UN can use military force or decide about the right of a military coalition to intervene in a country to guarantee ‘human security’. Many researchers argue that we are back to the Augustine concept of ‘just war’.

We now have some years of experience with several international interventions. In Afghanistan, there is no light in the tunnel, and the situation in Iraq is even worse. Almost ten years after the war in Kosovo, the political and humanitarian problems are far from solved. One might argue that some of these operations were not just ‘humanitarian interventions’. True, military operations were carried out to create stability, to advance geopolitical interests or as part of the ‘War on Terror’, but the arguments for these interventions were also linked to ‘human security’: to stop the Serbian atrocities, the Taliban killings and of the Saddam Hussein’s brutality. Now, a few years later, these less successful war experiences have been important for the loss of confidence in ‘just wars’. Also, the killings in Rwanda and Bosnia in the mid 1990s, which provoked the change of views in the international community and justified the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’, appear today to have been more complex. We believe that this case study and comparative study will offer important insights into the mechanism of power and how actors in favour of war and actors in favour of peace will operate side-by-side, and how conflicts are restrained by the latter and are calibrated at a certain level by the former.

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Case Studies Series (1989–2001): #18 (1997): The Problems of Doing Good: Somalia as a Case Study in Humanitarian Intervention

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