book review on 1962 the war that wasn't

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Book review: 1962 the war that wasn’t.

V Mahalingam

Brigadier (retd) V Mahalingam, has held varying command and staff appointments in his 35 years of Army service. He specializes in security related matters and is a leadership trainer. His areas of interest include national security, defence and security forces, governance, and politics. LESS ... MORE

Book: 1962 The War That Wasn’t

Author: Shiv Kunal Verma,

Publisher: Aleph Book Company,

Pages: 425, Price: Rs 695

The war was fought fifty-three years ago and yet it has contemporary implications. People might have forgotten the humiliating defeat and ignominy that India suffered but the reasons and pretexts that triggered the war cannot be wished away or wiped out. They still continue to remain and threaten to haunt India at the time and place of Beijing’s choosing. Five decades have changed the face of China as well as India but some of the conditions in India especially those relating to the military and higher defence management that contributed to the shame have only stagnated without keeping pace with the changes that have come about the world over. China on the other hand has not only modernised its military but has also been continuously updating its war strategies and incorporating instruments of modern technologies in its war doctrines. Its military has undergone appropriate structural changes at regular intervals to become lean and precise commensurate with its needs for prosecuting an integrated high-tech war. The infrastructure on the Chinese side of the border has changed the very face of Tibet but on the Indian side we seem to be preserving the antediluvian landscape causing hardship and sufferings to the people in the border areas and creating an unsurmountable handicap to the military in more than in one way.

What are and were these circumstances that culminated with an armed clash between India and China? To understand the complexities that influenced events at the time, any China watcher or military history student, nay every Indian, must read Shiv Kunal Verma’s book – 1962: The War That Wasn’t . Though the book has only recently been launched, it quickly climbed to the top of the charts; not surprising at all for the author has very accurately dealt with the full spectrum of issues which led to India’s defeat in the hands of the Chinese Army. Sample some of the incidents that the book explores.

China’s annexation of Sinkiang (Xinjiang) in 1949 contrived a land border between India and China in Ladakh overnight which was nonexistent till then. PLA’s entry into Tibet in 1950 removed a vital buffer between India and China and situated India in an unenviable position of permanently facing a live border with an expansionist China. Unfortunately the Indian ruling class was unable to read the long term strategic effect of the Chinese move. The irony was, despite having blundered inexcusably, India not only changed its narrative of Tibet’s independent status but also went ahead supporting China in the world stage despite its invasion and brutality on peace loving Tibetans in their own land against all norms.

The much maligned ‘Forward Policy’ has been put in correct perspective. While the Chinese were constantly moving forward between 1959 and 1961and ipso facto creating two claim lines, India had no option but to establish observation posts to keep the area under observation. For apparent reasons the areas could not have been left unattended. These posts thus established logically fell between the two claim lines. China cleverly termed the establishment these posts as India’s ‘nibbling policy’ and connected the issue to India’s ambitions to turn Tibet into its protectorate. Unfortunately the world and many Indians have been viewing the so called ‘Forward Policy’ from the Chinese point of view with the result the establishment of observation posts have been perceived as India’s expansionist policy and a major blunder besides labelling it the raison d’etre for the 62 War. Notwithstanding Chinese inching forward and creating dual claim lines, the Indians were patrolling much beyond these posts prior to the implementation of the so called ‘Forward Policy’, a point totally missed by the proponents of this theory.

The August 1959 Khenzemane and Longju incidents and its aftermath leading to the resignation and betrayal of General Thimayya is an outstanding narration which provides an overview of the way in which wide off the mark injudicious decisions are articulated in the Parliament even to this day by political leaders to get the monkey off their back. Left with no option but to admit in the Parliament that several thousand square kilometers of Indian Territory in Ladakh was under Chinese control and that the Chinese had indeed constructed a National Highway (G219 also called Western Highway) across Aksai Chin under our very nose, Nehru went ahead to narrate both the August 1959 incidents in the Parliament. He did not stop at that but declared out of the blue that the border areas of NEFA have been placed directly under the military authorities. That statement was purely meant to pacify the agitated house, whose members neither had any knowledge of the areas where the incidents had taken place nor did they have the professional acumen to evaluate the appropriateness of the solution propounded by the Prime Minister.

The question is did the Army have the necessary wherewithal to man the NEFA border? Was it an operationally viable remedy? Did the Prime Minister understand the implications of Change of command especially at the border and at that crucial juncture? Why didn’t Nehru consult the military before announcing the decision? Who was responsible for suggesting such an ill-conceived adjustment? The reality was that the Prime Minister of the country was committing the military for a policing role when the Army was short of necessary resources to professionally manage its own functions and commitments.

The self-destructive announcement obviously led General Thimayya to resign. What followed was an act which was not expected of any one who called himself a leader. After having persuaded the Army Chief to withdraw his resignation in the larger interest of the nation especially at a time when problem with the Chinese was escalating, Nehru went over to the Parliament to criticize General Thimayya after the General had withdrawn his resignation, an act of betrayal which no soldier will ever condone. The imprudence did not end there. Three months later in November the Government announced yet again that the Army would take control of Ladakh as in the case of NEFA.

General Thorat, the Eastern Army Commander had in 1959 forwarded his assessment of Chinese threat to NEFA. General Thimayya had shared this assessment with Menon. After further study and considering the lessons learnt from a high level military exercise ‘Exercise Sheel’ he recommended to the Government that a specialised mountain division be raised for the Indo – Tibet border. Menon shelved the proposal and after due prodding he took up the case once again only to finally bury it stating that it was ‘too much’ and it needed to be ‘pruned down’ as till then only small numbers had been involved in isolated border clashes. What a military logic! This decision by a clueless defence minister was to cost huge humiliation to the nation three years later.

Thorat had recommended a three tier defence plan for NEFA. The plan in outline, referred to as ‘Thorat Plan’ consisted of a forward line of outposts close to the McMahan Line meant to provide early warning of Chinese strength and direction of approach with a mandate to fall back before the Chinese could move forward and over run them.

The second line of defence was designed to delay the enemy by forcing him to deploy and clear the position before making any further advance. The suitability of the ground was a decisive factor in this plan so as to compel the enemy to pause, step up his logistic and fire support elements thus crafting the required time delay. The time delay would help assess enemy’s thrust lines and enable stage forwarding of reserves accordingly.

The third layer of defence was to be at line which was logistically maintainable. The distances and the topography of the position was expected to facilitate the protection of own axis of maintenance from enemy interference. The process would automatically extend the enemy’s lines of communication and make them vulnerable to our interference. That General Thorat believed would force the enemy to give up under pressure which could then be exploited to destroy the force. The decisive last man last round battle was to be fought at this location.

Unfortunately, the sane military logic could not be comprehended by the political leadership and the bureaucracy. Writing in his book ‘Chinese Betrayal’ BN Mullik the then Intelligence Bureau Chief says, “The main objection by the Army was that the ground was not suitable for fighting and it must choose its own ground. This was strange logic. Battles are fought on borders, be they suitable or not”. Nothing could have summed up the ignorance of the bureaucracy better.

Shiv Kunal Verma’s book is a thought-provoking masterpiece. It very effectively narrates the detailed step by step account of the war bringing out relevant strategic, operational, tactical and logistic lessons of the 1962 defeat which carries very relevant lessons for the future of the defence services as well as the decision makers. It provides a glimpse of the basics of war fighting. Nothing could have explained better as to how the decisions of the ill-informed and the inexperienced can adversely impact the outcome of a military situation.

It has taken half a century for an Indian to sally forth and produce what is by far the most definitive book on the 1962 conflict. Kunal Verma, without taking on Neville Maxwell directly (he ignores his writings altogether), paints a picture in such detail that one instinctively knows that this is how it had to have happened and in the process demolishes many of Maxwell’s blatant pro-Chinese theories which most Indian writers and intellectuals have swallowed unquestioningly.

The book is a must read for people who wish to understand the way Government handles the military even to this day. More than anyone, this book should be made mandatory reading for all Parliamentarians and bureaucrats in the country.

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Review: 1962 - The War That Wasn’t

Ramananda Sengupta

Feb 21, 2016, 09:32 AM | Updated 09:32 AM IST

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‘Looking back, I think I should have submitted my resignation at that time. I might have saved my country from the humiliation of defeat.’

General Pran Nath Thapar, India’s Chief of Army Staff 1961–1962, in a conversation with journalist Kuldip Nayar on 29 July 1970, in Nayar’s autobiography, Beyond the Lines

It truly was a war that wasn’t.

Officially, neither China nor India ever declared war, and Chinese officials express surprise when Indians keep referring to it as one.

But while the battle in the high Himalayas in October-November 1962 might be ‘just another border skirmish’ for the Chinese, it was a bitter humiliation for India that still deeply influences our perception of and relationship with our giant neighbour.

Over 2,000 Indian soldiers died in the month-long armed hostilities which began October 21, 1962 with a massive two-pronged offensive by the People’s Liberation Army in Ladakh and Arunachal, or the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) as it was then known.

Over 4,000 were taken prisoners of war, and an entire division of over 15,000 ill-equipped, ill-trained soldiers was routed in the face of the massive Chinese onslaught.

Much has been written on the subject, mostly blaming then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for ignoring the advice of Sardar Vallabhai Patel, who had voiced his suspicions about the Chinese as early as 1950, when the People’s Liberation Army ‘liberated’ Tibet.

“ Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam,” Patel had warned in a letter to Nehru dated November 7, 1950.

Blame is also placed on Nehru’s defence minister Krishna Menon, his Intelligence Bureau head BN Mullik, and Generals like Brij Mohan Kaul, who was appointed as General officer Commanding (GOC) North east in 1962.

Post the conflict, which ended when the Chinese unilaterally announced a ceasefire beginning November 21, 1962, most of the world saw India as the victim of Chinese belligerence and betrayal.

But that perception soon changed.

Brigadier John Parashuram Dalvi commanded India’s 7th Infantry Brigade, which was decimated by the PLA on day one of the Chinese attack. Captured as a PoW by the Chinese and released in May 1963, he went on to write Himalayan Blunder , which categorically blamed the Indian political leadership –and some military top brass, including himself--for ‘India’s most crushing military disaster.’

The book was promptly banned. (the ban was lifted years later).

In 1970, Australian journalist Neville Maxwell published India’s China War , which aggressively toed the Chinese line that Nehru’s arrogant antics had left Beijing with no other option but to ‘teach him a lesson.’

Maxwell apparently had access to the Henderson-Brooks- Bhagat report, commissioned by the Indian Army after the war, to analyse the reasons for the border debacle. The report -- named after Lieutenant-General TB Henderson Brooks and Brigadier Premindra Singh Bhagat, commandant of the Indian Military Academy)-- squarely puts the blame on inept political and military leadership.

It was promptly classified as Top Secret, and remains so even today.

Maxwell, however, uploaded volume I of the report on the Internet in March 2014. Despite frantic Indian attempts to block access, the report (which begins with a quote from Sun Tzu’s Art of War ) can still be found online. (Volume 2 reportedly just contains memos and other documents to back up the assertions made in the first volume.)

In July-August 1962, young Captain Ashok Kalyan Verma was transferred from 2 Rajput Battalion to the Indian Military Academy in Dehra Dun as instructional staff. Barely three months later, the entire battalion was decimated in the fierce Chinese attack on the banks of the Nam Ka Chu River in the NEFA Valley. Captain Verma, who went to fight in the 1971 war with Pakistan as a Lt Colonel commanding the 18th Battalion of the Rajput regiment, retired in 1991 as a Major General.

His book, Rivers of Silence , (Disaster on River Nam Ka Chu, 1962, and the Dash to Dhaka across River Meghna during 1971 ) spans two wars with very different results.

Describing the events of 1962 as a ‘national disaster,’ the first part of the book pays tribute to his unit, which was decimated in the first Chinese attack 20 October morning on an unknown Himalayan stream – Nam Ka Chu.

It vividly recounts how despite lack of political and military leadership, outnumbered, outgunned and outmanoeuvred, his comrades from 2 Rajput displayed exemplary bravery in the face of certain defeat and death.

General Verma’s son, filmmaker and military historian Shiv Kunal Verma, draws extensively from his father’s book, as well as his memories, diaries, friends and references, to write what is perhaps one of the most extraordinary book on the conflict in the Himalayas.

Three decades in the making, 1962, The War, That Wasn’t is a labour of love, sans the rhetoric and rose-tinted sunglasses.

Incredibly well researched, the book dispassionately examines events and circumstances that finally culminated with the month long hostilities in the Himalayas.

“At the time when rest of the world was exhausted from the Second World War and attention was focused on the Cold war, Chinese supremo Mao Tse-Tung (Mao Zedong) pulled off one of the greatest real estate coups of all time……..The Chinese played their cards in such a manner that the Indians lost what should have been at best a defensive war by not fighting it at all,” he says.

After setting the historical background, Verma brutally dissects how India’s security was compromised by Nehru and his ill-advised and incompetent coterie. The matter of fact recounting of how Nehru and Menon abominably betrayed one of India’s finest army chiefs, General KS Thimayya, in 1959, does not reflect a flattering image of India’s first Prime Minister.

Verma brilliantly balances the hair-raising heroism and courage displayed by our soldiers on the ground, against the ignorance, ineptitude and sheer cowardice shown by politicians and senior army leadership.

There’s the heart rending tale of Subedar Dashrath Singh, captured after an entire AK-47 magazine was emptied into his stomach, and saved by a Chinese military nurse ---who had once studied in Allahabad.

And then there’s the stories of how frightened and frantic generals ran from the battlefield at the first sign of the Chinese onslaught.

The crisp narrative echoes and reinforces the Henderson-Brooks report indictment: “comparatively, the mistakes and lapses of the staff sitting in Delhi without the stress and strain of battle are more heinous than the errors made by commanders in the field of battle”.

But 1962, the War that Wasn’t does more than just that.

By vividly bringing to life the follies, faults and outright heroism that marked 1962, Verma allows us to finally accept our lapses, and honour and remember our unsung bravehearts.

And hopefully, move on.

Ramananda Sengupta moved to the corporate world after 25 years in print and online journalism. He is an editorial consultant with Indian Defence Review, and teaches defence journalism to graduate students in his spare time.

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Book review: 1962 the war that wasn’t.

V Mahalingam

Brigadier (retd) V Mahalingam, has held varying command and staff appointments in his 35 years of Army service. He specializes in security related matters and is a leadership trainer. His areas of interest include national security, defence and security forces, governance, and politics. LESS ... MORE

Book: 1962 The War That Wasn’t

Author: Shiv Kunal Verma,

Publisher: Aleph Book Company,

Pages: 425, Price: Rs 695

The war was fought fifty-three years ago and yet it has contemporary implications. People might have forgotten the humiliating defeat and ignominy that India suffered but the reasons and pretexts that triggered the war cannot be wished away or wiped out. They still continue to remain and threaten to haunt India at the time and place of Beijing’s choosing. Five decades have changed the face of China as well as India but some of the conditions in India especially those relating to the military and higher defence management that contributed to the shame have only stagnated without keeping pace with the changes that have come about the world over. China on the other hand has not only modernised its military but has also been continuously updating its war strategies and incorporating instruments of modern technologies in its war doctrines. Its military has undergone appropriate structural changes at regular intervals to become lean and precise commensurate with its needs for prosecuting an integrated high-tech war. The infrastructure on the Chinese side of the border has changed the very face of Tibet but on the Indian side we seem to be preserving the antediluvian landscape causing hardship and sufferings to the people in the border areas and creating an unsurmountable handicap to the military in more than in one way.

What are and were these circumstances that culminated with an armed clash between India and China? To understand the complexities that influenced events at the time, any China watcher or military history student, nay every Indian, must read Shiv Kunal Verma’s book – 1962: The War That Wasn’t . Though the book has only recently been launched, it quickly climbed to the top of the charts; not surprising at all for the author has very accurately dealt with the full spectrum of issues which led to India’s defeat in the hands of the Chinese Army. Sample some of the incidents that the book explores.

China’s annexation of Sinkiang (Xinjiang) in 1949 contrived a land border between India and China in Ladakh overnight which was nonexistent till then. PLA’s entry into Tibet in 1950 removed a vital buffer between India and China and situated India in an unenviable position of permanently facing a live border with an expansionist China. Unfortunately the Indian ruling class was unable to read the long term strategic effect of the Chinese move. The irony was, despite having blundered inexcusably, India not only changed its narrative of Tibet’s independent status but also went ahead supporting China in the world stage despite its invasion and brutality on peace loving Tibetans in their own land against all norms.

The much maligned ‘Forward Policy’ has been put in correct perspective. While the Chinese were constantly moving forward between 1959 and 1961and ipso facto creating two claim lines, India had no option but to establish observation posts to keep the area under observation. For apparent reasons the areas could not have been left unattended. These posts thus established logically fell between the two claim lines. China cleverly termed the establishment these posts as India’s ‘nibbling policy’ and connected the issue to India’s ambitions to turn Tibet into its protectorate. Unfortunately the world and many Indians have been viewing the so called ‘Forward Policy’ from the Chinese point of view with the result the establishment of observation posts have been perceived as India’s expansionist policy and a major blunder besides labelling it the raison d’etre for the 62 War. Notwithstanding Chinese inching forward and creating dual claim lines, the Indians were patrolling much beyond these posts prior to the implementation of the so called ‘Forward Policy’, a point totally missed by the proponents of this theory.

The August 1959 Khenzemane and Longju incidents and its aftermath leading to the resignation and betrayal of General Thimayya is an outstanding narration which provides an overview of the way in which wide off the mark injudicious decisions are articulated in the Parliament even to this day by political leaders to get the monkey off their back. Left with no option but to admit in the Parliament that several thousand square kilometers of Indian Territory in Ladakh was under Chinese control and that the Chinese had indeed constructed a National Highway (G219 also called Western Highway) across Aksai Chin under our very nose, Nehru went ahead to narrate both the August 1959 incidents in the Parliament. He did not stop at that but declared out of the blue that the border areas of NEFA have been placed directly under the military authorities. That statement was purely meant to pacify the agitated house, whose members neither had any knowledge of the areas where the incidents had taken place nor did they have the professional acumen to evaluate the appropriateness of the solution propounded by the Prime Minister.

The question is did the Army have the necessary wherewithal to man the NEFA border? Was it an operationally viable remedy? Did the Prime Minister understand the implications of Change of command especially at the border and at that crucial juncture? Why didn’t Nehru consult the military before announcing the decision? Who was responsible for suggesting such an ill-conceived adjustment? The reality was that the Prime Minister of the country was committing the military for a policing role when the Army was short of necessary resources to professionally manage its own functions and commitments.

The self-destructive announcement obviously led General Thimayya to resign. What followed was an act which was not expected of any one who called himself a leader. After having persuaded the Army Chief to withdraw his resignation in the larger interest of the nation especially at a time when problem with the Chinese was escalating, Nehru went over to the Parliament to criticize General Thimayya after the General had withdrawn his resignation, an act of betrayal which no soldier will ever condone. The imprudence did not end there. Three months later in November the Government announced yet again that the Army would take control of Ladakh as in the case of NEFA.

General Thorat, the Eastern Army Commander had in 1959 forwarded his assessment of Chinese threat to NEFA. General Thimayya had shared this assessment with Menon. After further study and considering the lessons learnt from a high level military exercise ‘Exercise Sheel’ he recommended to the Government that a specialised mountain division be raised for the Indo – Tibet border. Menon shelved the proposal and after due prodding he took up the case once again only to finally bury it stating that it was ‘too much’ and it needed to be ‘pruned down’ as till then only small numbers had been involved in isolated border clashes. What a military logic! This decision by a clueless defence minister was to cost huge humiliation to the nation three years later.

Thorat had recommended a three tier defence plan for NEFA. The plan in outline, referred to as ‘Thorat Plan’ consisted of a forward line of outposts close to the McMahan Line meant to provide early warning of Chinese strength and direction of approach with a mandate to fall back before the Chinese could move forward and over run them.

The second line of defence was designed to delay the enemy by forcing him to deploy and clear the position before making any further advance. The suitability of the ground was a decisive factor in this plan so as to compel the enemy to pause, step up his logistic and fire support elements thus crafting the required time delay. The time delay would help assess enemy’s thrust lines and enable stage forwarding of reserves accordingly.

The third layer of defence was to be at line which was logistically maintainable. The distances and the topography of the position was expected to facilitate the protection of own axis of maintenance from enemy interference. The process would automatically extend the enemy’s lines of communication and make them vulnerable to our interference. That General Thorat believed would force the enemy to give up under pressure which could then be exploited to destroy the force. The decisive last man last round battle was to be fought at this location.

Unfortunately, the sane military logic could not be comprehended by the political leadership and the bureaucracy. Writing in his book ‘Chinese Betrayal’ BN Mullik the then Intelligence Bureau Chief says, “The main objection by the Army was that the ground was not suitable for fighting and it must choose its own ground. This was strange logic. Battles are fought on borders, be they suitable or not”. Nothing could have summed up the ignorance of the bureaucracy better.

Shiv Kunal Verma’s book is a thought-provoking masterpiece. It very effectively narrates the detailed step by step account of the war bringing out relevant strategic, operational, tactical and logistic lessons of the 1962 defeat which carries very relevant lessons for the future of the defence services as well as the decision makers. It provides a glimpse of the basics of war fighting. Nothing could have explained better as to how the decisions of the ill-informed and the inexperienced can adversely impact the outcome of a military situation.

It has taken half a century for an Indian to sally forth and produce what is by far the most definitive book on the 1962 conflict. Kunal Verma, without taking on Neville Maxwell directly (he ignores his writings altogether), paints a picture in such detail that one instinctively knows that this is how it had to have happened and in the process demolishes many of Maxwell’s blatant pro-Chinese theories which most Indian writers and intellectuals have swallowed unquestioningly.

The book is a must read for people who wish to understand the way Government handles the military even to this day. More than anyone, this book should be made mandatory reading for all Parliamentarians and bureaucrats in the country.

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1962 – The War That Wasn’t book review: A Himalayan debacle

An immaculately-researched study of how warriors paid, while netas and babus got away clean in the 1962 war against china.

1962: The War That Wasn’t Shiv Kunal Verma Aleph Pp 512 R995

WE HAVE, unfortunately, not seen too many dedicated scholars of military history on our shores. This is despite the fact that India has never lacked historians of the highest quality. Even though we have had academicians and scholars who have documented wars and battles, we still lack writers and analysts who have assessed military events with the same level of dedication and commitment that general historians have given to their fields of study. Sadly, India has too few writers like Alan Clark, who covered the titanic Soviet-German conflict in the last world war (Barbarossa), or Hugh Trevor-Roper, who analysed the fall of Nazi Germany and the Red Army’s triumphant capture of Berlin in his seminal study, The Last Days of Hitler (1947). Even Hugh Thomas, who was not a military historian, did a commendable job on the military aspects of the Spanish Civil War in his remarkable book.

In independent India’s history of 68-odd years, we have fought five major wars, four of which were with Pakistan and one with China. The Indo-Pak wars went clearly in our favour, although the 1965 clash may not have had as definitive an outcome as we wanted. The Indo-China war of 1962 was a  monumental fiasco, the ripple effects of which still resonate in our collective psyche. This disaster was, of course, documented by Australian journalist Neville Maxwell in his landmark study, India’s China War, published in 1970. The huge controversy surrounding this book was fuelled and exacerbated by the fact that Maxwell clearly had access to the top-secret ‘Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report’ (HBBR), which is still treated as classified and top-secret by the mandarins in Raisina Hill. And we all know that the feisty Maxwell rubbed the government’s nose in the dust by releasing the first and operative part of the HBBR on the Internet in March 2014.

Shiv Kunal Verma, who already has a number of books on military history and defence issues under his belt, would, therefore, have had access to the HBBR when he wrote 1962: The War That Wasn’t. However, what Verma has achieved is well beyond what Maxwell did. He has produced an immaculately-researched and carefully-structured study that will be of interest to all Indians, and not just military-history buffs. More importantly, it is likely to stand the test of time, which is the ultimate criterion for all historical treatises. Not being a professional historian has not harmed Verma, but what has definitely helped him are his family ties with the armed forces. Being a military brat has given Verma the requisite empathy for the nation’s warriors and an insight into the military mind, both of which are so important in a study like this.

Verma starts by sketching the historical backdrop of the momentous events of October-November 1962. He goes into the fascinating history of the entire region on both sides of the Himalayas. In the first four chapters, the complex interplay of historical forces in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is spelt out. One must emphasise here that Verma demonstrates how a number of western (particularly British) historians have been unduly biased in favour of the Chinese version. Maxwell, in particular, has gone overboard in peddling Beijing’s perspective that Tibet was a Chinese protectorate, while systematically downplaying India’s viewpoint that it had equally close links with a number of Indian princely states. Verma rebuts these western perspectives forcefully.

The book then goes on to the post-independence period when Jawaharlal Nehru and his ‘Sancho Panza’, Krishna Menon, made a complete hash of our defence and national security policies. Nehru’s first gaffe was when he ignored the sage advice of Sardar Patel about the strategic threat that China posed. Among his other traits, Nehru fancied himself a scholar of history and culture, and his disdain for those who did not share his world view was palpable.

Also, his paranoia about the country’s armed forces was obvious.

It was exacerbated when Menon moved to Delhi and was made defence minister. From then onwards, it was a rapid and precipitate decline of the state of India’s defence preparedness, accompanied naturally by the collapse in the overall capabilities of the armed forces. Verma describes in detail one of the shabbiest examples of the duplicity and underhandedness of the Nehru-Menon duo when they led then army chief, General KS Thimayya, up the garden path in August 1959 and literally tossed the fine soldier into the garbage bin. If nothing else, this abominable incident should put a lid on any efforts by Nehru acolytes to deify the man.

Then came Nehru’s crowning act of folly, when he chose a manifestly unsuitable BM Kaul to join the army headquarters in a critical position. The Menon-Thimayya clash eventually took place when the army chief strongly opposed Kaul’s placement in army headquarters on promotion as the quarter master general. Thimayya was candid and prophetic in his official assessment of Kaul, but it was he who was shown the door for his steadfast loyalty to the country, its army and its elected government. The HBBR noted that Kaul initiated an internal coup in the army headquarters, as a result of which professional military practice was jettisoned. In the ‘Alice-In-Wonderland’ ambience of South Block, officers were handpicked by Kaul to fill key general staff appointments.

The HBBR went on to state unambiguously that “comparatively, the mistakes and lapses of the staff sitting in Delhi without the stress and strain of battle are more heinous than the errors made by commanders in the field of battle”. In this deadly cocktail of Nehru, Menon and Kaul, there was another component, the Intelligence Bureau chief, BN Mullick, a former colonial police-wallah. It was this quartet that led India into headlong disaster in 1962. Verma’s meticulous recital of the events in October-November 1962 would do credit to established military historians in any part of the globe. He portrays the events on the battlefields, as well as in Delhi’s corridors of power, with an empathy and perception that is touching and heartrending. On one hand was the valour and courage of Indian soldiers and their officers in the battlefields—which is still awe-inspiring—and on the other were the lamentable lapses of judgment, at best, and monumental incompetence and cowardice, at worst, on the part of leaders in  Delhi and other decision-making centres.

There are many queries that Verma poses that will haunt the nation for years: why was the Indian Air Force  not used; why did morale fail at critical junctures? Did we also not see the ignominious crumbling of the ‘martial races’ myth of the erstwhile colonial masters, with examples like the Delta Company of 2 Rajputs, a Bengali unit (which was a legacy of the great army chief, KM Cariappa), fighting to the last man at Nam Ka Chu valley, while the others fled ?

Verma’s treatise raises as many questions as it answers. This is as it should be for a truly benchmark study. The final word on this book should be the epic lines of the almost-forgotten poem of the late Harji Mallik that Verma resurrects:

“Avenge our unplayed lives, redeem the unredeemable  sacrifice, In freedom and integrity, let this be your inheritance, and our unwritten epitaph.”

BY Jay Bhattacharjee

Jay Bhattacharjee is a business-corporate affairs analyst and a student of military affairs

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The past that wasn’t

Like all historians, shiv kunal verma must be read with a pinch of salt, for they are all victims of the ravages of history-telling.

Updated - April 23, 2016 06:16 pm IST

Published - April 23, 2016 04:00 pm IST

1962: The War That Wasn’t; Shiv Kunal Verma, Aleph, Rs. 1,000.

The title of Shiv Kunal Verma’s latest provoked me into thinking the author had attempted to challenge historical data by unfixing it from its moorings. It takes courage and a lot of daring to rewrite history, that too of the 1962 Chinese aggression on India, which for the most part lies consciously forgotten. It was a war we lost. That ignominy is best buried. Writing must be celebratory, we feel, especially when we speak of national pride. That is one possible reason no one was expected to re-think the Chinese debacle. However, Verma takes up that challenge. For Indians who know their history, no more tragic event took place in the entire 20th century than the 1962 Chinese invasion.

This is a book about how Jawaharlal Nehru, with his starkly conflicting prejudices and ineptitude, failed to prevent the conflict, utilising and manipulating the nationalist sentiment to wage a war against an insurmountable enemy, without the calculations of advantage and risk. This provokes future historians to explore the point at which policy and presentation, war and political discourse, come together as propaganda.

Verma admits that the very methodology of writing history is flawed: “As you move away from the war itself, the chain of events gets more distorted, since everyone’s perceptions of the war change. All one can do is come as close to the truth as possible, because it is vital to know what happened, where the weak links exist.” It is a point where information and lies, vilification and exaggeration merge.

History often verges on the speculative, the conjectural. Foundational histories are always suspect. All objective posturing comes out in the open sooner or later. Nevertheless, Verma has laboured on his research for three decades, undertaking the arduous task of visiting East Sikkim, parts of Kumaon and Garhwal, Lahaul and Spiti and the remote corners of Ladakh, interviewing many who lived through the war, scrutinising archival material so as to “peel through various layers of history, rumour, myths, half-truths and outright lies to understand why events played out the way they did.”

Verma’s concern, apart from the losses of other battalions located across the northern frontier as well as the remote frontlines in Ladakh, is the military tragedy at Namka Chu, a small rivulet in the Kameng Frontier Division of the North-East Frontier Agency, on October 20, 1962, when 283 soldiers died, and hundreds were wounded or taken prisoners.

India suffered a humiliating defeat in a war that lasted a month. The concept of ‘positional war’ that Lieutenant General B.M. Kaul envisaged and which none of his officers understood was mere rhetoric. A few days before the war, General Kaul, camping on Namka Chu, had come up with an imprudent plan of taking over the Thagla Ridge, when one of his junior commissioned officers, Dashrath Singh of 2 Rajput, questioned the military wisdom of such a move with Indian forces located in the valley and the Chinese breathing down their backs. Having never experienced combat warfare, Kaul had no answer. He threatened the Subedar with a court-martial. The next morning, Indian troops launched the attack only to beat a hasty retreat. Kaul escaped to New Delhi to confabulate with his patron, Nehru. A stiff-necked general had sacrificed combat effectiveness at the altar of the party line.

Had Lieutenant General S.P.P. Thorat, DSO, Eastern Commander, taken over as army chief, Verma reckons, things would have been different. Not many know that he had predicted, three years ago, that the Chinese would invade in 1962. In positing that the worst would not have happened if reasonable caution and common sense had dictated prudent assessment of the dangers posed by the confrontation, war historians like Verma tend to rely on the testimony of one soldier against that of another, which too is a flawed approach. History is replete with military strategists and political leaders with divergent and equally-misguided courses responsible for shocking military catastrophes.

Will Verma’s history be the ultimate one? It won’t. The unsung heroes are dead or suffer from unsubstantiated and false reportage, while one more historian glorifies, in his scholarship and research, another version of the truth. Sadly, many stories remain untold.

A few soldiers who survived found their way back to the plains and safety, and were even decorated; many others who were forced to spend over nine months in some godforsaken Chinese prisons in sub-zero temperatures, surviving the long, endless ordeal in scanty winter clothing and a diet of food consisting of merely rice and radishes, never got to tell their stories.

Who do we believe? As soon as a phenomenon is seen or a story heard, narratives take on another colour. War histories remain replete with contradictory information, one-sided accounts and prejudicialhearsay. The dates of the death of army officers change from one page to the next. And the reports on officers who rose to the ranks of Generals become lionised.

Many more histories will be written about the war, leaving generations to wonder why we fought the war at all. The bitterness of many stakeholders is understandable. However, historians like Verma would do well to be aware that the flow of information in a war zone is controlled by military and political authorities who wish to see the media adopt an expedient perspective. The questions to be asked are: how much censorship took place and what alternative sources were found by war historians; was the media at the time echoing the official version or was it objective to an extent. Are historians oblivious to the inherent deception of historiography based on the fallibility of the historical record, as well as to methodology that resorts to selective and interpretative processes of archival material that is always partial or biased? Unfortunately, Verma, like other historians before him, must be read with a pinch of salt, for they all remain victims of the ravages of history-telling. The remains of the past are always incomplete and suffer from inevitable distortion in the very attempt to present a coherent account of an inchoate past. All historical work is necessarily tentative.

Shelley Walia is Professor and Fellow, Department of English and Cultural Studies, Panjab University.

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non-fiction / books and literature / Literary Review

1962: The War That Wasn’t

By shiv kunal verma, category: history, non-fiction, price: rs. 999.

On 20 October 1962, high in the Himalayas on the banks of the fast-flowing Nam Ka Chu, over 400 Indian soldiers were massacred and the valley was overrun by soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army. Over the course of the next month, nearly 4,000 soldiers were killed on both sides and the Indian Army experienced its worst defeat ever. The conflict (war was never formally declared) ended because China announced a unilateral ceasefire on 21 November and halted its hitherto unhindered advance across NEFA and Ladakh. To add to India’s lasting shame, neither Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru nor the Indian Army was even aware that the ‘war’ had ended until they heard the announcement on the radio—despite the Indian embassy having been given the information two days earlier.

This conflict continues to be one of our least understood episodes. Many books have been written on the events of the time, usually by those who were involved in some way, anxious to provide justification for their actions. These accounts have only succeeded in muddying the picture further. What is clear is that 1962 was an unmitigated disaster. The terrain on which most of the battles were fought (or not fought) was remote and inaccessible; the troops were sorely underequipped, lacking even warm clothing; and the men and officers who tried to make a stand were repeatedly let down by their political and military superiors. Time and again, in Nam Ka Chu, Bum-la, Tawang, Se-la, Thembang, Bomdila—all in the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA in the Eastern Sector—and in Ladakh and Chusul in the Western Sector, our forces were mismanaged, misdirected or left to fend for themselves. If the Chinese Army hadn’t decided to stop its victorious campaign, the damage would have been far worse.

In this definitive account of the conflict, based on dozens of interviews with soldiers and numerous others who had a first-hand view of what actually happened in 1962, Shiv Kunal Verma takes us on an uncomfortable journey through one of the most disastrous episodes of independent India’s history.

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About the Author

Born into an army family (his father was a captain with 2 Rajput in 1962), filmmaker and military historian Shiv Kunal Verma has worked with all three arms of the Indian armed forces over the last two-and-a-half decades. From flying extensively with the IAF while making  Salt of the Earth  and  Aakash Yodha  to the filming of the  Naval Dimension  and the  Kargil War , Verma has had a ringside view of matters military. His film on the National Defence Academy— The Standard Bearers —is considered a classic. He is the author of the highly acclaimed Northeast Trilogy (that documented the entire region and its peoples) and  The Long Road to Siachen: The Question Why.

Praise for the Book

‘Having destroyed its combat readiness by tampering with the military hierarchy, the Indian Army was deployed in both NEFA and Ladakh as a glorified police force. More than half-a-century later, shorn of the myths and half-truths, this is a superbly told story that needs to be understood by future generations.’ — General V. K. Singh

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1962 THE WAR THAT WASN'T Hardcover – 4 February 2016

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• Print length 480 pages
• Language English
• Publisher Aleph Book Company
• Publication date 4 February 2016
• Dimensions 20.32 x 12.7 x 1.27 cm
• ISBN-10 9382652965
• ISBN-13 978-9382652960
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From the Publisher

In Conversation with Shiv Kunal Verma

1962: The War That Wasn’t By Shiv Kunal Verma

We died, unsuccoured, helpless We were your soldiers, men of bravery and pride

Yet we died like animals, trapped in a cage with no escape Massacred at will, denied the dignity of battle

With the cold burning flame of anger and resolution With the courage both of the living and the dead,

Avenge Our unplayed livesRedeem the unredeemable sacrifice

In freedom and integrity

Let this be your inheritance

And our unwritten epitaph

Harji Malik, ‘Nam Ka Chu: October 1962’

Introduction

LIVING IN THE SHADOW

After completing almost three years in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, now called Arunachal Pradesh), my father, Captain Ashok Kalyan Verma, was posted to the Indian Military Academy (IMA) in Dehradun as a platoon commander in July 1962. For him, this move would prove to be providential, for within a few months of his departure, 282 of the men and officers he left behind in 2 Rajput would be dead. The others were wounded or overpowered by the Chinese and taken prisoner. Among the handful who succeeded in getting away, some died of cold and starvation, while a few survived weeks of unbelievable hardship and made it back to the plains of Assam through the jungles of the Kameng Frontier Division and Bhutan.

We had moved into one of the spacious bungalows at the IMA sometime in September and I doubt if there could have been a more picturesque or happier place for a little boy to grow up in. Even though I was barely two years old, I have fleeting recollections of the place: Gentlemen Cadets, better known as GCs, running and cycling along the tree-lined avenues, horses being exercised on the polo ground, the commandant’s buggy with its coterie of resplendent sowars (mounted soldiers) and ponies, our own bungalow opposite the club and the one time a huge black rat snake suddenly appeared, scaring everyone. I remember the fallen leaves strewn on the ground, the imposing clumps of bamboo and the stunning majesty of Chetwode Hall that dominated the Academy.

Then, suddenly, as the colours of autumn gave way to winter, the Academy, like the leaves on the trees, seemed to shrivel into itself. Even to me, it was obvious that something terrible had happened. Brigadier (later, Lieutenant General) Premindra Singh Bhagat was then the commandant of the Academy. An Engineer officer, he had been awarded the Victoria Cross in Ethiopia in 1941, making him the highest decorated officer in the Indian Army at the time of Independence. In his mid-forties, Bhagat’s receding hairline and bushy moustache gave him a dapper and somewhat avuncular appearance. As was the norm with all incoming officers posted to the IMA, he interviewed my father in early October. Glancing up from the dossier which contained Captain Ashok Kalyan Verma’s service record, the commandant asked him if he was happy with his new posting. The usual answer that it was a great honour did not fool the brigadier, who could perhaps sense that the young officer in front of him was holding something back.

The commandant encouraged him to speak freely and the dam burst. My father said he had been posted out of 2 Rajput in July when it was de-inducting from the Lohit Valley where it had been deployed for the last three years. The battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Maha Singh Rikh, had been on its way to Mathura, but even as the men and equipment were being marshalled onto a special train at Missamari (near Tezpur), it had been ordered to redeploy in the Kameng Frontier Division as part of 7 Infantry Brigade. With barely any winter stores or equipment, the men had somehow made their way across Eaglenest to Bomdila, Dirang Dzong, Se-la and on to Tawang. They had then been pushed further north towards the Bhutan-NEFA-Tibet tri-junction. Military circles had been anticipating an armed clash with China, and under the circumstances the only place my father wanted to be was with the men of his battalion.

Brigadier Bhagat had been the Director, Military Intelligence at Army Headquarters, Delhi, prior to moving to the IMA. Obviously he had a reasonable idea of what was happening in NEFA and asked searching questions about the Kibithu and Walong sectors in the Lohit Frontier Division. Signalling the end of the interview, Bhagat said: ‘I know how you feel, but you must now concentrate on training the GCs here—that has to have your entire focus. Let us hope the situation with the Chinese will soon sort itself out and hopefully all will be well.’

Ever since the onset of hostilities between India and China on 20 October, only sporadic news had been filtering through with no clear picture emerging as to what was actually happening. In the last week of November, Brigadier Bhagat called my father to his office. Breaking the news as gently as he could, he said things had gone very wrong for 7 Infantry Brigade and 2 Rajput on 20 October in the Nam Ka Chu Valley. The commandant then said there were hardly any survivors and those who had escaped the massacre were being collected in Ramgarh in Bihar. Being posted back to the battalion was out of the question, but the brigadier suggested my father leave immediately for Ramgarh to find out what had transpired.

Buy your copy today to find out what had really transpired….

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About the author, product details.

• ASIN ‏ : ‎ 9382277978
• Publisher ‏ : ‎ Aleph Book Company; Latest Edition (4 February 2016); Rupa Publications India
• Language ‏ : ‎ English
• Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 480 pages
• ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 9382652965
• ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-9382652960
• Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 739 g
• Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 20.32 x 12.7 x 1.27 cm
• Country of Origin ‏ : ‎ India
• Net Quantity ‏ : ‎ 1 Piece
• Importer ‏ : ‎ Rupa Publications India
• Packer ‏ : ‎ Rupa Publications India
• Generic Name ‏ : ‎ Book
• #148 in True Accounts (Books)
• #726 in Fantasy (Books)
• #1,487 in History (Books)

About the author

Kunal verma.

Shiv Kunal Verma is the author of Ocean to Sky – India from the Air (Roli Books), a pictorial on the Military World Games and two books on the Assam Rifles. Another pictorial, The Northeast Palette was a prelude to the highly acclaimed Northeast Trilogy (KaleidoIndia). He is also the author of The Long Road to Siachen: The Question Why (Rupa & Co.) and Courage & Conviction, the autobiography of General VK Singh which was published by Aleph in October 2013; His latest book, 1962 – The War That Wasn’t has also been published by Aleph and is being hailed by critics as being the most definitive work on the Indo-China conflict.

Along with Dipti Bhalla, he has produced some of the most highly acclaimed films on the Services. In 1992, he shot and produced Salt of the Earth for the IAF. This was followed by a series of Naval and Army films, culminating with the film on the Kargil War. In addition he has also made The Standard Bearers (NDA) and the Making of a Warrior (IMA). The film Aakash Yodha along with the NDA film was premiered on the Discovery Channel. Having clocked hundreds of hours in a variety of aircraft, he is by far the most accomplished aerial cameraman in the country today.

A graduate of Madras Christian College, he did his schooling at the Doon School. He started his career opening trekking routes between Kashmir and the Zanskar and Ladakh regions. After a brief stint with India Today and the Associated Press he went on to direct and photograph the Project Tiger television series.

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On 20 October 1962, high in the Himalayas, on the banks of the fast-flowing Nam Ka Chu, over 400 Indian soldiers were massacred, and the valley was overrun by soldiers of China's People's Liberation Army. Over the course of the next month, nearly 4,000 soldiers were killed on both sides, and the Indian army experienced its worst defeat ever. The conflict (war was never formally declared) ended because China announced a unilateral ceasefire on 21 November and halted its hitherto unhindered advance across NEFA and Ladakh. To add to India's lasting shame, neither Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru nor the Indian army was even aware that the 'war' had ended until they heard the announcement on the radio - despite the Indian embassy having been given the information two days earlier.

This conflict continues to be one of our least understood episodes. Many books have been written on the events of the time, usually by those who were involved in some way, anxious to provide justification for their actions. These accounts have succeeded only in muddying the picture further. What is clear is that 1962 was an unmitigated disaster. The terrain on which most of the battles were fought (or not fought) was remote and inaccessible; the troops were sorely underequipped, lacking even warm clothing; and the men and officers who tried to make a stand were repeatedly let down by their political and military superiors. Time and again, in Nam Ka Chu, Bum-la, Tawang, Se-la, Thembang, Bomdila - all in the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA in the Eastern Sector - and in Ladakh and Chusul in the Western Sector, our forces were mismanaged, misdirected or left to fend for themselves. If the Chinese army hadn't decided to stop its victorious campaign, the damage would have been far worse.

In this definitive account of the conflict, based on dozens of interviews with soldiers and numerous others who had a firsthand view of what actually happened in 1962, Shiv Kunal Verma takes us on an uncomfortable journey through one of the most disastrous episodes of independent India's history.

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Shiv Kunal Verma?s book ?1962: The War That Wasn?t? is an unrivalled attempt at unravelling the mystery that surrounds India?s most shameful defeat at the hands of the People?s Liberation Army of China. This was a conflict between India and China across India?s Himalayan frontiers in the north and the East. It was a conflict that was never formally declared and several accounts have been written dedicated to this matter; however, none is as deterrent as the account given by Shiv Kunal Verma. He talks of the plight of the Indian solders across the northern border, all the way from Nam ka Chu in the eastern sector to Ladakh on the Western front. He talks about the horror that would have happened had the Chinese army not decided unilaterally to cease fire and stop its vicious campaign on the Indian soil. This was a conflict that saw massacre on both lands injuring over four thousand soldiers.?? The book is based on several accounts from soldiers who were present in the line of fire and were able enough to give a vivid first person account on what actually took place in that unfortunate year of 1962. ?1962: The War That Wasn?t? is an account of India?s horrific escape from disaster in young Independent existence. The book is un-nerving to the extent of sending chills down your spine by citing riveting intricacies of shocking developments. The book is a result of over two decades worth of research and interviews by the author. He personally sat down with officers and soldiers from the war. The book features a deep analysis on India?s border issues with China at the time.??? About the author? The book has been written by author Shiv Kunal Verma, who has dedicated over twenty years of his life in an effort to bring forth this book to the masses, so that the Indian populous can have a definitive account of what their motherland had to go through during those hard times. The book has been published by the Aleph Book Company in 2016 and is available in the form of a Hardcover.?? The book is available online for convenient shopping. You can bag this book from A today by following a few easy steps.

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Verma, Shiv Kunal The War That Wasn't ( 1962)

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1962 : The War that wasn’t

‘History tells us we never learn from history…’ If ever there was a book that every Indian needs to read, this is it…

– Viswajeet Singh

Noted film maker and author Shiv Kunal Verma has written this book on the 1962 war, which will be released shortly in India. This is a first look at his book..  A detailed review will follow soon.

The definitive account of the clash between India and China On 20 October 1962, high in the Himalayas on the banks of the fast-flowing Nam Ka Chu, over 400 Indian soldiers were massacred and the valley was overrun by soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army. Over the course of the next month, nearly 4,000 soldiers were killed on both sides and the Indian Army experienced its worst defeat ever. The conflict (war was never formally declared) ended because China announced a unilateral ceasefire on 21 November and halted its hitherto unhindered advance across NEFA and Ladakh. To add to India’s lasting shame, neither Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru nor the Indian Army was even aware that the ‘war’ had ended until they heard the announcement on the radio—despite the Indian embassy having been given the information two days earlier.

This conflict continues to be one of our least understood episodes. Many books have been written on the events of the time, usually by those who were involved in some way, anxious to provide justification for their actions. These accounts have only succeeded in muddying the picture further. What is clear is that 1962 was an unmitigated disaster. The terrain on which most of the battles were fought (or not fought) was remote and inaccessible; the troops were sorely underequipped, lacking even warm clothing; and the men and officers who tried to make a stand were repeatedly let down by their political and military superiors. Time and again, in Nam Ka Chu, Bum-la, Tawang, Se-la, Thembang, Bomdila—all in the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA in the Eastern Sector—and in Ladakh and Chusul in the Western Sector, our forces were mismanaged, misdirected or left to fend for themselves. If the Chinese Army hadn’t decided to stop its victorious campaign, the damage would have been far worse. In this definitive account of the conflict, based on dozens of interviews with soldiers and numerous others who had a first-hand view of what actually happened in 1962, Shiv Kunal Verma takes us on an uncomfortable journey through one of the most disastrous episodes of independent India’s history. 

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1962 The War That Wasn't Hardcover – January 1, 2016

• Print length 480 pages
• Language English
• Publisher RUPA PUBLICATIONS INDIA PVT LTD
• Publication date January 1, 2016
• Dimensions 8 x 5 x 0.5 inches
• ISBN-10 9382652965
• ISBN-13 978-9382652960
• See all details

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From the publisher.

In Conversation with Shiv Kunal Verma

1962: The War That Wasn’t By Shiv Kunal Verma

We died, unsuccoured, helpless We were your soldiers, men of bravery and pride

Yet we died like animals, trapped in a cage with no escape Massacred at will, denied the dignity of battle

With the cold burning flame of anger and resolution With the courage both of the living and the dead,

Avenge Our unplayed livesRedeem the unredeemable sacrifice

In freedom and integrity

Let this be your inheritance

And our unwritten epitaph

Harji Malik, ‘Nam Ka Chu: October 1962’

Introduction

LIVING IN THE SHADOW

After completing almost three years in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, now called Arunachal Pradesh), my father, Captain Ashok Kalyan Verma, was posted to the Indian Military Academy (IMA) in Dehradun as a platoon commander in July 1962. For him, this move would prove to be providential, for within a few months of his departure, 282 of the men and officers he left behind in 2 Rajput would be dead. The others were wounded or overpowered by the Chinese and taken prisoner. Among the handful who succeeded in getting away, some died of cold and starvation, while a few survived weeks of unbelievable hardship and made it back to the plains of Assam through the jungles of the Kameng Frontier Division and Bhutan.

We had moved into one of the spacious bungalows at the IMA sometime in September and I doubt if there could have been a more picturesque or happier place for a little boy to grow up in. Even though I was barely two years old, I have fleeting recollections of the place: Gentlemen Cadets, better known as GCs, running and cycling along the tree-lined avenues, horses being exercised on the polo ground, the commandant’s buggy with its coterie of resplendent sowars (mounted soldiers) and ponies, our own bungalow opposite the club and the one time a huge black rat snake suddenly appeared, scaring everyone. I remember the fallen leaves strewn on the ground, the imposing clumps of bamboo and the stunning majesty of Chetwode Hall that dominated the Academy.

Then, suddenly, as the colours of autumn gave way to winter, the Academy, like the leaves on the trees, seemed to shrivel into itself. Even to me, it was obvious that something terrible had happened. Brigadier (later, Lieutenant General) Premindra Singh Bhagat was then the commandant of the Academy. An Engineer officer, he had been awarded the Victoria Cross in Ethiopia in 1941, making him the highest decorated officer in the Indian Army at the time of Independence. In his mid-forties, Bhagat’s receding hairline and bushy moustache gave him a dapper and somewhat avuncular appearance. As was the norm with all incoming officers posted to the IMA, he interviewed my father in early October. Glancing up from the dossier which contained Captain Ashok Kalyan Verma’s service record, the commandant asked him if he was happy with his new posting. The usual answer that it was a great honour did not fool the brigadier, who could perhaps sense that the young officer in front of him was holding something back.

The commandant encouraged him to speak freely and the dam burst. My father said he had been posted out of 2 Rajput in July when it was de-inducting from the Lohit Valley where it had been deployed for the last three years. The battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Maha Singh Rikh, had been on its way to Mathura, but even as the men and equipment were being marshalled onto a special train at Missamari (near Tezpur), it had been ordered to redeploy in the Kameng Frontier Division as part of 7 Infantry Brigade. With barely any winter stores or equipment, the men had somehow made their way across Eaglenest to Bomdila, Dirang Dzong, Se-la and on to Tawang. They had then been pushed further north towards the Bhutan-NEFA-Tibet tri-junction. Military circles had been anticipating an armed clash with China, and under the circumstances the only place my father wanted to be was with the men of his battalion.

Brigadier Bhagat had been the Director, Military Intelligence at Army Headquarters, Delhi, prior to moving to the IMA. Obviously he had a reasonable idea of what was happening in NEFA and asked searching questions about the Kibithu and Walong sectors in the Lohit Frontier Division. Signalling the end of the interview, Bhagat said: ‘I know how you feel, but you must now concentrate on training the GCs here—that has to have your entire focus. Let us hope the situation with the Chinese will soon sort itself out and hopefully all will be well.’

Ever since the onset of hostilities between India and China on 20 October, only sporadic news had been filtering through with no clear picture emerging as to what was actually happening. In the last week of November, Brigadier Bhagat called my father to his office. Breaking the news as gently as he could, he said things had gone very wrong for 7 Infantry Brigade and 2 Rajput on 20 October in the Nam Ka Chu Valley. The commandant then said there were hardly any survivors and those who had escaped the massacre were being collected in Ramgarh in Bihar. Being posted back to the battalion was out of the question, but the brigadier suggested my father leave immediately for Ramgarh to find out what had transpired.

Buy your copy today to find out what had really transpired….

Product details

• ASIN ‏ : ‎ 9382277978
• Publisher ‏ : ‎ RUPA PUBLICATIONS INDIA PVT LTD (January 1, 2016)
• Language ‏ : ‎ English
• Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 480 pages
• ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 9382652965
• ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-9382652960
• Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 1.63 pounds
• Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 8 x 5 x 0.5 inches
• #1,833 in Asian & Asian American Biographies
• #2,802 in Military Fantasy (Books)
• #50,364 in Paranormal & Urban Fantasy (Books)

About the author

Kunal verma.

Shiv Kunal Verma is the author of Ocean to Sky – India from the Air (Roli Books), a pictorial on the Military World Games and two books on the Assam Rifles. Another pictorial, The Northeast Palette was a prelude to the highly acclaimed Northeast Trilogy (KaleidoIndia). He is also the author of The Long Road to Siachen: The Question Why (Rupa & Co.) and Courage & Conviction, the autobiography of General VK Singh which was published by Aleph in October 2013; His latest book, 1962 – The War That Wasn’t has also been published by Aleph and is being hailed by critics as being the most definitive work on the Indo-China conflict.

Along with Dipti Bhalla, he has produced some of the most highly acclaimed films on the Services. In 1992, he shot and produced Salt of the Earth for the IAF. This was followed by a series of Naval and Army films, culminating with the film on the Kargil War. In addition he has also made The Standard Bearers (NDA) and the Making of a Warrior (IMA). The film Aakash Yodha along with the NDA film was premiered on the Discovery Channel. Having clocked hundreds of hours in a variety of aircraft, he is by far the most accomplished aerial cameraman in the country today.

A graduate of Madras Christian College, he did his schooling at the Doon School. He started his career opening trekking routes between Kashmir and the Zanskar and Ladakh regions. After a brief stint with India Today and the Associated Press he went on to direct and photograph the Project Tiger television series.

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1962: The War That Wasnt

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Description

The definitive account of the clash between India and ChinaOn 20 October 1962 high in the Himalayas on the banks of the fast-flowing Nam Ka Chu over 400 Indian soldiers were massacred and the valley was overrun by soldiers of China s People s Liberation Army. Over the course of the next month nearly 4 000 soldiers were killed on both sides and the Indian Army experienced i The definitive account of the clash between India and ChinaOn 20 October 1962 high in the Himalayas on the banks of the fast-flowing Nam Ka Chu over 400 Indian soldiers were massacred and the valley was overrun by soldiers of China s People s Liberation Army. Over the course of the next month nearly 4 000 soldiers were killed on both sides and the Indian Army experienced its worst defeat ever. The conflict war was never formally declared ended because China announced a unilateral ceasefire on 21 November and halted its hitherto unhindered advance across NEFA and Ladakh. To add to India s lasting shame neither Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru nor the Indian Army was even aware that the war had ended until they heard the announcement on the radio despite the Indian embassy having been given the information two days earlier.This conflict continues to be one of our least understood episodes. Many books have been written on the events of the time usually by those who were involved in some way anxious to provide justification for their actions. These accounts have only succeeded in muddying the picture further. What is clear is that 1962 was an unmitigated disaster. The terrain on which most of the battles were fought or not fought was remote and inaccessible the troops were sorely underequipped lacking even warm clothing and the men and officers who tried to make a stand were repeatedly let down by their political and military superiors. Time and again in Nam Ka Chu Bum-la Tawang Se-la Thembang Bomdila all in the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA in the Eastern Sector and in Ladakh and Chusul in the Western Sector our forces were mismanaged misdirected or left to fend for themselves. If the Chinese Army hadn t decided to stop its victorious campaign the damage would have been far worse.In this definitive account of the conflict based on dozens of interviews with soldiers and numerous others who had a first-hand view of what actually

The definitive account of the clash between India and ChinaOn 20 October 1962 high in the Himalayas on the banks of the fast-flowing Nam Ka Chu over 400 Indian soldiers were massacred and the valley was overrun by soldiers of China s People s Liberation Army. Over the course of the next month nearly 4 000 soldiers were killed on both sides and the Indian Army experienced i The definitive account of the clash between India and ChinaOn 20 October 1962 high in the Himalayas on the banks of the fast-flowing Nam Ka Chu over 400 Indian soldiers were massacred...  Read More

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