edward titchener major experiments

Edward B. Titchener

Edward Bradford Titchener (1867 – 1927) was an Englishman and a British scholar. He was a student of Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig, Germany , before becoming a professor of psychology and founding the first psychology laboratory in the United States at Cornell University . It was Edward Titchener who coined the terms "structural psychology" and "functional psychology," in 1898, the early trends in scientific psychology. Structural psychologists analyzed human experiences through introspection , breaking mental activity down into "basic elements" or "building blocks." Although his theoretical models were not adopted by others, his championing of psychology as a science, using the scientific method of laboratory experiments to collect data, made a clear separation between experimental psychology and other trends such as psychoanalysis . Ultimately, however, our understanding of human nature cannot be achieved solely through science, although the distinctions drawn by Titchener were valuable in its early development.

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Edward Bradford Titchener was born in southern England to a family of old lineage but little money.

He entered Oxford University in 1885 on a scholarship to study philosophy , and he became interested in Wilhelm Wundt 's writings, translating the third edition of the Principles of Physiological Psychology . However, the psychology of Wundt was not enthusiastically received at Oxford, so Titchener resolved to go to Leipzig and work with him directly. There, he took his doctorate completing a dissertation on binocular effects of monocular stimulation.

After unsuccessfully searching for a position in England, Titchener accepted a professorship at Cornell University , which had opened up when Frank Angell, another American student of Wundt, went to the newly founded Stanford University . For thirty-five years, Titchener presided over psychology at Cornell, where he was an institution unto himself, arrogantly lecturing in his academic robes and tolerating no dissent.

Titchener often quarreled with his American colleagues and founded his own organization to rival the fledging American Psychological Association because of the dispute with members of the latter group. Titchener became the American editor of Mind in 1894, and associate editor of the American Journal of Psychology in 1895. Later, he received honorary degrees from Harvard , Clark , and Wisconsin. Although Titchener supervised a large number of students in early twentieth-century American psychology, his system died with him in 1927.

In the end of the nineteenth century, Edward B. Titchener carried the basic ideas of Wilhelm Wundt to the United States . Titchener called Wundt's ideas structuralism , and tried to study the structure of mental life or consciousness .

His structural psychology has a threefold aim:

• to describe the components of consciousness in terms of basic elements,
• to describe the combinations of basic elements,
• to explain the connections of the elements of connections of the elements of consciousness to the nervous system.

Consciousness is defined as "immediate experience," i.e., experience as it is being experienced. Mediate experience was flavored by contents already in the mind, such as previous associations and the emotional and motivational levels of a person. Structural psychology, in general, attempted to defend the integrity of psychology by contrasting it with physics.

Edward Titchener put his own spin on Wundt's psychology of consciousness. He attempted to classify the structures of the mind , not unlike the way a chemist breaks down chemicals into their component parts— water into hydrogen and oxygen , for example. Thus, for Titchener, just as hydrogen and oxygen were structures, so were sensations and thoughts . He conceived of hydrogen and oxygen as structures of a chemical compound, and sensations and thoughts as structures of the mind. This approach is known as "structuralism."

The experimental method employed by structuralists was introspection . This technique of self-report is the ageless approach to describing self-experience. Introspection depended on the nature of consciousness observed, the purpose of the experiment, and the instructions given by the experimenters. Introspection was considered valid only if done by exceptionally well-trained scientists, not naive observers. The most common error made by untrained introspectionists was labeled the "stimulus error"—describing the object observed rather than the conscious content. Stimulus error, according to Titchener, resulted not in psychological data but in physical descriptions.

Under this natural science approach, psychology was defined as the experimental study of the data of immediate experience through the method of introspection. The goal of psychology was to reduce the contents of consciousness to constituent elements of sensory origin.

In the 1890s, Wilhelm Wundt developed a three-dimensional theory of feeling. Essentially, Wundt thought that feelings vary along three dimensions: Pleasant—unpleasant, strain—relaxation, excitement—calm. Titchener agreed with and accepted only the pleasant—unpleasant dimension. This approach led him to relegate emotions to organic visceral reactions. Further, Edward Titchener proposed a theory of meaning suggesting that the context in which a sensation occurs in consciousness determines meaning. Accordingly, simple sensation has no meaning by itself, but it acquires meaning by association with other sensations or images. In that way, Titchener described the mind in terms of formal elements with "attributes" of their own, connected and combined by the mechanism of associations.

As a structural psychologist, Titchener, in his attempt to adhere strictly to a natural science model, readily sacrificed psychological processes and activities that did not fit into his methodological framework. In addition, the over-reliance on the questionable, strict methodology of introspection led Titchener and other structural psychologists into a sterile dead end. In a sense, structuralism was caught between the "empiricism of the British tradition" and "nativism of the German tradition." Titchener and other structuralists articulated a view of the mind as determined by the elements of sensation; at the same time they recognized mental activity and attempted to deal with activity through such constructs as "apperception." Coupled with the inadequacies of introspection, structuralism failed to accommodate conflicting philosophical assumptions about the nature of the mind.

Most of the major findings of structuralism were seriously challenged. In terms of higher mental processes, Titchener called thought a mental element that is probably an unanalyzed complex of kinesthetic sensations and images. Moreover, he perceived what we call will as an element composed of complex of images that form ideas in advance of action. As a result, thought and will are linked through mental images. According to this analysis, thought must be accompanied by images. This imperative gave rise to the "imageless thought controversy," in which other psychologists, (Oswald Külpe, Alfred Binet , and Robert S. Woodworth ) argued the possibility of thought processes without discrete mental images. Such an interpretation was unacceptable for Titchener because it contradicted his analytic view of thought, described by elements of images. Instead, it substituted a more holistic or phenomenal view of thought processes, unanalyzed into constituent elements.

Titchener proposed a model of psychology that bore similarities to materialistic empiricism . Although he recognized the necessity of a mental construct, he argued that the contents of the mind could be reduced to the elements of sensation. This analytic model of psychology ultimately led to reduction of the sensations to their corresponding stimuli. The integrity of psychology was lost, and psychology was logically reduced to physics.

Structural psychology holds a unique place in the development of the natural science model for psychology in Germany. Specifically, the writings of Edward B. Titchener as well as those of Wilhelm Wundt constitute a systematic attempt to start a coherent science, encompassing all that they considered to be psychological. As such, structural psychology was a system of psychology.

However, other scientists in Germany, contemporary with Wundt and Titchener, responded to the same forces of Zeitgeist and wrote on psychology (Ewald Hering, Georg Elias Müller, Herman Ebinghaus, Ernst Mach ). They wrote as individuals, though, not as system builders. Within the limits of natural science approach to psychology, they rejected the extremism of Wundt (Germany) and Titchener (the United States), both in the terms of the substance and the methodology of structuralism . These scientists were experimentalists in the sense that they were guided in their progress not by the framework of a preconceived system, as were Wundt and Titchener, but rather by the results and implications of their laboratory studies.

Titchener did not succeed in separating the applied from the scientific in psychology, even though he spoke with passion and conviction on this topic. He was sufficiently effective in such presentations that Sigmund Freud considered Titchener "the adversary" following his speech at Clark University in 1909 when psychoanalysts were first introduced into America. Equally, Titchener's theoretical model of mental processes failed to account for the rich diversity of the activities and products of the human mind. Nevertheless, Titchener's work firmly set the stage for psychology to be treated as a scientific enterprise, using the scientific method of laboratory experiments to obtain data.

Publications

Titchener's writings are characterized as scholarly and systematic, almost encyclopedic in their scope. He would not admit applied aspects of psychology, and so he removed himself from the mainstream of American psychology that was eagerly studying such topics as child psychology , abnormal psychology , and animal psychology. Titchener was solely concerned with the experimental analysis of the normal adult human mind, not with individual differences. Until the end of his earthly life, Titchener remained a European scientist, more exactly, a British naturalist and a German empiricist .

• Titchener, E.B. 2005 (original 1896). An Outline of Psychology . Adamant Media Corporation. ISBN 1402177461
• Titchener, E.B. 1903 (original 1898). A Primer of Psychology . Macmillan & Co.
• Titchener, E.B. 1901. Experimental Psychology .
• Titchener, E.B. 1973 (original 1908). Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention . Ayer Co Pub. ISBN 0405051662
• Titchener, E.B. 1909. Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes . Arno Press; Reprint edition. ISBN 0405051670
• Titchener, E.B. 1910. A Textbook of Psychology . New York: Macmillan.
• Titchener, E.B. 2005 (original 1915). A Beginner's Psychology . Adamant Media Corporation. ISBN 1402185146
• Titchener, E.B. 1972 (original 1929). Systematic psychology: Prolegomena . Cornell Univ+press. ISBN 0801491320
• Titchener, E.B. 1898. "The postulate of structural psychology" in Philosophical Review . No.7, 449-465.
• Titchener, E.B. 1899. "Structural and functional psychology" in Philosophical Review . No.8, 290-299.
• Titchener, E.B. 1925. "Experimental psychology: A retrospect" in American Journal of Psychology . No.36, 313-323.

Titchener also translated several works of his colleagues, including Oswald Külpe's Outlines of Psychology .

References ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

• Boring, E.G. 1977 (original 1950). A history of experimental psychology . Irvington Pub. ISBN 0891979336
• Boring, E.G. 1927. "Edward Bradfors Titchener" in American Journal of Psychology . No.38., 489-506.
• Brennan, J.F. 1982. History and systems of psychology . Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
• Evans, R.B. 1972. "E.B. Titchener and his lost system" in Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences . No.8, 168-180.
• Evans, R.B. 1975. "The origins of Titchener's doctrine of meaning" in Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences . No.7, 23-28.
• Henle, M. 1971. "Did Titchener commit the stimuli error? The problem of meaning in structural psychology" in Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences . No.7, 279-282.
• Henle, M. 1974. "E. B. Titchener and the case of the missing element: The problem of meaning in structural psychology" in Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences . No.10, 227-237.
• Hindeland, M.J. 1971. "Edward Bradford Titchener: A pioneer in perception" in Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences . No.8, 168-180.
• Pillsbury, W.B. 1928. "The psychology of Edward Bradford Titchener" in Philosophical Review No.37, 104-131.
• Woodworth, R.S. 1906. "Imageless thought." In The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods . No.3, 701-708.

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Introduction

Titchener, Edward Bradford (1867–1927) is best known for his system of psychology called structuralism. It was an experimental psychology that studied the structure of human consciousness by identifying its smallest elements.

Early Years and Education

Titchener was born in Chichester, England, on January 11, 1867 to John and Alice (nee Habin) Titchener. His ancestors had lived in Chichester since the 1500s and many had been wealthy and influential (see Boring 1927 for more detail). But Titchener’s paternal grandfather lost the family fortune and died poor. Financial hardship persisted and was exacerbated when Titchener’s father died while still in his 30s.

Without financial assistance from family, Titchener attended elite schools on academic scholarships. He graduated from the prestigious Malvern College before entering Oxford University at the age of 18 to complete an A.B. degree (1885–1890). He studied philosophy, classics, Greek, and Latin and conducted supervised...

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Boring, E. G. (1927). Edward Bradford Titchener: 1867–1927. The American Journal of Psychology, 38 , 377–394.

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Dallenbach, K. M. (1928). Bibliography of the writings of Edward Bradford Titchener: 1917–1927. The American Journal of Psychology, 40 , 121–125.

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Dewsbury, D. A. (1997). Edward Bradford Titchener: Comparative psychologist? The American Journal of Psychology, 110 , 449–456.

Heidbreder, E. (1933). Seven psychologies . Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Jastrow, J. (1901). Reviewed work: Experimental psychology by Edward Bradford Titchener. Science, 332 , 741–744.

Titchener, E. B. (1896). Outline of psychology . New York: Macmillan.

Titchener, E. B. (1898). The postulates of a structural psychology. Philosophical Review, 7 , 449–465.

Titchener, E. B. (1901). Experimental psychology: A manual for laboratory practice . New York: Macmillan.

Titchener, E. B. (1910). A textbook of psychology . New York: Macmillan.

Titchener, E. (1929). Systematic psychology: Prolegomena . New York: Macmillan.

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Washburn, M. F. (1908). The animal mind . New York: Macmillan.

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Digdon, N. (2019). Edward B. Titchener. In: Vonk, J., Shackelford, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47829-6_1646-1

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Edward Bradford Titchener

The Anglo-American psychologist Edward Bradford Titchener (1867-1927) was the head of the structural school of psychology.

Edward Titchener was born on Jan. 11, 1867, in Chichester, England. The family was old and distinguished, but there was little wealth. By scholarship, Titchener entered Malvern College, a top Anglican preparatory school, and demonstrated characteristic drive and excellence. One year, when school awards were presented by the visiting American poet James Russell Lowell , Titchener was called so often that Lowell remarked, "Mr. Titchener, I am tired of seeing your face."

The family intended Titchener for the Anglican clergy, but his interests were not in religion. In 1885 he entered Brasenose College, Oxford, on a classics scholarship but soon turned to a study of biology and then comparative psychology. He met Sir John Scott Burdon-Sanderson, one of England's first experimental biologists, and two great exponents of Darwinism, T. H. Huxley and John George Romanes. Titchener remained interested in comparative psychology, but there was not enough structure or rigor in the subject matter to satisfy him.

A few years earlier Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig had founded psychology as a systematic and experimental science of the human mind. Burdon-Sanderson suggested that Titchener do his graduate work there in the "new psychology." With Wundt, Titchener found the kind of study he had been seeking, and this analytic study of human experience occupied him for the rest of his life.

After receiving his doctorate in 1892, Titchener accepted a position in the recently founded laboratory of psychology at Cornell University . He quickly rose to full professor and head of the department of psychology when psychology became independent from philosophy. To fill the void of textbooks in experimental psychology, he published his Outline of Psychology (1897) and his monumental four-volume Experimental Psychology (1901-1905). He was an inspiring speaker, and his lectures became legend among generations of Cornell students.

Titchener emphasized psychology as a science, in contrast to technology, desiring to understand the facts of experience with no particular notion of application. His structural school studied the world of experience in terms of the experiencing individual and explained experience in terms of the nervous system . The model for structuralism was chemistry, the task being to analyze the complex experiences of everyday life into their elemental components and then to attempt to understand the nature of the compounding. His primary tool was introspection, the systematic description of experience. Titchener's A Textbook of Psychology (1910) became the bible of the school.

On Aug. 3, 1927, Titchener died in Ithaca. Without him and his system as a point of reference, systematic psychology was thrown into chaos, and perhaps because of this the day of the general psychological system soon came to an end.

Further Reading

There is no definitive biography of Titchener. A good discussion, though short, is in Edwin G. Boring, Psychologist at Large (1961). □

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structuralism

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structuralism , in psychology , a systematic movement founded in Germany by Wilhelm Wundt and mainly identified with Edward B. Titchener . Structuralism sought to analyze the adult mind (defined as the sum total of experience from birth to the present) in terms of the simplest definable components and then to find the way in which these components fit together in complex forms.

The major tool of structuralist psychology was introspection (a careful set of observations made under controlled conditions by trained observers using a stringently defined descriptive vocabulary). Titchener held that an experience should be evaluated as a fact, as it exists without analyzing the significance or value of that experience. For him, the “anatomy of the mind” had little to do with how or why the mind functions. In his major treatise , A Textbook of Psychology (1909–10), he stated that the only elements necessary to describe the conscious experience are sensation and affection (feeling). The thought process essentially was deemed an occurrence of sensations of the current experience and feelings representing a prior experience.

Although structuralism represented the emergence of psychology as a field separate from philosophy , the structural school lost considerable influence when Titchener died. The movement led, however, to the development of several countermovements that tended to react strongly to European trends in the field of experimental psychology . Behaviour and personality were beyond the scope considered by structuralism. In separating meaning from the facts of experience, structuralism opposed the phenomenological tradition of Franz Brentano ’s act psychology and Gestalt psychology , as well as the functionalist school and John B. Watson ’s behaviourism . Serving as a catalyst to functionalism , structuralism was always a minority school of psychology in America .

What is Structuralism in Psychology?

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Take-home Messages

• Structuralism is a theory of consciousness that seeks to analyze the elements of mental experiences, such as sensations, mental images, and feelings, and how these elements combine to form more complex experiences.
• Structuralism was founded by Wilhelm Wundt, who used controlled methods, such as introspection,to break down consciousness to its basic elements without sacrificing any of the properties of the whole.
• Structuralism was further developed by Wundt’s student, Edward B. Titchener.
• Titchener proposed 3 elementary states of consciousness: Sensations (sights, sounds, tastes), Images (components of thoughts), and Affections (components of emotions).

Structuralist School of Thought

Structuralism proposes that the structure of conscious experience could be understood by analyzing the basic elements of thoughts and sensations.

Structuralism is considered the first school of thought in psychology, and was established in Germany by Wilhelm Wundt , and mainly associated with Edward B. Titchener.

Structuralism looked to examine the adult mind in terms of analyzing the basic elements of thoughts and sensations, and afterward to discover the manner by which these segments fit together in complex structures.

Wundt’s aim was to record thoughts and sensations, and to analyze them into their constituent elements, in much the same way as a chemist analyses chemical compounds, in order to get at the underlying structure. The school of psychology founded by Wundt is known as voluntarism, the process of organizing the mind.

Wundt’s theory was developed and promoted by his one-time student, Edward Titchener (1898), who described his system as Structuralism, or the analysis of the basic elements that constitute the mind.

Introspection: Structuralism’s Main Technique

Introspection is the process by which a person looks inward at their own mental processes to gain insight into how they work. It is the self-observation of one’s consciousness.

Wundt’s introspection was not a casual affair, but a highly practiced form of self-examination. He trained psychology students to make observations that were biased by personal interpretation or previous experience, and used the results to develop a theory of conscious thought.

Highly trained assistants would be given a stimulus such as a ticking metronome and would reflect on the experience. They would report what the stimulus made them think and feel. The same stimulus, physical surroundings and instructions were given to each person.

Wundt’s method of introspection did not remain a fundamental tool of psychological experimentation past the early 1920″s. His greatest contribution was to show that psychology could be a valid experimental science.

Titchener trained his students to become skilled at trained introspection, and to report only the sensations as they were experienced without reliance on “meaning words”, which he called a stimulus error.

Using this approach, Titchener’s students reported various visual, auditory, tactile, etc experiences: In An Outline of Psychology (1899), he reported over 44,000 elements of sensation, including 32,820 Visual, 11,600 Auditory, and 4 Taste.

Titchener’s Structuralism

Elements of the mind.

Titchener (1908) concluded that three kinds of mental components could be considered to constitute conscious experience:

Sensations (components of discernments), Images (components of thoughts), Affections (expressions of warmth which are components of emotions).

He suggested these components could be dissected into their unique properties, which he identified as quality, intensity, duration, clearness, and extensity.

• Quality – “cold” or “red”: distinguishes each element from the others.
• Intensity – how strong, loud, bright etc. the sensation is.
• Duration – course of a sensation over time; how long it lasts.
• Clearness (attensity) – role of attention in consciousness – clearer if attention is directed toward it.

Pictures and expressions of warmth could be separated further into just bunches of sensations. It can therefore be concluded that by following this train of reasoning, all of the thoughts in question were pictures, which, being developed from rudimentary sensations, implied that all perplexing thinking and thought could, in the end, be separated into simply the sensations which he could get at through introspection.

Interaction of Elements

The second issue in Titchener’s hypothesis of structuralism was the topic of how the psychological components consolidated and interfaced with one another to shape any conscious experience.

His decisions were generally founded on thoughts of associationism. Specifically, Titchener centers around the law of contiguity, which is the idea the elements combine together.

Titchener dismissed Wundt’s ideas of apperception and innovative blend (intentional activity), which were the premise of Wundt’s voluntarism. Titchener contended that consideration was essentially a sign of the “clearness” property inside sensation.

Physical and Mental Relationship

When Titchener distinguished the elements of the mind and the specific interactions they make with each other, his theory was concerned with figuring out why the components cooperate in the manner they do.

Specifically, Titchener was keen on the connection between the physical process and the conscious experience – he wanted to discover specifically what was responsible for most of the interactions between them.

Titchener accepted that physiological cycles give a nonstop foundation that gives mental cycles a coherence they in any case would not have. As a result, the sensory system doesn’t cause any form of conscious experience, yet can be utilized to clarify a few attributes of mental occasions.

Influence on Psychology

Despite the fact that structuralism spoke to the development of psychology as a field separate from reasoning, the basic school lost significant impact when Titchener eventually passed away.

Over the years Titchener’s approach using introspection became more rigid and limited. By today’s scientific standards, the experimental methods used to study the structures of the mind were too subjective; the use of introspection led to a lack of reliability in results.

Other critics argue that structuralism was too concerned with internal behavior, which is not directly observable and cannot be accurately measured.

Also, because introspection itself is a conscious process it must interfere with the consciousness it aims to observe.

The development drove, nonetheless, to the advancement of a few countermovements that would in general respond firmly to European patterns in the field of exploratory psychology.

Conduct and character were past the degree considered by structuralism. In isolating significance from current realities of involvement, structuralism contradicted the phenomenological convention of Franz Brentano’s demonstration psychology and Gestalt psychology , just as the functionalist school and John B. Watson’s behaviorism .

Filling in as an impetus to functionalism, structuralism was consistently a minority school of psychology in America.

Titchener, E. B. (1898). The postulates of a structural psychology . The Philosophical Review, 7 (5), 449-465.

Titchener, E. B. (1908). Lectures on the elementary psychology of feeling and attention . Macmillan.

Titchener, E. B. (1899). An outline of psychology (New edition with additions). MacMillan Co

Further Reading

Leahey, T. H. (1981). The mistaken mirror: On Wundt’s and Titchener’s psychologies. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 17(2), 273-282.

Titchener, E. B. (1921). Wilhelm Wundt. The American Journal of Psychology, 32(2), 161-178.

What is structuralism in psychology?

Structuralism is an early school of psychology that sought to understand the structure of the mind by analyzing its components. Introduced by Edward B. Titchener, a student of Wilhelm Wundt, structuralism used introspection to observe and report on individual sensory experiences and thoughts.

The goal was to break down mental processes into their most basic elements, such as sensations and feelings, to understand how they combine to create complex experiences.

Who founded structuralism?

Structuralism was founded by Edward B. Titchener, a student of Wilhelm Wundt, in the early 20th century.

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The Synthetic Experiment: E. B. Titchener's Cornell Psychological Laboratory and the Test of Introspective Analysis

• PMID: 29508952
• DOI: 10.5406/amerjpsyc.130.1.0003

Beginning in 1 9a0, a major thread of research was added to E. B. Titchener's Cornell laboratory: the synthetic experiment. Titchener and his graduate students used introspective analysis to reduce a perception, a complex experience, into its simple sensory constituents. To test the validity of that analysis, stimulus patterns were selected to reprodiuce the patterns of sensations found in the introspective analyses. If the original perception can be reconstructed in this way, then the analysis was considered validated. This article reviews development of the synthetic method in E. B. Titchener's laboratory at Cornell University and examines its impact on psychological research.

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Supplement to Mental Imagery

Edward b. titchener: the complete iconophile.

An Englishman, Edward B. Titchener, became one of Wundt's most influential students. After graduate studies with Wundt, Titchener moved to the United States and became Professor of Psychology at Cornell, where, as well as being responsible for translating many of the more experimentally oriented works of Wundt into English, he established a successful graduate school and a vigorous research program (Tweney, 1987). Despite the fact that Wundt's and Titchener's philosophical and theoretical views, and their scientific methodologies, differed in important ways (Leahey, 1981), Titchener, much more than most of his American born colleagues, shared Wundt's vision of psychology as a pure science, with essentially philosophical rather than pragmatic ends, and he gained the reputation of being Wundt's leading disciple and representative in the English speaking world. However, he had no interest in his master's völkerpsychologie . Titchener had been deeply influenced by positivist optimism as to the scope of science, and he hoped to study even the “higher” thought processes experimentally (Danziger, 1979, 1980). Thus he attempted to push the method of controlled laboratory introspection far beyond the bounds that Wundt had so carefully set for it. Although he certainly knew why Wundt rejected introspection as a method for studying these processes, he believed its pitfalls could be avoided if the introspectors were suitably trained. Thus, an important part of the education of a psychologist in Titchener's laboratory was a rigorous training in how to introspect reliably (Titchener, 1901-5; Schwitzgebel, 2004).

Titchener appears to have been both a particularly vivid imager, and a firm believer in imagery's cognitive importance. He had studied British Empiricist philosophy whilst an undergraduate at Oxford, and was well aware of Berkeley's argument that “general ideas” (i.e. mental images that, in-and-of-themselves, represent kinds or categories of things, rather than particulars) are inconceivable (see section 2.3.3 ). Many philosophers today take Berkeley's argument to amount to a knock-down refutation of the traditional theory that images (ideas) are the primary vehicles of thought and that they ground linguistic meaning. [ 1 ] If mental images can only, intrinsically represent particulars, as Berkeley held, then they are surely inadequate for grounding the meanings of the general, categorical terms that are fundamental to thought and language. Titchener, however, flatly rejected Berkeley's claim, not because he found a flaw in his logic, but on introspective grounds. Commenting on Berkeley's remark about the impossibility of having an idea (image) of a general triangle (Berkeley, 1734, Introduction XIII), Titchener replies:

But I can quite well get … the triangle that is no triangle at all and all triangles at one and the same time. It is a flashy thing, come and gone from moment to moment: it hints two or three red angles, with the red lines deepening into black, seen on a dark green ground. It is not there long enough to say whether the angles join to form the complete figure, or even whether all three of the necessary angles are given. Nevertheless, it means triangle; it is Locke's general idea of a triangle; (Titchener, 1909).

Of course, Titchener was well aware that the image described here was thoroughly idiosyncratic. However, he did want to claim that such images (in virtue not so much of their individual, intrinsic characteristics, but of their place in a whole associative network of imagery) do carry meaning, and are thus fitted to be the vehicles of thought. He also described examples of his own visualizations of abstract concepts (such as the concept of meaning itself: “the blue-grey tip of a kind of scoop … digging into a dark mass of what appears to be plastic material”) and even claimed to experience imaginal meanings of connectives such as but (Titchener, 1909). Titchener plainly held that (together with actual sensations, and emotional feelings ) mental content is mental imagery.

Classics in the History of Psychology

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The 'Type-Theory' of Simple Reaction

By E. B. TITCHENER (1896)

First published in Mind , 5 , 236-241.

Posted December 2001

Professor Baldwin evasions are exceedingly skilful, and the eruptions of polite invective which usually follow them exceedingly telling.   But those who have followed this discussion with the purpose which I had in beginning it -- the purpose of finding, if possible, the true explanation of the results of psychological experiments upon the duration of the simple reaction -- will refer from his latest paper to mine, and read comparatively.   I shall therefore assume that they have noted the importance of Professor Baldwin's admissions ( e.g., p. 81), promises ( e.g., p. 85) and qualifications ( e.g., p. 89), and proceed at once to the special points emphasised in his argument[ 1 ].

1.    As to the Leipsic procedure, I can only repeat deliberately what I have before deliberately stated: that, so far as my knowledge goes, no subject who has been found capable of reaction (of giving approximately the same response to the same stimulus in a, series, say, of fifteen trials, after practice) has been neglected either in the parent or in any more recently established laboratory.   It was Martius -- one of the contributors to the Leipsic theory -- who first analysed what is now known as the " central " form of the simple reaction, a form which is neither sensorial nor muscular.   In the Cornell Study from which Professor Baldwin quotes the 'disposition view' are given the times of several observers who did not show the sensorial-muscular difference; and that although it is expressly stated that the object of the Study was not to examine and account for these divergences from the norm.   In face of these and similar facts, the charge is made that I (and, I suppose -- else the matter would not be important -- the Leipsic school with me) think that certain results "ought to have been suppressed," and that certain cases "ought not to have been investigated"[ 2 ]! [p. 237]

2.   I stated that there were many ways of testing memory type besides that of the reaction experiment.   Professor Baldwin challenges me to produce my methods, remarking that he knows of none which are conclusive except those of introspection and pathology.   I was referring to the normal mind when I made the statement; and as all psychological experiments on the normal mind, the reaction experiment included, follow or should follow the introspective method, I am afraid that a list of my methods will not broaden Professor Baldwin's knowledge.   However, I recognise the justness of the challenge, and give the laboratory and other methods (co-ordinate with the reaction method as sub-forms of introspection) which I have found useful[ 3 ].

Methods of Investigating Memory Type.   (1) I believe the best method for the determination of memory type to consist in the introspection of a trained observer at times when consciousness is, so to speak, off its guard. He must educate himself to take his mind unawares when he is remembering, or failing to remember. All sorts of rememberings -- cases referring to all the different sense departments -- must be noted.   This, the most direct way in which introspection can be practised, is also, I think, the most fruitful. I have employed it for five (not 'one or two') years; and have only refrained from publishing my results in detail because, as I said in my previous paper, some facts are still obscure to me.   (2) I have [p. 238] tried to get at memory type by questioning, with as absolute as possible avoidance of suggestion.   This method can be usefully employed only where the subjects questioned have a general knowledge of psychology but are ignorant of the doctrine of memory type.   Its results check and are checked by those of the foregoing and next following methods. (3) Questioning with suggestion is a method covering all such tests as Mr Galton's breakfast-table recollection. It has grave dangers, and must be used with great caution.   I have tried to check it by what is called the "method of reproduction," -- the subject being required to reproduce his memory image in objective form; and by an error method ,-- the memory image being compared with some objective standard. Neither check is very easy of application. But my results lead me to think that a method may be perfected, under this general head, which will be especially valuable for the estimation of the relative importance of the different memories in a given consciousness. (4) Another way of testing the relative importance of memories, or the fixity of a particular memory, is the following.   A series of experiments on memory is made, with no directions to the subject as to the way in which he is to memorise.   He is encouraged to be as full as possible in his introspective remarks. From these, checked by special experiments the experimenter ascertains the type of memory employed ,   a new set of experiments is then begun, in which the subject is told to remember in a particular way, different from the way of least resistance.   The experimental results and the subject's introspection show whether the shift of type is successful, or only partially or sporadically possible, or impossible.   (5) Sometimes two types are used in one and the same act of remembrance: introspection reveals the fact, but cannot say, under the ordinary conditions of memory, which type is the more indispensable.   Experiments by the method of reproduction, checked by others with voluntary suppression, are again useful.   (6) It is very Important to determine whether non-employment of a type is due to nature or habit and education.   I am this year trying to get a reliable method of investigating the problem, and have obtained good preliminary results from two forms of the method of reproduction. (7) Another method of testing type in general I owe to Professor M. Washburn.   Psychological experiments are often made under distraction: the subject is required to judge of the difference or likeness of impressions while he is adding numbers, etc. The mistakes made in this addition, etc., are indicative of type: if one sees the figures to be added, one's mistakes differ from those made by a subject who hears the numbers spoken as he adds them. (8) Mr A. Fraser has shown how a writer's memory type can be determined from his writings (Am .. Journ . of Psych., IV., pp. 230ff.).   This is the method which should replace 'surmise' in the case of Donders .

3.   Professor Baldwin wrote of the subjects of his Study as follows (italics mine).   "The reagents were, besides the writers (B. and S.), Mr Faircloth (F.), a student who had had only the experience gained from the practical work in this subject of the course in Experimental Psychology.   His reactions were ready and unconfused, and from all a ppearances he was a normal and more than usually suitable man for such work. The fourth, Mr Crawford (C.), is an honour student in this subject in Princeton .   H is reactions were take n in the course of another investigation, and being so few in number, they are included only because they give a certain case of a capable reagent whose sensory is shorter than his motor reaction. [p. 239] We hope to test him further. " I read this to mean that the authors believed their two reagents to be reliable subjects, but were a little doubtful as to the extent of their practice.   Hence I said: "The greatest reliance is placed upon the times of B. and S." · It was an instance of the psychologist's fallacy: had I written the paragraph, I should have meant what I took it to mean.   I am sorry that I misunderstood the writers[ 4 ]

4.   I come to the matter of Professor Baldwin's own reaction times.   In his Senses and Intellect he remarks, in general terms, that he had anticipated Lange's discovery of the sensorial-muscular difference.   Lange found that the difference averaged one-tenth of a second ( Phil. Stud., IV., 494; Wundt, Phys. Psych., 4te Aufl ., II., 311).   Many subsequent experiments have confirmed this result ( e.g., those published in the Phil. Stud., VIII., 144; and those of the Cornell Study before alluded to), and it is now generally accepted by 'the Leipsic people' as the normal difference between the two forms (Wundt, loc. cit.; Kuelpe , Outlines, 408, 410).   If Professor Baldwin anticipated Lange, his times must have shown an original difference of some 85 to 115 s .   If they did not, he did not anticipate Lange.

The differences between the times given for himself in his Study are, as I said in my earlier paper, 29, 7, 12 and 46 s .   No one of these is anything like the sensorial-muscular difference.   The 7 and 12 are times no larger than the average m.v . of the muscular reaction (about 10s ); an m.v , of 30 s is not uncommon in the case of the sensorial form; and 46 would be a typical "central" difference.   Either Professor Baldwin is mistaken in thinking that he anticipated Lange, or his times have changed since he wrote his Senses and Intellect. S.'s differences are 51, 40, 79 and 40 s . Taken as absolute times, these would all be "central," though one shows an approximation to the true sensorial-muscular difference. I do not think, however, that the differences can be treated in this way, since neither B. nor S. gave what would be ordinarily regarded as a muscular reaction.   The times are 171, 149, 164, 138; 195, 184, 158, l79 s .   These are all, in my opinion ,-- and I believe that [p. 240] those familiar with chronometrical results will agree with me,-- more or less "central" or mixed reactions. The muscular reaction to sound averages 120 s [ 5 ].

5.   Professor Baldwin resents my method of appraising his theory.   I confess that, when I am trying to form a, theory of certain phenomena or to estimate a theory already set up, I like to have the facts 'catalogued,' ticketed and weighted.   Professor Baldwin objects to bringing facts together: he distributes them sparsely in a matrix of theory ,-- like the infrequent plums in school plum-cake.   Then, if the critic complains of the quality of the compound, he says: But I have plenty more plums in the pantry. How does that help the present consumer?

The type-theory has been written about in a medical weekly, a philosophical bi-monthly, a psychological bi-monthly, and a book. Now we are told that its presentation is not yet complete. I did not, of course, know this when I criticised it.   Nevertheless, I do not regret the criticism: since it may prevent overhasty acceptance of an attractive hypothesis, and may impel Professor Baldwin to show his full hand to the psychological public.

Something might be said, I think, from the ethical standpoint, of this piecemeal doling-out of a scientific theory.   Had Professor Baldwin's article left me a shred or two of moral character, I might have made bold to say it.

6.   A few minor differences remain to be cleared up.   I deal with them in a foot- note[ 6 ]. [p. 241]

In conclusion, I cannot but express my regret that Professor Baldwin should have seen fit to write a dialectical and personal rejoinder to my criticism, without furnishing new facts or reasons for the absence of facts in earlier publications.   A good deal of his reply, and therefore of this answer to it, might have been disposed of in private correspondence. Until the promised support is brought up, the theory remains what it has been ,-- a very happy idea, or ingenious analogy, apparently natural and probable, but (so far as published) based upon an altogether insufficient substrate of fact.

I also regret Professor Baldwin's attitude to the "Leipsic people."   He is a professor of experimental psychology; he must know the literary history of reaction theories ,-- he must know how much patient work the "Leipsic people" have done, for how many years,-- how much the different theorists differ, and how the central theory has advanced,-- how the theory compares with other theories, and how adequately it covers the ground of ascertained fact. Yet he nowhere meets the Leipsic theory as a theory, but only questions its norms; he sets its authors contemptuously aside, as if to have worked at Leipsic meant a biassed view of psychology in general; he charges "Wundt, Kuelpe ," et id genus omne in the present instance with "a flagrant argumentum in circulo ," and attributes to them an unscrupulous rejection of results which make against their circulus , -- when some of these results are published by their own "people," and some even in their own organ! I have tried to write moderately in this and my previous paper, and have no wish to emulate Professor Baldwin in the matter of name-calling at the last moment.   But I cannot think that his attitude to a long line of predecessors in the field is either scientifically or ethically defensible.

E. B. TITCHENER

[1] I give one instance of the way in which Professor Baldwin can parry an objection.   In his Psych. Rev. Study he identified the 'disposition view' with the Leipsic theory.   I urged that the 'view' was not a theory at all; and that the type theory had to meet, not it, but the Leipsic theory proper ,-- something quite different.   He now says, in effect: I grant that the view is not a theory; but that leaves my theory in a better position than ever, since it is a theory.   To which course, reply that the rejoinder is formally correct, but that the objection holds as strongly as it held before, inasmuch as no comparison of the type theory with the Leipsic theory has been carried out.

[2] Nine gentlemen took part with me in my Leipsic Study. I published the results obtained from Dr Meumann , Mr H. C. Warren and myself. There are consequently seven (not six) to be accounted for. One devoted almost all his time to the apparatus. One was called away on military service early in the course of the investigation; the series which I have from him promise well. One found the apparatus too complex, and its management too tedious, and withdrew from the research group. One gave such curiously slow reactions that they were hardly reactions at all. I was advised by Professor Wundt to continue work with him, but he left the laboratory for a reason which I cannot recall.   One was found to be colour-blind, and left my group for another in consequence.   I have many series from him, which may be useful some day to compare with those taken from other colour-blind persons.   One was unanimously -- himself included -- referred to the category of incapables in this department of work.   It would have been interesting to study his irregularity (here I heartily agree with Professor Baldwin): but that was not the object of my inquiry.   It would have demanded simple experiments in many sense spheres: I was desirous of making complicated experiments in one.   The last participator was the 'odd man' of the group: a very useful personage, liable to be called upon at short notice to replace an absentee as experimenter or subject, in order to prevent interruption of the work.   His results were good ; but they were too scanty to be published, and were not intended for publication

Only one of the seven, then, was rejected on the ground of incapacity: though others might have been, had they continued with me. And it is surely evident that irregularities cannot be explained till we have norms whereby to explain them; i.e., that it was more important to proceed with the original research than to turn aside to examine the single case. This is to me so obvious, that I almost wonder whether Professor Baldwin and myself are not using the term "reaction experiment" in two totally different senses,-- such as those indicated by Dr Rivers, Journ . of Mental Science, Oct. 1895.

[3] Is it illogical, as Professor Baldwin implies, to state that there are many methods of testing type, and yet that the elucidation of type is difficult? There are many methods of learning Greek.

In Nature of Dec. 5, 1995 , a reviewer says : "Surely we all know what is the particular language of our own translation of experience."   If we did, all the method-work -- reaction and other -- would be needless.

[4] Just as, I am sure, Professor Baldwin will be sorry that he jumped to an interpretation of the sentence in my Leipsic Study, which turns out to be very largely wrong. I must be more accustomed to making mistakes than Professor Baldwin is; for I find it impossible in that case to work myself up to the height of moral and intellectual indignation from which he looks down upon my misreading here.

My presumption that the writers were working definitely upon the type theory from the outset was based on the statement that one of the "questions set for research" was that of "the differences of reaction times for different individuals under identical conditions."

In the paragraph in which he insists that the greatest reliance was not placed upon the times of B. and S., Professor Baldwin writes that these times are "very neutral to the discussion."   Yet they receive quite detailed treatment in his Study in the examinations following the two Tables.   Why?

[5] Professor Baldwin says that his times "have only changed in that the distinction is less marked than it used to be; and this I go [to] the trouble to explain in the same article as probably due to habit and practice."   In my copy of the Study there is not a word of this explanation.   The change in the author's times is not once referred to.   A general statement is made about habit towards the end of the Study; I commented on it on p. 514 of my criticism.   It does not contain any the most remote trace of personal reference.

[6] (1) "How can Kuelpe say beforehand that the muscular form will turn out in each case to be shorter than the sensorial?"   If Professor Baldwin will read Kuelpe's Studien articles ,-- or if he will even read on for a single page of the "Outlines," from the place of my quotation,-- he will find Kuelpe's answer to this question. (2) "Is not the fact that F is a musician something of an explanation of his auditive 'disposition'?" Not necessarily; not i.e., if other musicians do not show auditive dispositions in their reactions.   It is just here that facts are so useful ,-- or so obstinate. (3) Defect of vision might, certainly, lengthen: reaction time.   I do not see that this helps to explain the reaction itself.   (4) The rest of the paragraph which, has called forth these last two remarks is obscure to me, m spite of many readings. The type theory would hardly be a theory of the geistige Anlagen which it presupposes, even if it fitted all the reaction facts. It surely posits memory type; it does not state the conditions under which one or other type may be looked for. I fail to see, therefore, how its application can be 'an investigation of the so-called 'dispositions' to find out what they really are.'   The Study, indeed, dismisses this problem (p. 78): it is evident, we read, that attention is now motor, now sensory, differing in individuals with type,-- "apart quite from the question as to how one of other state of things comes to be as it is in any one case."   At the same time, I admit that the incomplete statement of the theory may account for its obscurity on this point, and shall await the complete presentation before offering further criticism. (5) I quoted Professor Cattell's letter, because he allowed me to publish it under his name.   I did so altogether unhesitatingly, because Professor Cattell has taken part in the discussion of the validity of Lange's distinction (readers of the Studien will know how rigidly his adverse criticisms were 'suppressed' by Professor Wundt), and because every jot of direct evidence for or against the type theory was important to me. When the 'exact figures' and their analysis are published Professor Cattell's cases will, undoubtedly, carry greater weight than they can in outline form. The same is true of Professor Baldwin's cases: "I fear that those mean variations which "are too complex to be of any value" will still be asked for by the cataloguing psychologists.   (6) M. Inaudi's case tells heavily against the type theory, as published, for the reasons given on p. 513 of my earlier paper.

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The Origins of Structuralism in Psychology

One of Psychology's First Schools of Thought

Wikimedia Commons​​

Structuralism is considered the first  school of thought in psychology . It involved breaking down the mind into the smallest possible parts and analyzing each one. The goal was to learn how each component functioned individually, as well as how they worked together to support complex mental processes.

Wilhelm Wundt , who was famous for founding the first psychology lab and is considered the father of modern psychology, founded structuralism. Although, one of his students also contributed greatly to this school of thought.

Origins of Structuralism

While Wundt is often listed as the founder of structuralism, he never actually used the term, instead referring to his ideas as voluntarism . It was his student, Edward B. Titchener , who invented the term structuralism .

Though Titchener is usually the one credited with the establishment of structuralism and bringing the ideas to America, the ideas started with Wundt. Titchener actually changed much of what Wundt taught.

Wundt believed that similar to other sciences, the mind could be broken down into structures by classifying conscious experiences into small parts that could be analyzed. Titchener decided to scrap Wundt's brand of psychological study.

Titchener did this because conscious experiences aren't as easy to control in an experiment as behavior is. Rather than focusing on obtaining quantitative measurements, Titchener prioritized observation and analysis.

Introspection: Structuralism's Main Tool

Titchener took Wundt's experimental technique, known as introspection, and used it to focus on the structures of the human mind. Anything that could not be investigated using this technique, Titchener believed, was not in the domain of psychology.

Titchener believed that the use of introspection , which utilized observers who had been rigorously trained to analyze their feelings and sensations when shown a simple stimulus, could be used to discover the structures of the mind. He spent the bulk of his career devoted to this task.

Titchener's Structuralism

Titchener's structuralism stressed three important tasks in the study of the human mind:

• To discover how many mental processes there were, identify the elements of these processes, and explain how they work together
• To analyze the laws governing the connections between the elements of the mind
• To evaluate the connections between the mind and the nervous system

For approximately 20 years, Titchener dominated American psychology. He was extremely prolific, publishing 216 books and papers during his lifetime. He also trained a number of influential psychologists, supervising the doctoral work of nearly 60 students, including Margaret Floy Washburn and Edwin G. Boring.

Today, Ticheners's work is rarely mentioned outside of a purely historical context. He maintained a powerful hold on American psychology during his lifetime and contributed to psychology becoming a respected branch of the sciences, but his influence began to wane following his death.

Structuralism's Impact on Psychology

Structuralism may have enjoyed a brief period of dominance in psychology, but the school of thought essentially died out following the death of its founder. It did, however, lead to the development of other movements, including functionalism, behaviorism, and Gestalt psychology .

Kim A.  Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt .  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  

Schultz DP, Schultz SE.  A History of Modern Psychology .

Roback AA. The structuralism of Titchener . Hist Amer Psychol . 1952:180-191.

Hockenbury, DH, Hockenbury, SE. Introduction and Research Methods. In: Discovering Psychology. 5th ed. New York, NY: Worth Publishers; 2010:4-5.

By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Member Article

100 years of ‘the experimentalists’.

• Experimental Psychology
• History of Psychology

The Society of Experimental Psychologists celebrated the beginning of its centennial year March 7-8, 2003 by holding its 100th annual meeting at Washington University in St. Louis. The centennial observation will culminate in 2004 with a meeting at Cornell University where the society was established in 1904.

Known initially as “the Experimentalists,” the society was formed by Cornell psychologist Edward Bradford Titchener (1867-1927) as a vehicle for organizing small, informal gatherings of North America’s leading experimental psychologists. Members and invited guests were encouraged to speak about current research in their labs and to exchange barbed criticisms in smoke-filled rooms; women were specifically excluded.

“Titchener created the Experimentalists in his own image,” suggested Ludy Benjamin Jr. a noted historian of psychology and professor of psychology and educational psychology at Texas A&M University. During a brief talk on SEP history offered as part of the annual meeting, Benjamin discussed Titchener’s complete dominance of the group’s early meetings. Titchener’s control of the society, he noted, was released only in his death in 1927. The group voted to admit women the next year and changed their name to the Society of Experimental Psychologists.

This year’s meeting included some 45 participants from universities in the United States and Canada. Henry L. (Roddy) Roediger, III is chair of SEP and organized this year’s meeting. The two-day meeting produced a series of talks on contemporary issues in psychology. “The format of the meetings may not have changed too much over the years,” Roediger said. “We still seek to exchange the latest information from our labs. However, the original members would be astounded to see that smoking is banned from the meetings and that women form an integral part of SEP. In fact, Carolyn Rovee-Collier was awarded the Howard Crosby Warren Medal this year, the most prestigious award the Society has traditionally given.” Rovee-Collier is professor of psychology at Rutgers University.

In addition, the society presented its Norman H. Anderson Lifetime Achievement Award to Bennet Murdock, professor of psychology emeritus at the University of Toronto. This award was offered for the first time this year and is sponsored by a generous donation from Norman Anderson of the University of California, San Diego. SEP’s other new award, the Early Investigator Award, was awarded to Zhong-Lin Lu, associate professor of psychology at the University of Southern California.

The Society has generally adhered to Titchener’s original vision that the meetings be small and fairly casual. They are limited to members of the Society and to faculty and graduate students of the host department. The original bylaws limited membership to less than 50, although that number has been liberalized in recent years. Currently nine new members are inducted each year. New members elected this year include John Cacioppo, University of Chicago; Morton Ann Gernsbacher, University of Wisconsin at Madison; Richard Ivry, University of California, Berkeley; John F. Kihlstrom, University of California, Berkeley; Richard E. Nisbett, University of Michigan; Hal Pashler, University of California, San Diego; Keith Rayner, University of Massachusetts; Sara Shettleworth, University of Toronto; and Zhong-Lin Lu, University of Southern California. Induction into the group is a significant honor.

Roediger remarked that “Examination of this list of new members reveals trends that were unthinkable in Titchener’s time. Several social psychologists were voted in, and developmental psychologists are also included in SEP. We now try to consider members of all fields in which experimental methods are used to study behavioral phenomena, from neuroscience on the one hand to social and personality psychology on the other.”

After a welcome from Edward S. Macias, Executive Vice-Chancellor and Dean of Arts and Sciences at Washington University, the talks began. Roediger provided a historical talk, noting that the centennial of SEP happened to correspond with the Sesquicentennial (150th anniversary) of Washington University. He therefore spoke on “Experimental Memory Research Before Ebbinghaus” in which he detailed the contributions of Francis Eugene Nipher (1847-1926), the first Wayman Crow Professor of Physics at Washington University in St. Louis. Nipher conduced and published experiments on immediate serial recall and discovered, among other things, the serial position effect showing the first and last elements of a series are better recalled that items appearing in the middle of a list. Nipher published this work in the 1870s, before Hermann Ebbihnghaus began his research in 1879 and published it in 1885.

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