ideal society research paper

• DOI: 10.1177/00220221221126419
• Corpus ID: 252937249

Profiles of an Ideal Society: The Utopian Visions of Ordinary People

• Julian W. Fernando , Nicholas Burden , +4 authors Y. Kashima
• Published in Journal of Cross-Cultural… 13 October 2022

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Home / Shifting views of an ideal society in the U.S.

Climate Note · Nov 11, 2020

Shifting views of an ideal society in the u.s., by jennifer carman , seth rosenthal , edward maibach , john kotcher , xinran wang , jennifer marlon and anthony leiserowitz, filed under: beliefs & attitudes and policy & politics.

Individuals’ attitudes toward climate change risks and solutions are shaped by personal and social factors other than knowledge of climate change alone (van der Linden, 2015) . One such factor is differing cultural worldviews, or values regarding how society should be structured and the role of government in addressing problems (e.g., Douglas, 1966; Leiserowitz, A., 2006; van der Linden, 2015). 

Two important types of cultural worldviews are egalitarianism and individualism . People with a more egalitarian worldview tend to believe that society should promote equality, social justice, participatory democracy, and diversity, and are generally more concerned about environmental hazards including climate change (Leiserowitz, 2006). They also tend to favor government actions to solve societal problems, including increased environmental regulations. In contrast, people with a more individualistic worldview are more likely to believe that society should promote individual liberty, autonomy, and opportunity (Leiserowitz, 2006). They tend to be less concerned about environmental hazards and favor greater freedom for industry. As a result, they generally oppose government intervention and environmental regulations.

Our Climate Change in the American Mind surveys have repeatedly included questions over the past 12 years that measure these worldviews among the American public. Here we report on how several key measures of these worldviews have changed among registered voters over time.

Democrats and Republicans tend to have very different cultural worldviews: Democrats tend to be more egalitarian, while Republicans tend to be more individualistic. Our data suggests that Democrats — particularly liberal Democrats — have become more egalitarian and less individualistic since 2008, whereas Republicans have remained highly individualistic.

Liberal Democrats increasingly say all basic needs (food, housing, health care, education) should ideally be guaranteed by the government for everyone. In 2020, about half of registered voters (47%) say that in an ideal society, the government would guarantee all basic human needs (including food, housing, health care, and education) for everyone. Strikingly, about eight in 10 liberal Democrats (83%) and about six in 10  moderate/conservative Democrats (59%) agreed with this statement in 2020. By contrast, only about three in 10 liberal/moderate Republicans (32%) and one in 10 conservative Republicans (11%) agree with this vision of an ideal society. From 2008 to 2020, liberal Democrats’ support for this statement increased by 21 percentage points, while moderate/conservative Democrats’ support remained essentially unchanged (+1 percentage point). Conversely, support for this statement decreased by 6 points among liberal/moderate Republicans and by 5 points among conservative Republicans.

Democrats increasingly say the world would be more peaceful if wealth were divided more equally among nations. In 2020, nearly half of registered voters (46%) say the world would be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided more equally among nations. Majorities of liberal Democrats (72%) and moderate/conservative Democrats (66%) held this view, but only about three in ten liberal/moderate Republicans (31%) and fewer than two in 10 conservative Republicans (16%) held this view. From 2008 to 2020, support for this statement increased by 12 points among liberal Democrats and by 18 points among moderate/conservative Democrats. In contrast, support among liberal/moderate Republicans decreased by 12 points from 2008 to 2020, and among conservative Republicans it remained relatively low and steady throughout.

Democrats increasingly disagree that the government should spend less time trying to fix people’s problems. In 2020, half of registered voters (50%) say that if the government spent less time trying to fix everyone’s problems, we’d all be a lot better off. Republicans were particularly likely to support this statement, including eight in 10 conservative Republicans (80%) and about two in three liberal/moderate Republicans (65%). Support was much lower among Democrats, including 37% of moderate/conservative Democrats and about one in five liberal Democrats (22%). Moreover, support for this statement among registered voters overall has decreased significantly since 2008. However, this change has largely been driven by Democrats, who have become much less likely to support this statement, with agreement falling by 21 points among both liberal Democrats and moderate/conservative Democrats. Support among Republicans, however, did not change much over the 12-year period (liberal/moderate Republicans -4 percentage points, conservative Republicans -2 percentage points).

Democrats increasingly disagree that the government tries to do too many things for too many people, and we should just let people take care of themselves. Eight in 10 conservative Republicans (81%), and about six in ten liberal/moderate Republicans (59%), say our government tries to do too many things for too many people, and we should just let people take care of themselves. In contrast, only three in 10 moderate/conservative Democrats (29%) and half that many liberal Democrats (14%) agree. Since 2008, agreement among both liberal Democrats and moderate/conservative Democrats decreased by 13 points, while agreement among both conservative Republicans and liberal/moderate Republicans increased by 4 points.

Nearly seven in ten registered voters (69%) say that discrimination against minorities is a serious problem. In 2020, large majorities of liberal Democrats (93%) and moderate/conservative Democrats (85%), and six in 10 liberal/moderate Republicans (61%) say that discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society. In contrast, only four in 10 conservative Republicans (41%) agree with this statement. Overall, voters’ level of agreement with this statement in 2020 is similar to 2008, but has increased significantly since 2014 after an initial drop in 2010, during the early years of the Obama presidency.

Democrats and Republicans tend to have very different cultural worldviews about the ideal structure of society and the role of government. Democrats tend to be more egalitarian than individualistic, while the opposite is true for Republicans. Moreover, over the past 12 years, Democrats’ have become more egalitarian and less individualistic, whereas Republicans’ worldviews have remained mostly static. The shift among Democrats has led to  increasing support for strong government action to solve societal problems, from health care to climate change. Therefore, building a bipartisan consensus on climate change may be becoming more difficult, as the two parties increasingly have divergent views of the role of government in solving problems like climate change.

The data included in this report are based on data from 10 waves ( n = 10,436 registered voters) of the bi-annual Climate Change in the American Mind survey — a nationally-representative analysis of public opinion on climate change in the United States conducted by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication and the George Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication . Surveys were conducted from Fall 2008 to June 2017 using the Ipsos (formerly GfK) KnowledgePanel®, a representative online panel of U.S. adults (18+). Data for July 2020 ( n = 803 registered voters) were also collected separately by Yale and George Mason University using the Ipsos KnowledgePanel® omnibus survey. Datapoints for 2011, 2012, and 2013 report the average of results from two waves of data collected in each of those years. All questionnaires were self-administered by respondents in a web-based environment.

The average margin of error for each wave of data is +/- 3 percentage points at the 95% confidence level. Percentage values are weighted to align with U.S. Census parameters. For tabulation purposes, percentage points are rounded to the nearest whole number.

References:

Douglas, M. (1966). Purity and danger: An analysis of concepts of pollution and taboo . London and New York: Routledge & Keagan Paul.

Van der Linden, S. (2015). The social-psychological determinants of climate change risk perceptions: Towards a comprehensive model. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 41.  112-124. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2014.11.012

Leiserowitz, A. (2006). Climate Change Risk Perception and Policy Preferences: The Role of Affect, Imagery, and Values. Climatic Change, 77 , 45–72. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-006-9059-9

Carman, J., Rosenthal, S., Maibach, E., Kotcher, J., Wang, X., Marlon, J., & Leiserowitz, A. (2020). Shifting views of an ideal society in the U.S. Yale University and George Mason University. New Haven, CT: Yale Program on Climate Change Communication.

Funding Sources

The research was funded by the Schmidt Family Foundation, the U.S. Energy Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and the Grantham Foundation.

Climate Change in the American Mind

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"Utopia: The Search for the Ideal Society in the Western World." New York Public Library, Humanities and Social Sciences Library, Fifth Ave. and 42d St., New York, NY 100 18.

Temporary exhibition, Oct. 14, 2000-Jan. 27, 2001. 550 objects. Roland Schaer, curator; Holland Goss, research curator; Gregory Claeys, Paul LeClerc, and Lyman Tower Sargent, advisory team.

Utopia: The Search for the Ideal Society in the Western World. Ed. by Roland Schaer, Gregory Claeys, and Lyman Tower Sargent. (New York: New York Public Library and Oxford University Press, 2000. 386 pp. Cloth, $49.95, ISBN 0-19-514110-5; paper, $27.50, ISBN 0-19-514111-3.)

Internet: <http: //www nypl.org/utopia>.

As the third millennium began, it was certainly appropriate to reflect on the evolution of utopian visions that, in one form or another, have been a hallmark of Western culture. The product of an unprecedented partnership between the New York Public Library and the Bibliotheque Nationale de France in Paris-which earlier mounted a similar but separate exhibition-"Utopia" ranged from ancient cultures to the Internet. Its roughly 550 objects included often priceless books, manuscripts, documents, drawings, prints, maps, photographs, posters, and album covers. Among those objects were the first editions of Thomas More's Utopia (15 16) and of other classic utopian works; Thomas Jefferson's handwritten copy of the Declaration of Independence; "The Green Globe," the first depiction of the Americas as separate continents; the "Columbus Letter," the published version of Christopher Columbus's report from the New World; Shaker drawings; items from the 1939-1940 and 19641965 New...

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16 Idealism, Society, and Community

• Published: January 2016
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Continuing the discussion of idealist arguments that might be given for concerning oneself with the well-being of others, this chapter examines the British Idealist theory of the organic social whole (focusing on the common good theory of T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Marietta Kies), and the Personal Idealist theory of community (focusing on Josiah Royce and J. M. E. McTaggart). Despite their differing views regarding the metaphysics of community and the ‘separateness of persons’ these two approaches lead to remarkably similar ethical theories, in large part because the Personal Idealists understand the development of distinct moral personality as something conditional upon membership of a community. In each of the cases considered it is demonstrated how it is the thinkers’ idealism that underpins their altruistic or communtarian orientation.

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Explaining Society: An Expanded Toolbox for Social Scientists

We propose for social scientists a theoretical toolbox containing a set of motivations that neurobiologists have recently validated. We show how these motivations can be used to create a theory of society recognizably similar to existing stable societies (sustainable, self-reproducing, and largely peaceful). Using this toolbox, we describe society in terms of three institutions: economy (a source of sustainability), government (peace), and the family (reproducibility). Conducting a thought experiment in three parts, we begin with a simple theory with only two motivations. We then create successive theories that systematically add motivations, showing that each element in the toolbox makes its own contribution to explain the workings of a stable society and that the family has a critical role in this process.

People create society. People generate, through their independent and joint decisions, both conflict and cooperation in dyads, groups, and society. Conflict is not hard to explain as a result of the actions of self-interested persons, but cooperation has proved more difficult to explain. Over the past 350 years, many philosophers and social scientists have contemplated how society and its institutions can emerge from the actions of individuals. How, they ask, can a stable, self-sustaining society be created from the actions of actors who are separate, self-interested individuals? This Hobbesian problem of order ( Hobbes, 1952 ) was proposed by Parsons (1937) and ratified by many others as a primary sociological question (e.g., Sawyer, 2005 ; Wrong, 1994 ). For our purposes, order in a social system means that the system is sustainable, self-reproducing, and predominantly peaceful.

We consider a few of the efforts social theorists have made to understand how individuals’ motivations generate behaviors that then interact in dyads and groups to create a stable society. How individual actors’ interactions create society is referred to as a process of emergence ( Sawyer, 2005 ). By accounting for how individuals and their interactions and relationships give rise to societal institutions, emergence theories explain the structure of society as a complex system. However, many of the earlier efforts to construct this type of theory, though creative and influential, were limited by their restricted assumptions: they did not have access to modern neurobiological insights into the range of human motivations.

In this article, we embark on a similar effort to understand how stable societal institutions might arise from individual motivations. To do so, we metaphorically assemble a theoretical toolbox in which each of our tools is a human motivation. One of our goals is to evaluate such a theoretical toolbox for understanding the organization of a stable society. We begin by reviewing previous efforts to derive emergent theories of stable society. We then discuss some of what is currently known about human motivations. Last, we conduct a thought experiment using tools from the theoretical toolbox.

We limit the focus of our experiment to the emergence of three of the key institutions that facilitate stable societies—economy (sustainability), government (peace), and family (reproducibility). We use these three institutions because they are of particular importance to social stability. First, the economy provides for the distribution of goods and services that make a society sustainable. Second, governments ensure peace through regulation, such as enforcement of contracts. Third, families enable society to be self-reproducing through the nurturance and socialization of new members. We treat economy, government, and family as functional constructs rather than as concrete historical structures.

We do not claim that these three institutions are the only, or even the most important, institutions to understand society fully. However, we suggest that the theoretical toolbox we propose is adequate to explain these fundamental aspects of society. The first theory in our thought experiment is based on a toolbox containing only the motivations of self-interest and lust. When that theory does not produce an adequate emergent theory of society, we successively add motivations to our toolbox to construct two more theories, working through each motivation’s additive effect on our specified institutions and the resultant society that they generate. In the end, we note ways in which the family is of particular importance.

The Nature of Emergence

To construct a theory of stable societies, we examine the social implications of a set of human motivations. In calling what we produce a theory, we note that some authors have proposed a distinction between a theoretical orientation, which carries the logic of an explanation, and a theory, which applies that logic to a set of empirical contexts ( Bell, 2008 ; Hage, 1972 ). Using that terminology, what we propose here is to develop a theoretical orientation of how a stable social system can emerge from the motivations of individual actors. Thus, we present not a theory of any particular society but a theoretical orientation that can be applied to better understand any stable society. However, because this terminology is not yet widespread in the social sciences, we use the more common, if ambiguous, terminology by referring to our product as theory.

Before we begin to develop theories of stable society, let us clearly note what we are not doing. We are not attempting to explain the historical or cultural development of society; that is, we are not attempting to explain the emergence of human society as a historical or prehistorical phenomenon. Thus, when we discuss emergence, we are not presenting a historical narrative of the development of empirical societies. We do not attempt to explain the political, demographic, cultural, or religious trajectory of any historically observed societies.

We set a modest goal: to identify what types of theories (theoretical orientations) of stable society might emerge from limited assumptions about human motivations. From these assumptions, we derive a set of successive theories, the last of which accounts for critical elements of societal functioning that are familiar to those who live in stable societies. Specifically, we ask, What is the minimal set of assumptions about the nature of human motivations that can account for the emergence of three fundamental social institutions—economy, government, and family—that aid and facilitate a stable society? We focus on stability rather than order, because for some authors (e.g., Hayek, 1982 ) order means just predictability, so that what Hobbes refers to as the “war of all against all” (discussed here) is a predictable order. For our purposes, however, stability means that a social system is sustainable, self-reproducing, and predominantly peaceful. Thus, what we are creating with the toolbox is not a theory to explain all societies at all times. In particular, we are not trying to model societies undergoing civil war or other types of internal schism. As we suggest in our final discussion, modeling such societies would probably require greater emphasis on the motivations of anger, fear, and attachment.

Although we begin with motivations that are located solely in the individual actor, it is important to recognize that as motivations are enacted and social institutions emerge, those institutions in turn have an effect on the actors in that emergent society. Individual action and interaction creates social patterns. In turn, the social environment enables individual and interactive patterns selectively. Actors create their own social contexts, but they are not masters of those contexts ( Bourdieu, 1990 ; Giddens, 1984 ). Nor is the social environment master of the individual. Social contexts put constraints on individuals; provide incentives to achieve social goals; and provide resources that individuals use actively and creatively in responding to, re-creating, and modifying their own environments and in their quest to fulfill the needs generated by their motivations. Furthermore, as we will see, the social environment can foster or limit individual motivations. This circular relation between social institutions and the individual, though not our main focus, is an important aspect to consider when attempting to understand how society as a whole emerges from the motivations of individual actors. Because we emphasize motivations, we focus primarily on a particular beginning of this circular relationship between actors and institutions and leave other aspects of the circular relationship for others to contemplate.

A fundamental principle of emergence, as we use the concept, is that there are characteristics of the system that are not characteristics of the individual components of the system. By this, we mean that there are societal characteristics that are not characteristics of individual actors themselves but that instead develop from the actors’ characteristics and the actions and resultant interactions that express those characteristics. It should be noted that we do not take a position on the issues of social holism, the idea that there may be nonemergent social phenomena ( Sawyer, 2005 ); instead, we have chosen to focus on delineating the processes by which individual phenomena—specifically biologically identifiable motivations—influence the processes and structures of economy, government, and family.

Some Theories of Emergence

Attempts to explain the emergence of a stable society from individual goals and motivations can be traced back at least as far as Plato and Aristotle. For our part, we consider the notable efforts of several social contract theorists. Hobbes (1588–1679) described self-interested actors who continually seek to fulfill their needs ( Hobbes, 1952 ). Because total available resources are relatively limited, actors frequently want more than they have, and they compete with other actors who want the same. This eternal competition creates the “war of every man against every man” ( Hobbes, 1952 , p. 85). For Hobbes, this constant war will stop only when fear causes actors to unanimously choose to enter into a social contract to give up some of their individual freedoms and form a government to protect themselves from the predations of others. This government, Hobbes suggests, provides stability, as it is given absolute power that does not require additional consent after the initial social contract is formed.

John Locke (1632–1704) also assumed that actors are fundamentally self-interested ( Locke, 1986 ). He believed, however, that as actors exert labor to fulfill their needs, their labor then creates private property and ownership. The effort that creates private property leads most others to respect that property, and thus the state of nature is relatively peaceful. Yet Locke understood that some actors would commit offenses against others in the service of their own self-interest. So the fear of such predations would lead actors to agree to a social contract to install a government to protect life, liberty, and property (thus protecting the industrious who were able to legitimately accumulate more than others). For Locke, the social contract establishes the government’s authority; although Locke has a less benign view of government then Hobbes, Locke argues that legitimacy is conditional on the government’s acting as a neutral judge to protect property.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) agreed with Hobbes and Locke that actors are self-interested, but he also emphasized that actors are naturally limited in their wants and are empathic toward others, so that actors in the presociety state of nature lead solitary, peaceful, and productive lives ( Rousseau, 1994 ). As members of a potential society improve their productivity through interaction, increased productivity generates pride in comparison with others. Interdependence allows for the creation of new products, which in turn produces insatiable new desires, as well as the desire to control others. Rousseau argued that the need to resolve conflicts that emerges from the unequal distribution of property leads to the formation of the social contract and its resultant government to keep peace between men, a peace that primarily benefits the already powerful. For Rousseau (1994) , “the first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, to whom it occurred to say this is mine and found people sufficiently simple to believe him, was the true founder of civil society” (p. 60). Thus, Rousseau had a more equivocal view of the role of government in creating stability than either Hobbes or Locke.

Human Motivation

Recent developments in neurobiological research have given new insights into human motivations, insights that go beyond what was known to classical theorists. This research has identified the existence of multiple motivations produced by systems in the brain ( MacLean, 1990 ; Panksepp, 1998 ). These motivations are part of what Damasio (1994) calls “pre-organized mechanisms” (p. 117) in the brain and are produced by systems that have been preserved through evolution because they provide survival advantages. Much has been learned about these motivations by examining their operation in nonhuman species. In these species we can see how the motivations operate without the interaction with cultural influences that complicate understanding their operations in humans. Four identified motivations that are found in all vertebrates (mammals and nonmammals) are seeking (which we understand as self-interest), lust, fear, and anger ( Panksepp, 1998 ).

Self-Interest

The seeking motivation, in its most primitive form, directs the search for nutrients and the related exploration of the environment. The seeking motivation is an energy-conserving motivation. It is of no benefit to an animal if it exerts more energy in capturing a prey than can be recovered by eating the prey. Seeking is thus a reward-maximizing motivation. In humans, the seeking motivation appears to direct actors to achieve the satisfaction of their wants in general ( Bell, 2010 ; Panksepp, 1998 ). For the sake of clarity, we refer to this maximizing motivation in humans as self-interest.

Self-interest has both a conventional and a technical meaning. Conventionally, it refers to anything one wants: thus, one can have an interest in food, in sex, in survival, in revenge, in security, or in one’s child’s success. Technically, in economics ( Samuelson & Nordhaus, 1995 ), in sociology in social choice theory ( Coleman, 1990 ; Hechter, 1987 ) and social exchange theory ( Blau, 1986 ; Ekeh, 1974 ; Emerson, 1976 ), and in behavioral psychology ( Miller & Ratner, 1998 ), self-interest refers to utilities that can be compared across actions and for which one makes decisions so as to maximize resulting utility. Of the conventional interests described above, only those involving tangible goods or services also involve any kind of conscious maximization of utility. We use the technical meaning of self-interest here: thus we exclude lust (sex), fear (survival), anger (revenge), attachment (security), and caregiving (support for the child) from the self-interest motivation because these motivations involve different neural circuits from self-interest. In addition, as we will see, most of them do not involve the utility maximization of self-interest. We hold a slightly different view of self-interest from Panksepp ( Panksepp & Moskal, 2008 ; Panksepp & Smith-Pasqualini, 2005 ). For Panksepp, the seeking system governs an animal’s exploration of the environment, the result of which is the knowledge of where food, water, and other resources may be found. He also includes higher-order exploration, such as curiosity and science under the purview of this motivation. However, unlike Panksepp, for which knowledge of the location of food is a by-product of exploration, we propose a more sociological usage and thus suggest that the motivation of the seeking system is not just to know where food is as a means but also to procure the food and to consume it as an end. The satisfaction of self-interest produces pleasure from the production of dopamine in the brain ( Panksepp, 1998 ).

A number of classical and contemporary authors have gone beyond self-interest as the primary motivation in human nature. Authors have frequently concluded that social reality is complex and governed not only by self-interest but also, as Brickman (1987) notes, by something else. Social contract theorists included other motivations to help account for how actors in a society might interact with one another (e.g., fear and pride for Hobbes, respect for Locke, and pity and/or empathy for Rousseau). Some authors recognize the something else at the level of the society, such as gemeinschaft ( Toennies, 1961 ), mechanical solidarity ( Durkheim, 1933 ), partnership ( Eisler, 1987 ), commitment ( Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985 ), and community ( Etzioni, 1993 ; Nisbet, 1990 ). Others see it at the level of the relationship, such as bestowal ( Singer, 1966/1984 / 1984 / 1987 ), communion ( Bakan, 1966 ; Clark & Mills, 1979 ; Weber, 1947 ), expressiveness ( Parsons & Bales, 1955 ), connectedness or connection ( Hess & Handel, 1959 ; Jordan, 1991 ; Miller, 1986 ), affect ( Kantor & Lehr, 1975 ), status ( Kemper, 1978 ), object relations ( Mitchell, 1988 ), and solidarity ( Schwartz & Merten, 1980 ). Still others see the something else at the level of the individual, such as altruism ( Thomas, 1989 ), agape ( Nygren, 1953 ), or care ( Gilligan, 1982 ). We look for the something else in the biological systems in the brains of humans.

Lust evolved as a motivation aroused by copulative opportunities. In humans, the conscious feeling of lust, or sexual desire, may be defined as “a psychological state subjectively experienced by the individual, an awareness that he or she wants or wishes to attain a (presumably pleasurable) sexual goal” ( Regan & Berscheid, 1999 , p. 15). It is the awareness of one’s desire for sexual stimuli and sexual contact, as well as the motivation to achieve such sexual gratification and establish a sexual relationship ( Regan & Berscheid, 1999 ). Like the self-interest system, satisfaction of lust produces pleasure. Because both involve dopamine, in principle an actor makes choices among sex and other interests to maximize pleasure across the two motivations.

Although the self-interest motivation directs the search for food in the simplest organisms, the fear motivation directs the effort to avoid becoming a meal to another organism’s seeking system. Unlike the maximizing self-interest motivation, the fear motivation is profligate. Because the consequences of not avoiding a predator can be terminal, the fear motivation directs escape and avoidance actions that can consume enormous amounts of energy. The human fear motivation directs the avoidance of danger from both physical and social threats ( Damasio, 1994 ; LeDoux, 1996 ). Hobbes was quite clear to include fear as a major human motivation; however, contemporary authors are more likely to use softer terminology, such as anxiety , concern , worry , frustration , and distress to refer to the fear motivation at different levels of activation. Although one may consider that an actor has an interest in survival, the fear motivation to avoid threats is not an energy-conserving motivation: this suggests that it is not appropriate to conceptualize it as reward maximizing.

The motivation of anger is closely related to fear, and evolutionarily it was a differentiation of the fear system ( Panksepp, 1998 ). In its most primitive form, anger is a prey’s desperate struggle to escape when captured by a predator ( Panksepp, 1998 ). In general, it is a defensive aggression that protects against social and physical predation. When self-interest or lust goals are not met, the fear system is activated in the form of frustration, which in turn activates the anger system to add emotional force to efforts to satisfy goals. Like fear, anger is not a reward-maximizing motivation. Anger is “a powerful brain force we experience as an internal pressure to reach out and strike someone” ( Panksepp, 1998 , p. 188) that motivates us to compete for resources. It serves the purpose of increasing the chances of getting what we want and compete for. Thus, anger becomes a non-energy-conserving mechanism that supports the achievement of self-interest and other motivation goals. Although the anger motivation does not determine which rewards are available to a successfully dominant actor (those rewards depend on resources available in the physical, social, and cultural environment), the anger motivation provides the emotional impetus to achieve the rewards ( Sewards & Sewards, 2002 ). Furthermore, in mammals, including humans, the aggressive action to escape has evolved further into an aggressive intention to dominate ( Kemper, 1990 ; Lara, Pinto, Akiskal, & Akiskal, 2006 ).

In addition to the motivations of seeking, lust, fear, and anger, which are found in all vertebrates, there are three motivations found only in mammals: caregiving, attachment, and play ( Panksepp, 1998 ).

Caregiving is a motivation within all mammals to protect, comfort, and nurture another actor ( Bowlby, 1969/1982 ; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007 ; Solomon & George, 1996 ). The caregiving system in the brain produces this motivation and related processes, such as empathy and responsibility ( Bell, 2010 ; Uvnäs Moberg, 2003 ). As are the four vertebrate emotions of self-interest, lust, fear and anger, caregiving is a biologically rooted motivation that evolutionarily predates social structure, culture, and social norms ( Bell, 2001 ; Clutton-Brock, 1991 ). In humans, of course, cultural and cognitive factors can shape the development and expression of this motivation ( Bell, 2010 ). The strength of the motivation tends to increase with physical contact and interaction. Proximity and strength of caregiving are thus linked, so that more caregiving is likely to lead to more proximity, and more proximity is likely to lead to more caregiving ( Montagu, 1986 ), thus promoting development of an emotional bond between adults as well as between parents and their children. Like the fear and anger motivations, the caregiving motivation is not reward maximizing. The mother nursing an infant or the father comforting a nervous, crying, teething child does not primarily maximize any identifiable self-interest rewards through these activities.

Attachment is a motivation that is oriented toward satisfying the fundamental human need for security and support ( Bowlby, 1969/1982 ). The system in the brain that produces attachment is closely related to the system that produces fear and is thus often activated by fear, usually conceptualized as distress ( Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007 ). This motivation thus helps create security, which is a state involving trust and the absence of fear. Security is a particularly important issue for children because of their relative helplessness, but also because childhood resolution of attachment needs affects personality and relationships throughout life ( Ainsworth, 1989 ; Bowlby, 1969/1982 ; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985 ). Attachment motivates the actor to seek support from a special protecting other to reduce distress ( Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007 ). Caregiving and attachment have their earliest development in the family. Children whose attachment needs are not met or are met only sporadically generally become insecure and have difficulty forming and maintaining rewarding adult relationships, whereas children whose attachment needs are met tend to have fulfilling relationships with others and positive expectations about forming new adult relationships ( Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978 ; Bowlby, 1973 , 1980 ). Like fear, attachment is not inherently a reward-maximizing motivation.

Play is a motivation only recently identified in the brain and not yet well understood ( Panksepp, 1998 ; Panksepp & Smith-Pasqualini, 2005 ). What is known is that the urge to play is intrinsic to the mammalian system. Because of its association with physical contact and intense interaction, play creates and strengthens social bonds ( Brown & Vaugh, 2009 ; Huizinga, 1949/2000 ; Panksepp, 1998 ). It provides a vehicle for the exercise of other emotional systems, especially social ones, in safe and familiar relationships ( Huizinga, 1949/2000 ; Panksepp, 1998 ). The play system generates pleasure and thus provides a rewarding vehicle for learning skills associated with all of the other motivations, such as fear (e.g., peek-a-boo, scary movies) or anger (rough-and-tumble play, other competitions). In addition, play appears to strengthen executive psychological functions and so support actors’ thoughtful engagement with the people and world around them ( Panksepp & Smith-Pasqualini, 2005 ).

The motivations of self-interest, lust, fear, anger, attachment, caregiving, and play are produced from strictly biological neuronal systems in the brain. However, simply because they are embodied in the brain does not mean that they are independent of social influences. As a neuronal system is laid down and consolidated, the strength of the corresponding motivation is influenced by social and cultural contexts that vary throughout the population. The growth and interconnections among these systems in the brain are affected by factors such as prenatal nutrition, maternal stress levels, birth experiences, physical contact, and social interaction ( Carter, 1998 ; Hrdy, 1999 , 2005 ; Insel, Young, & Wang, 1999 ; Kemper, 1990 ; Panksepp, 1998 ; Panksepp & Smith-Pasqualini, 2005 ). Wider social influences, such as level of education and economic resources available to caregivers, also influence the rate of development of each brain system during childhood ( Bell, 2009 , 2010 ). In fact, each motivation varies throughout the population depending on personal and interpersonal experiences that strengthen or weaken the motivation.

A Thought Experiment in Three Parts

In this article we develop a series of theories of society. Like all theorists of social systems from Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau through Durkheim and Parsons to Coleman and Giddens, we start with certain assumptions and then deductively describe the society that would emerge from these assumptions. We use this process three times as we cumulatively add motivations to our theoretical toolbox until we arrive at our final theory. In this series we begin the conceptualization of each theory with strictly limited assumptions about human motivations and then deduce from those motivations the forms that society would or could take as actors spontaneously express the motivations. The ultimate goal is to produce a theory that generates a close approximation to a stable society. We conclude in the end that this occurs in the theory that includes the motivations that we suggest for the social scientist’s theoretical toolbox. In developing each theory, we ask three sets of questions in particular:

• What kind of economic system arises by which adults meet their needs for sustenance, shelter, and other physical needs for survival? Why, given the motivations assumed by the theory, does one actor provide goods and services wanted by another?
• What kind of government system arises? How will actors in a society organize to minimize violence and threats of violence? How, given the motivations assumed by the theory, will protection and other resources for the common good be provided?
• What kind of family system arises to provide the reproduction of society? Given the motivations assumed by the theory, why will adults provide the nurturance and socialization of children necessary to populate the next generation?

We construct three theories with increasing sophistication and increasing verisimilitude. The first theory is admittedly very limited, but it corresponds to what many theorists claim as minimal assumptions. The inadequacies of Theory 1 will become clear relatively quickly, but this theory creates a foundation, inadequate as it may be by itself, on which the subsequent theories are built.

Theory 1: Self-Interest and Lust

We begin with a very limited model of human motivation: we imagine that all actors have only two motivations, those of self-interest and lust, the energy-conserving, interest-maximizing motivations. We imagine independent actors in an environment of some scarcity. In this environment, each actor will seek to find adequate resources to sustain life, competing with others who want the same resources. Theory 1 explicitly excludes fear, anger, caregiving, attachment, and play, focusing primarily on self-interest and including lust only in the segment of the theory where it is applicable.

Many contemporary theories of how individuals come to act together to construct societies have largely been based on the assumption that self-interest is the primary human motivation ( Bourdieu, 1984 ; Coleman, 1990 ; Giddens, 1979 ; Gouldner, 1960 ; Held, 1990 ; Mansbridge, 1990 ; Miller & Ratner, 1998 ; Parsons, 1951 ; Rawls, 1971 ; Rescher, 1975 ; Schwartz, 1986 ; Sober & Wilson, 1998 ). “Evolutionary biology, neoclassical economics, behaviorism, and psychoanalytic theory all assume that people actively and single-mindedly pursue their self-interest, whether it takes the form of reproductive fitness, utility maximization, reinforcement, or the pursuit of pleasure” ( Miller & Ratner, 1998 , p. 53). To this list we add rational choice theory, exchange theory, and most power theories across the social sciences.

An inherent part of the assumption of self-interest as a motivation is that actors are rational; that is, we assume that they act on the basis of their personal interests in such a way as to maximize their net rewards ( Becker, 1991 ; Coleman, 1990 ; Elster, 1989 ; Nye, 1982 ). Governed by the self-interest motivation, the actor attempts to use resources, energy, and time efficiently to maximize the achievement of rewards. Because we have not included fear in this theory, actors do not—cannot—fear their neighbors, and because we have not added anger, there will inevitably be differences among actors but no dominance motivation, that is, no alpha males or alpha females. Actors cannot fear their neighbors, and they cannot feel a need to defend through strength against their neighbors. We take this to mean that there will be no hierarchy, no dominance of one over another. Thus, we imagine a kind of Rousseau-like world in which actors are characterized by their primary concern for satisfaction of their own needs and lead an innocent, peaceful and largely solitary existence.

In the environment we are considering, actors can meet their survival needs for sustenance, shelter, and the like only from their own efforts (e.g., growing their own food, weaving their own cloth) or by entering into mutually acceptable trades with other actors. For actors motivated solely by self-interest, transactions to achieve sustenance will involve voluntary exchange between equals. Actors will not voluntarily enter into a transaction unless the maximization of those interests in the moment is achieved. If two actors are equal and there is no regulatory mechanism, they can transact only through voluntary, mutually rewarding exchanges in the moment. Voluntary exchange is for most people the preferred way for society to be conducted. Actors can live in mutually rewarding peace with their neighbors in an economy limited to direct exchange.

There is no government in this theory because our preliminary restriction to the motivation of self-interest eliminates the possibility that fear might motivate a search for protection. Actors might desire a market and a government that can enforce contracts. However, without fear and enforceable power, any actor can refuse to honor any contract at any time with impunity. If actors were to try to create a government, any government official would be, by assumption, strictly self-interested. This official would have no motivation to resolve disputes fairly. In Theory 2 we will see a stronger motivation to create a government.

Actors want what they want, and one of the things they want is sex, because, as discussed previously, lust is also a biological motivation that we have in this theory. Therefore, some actors will eventually produce children. The motivation of lust per se is not goal directed toward the birth of children most of the species in which lust is a motivation have no known awareness of such a link. For most sociological theories, lust is a background, unexamined assumption from which children just appear; lust has no formal role in most theories of society, and it will not have much of a role here other than that of propagation.

When children appear, they will likely die unless they are fed, clothed, housed, protected, and socialized with the skills to navigate the world. We refer to actions to meet these needs as nurturing the child. In a system of actors motivated only by self-interest and lust, nurturing is difficult to motivate in adult actors. In the society of Theory 1, families must develop from actors’ efforts to satisfy their self-interest and lust motivations. Thus, the nurturance of children will by assumption be enacted—to the extent that it occurs—by self-interested actors who require an immediate reward to compensate for those nurturing activities. In such a society, there is no immediate inherent benefit for an actor to nurture a child. An ideal exchange between an adult and a child might be for the adult to provide child nurturance at one time in return for labor in a family enterprise or old-age assistance from the child at a later time. In this arrangement, the self-interested adult would be providing nurturance in anticipation of the child’s eventual ability and willingness to repay the adult through labor or providing old-age assistance. However, when the child became able to do so, it would not necessarily, or automatically, be in the interests of the child to provide the services to the adult. Because the adult would know this in advance, few adults would recognize a self-interested benefit in nurturing the child.

It appears, then, that a family system cannot emerge in a society in which actors are motivated only by self-interest and lust. Lust can produce children, but neither lust nor self-interest facilitates the nurturance of those children to assure their survival and socialization, which are prerequisites for a self-reproducing society. There is no credible source of reward that can harness self-interest to motivate adult nurturance. Thus, Theory 1 does not allow for exchanges or contracts that create families that are recognizable as they are understood in a stable society.

Table 1 summarizes the nature of economy, government, and family that our analysis shows will (or will not) emerge in Theory 1. It is clear, as we explain above, that human actors who are motivated only by self-interest and lust will be unable to constitute a society that is sustainable and self-reproducing.

Summary of Emergent Theories

Note : The economy provides for the distribution of goods and services that make a society sustainable. Government ensures peace through regulation, such as enforcement of contracts. Family enables society to be self-reproducing through the nurturance and socialization of new members.

Theory 2: Theory 1 Plus Fear and Anger

In Theory 2, we add two new motivations, fear and anger, to Theory 1’s self-interest and lust. Hobbes refers to fear more than 150 times in Leviathan (1952), in which he proposes his social contract explanation of the motivation to create government. As each actor must contend with the self-interested actions of others, so each becomes afraid of the predations of others. This state of constant competition creates the so-called war of all against all.

In Hobbes’s state of nature, each actor must balance the self-interested desire for more with the fear of failure and the fear of losing what one has (see also Wrong, 1994 ). As actors vary in the strength of their motivations, there will be some actors whose fear system is very sensitive and who feel particularly threatened by the success of others. The fearful actor can reduce fear through power and through accumulating additional resources. Being afraid of what other actors might do activates the anger motivation to reduce one’s vulnerability. Actions to augment one’s power (e.g., greater physical strength, better weapons, skill in using them), whether done reactively for protection or proactively because of a high level of acquisitiveness, create consequential inequalities. When actors are unequal in a consequential way and there is no regulatory structure, the stronger will have the capability and incentive to coerce the weaker and receive unequal benefits. Thus, one actor may propose a transaction such as, “I will give you nothing if you give me your money; I’ll beat you up if you don’t.” The other actor may find this to be a relatively attractive offer compared to the alternative: “I can give him my money, or I can wait for him to beat me up—and then he’ll take my money anyway.”

In Theory 1, self-interest and lust were able to create only a local economy of direct person-to-person exchange. With the addition of anger and inequality, the level of exploitation rises. Fear provides a reason to desire a stable economy with protections against coercion and exploitation, and anger provides an emotional impetus to achieve such a goal. However, just wanting to receive the benefits of a stable economy is not enough to obtain them. There is no motivation in this theory that will lead the stronger to use restraint—getting more is always better than getting less. The economy of Theory 2 will still enable direct exchanges, but inequality will enable power interactions in which stronger actors will take resources from weaker actors.

As some actors become stronger and more powerful than others and expropriate resources from them, the fear system in the weaker actor is activated. For Hobbes, it is fear that motivates the eventual willingness to subject oneself to a government: Hobbes “regarded all men as driven to seek power, and eventually to agree to subordinate themselves to a common power, neither for glory nor to increase their opportunities for economic exploitation but rather for security against the depredations of others” ( Wrong, 1994 , p. 24, emphasis in original). Thus, there arises a demand for a form of regulation to limit predation. Hobbes’s solution to the war of all against all is for the actors in a society to unanimously agree to give up some of their freedoms and create a government to provide protection. If such a regulatory system succeeds in restricting predation and exploitation, the result is again an exchange system of voluntary transactions, but one that also supports contracts and indirect exchanges. That is, inequalities and resulting potential for coercion become the monopoly of the regulatory system. Locke (1986) and Rawls (1971) provide similar justifications for instituting a social contract.

Thus, self-interested actors aware of their potential vulnerability to exploitation by more powerful others might desire a binding agreement to forgo some personal autonomy in return for protection by a government. For this solution to work, at least two conditions must be satisfied: protection of the social contract itself and protection of actors subject to the social contract.

First, the social contract must be protected. Once the government is constituted per the social contract, it must enforce the contract against those who oppose it, including new members (e.g., children) who were never parties to the original contract. Some actors, after the original unanimous agreement to establish the social contract, may change their minds and oppose decisions by the government that do not provide rewards for them. By the assumptions of Theory 2, actors who were self-interested before agreeing to a social contract will still be self-interested afterward. Some will not be afraid enough of others to wish to be constrained by government. In such a case of actors who come to oppose the social contract, the government may have to use coercion to overcome their opposition.

The second condition that must be satisfied is that members of the society must be protected. The government must fulfill the social contract and impartially provide protection for all actors against exploitation by others. At any point at which the government begins to abet exploitation by any actor or group of actors, or even by the government itself, the social contract will be broken ( Locke, 1986 ).

Unfortunately for the intentions of the social contract, if the actors should agree to set up a government, then self-interested actors will staff it. Because the actors who come to hold positions in the government are by definition in this theory self-interested (as well as motivated by lust, fear, and anger), these officials will enforce the social contract to the extent that to do so is in their self-interest and fulfills their other motivations of lust, fear, and anger. Officials will have a self-interested motivation to coerce others for their own benefit. Furthermore, because they are the ones who control the means of coercion, they need not fear retaliation by others or constraint by the government they themselves control. Graft, corruption, and exploitation of those outside the government are inevitable under a system operated by such officials.

This theory provides no intrinsic motivation for government officials to enforce the social contract, so there will have to be effective oversight of their performance to ensure that officials enforce the social contract. There is, however, no mechanism under the social contract for some additional layer of superofficial to oversee the official. Even if such a layer were created, there would be no oversight to ensure that the superofficials faithfully exercised this role without another layer of oversight over them, ad infinitum.

Thus, the sort of government that emerges in a society of actors who are motivated only by self-interest, lust, fear, and anger is a system of untrammeled power. A government in such a society will be absolute and authoritarian. Self-interested officials will be motivated to exploit others for personal benefit; fear may make them sensitive to opposition from those they exploit, but their anger will activate protective and defensive action against any opposition. This government will be inherently incapable of impartial enforcement of the social contract because there is no mechanism to prevent exploitation by the government or by those who can reward officials for nonenforcement of the social contract.

In Theory 2, children’s and adult actors’ needs are expanded to include those generated by the fear and anger motivations. In the family, children still need nurturance, but the addition of fear and anger provide no new rewards to pay adults for these services. The creation of an authoritative government structure allows for the possibility of enforcement of contracts, so delayed exchanges become possible. The emergence of a coercive, yet unbiased, regulatory system to enforce contracts would allow for an exchange over time between an adult actor and child. Anyone could in principle enter into a contract with an adult to provide a stream of rewards as compensation for the efforts of nurturing a child. If the adult enters into such a contract, threats of punishment by a regulator could serve to enforce the contract. And yet there is no reward to the first actor for entering into this contract even under a regulatory system that enforces voluntary contracts.

The government, in its regulatory function, might choose to enforce involuntary contracts (which is essentially what social norms are). For example, an adult actor might enter into a contract with the child, who is not capable of giving informed agreement. The adult can contract to give nurturance to the child in exchange for support to be given by the child to the adult in old age (perhaps invoking the social norm of reciprocity). The self-interested adult will, of course, maximize his or her own reward by giving the minimum level of nurturance to the child to avoid punishment by the authority charged with enforcement of the contract. Similarly, the child in adulthood will give the minimum level of nurturance to the elder adult to avoid punishment by the authority charged with enforcement. If the adult wants more than minimal nurturance in old age, the adult might create an equal value contract, in which the adult will record the level of nurturance to the child with the regulating authority, and that authority can then enforce an equal level of nurturance from the child in the adult’s old age.

An alternative method for ensuring adult nurturance of children is for the government to directly mandate such nurturance. A government, staffed with self-interested officials, might recognize the benefit to itself of socializing future generations and might then decide to enforce nurturance of children by adult actors. To Locke (1986) , it is part of the social contract that parents are obligated in this way. Of course, even if society were to charge the government to enforce adult nurturance of children, there is no plausible mechanism by which some enforcement official can be both motivated to enforce nurturance and knowledgeable enough to make the enforcement effective.

Anger can create child abuse along with other forms of interpersonal violence. Actors who are motivated only by self-interest, lust, fear, and anger will have no intrinsic motivation to nurture children. But to the extent that the government coerces such behavior from parents, nurturance can create enormous frustration for parents from the burdens of attention, expense, and effort required to meet even the most basic survival needs of children. Frustration induces anger, and the greater size and strength of parents creates the opportunity for parents to vent their anger in aggression against children ( Justice & Justice, 1990 ; Straus & Gelles, 1986 ). Such aggression threatens the well-being and even survival of children.

To satisfy the increased demand for a nurturing parental role, government would need to establish surveillance over the family. Thus, a society peopled by actors motivated only by self-interest, lust, fear, and anger must either reduce privacy of the family to allow government surveillance or give up on enforcing parental nurturance. A potential solution for increasing surveillance is for the government to create a role in the family to monitor adult care of children, but the enforcement issue remains. Thus, adult-child nurturance will be sporadic and unenthusiastic, because high levels of nurturance cannot be reliably compensated or enforced.

We have seen that, in a social system in which all motivations are focused on the self, there are no mechanisms besides reward or punishment to achieve the nurturance of children. Children are needed to replenish the workforce, to provide economic services to the family business, to provide care services in the adult actors’ old age. These outcomes are likely to occur only to the extent that there is a coercive social structure that ensures the children’s needs are met; that the children obey an involuntary contract to provide these services; and that the children, as adults, repeat the cycle with children of their own.

Table 1 summarizes the nature of economy, government, and family that our analysis shows emerges in Theory 2. Because of fear and anger, government might be instituted, but it would necessarily be corrupt. It appears that a family system could not emerge spontaneously in a society under the motivational assumptions of this theory unless the government coerces it. However, such coercion is likely to be ineffective. We saw in Theory 1 that there was no credible source of reward that can harness self-interest or lust alone to motivate adult nurturance of children. And we have seen in Theory 2 no credible threat that can harness the additional motivations of fear or anger to foster such nurturance either. Clearly, children will result in any hypothetical society—if for no other reason than lust. However, given the assumptions of Theories 1 and 2, actors have no rational reason (no expected net reward and no credible threatened punishment) for nurturing them.

Theory 3: Theory 2 Plus Caregiving, Attachment, and Play

In this theory, we add three final motivations to our theoretical toolbox, caregiving, attachment, and play. The social contexts that determine the development of the caregiving and attachment systems generally happen primarily and earliest in the family. The play system as well is strongly associated with the family. Because of the particular importance of the family to these motivations, our discussion of Theory 3 examines the emergence of the family before examining that of the government and economy as in our previous two theories, because in this theory, the family provides the necessary foundation from which cooperative economic and regulatory processes can emerge.

The caregiving motivation is inherently oriented toward a specific partner, this motivation directs action to meet that specific partner’s needs. Actors who hold a partner and interact with him or her (whether the partner is another adult or a child) activate the caregiving circuits ( Panksepp, 1998 ) that allow him or her to come to be proactively committed emotionally to the partner and to meeting the partner’s needs ( Bell, 2001 , 2010 ; Bell & Richard, 2000 ; Hrdy, 1999 ; Montagu, 1986 ). This process operates spontaneously and deeply between most children and the adults who nurture them. In addition, adults build mutual caregiving relationships in a more deliberate way with other adults, which in turn provide a foundation for marriage and other long-term relationships.

When we add the caregiving motivation to our theoretical toolbox, we have, for the first time, a motivation for the voluntary nurturance of others, finally making it motivationally feasible for children to receive the nurturance they need to grow to adulthood, and so enabling the literal reproduction of society. We can directly conceptualize dyadic relationships in which two actors nurture and support each other without any necessary assumption of reward or coercion. The caregiving motivation provides a foundation for the family as a nurturing and socializing institution by allowing for internal motivation of supportive relationships. The ability of the caregiving motivation to foster secure attachment is a critical contribution to social stability through the family structure. Because healthy adults are proactively committed to their children, they have a motivation to be sensitive and responsive to their children’s needs. For an adult with a fully functioning caregiving system, it is the adult’s perception of the child’s needs that determines the adult’s responses to the child ( Blood, 1969 ; Erikson, 1963 ; LaRossa & LaRossa, 1981 ; Rapoport, Rapoport, Strelitz, & Kew, 1977 ; Ruddick, 1989 ). Adults are still self-interested, and potentially fearful, and angry in this model of human motivation, but they are now also interested in meeting the needs of others. Adults may be frustrated and angry from the costs and inconveniences of child nurturance, but now they have a countervailing motivation—caregiving. Thus in the families that emerge in theories produced by this model of human motivation, family members still negotiate, exchange with, and coerce one another; but they also ask and receive; they listen and give. In these families, sensitive and responsive caregiving meets the attachment needs of children and partners, creates more attachment security, and lays the groundwork for cooperative activity across society.

Furthermore, because of the adult’s personal and emotional commitment to the child, monitoring of nurturance is now done by the adult instead of by the government or some other regulatory arm of the society. The result is that the monitoring is more effective, and sensitivity and responsiveness are higher than can be expected from external monitoring by either through a formal means such as the government or informally through social norms enforcement. The security that human actors now actively pursue because of the attachment motivation is able to be produced by consistently responsive and sensitive nurturance. This results in secure attachment that supports open, flexible relationships—first in the family and later in the society in general.

In families with such security, play can flourish when family members are comfortable and warm toward one another ( Panksepp, 1998 ). Caregiving thus engenders the trust that makes play possible ( Bekoff, 2004 ). Play supports health through physical exercise and fitness, enhances cognitive abilities and physical dexterity, and can encourage social flexibility and innovation ( Huizinga, 1949/2000 ). In a self reinforcing cycle, play then also reinforces the feeling of security. To the extent that family experiences generalize to actors outside the family, caregiving and playfulness have the potential to affect how actors can live together cooperatively in larger groups.

As the motivation to voluntarily provide nurturance to others, caregiving can have a profound effect on the society, including the economy. People who grow up in supportive and loving families in which the motivation to nurture family members is modeled and encouraged tend to exhibit high levels of caregiving toward strangers as well ( Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007 ; Oliner & Oliner, 1988 ). Actors who receive sensitive and responsive nurturance in their families do not have to worry about their own unmet attachment needs and can thus spare attention for the needs of others. Generalization of the dyadic caregiving experienced in the family to those outside of the family unit allows actors to recognize needs in others, and then meet those needs. This creates at least two outcomes. First of all, there are still exchange and power. Actors still enter into voluntary exchanges with persons who are functionally equivalent, and may still coerce extra rewards from others who are weaker. But to the extent that actors are motivated by caregiving, they also become empathic toward the needs of others ( Bell, 2010 ). In a dyadic relationship, this works to balance the self-interest motivation’s intent to maximize reward at any cost with the caregiving motivation’s concern about the welfare of the other actor. The actor’s empathy thus acts as a restraint on the actor’s self-interest.

A second outcome results from the recognition that actors differ in their levels of self-interest, fear, and caregiving. Those with high caregiving motivations are led to meet the needs of not just those with whom they have a personal relationship but also others whom they do not know. In addition to individual philanthropy, organizations designed to meet the needs of others, such as homeless shelters and orphanages, express the caregiving motivation that has been generalized from specific close relationships to those outside the family.

As secure actors can be individually concerned about the needs of others, this generalized concern for a variety of different actors can then become a facilitator of governmental action. Now that governmental officials can be motivated by caregiving in addition to the more base motivations of self-interest, lust, fear, and anger, government can effectively offer impartial enforcement of exchange contracts and impartial detection and punishment of coercion, thus permitting effective long-term contractual agreements. The addition of attachment does not change the purpose or structure of government from Theories 1 and 2, but it does enlarge the potential scope of regulation because the actors have an enlarged set of benefits they wish to obtain (self-interest rewards, reduction of fear, and security through attachment).

When government officials are motivated by caregiving as well as other motivations, then government action can be directed effectively toward the needs of society instead of exclusively toward the self-interest, lust, fear, and anger of the official, and an ethic of care can emerge ( Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor, 1988 ; Rich, 1986 ; Ruddick, 1989 ). Although it remains true that some in government may be motivated predominantly by self-interest and may thus seek to exploit rather than protect citizens, officials in the government who are motivated more strongly by caregiving will monitor the effectiveness of their own actions and that of other officials, thus reducing (though certainly not eliminating) the exploitive efforts of those officials driven mainly by self-interest. When the idea of governmental caregiving becomes established in the population, oversight of the government by the populace as well as by representatives of the populace becomes legitimated. Officials who profit individually rather than discharging the public trust can be disapproved and punished more effectively if citizens are actively engaged in the government’s oversight. In addition, it is legitimate to expect that securely attached citizens who are trustful of others will be inclined to accept governmental support and authority when governmental actions are carried out for the general welfare.

Another effect of caregiving is that anger is reduced. This reduction occurs at the individual level as the caregiving system competes with and inhibits self-interest. Anger is also reduced socially as government regulation reduces anger directly by threatening punishment of unrestrained predation and indirectly by reducing frustration from predation.

When actors vary in their caregiving levels and abilities, some will have strong motivation, knowledge, and ability to nurture sensitively and responsively, whereas others will have lesser knowledge and ability. As the members of society note such variations in caregiving, some forms of this motivation will become more valued than others. The result of this variation is likely to be the development of a social norm (or some sort of moral code) regarding what is considered an appropriate level of caregiving. Hence, it is likely that the government’s role will expand in Theory 3 beyond regulating self-interest and anger to regulating caregiving itself to encourage highly regarded forms or demonstrations of this motivation. Government regulation of caregiving can be in various forms, but at minimum it will evolve into some sort of system that punishes those actors whose caregiving is deemed to be “not good enough,” provides them with resources that can be used to better this motivation in those actors, or simply offers an ample-enough reward to encourage or train those with lower levels of the caregiving motivation.

With the specification of Theory 3, the basic theoretical toolbox is complete. Theory 3 recognizes that actors are motivated by self-interest to maximize their rewards; by fear and anger to resist predation as others try to maximize their own rewards; by attachment to achieve safety, support, and comfort from others; and by caregiving to encourage and support the needs of others. Anger and attachment are of secondary importance in Theory 3. Anger is reduced because of regulation; attachment is reduced because of its dependence on caregiving. The toolbox also includes lust and play, although we have found them to be less central to the problem of social stability than they might be for other problems. Self-interest and fear, and to a lesser extent, anger, identify needs whose centrifugal forces create conflict, disappointment, and pain in human relationships. Caregiving, and to a lesser extent, attachment and play, provides an understanding of centripetal forces that bind actors into cooperative and supportive social structures, of which the family is particularly important. Table 1 summarizes the nature of economy, government, and family that our analysis shows emerges in Theory 3.

The question of how a stable society can arise from a population of self-interested individuals has been of great interest to philosophers and social scientists over a long period of time. Most of the attempted answers have relied on government ( Hobbes, 1952 ; Locke, 1986 ; Rousseau, 1968 ) or on a more diffuse sort of social control ( Coleman, 1990 ; Elster, 1989 ; Hechter, 1987 ; Parsons, 1951 ) to create conditions for cooperation in society. Instead of trying to explain behaviors that are not easily identifiable as self-interested as “really” self-interested, we advocate that theorists should acknowledge that people sometimes are not self-interested. We believe the social scientist’s theoretical toolbox should include the seven motivations of self-interest, lust, fear, anger, caregiving, attachment, and play. The final theory we have provided here (Theory 3) is based on these seven fundamental human motivations, each of which has a clear biological reality. The final theoretical toolbox that we propose is not a complete set of tools for all social explanation, but it provides a solid beginning for such an explanation and allows for the addition of other emotional motivations, such as shame ( Scheff, 1990 ), embarrassment ( Goffman, 1959 ), and many others. For some social investigations, a theorist might want to add these or other biologically based motivations to his or her own toolbox—or even other speculative motivations whose biological basis has not yet been determined. As each carpenter typically has a set of common and basic tools, and adds more specialized tools over time to suit his or her specific needs, we are suggesting the same thing for social scientists. We start with what we believe to be seven basic tools.

As we suggest in our analysis, the family is not just another societal institution. It can in fact be considered the place where we find the beginning of an answer to the question of social stability and cooperation, because it is in the family that caregiving has its strongest expression. As a proactive motivation to meet the needs of specific partners, the caregiving motivation releases the theorist from having to explain the sacrifice of parenting as a convoluted outcome of self-interest. Instead, including the motivation of caregiving in the theoretical toolbox provides the theorist with a tool to explain voluntary and proactive nurturance and cooperation in the family and elsewhere. By allowing for full development of cooperation in society, it provides a basis for a positive explanation of how a stable society can exist, a society that is sustainable, peaceful, and self-reproducing.

As Brickman (1987) points out, an “economic” view of human nature as maximizing self-interest is part of “what every educated person should know” (p. 16). What we argue here is that such a view of human nature is partially true but incomplete. Just as self-interest is routinely considered universal for humans—as a central element of human nature—so do fear, caregiving, attachment, anger, and other motivations need to be considered universal components of human nature, and those components need to be taken into account in social theory.

The theoretical toolbox that we propose contains, as we have seen, a minimum of seven motivations as theoretical tools. For the purpose of understanding how a stable society emerges from these motivations, we have concluded that self-interest, caregiving, and fear can be considered the most central. Self-interest motivates the solitary search for reward, “even against the resistance of others” ( Weber, 1946 , p. 180). Caregiving is the central motivation for providing care and support to others. Because caregiving does not always provide as much nurturance as an actor might desire, distress as a reduced form of fear is the motivation for protesting against frustrated desires and against physical and social threats. Somewhat less central for the coherence of a stable social system, attachment is the motivation that allows one to rely on the caregiving of trusted others and accept their care and support when individual self-interested efforts are insufficient. Although less central in a social system with substantial caregiving compared to Hobbes’s war of all against all, anger motivates a proactive response to fear and provides the emotional force behind efforts to find new arrangements that can eliminate threats. From this analysis, it is only as we include caregiving that we see the glue that holds society together peacefully.

There are some directions in which the proposed toolbox might enrich theory. One potential area in the family is the issue of power and family violence. In the 1960s and 1970s, there were extensive power analyses of family interaction in terms of contending self-interests ( Burr, Hill, Nye, & Reiss, 1979 ; Gelles, 1980 ; Goode, 1971 ; Kumagai & O’Donoghue, 1978 ; McDonald, 1980 ; Olson & Cromwell, 1975 ; Sprey, 1975 ). The weakness of these analyses from the point of view of the theoretical toolbox is their exclusive focus on self-interest as the motivation for power. Most power analyses have focused on contending for superiority and have viewed nurturance as an instance of weakness and lack of control. However, using caregiving as a motivation could lead to a healthy focus on nurturing. Nurturing can be viewed as an activity of strength, maturity, and competence, whereas being nurtured involves need and dependency. Studies of marital and other family violence might be strengthened by recognizing that violence and some other forms of power, like the temper tantrums of childhood, are also a response of the needy and dependent against the strong and competent.

A contribution of the toolbox to attachment research is to emphasize that fear and attachment are different motivations. Almost all contemporary formulations of attachment theory conceptualize attachment only in its combination with fear (for further discussion, see Bell, 2009 , 2010 ). Just as social scientists have studied the interaction of fear and anger as separate motivations in the frustration-aggression literature, efforts to conceptualize attachment independently of fear may prove beneficial in family studies. Previous analyses of adult attachment have often combined lust, attachment, and caregiving into a single concept of adult attachment ( Ainsworth, 1982 ; Hazan & Zeifman, 1994 , 1999 ; Shaver, Hazan, & Bradshaw, 1988 ). Combining the three motivations under a single concept emphasizes how they are often correlated, but at the same time this approach obscures the many potential conflicts among the motivations both within and between dyad partners. Using the theoretical methodology of the toolbox may allow this research to be strengthened by a careful separation of the autonomous motivations of fear, lust, attachment, and caregiving.

Social action based on altruism, such as philanthropy, may be better understood when each motivation is accounted for individually as well. Understanding why one individual behaves in a self-sacrificing manner to aid another individual or to help a group is likely to become clearer if caregiving and self-interest are understood as separate constructs and each of the motivations is accounted for individually.

To expect all theorists to fully navigate the neurobiological intricacies of human motivations is an unrealistic expectation. However, it is clear that social scientists who exclude caregiving from the theoretical toolbox will be limited in explaining the cooperative, altruistic, and intimate aspects of social life.

Our goal in this project has been to address a question older than social science: how can self-interested persons come together to create a stable, self-reproducing, and peaceful society? Our basic answer is that, as long as self-interest is the only motivation, people cannot create such a society. And as long as social scientists continue to use self-interest exclusively in their theories, we cannot understand how such societies come to be. Only when we social scientists recognize that humans also have a genuine motivation to nurture one another, a motivation that is strongest in the family but that generalizes to other parts of the social system, can we understand clearly how a cooperative and peaceful society can exist.

Acknowledgments

Support for this research was provided by a grant from the Eunice K. Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (R01 HD055826) to David C. Bell. The authors acknowledge the contributions of Anne Mitchell to this article.

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Ideal Society by Plato Research Paper

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Researchers traditionally define society as a group of people who interact with each other basing on the common culture, morality, and economy. To become the society, a group of people should function as an organization.

From this point, to create an ideal society, it is necessary to change the principles of organization and to propose new patterns according to which people should interact with each other as the complex organism. The concept of the ideal society is discussed in the works by many philosophers. It is important to pay attention to the conception presented by Plato in his work The Republic on the issue of the ideal society.

Thus, Plato discusses social classes and forms of governance to provide the model of the ideal society. To propose one more model of the ideal society, it is necessary to refer to the classical Plato’s vision. Nevertheless, the concept of the ideal society is rather utopian because of impossibility to create this society in reality.

Although the notion of ideal society is a controversial question with the elements of utopia, there are specific features and components which combination can contribute to constructing the model of the perfect society with references to the personal vision of an ideal.

Society as a collective consists of individuals whose human nature makes them compete and fight for the better resources. Nevertheless, people can be discussed as good and sympathetic while living in the community if their interests are met. Thus, people become aggressive if they are afraid of losing their resources, property, or advantageous living conditions.

As a result, to build the community where relations are based on the positive side of the human nature, it is necessary to create the specific conditions to respond to the interests and expectations of the majority (Ede and Cormack). The task of the social leaders is to orient to interests of the majority in order to avoid the opposition of the public which can lead to revealing the negative qualities of people living in society.

Referring to the mentioned task, it is possible to formulate the purpose of the ideal society. Society can be discussed as a strong organization where all the components of the society cooperate with each other for the common good. In its turn, the effective cooperation of the society’s members depends on the particular features of organization. From this point, the society should be organized in a specific way to provide the social support and assistance for all the members.

The purpose of the society is to protect individuals with the help of organizing them in a group where people can freely and effectively interact with each other. Thus, the society is created to help people satisfy and complete their needs (Osborne). The fulfillment of people’s interests should become the main purpose of any society because society as an institution is only the organization of individuals which interests are important for the further successful development of the whole group.

The principles of satisfying the people’s needs and interests within the ideal society are correlated with the concept of justice according to which this society should function. According to Plato, the idea of justice is closely associated with the personality of the leader ruling the society.

Plato states that philosophers should become social rulers because only these people can guarantee the rule of justice within the group of people organized as society. Moreover, justice should be represented in just laws which are followed by all the society’s representatives without opposition because of the ruler’s significant authority.

Plato continues that philosophers should be chosen as the rulers of society because they create just laws not to accentuate their power, but to contribute to the social good (Plato). However, just laws are developed to control the actions of the public. The just and rational control is necessary for the society in order to prevent the social degeneration and the further focus on chaos. From this perspective, justice plays an important role in society.

Society in which just laws are used and just leaders rule contributes to creating the common good. It is important to note that in spite of the concentration of modern public on the ideas of individualism and freedom of choice, people cannot live without social interactions and their communication is directed toward creating the good for a personality without doing any harm in relation to the other members of society.

This positive pattern of communication within the society is possible with references to the ideal society. Referring to the real societies and to the elements of their functioning, it is necessary to note that people can achieve the welfare only while acting within the society as the part of it because of sharing the common economic infrastructure and participating in the same social institutions (Brym and Lie). From this point, the society develops to produce the common good for all the members.

The question of a governmental system used in the perfect society is one of the most controversial ones in relation to the idea of constructing the society focusing on the interests of the majority. The governmental system is significant for the society in order to provide the necessary control. It is possible to refer to the responsibility of an individual and to the democratic form of government as the best choices for the society when all the associated legal laws, social rules, and principles are clearly stated.

People need limits in order to avoid chaos. That is why, just laws are important for all the forms of government, including democracy. Democracy is based on the ideals of freedom, equality, rights, and choice (Appelrouth). All the mentioned concepts are appreciated by modern people because these ideas provide the context for the development of individualities.

Nevertheless, Plato claims that much freedom guaranteed with references to the democratic principles can lead to chaos, people’s outrage, and social mess (Plato). From this perspective, the legal system should work for the society providing people with just laws. Appropriate social norms and rules should be developed with references to the principles of morality which is accepted in the definite society. These easy points can help prevent the democratic society from the decay.

However, people are inclined to follow laws correctly and avoid their violation when they are satisfied with the position within the society, including the social status and welfare. To improve the state of the public, the democratic government should implement the effective economic system. Today, people pay much attention to such concepts as equality and freedom (Levitas).

These notions are also relevant to discuss the ideal economic system for society. Thus, capitalism guarantees the focus on people’s freedoms, and the principle of equality is discussed from the point of fair competition. Nevertheless, only laissez-faire capitalism can help people realize their freedoms and rights in the economic sphere fully because economy is not controlled by the government.

That is why, this economic system is the most appropriate for contributing to the progress of the democratic society. The democratic society provides equal opportunities for all the people to achieve the necessary welfare (Ede and Cormack). Laissez-faire capitalism limits the control of the government and focuses on people’s interests when they develop strategies to improve their business and achieve the economic success with references to their abilities and intentions.

Focusing on the ideas presented earlier, it is necessary to note that individuals living in such societies should be characterized by the developed feelings of responsibility and respect for each other (Novacek). Such issues as racism, discrimination, and prejudice are inappropriate for the ideal society. That is why, the public should be well-educated.

The accents should be made on the primary education when children learn the moral norms and principles and on the higher education when people choose their career path. It is important to note that moral training is effective when it is combined with education. Well-educated people are able to live in the society where the focus is made on following definite laws and norms strictly.

Equality should be realized in providing the equal educational opportunities (Osborne). Furthermore, morality and religion are connected spheres. People need moral limits to live in society according to the definite rules. From this point, the role of religion and morality in society is to control people without the impact of any external factors, but with the accents on the inner world and personal inclinations.

Plato proposes the Allegory of the Cave in order to depict the reality from the point of ordinary people who are ‘prisoners’ within the society (Plato). The journey out of the cave is necessary for people as the representatives of the society in which the public concentrates on education, equality, and freedoms.

To help people go out the ‘cave’, it is necessary to achieve the balance between the social control and role of individuality in community. The focus on democracy, laissez-faire capitalism, and individualism is possible when people are allowed to leave their ‘caves’ and begin to participate in the life of their society as morally and socially responsible personalities.

Family is the main social institution which is typical for traditional societies. The creation of family is the creation of a micro-society with the specific hierarchy and rules. Nowadays, people are inclined to interact within the larger groups and rely only on their own abilities. Family in its traditional form cannot be discussed as the effective way to organize the society (Appelrouth). The main accents should be made on socially responsible individuals who are flexible in their interactions.

Society in which the majority of people can satisfy their needs and achieve the necessary welfare without violating the rights and freedoms of the other people can be discussed as ideal. This society is based on the principles of democracy, free will, and free choice. In this situation, rulers or social leaders are only reflectors of the public’s will. However, strict norms and laws which prohibit the illegal and immoral behaviors should regulate the life within the society without limiting the people’s basic rights and opportunities.

Works Cited

Appelrouth, Scott. Classical and Contemporary Sociological Theory: Text and Readings. USA: Pine Forge Press, 2008. Print.

Brym, Robert, and John Lie. Sociology: Your Compass for a New World . USA: Cengage Learning, 2006. Print.

Ede, Andrew, and Lesley Cormack. A History of Science in Society: From Philosophy to Utility . USA: University of Toronto Press, 2004. Print.

Levitas, Ruth. The Concept of Utopia . USA: Peter Lang, 2010. Print.

Novacek, Pavel. “Human Values Compatible with Sustainable Development”. Journal of Human Values 19.1 (2013): 5-13. Print.

Osborne, Roger. Civilization: A New History of the Western World . USA: Pegasus Books, 2006. Print. Plato. The Republic . USA: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Print.

• Descartes and Our Existence
• Plato’s Visions of Beauty and Déjà Vu
• Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave” Analysis
• Plato's "Allegory of the Cave" and "You, Screws"
• Plato's Philosophy
• Analysis of “An enquiry concerning Human Understanding” by David Hume
• Michel Foucault: Views on Prisons and Psychiatric Hospitals
• Lessons From Plato’s Book ‘the Apology’
• Mental Imprisonment in the "Allegory of the Cave"
• Direct Realism
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

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Profiles of an Ideal Society: The Utopian Visions of Ordinary People

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Isaac Deutscher 1948

Marx and Russia

Source : BBC Third Programme talk, November 1948, republished in Isaac Deutscher, Heretics and Renegades and Other Essays (Hamish and Hamilton, London, 1955). Scanned and prepared for the Marxist Internet Archive by Paul Flewers.

The attitudes of Marx and Engels towards Russia and their views on the prospects of Russian revolution form a curious topic in the history of socialism. Did the founders of scientific socialism have any premonition of the great upheaval in Russia that was to be carried out under the sign of Marxism? What results did they expect from the social developments inside the Tsarist Empire? How did they view the relationship between revolutionary Russia and the West? One can answer these questions more fully now on the basis of the correspondence between Marx, Engels and their Russian contemporaries, published by the Marx – Engels – Lenin Institute in Moscow last year. This correspondence covers nearly half a century. It opens with Marx’s well-known letters to Annenkov [1] of 1846. It closes with the correspondence between Engels and his Russian friends in 1895. The volume also contains nearly fifty letters published for the first time.

Among the Russians who kept in touch with Marx and Engels there were men and women belonging to three generations of revolutionaries. In the 1840s the revolutionary movement in Russia had an almost exclusively intellectual and liberal character. It was based on no social class or popular force. To that epoch belonged Marx’s early correspondents, Annenkov, Sazonov [2] and a few others. Marx explained to them his philosophy and his economic ideas, but engaged in no discussion on revolution in Russia. For this it was too early. Broadly speaking, in those years Russia was to Marx still identical with Tsardom, and Tsardom was the hated ‘gendarme of European reaction’. His and Engels’ main preoccupation was to arouse Europe against that gendarme, for they believed that a European war against Russia would hasten the progress of the West towards socialism.

In the 1860s another generation of Russian revolutionaries came to the fore. They were the Narodniks or Populists or Agrarian socialists. It was, curiously enough, with the Russian intellectuals of that school advocating a pure peasant socialism that the two founders of the Western, strictly proletarian, socialism established ties of the closest friendship. Russia possessed no industry yet, no modern working class, almost no bourgeoisie. The intelligentsia and the peasantry were the only forces inside Russia to whom the two sworn enemies of Tsardom could look. There was, of course, also Bakunin’s anarchism. Marx first cooperated with Bakunin and then quarrelled with him. But I shall not discuss that controversy, to which only casual references occur in the correspondence under review. Incidentally, vis-�-vis Marx, Bakunin acted more as the spokesman of Italian, Swiss and Spanish anarchists than as a Russian revolutionary.

The Narodniks in Russia and in exile eagerly responded to the theories of Marx and Engels. Russian was the first language into which Das Kapital was translated from the original. Based on English classical economy and German philosophy and on a thorough study of Western industrial capitalism, this great work seemed to bear no direct relation to the social conditions then prevailing in Russia. And yet right from the beginning when it was making no impression on the Western European public, Marx’s opus exercised an enormous influence upon the Russian intelligentsia. Danielson, [3] the translator of Das Kapital , himself a prominent Narodnik and economist, wrote to Marx that the Russian censor passed the book, believing it to be too strictly scientific to be suppressed. The book, so the censor thought, made in any case too heavy reading to have any subversive influence. He was more afraid of the frontispiece of the Russian edition with Marx’s portrait, and, allowing Marx’s ideas to reach the Russian public, he confiscated his picture. Some years later the Russian censor passed the second volume of Das Kapital too, even though he had shortly before confiscated a Russian edition of the works of good old Adam Smith. Nine hundred copies of Das Kapital were sold out in St Petersburg within a few weeks after its publication in 1872, a very large number considering the character of the book, the time and the place. But even before that Marx received striking proof of strange Russian enthusiasm for his ideas, when on 12 March 1870 a group of Russian revolutionaries asked him to represent Russia on the General Council of the First International.

Marx was slightly puzzled by this unexpected Russian enthusiasm. ‘A funny position for me’, he wrote to Engels, ‘to be functioning as the representative of young Russia! A man never knows what he may come to, or what strange fellowship he may have to submit to.’ [4] But ironical amusement was only one part, perhaps the least essential, of Marx’s reaction to Russian admiration. His mind was agitated by Russia as a social phenomenon. At the age of fifty he and Engels began to learn Russian. They watched the development of Russian literature and swallowed volume after volume of Russian statistics and sociology. Marx even intended to rewrite a portion of Das Kapital so as to base it on his Russian findings, an intention he was never able to carry out. Although amusement at some Russian eccentricities never left them, both Marx and Engels acquired a profound respect for the Russian intellectual achievement. Chernyshevsky, [5] then serving his term of slave labour in Siberia, impressed Marx as the most original contemporary thinker and economist. He planned to arouse protests in Western Europe against the victimisation of Chernyshevsky, but Chernyshevsky’s friends feared that foreign protest and intervention might do more harm than good to the great convict. Dobrolyubov, [6] who had died at the age of twenty-five, was another Russian thinker highly valued by Marx as ‘a writer of the stature of a Lessing or a Diderot’. [7] Finally, in 1884, Engels wrote to Madame Papritz, a Russian singer, and translator of Engels:

We both, Marx and myself, cannot complain about your countrymen. If in some groups there was more revolutionary muddle than scientific research, there was also, on the other hand, critical thought and disinterested investigation in the field of pure theory, worthy of the nation of Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky... I have in mind not only the active revolutionary socialists, but also the historical and critical school in Russian literature, which is infinitely superior to anything achieved by respectable historians in Germany and France. [8]

But the main issue of the correspondence was Russia’s road to socialism. In the West, capitalist industrialisation was, according to Marx and Engels, paving the way for socialism. The industrial working class was the main force interested in socialism. But what about Russia, where capitalist industry had not even begun to strike roots? The Narodniks argued that Russian socialism would be based on the primeval rural commune or the obshchina , which had existed alongside of feudalism. Even after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, the peasant land was still owned by the rural commune, in some respects the forerunner of the present Russian kolkhoz . Russia, said the Narodniks, need not go through the trials and tribulations of capitalist industrialism to attain socialism. She finds socialism in her native rural tradition, which she only needs to cleanse of feudal remnants. This then was to be Russia’s road to socialism, very different from that by which Western Europe was expected to travel.

Most, though not all, Narodniks were Slavophils and believed in Russia’s peculiar socialist mission. Marx, as we know, rejected Slavophilism; and nothing made him more furious than the talk about Russia’s socialist mission. He did not believe, he once said, that old Europe needed to be rejuvenated by Russian blood. But he did, nevertheless, share some of the hopes that the Narodniks placed on the Russian rural commune. Here, he said, in a famous letter to a Russian periodical in 1877, here was ‘the finest chance ever offered by history to any nation’ the chance to escape capitalism and to pass from feudalism straight into socialism. [9] True, Marx added important qualifications: the rural commune had begun to disintegrate, and if that process were to continue Russia would miss her ‘finest chance’. Moreover, a stimulus from outside, the socialist transformation of Western Europe, was needed to enable Russia to build socialism on the rural commune. In his eyes Western Europe had the birthright of socialist revolution, while Russia’s role could be secondary only. Nevertheless, Russia might have her own short cut to socialism.

He and Engels also sympathised with the terrorism of the Narodniks, with their attempts on the life of the Tsar and his satraps. When, in 1881, revolutionaries assassinated Tsar Alexander II, Marx and Engels applauded the deed. In a message to a Russian meeting commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Paris commune, they expressed the hope that the assassination of the Tsar foreshadowed ‘the formation of a Russian commune’. [10] Here we reach the most dramatic point in the whole correspondence. By the time of the assassination of Alexander II a new generation of revolutionaries, the first real Russian Marxists, had entered politics. Their chief spokesmen were George Plekhanov, Vera Zasulich and Paul Axelrod, the future founders of Russian social democracy. These first Russian Marxists were bitterly opposed to the Narodniks precisely on those points in which Marx and Engels had supported them. The young Marxists opposed terrorism. Plekhanov in particular had regarded the planned assassination of the Tsar as a senseless adventure. He believed that the task of Russian revolutionaries was to abolish the autocratic system, not to kill an autocrat. The Russian Marxists further believed that like Western Europe Russia had to go through capitalist industrialisation and the experience of democratic self-government before she could even begin to evolve in the direction of socialism. They held that the rural commune was irretrievably disintegrating and was of no use to socialism. They placed their hopes not on the peasants but on the industrial working class now beginning to grow, not on agrarian but on proletarian socialism.

Both Narodniks and Marxists quoted Das Kapital as their authority. The Marxists had reason to expect that the two great Western socialists would agree with them that Russia was destined to go through the same evolution that Western Europe had gone through. One can therefore imagine their disappointment when Marx himself cold-shouldered them. In a letter to Vera Zasulich of 1881 Marx told them that it was no use to quote Das Kapital against the Narodniks and the rural commune, for in Das Kapital he had analysed the social structure of Western Europe only – Russia might well evolve towards socialism in her own way. Marx admitted that the rural commune had begun to decay, but on balance he still subscribed to the Narodnik view that the commune had a great future. [11] Nor was Marx impressed by indignant arguments against Narodnik terrorism, although he regarded it as a ‘specifically Russian and historically inevitable method about which there is no reason... to moralise for or against’. [12] He would, of course, have none of that terrorism in Western Europe.

In 1883 Marx died and Engels took over the correspondence. The Russian Marxists tried to convert the surviving founding father of the Marxist school to their view. At first they were unsuccessful. Engels persisted in the hope that the Narodnik terrorist attempts would lead to the overthrow of Tsardom. In 1884 and 1885 he expected dramatic political changes inside Russia. Russia, he wrote, was approaching her 1789. Recalling the assassination of the Tsar four years after the event, he said that this was ‘one of the exceptional cases in which a handful of men could make a revolution’, a view that the young Russian Marxists, hoping for revolution by a social class and not by a ‘handful of men’, had already derided as a dangerous illusion.

Every month now [Engels wrote to Vera Zasulich in 1884], ought to aggravate Russia’s domestic difficulties. If some constitutionally minded and courageous Grand Duke were to appear now, even the Russian upper classes would find that a palace revolution was the best way out of the impasse. [13]

One can imagine the ironical smile with which Plekhanov and Zasulich tried to disillusion him but in vain. We now know that in this controversy it was the Russian Marxists and not Marx and Engels whom events proved to be right. The assassination of Alexander II in fact entailed the disintegration and demoralisation of the Narodnik movement and a prolonged period of reaction. This cool attitude of Marx and Engels towards their Russian followers was marked by intellectual inconsistency. But it was understandable and very human. The Narodniks had been Marx’s close and admired friends, the first to raise the banner of popular revolution, the first to respond, in their own Slavonic manner, to Marxism. The Narodnik views had now become outdated. But an old loyalty and, no doubt, remoteness from the Russian scene, prevented Marx and Engels from grasping this as quickly as their young Russian pupils had done it.

Only in the early 1890s, towards the end of his life, Engels at last realised that Plekhanov and Zasulich had been right, that the rural commune was doomed, that capitalism was invading Russia and that the agrarian brand of socialism had to give way to the industrial one. He tried to impress his new view upon the old Narodniks, especially upon Danielson, the translator of Das Kapital . The letters that now passed between Danielson and Engels make melancholy reading. Danielson vented his disappointment with Engels’ new attitude. He described very eloquently the evils of capitalism in Russia, suggesting that by its insistence on the need for Russia to go through the capitalist phase Marxism acted as advocatus diaboli . [14] He reminded Engels what great store Marx had set by the Russian rural commune. In reply Engels argued seriously, patiently and gently, very gently indeed, that new social processes had taken place, that in the meantime the rural commune had become part of a ‘dead past’, and that though the evils of capitalism were so great, Russia could unfortunately not escape them. ‘History’, said Engels, ‘is the most cruel of all goddesses. She drives her triumphal chariot over heaps of corpses, not only during war, but even in times of “peaceful” economic development.’

This was a reference to the disastrous Russian drought and famine of 1891, which Danielson had blamed on incipient capitalist disorganisation in agriculture. The rural commune, Engels went on, would have become the basis for Russian socialism, if in the industrial West socialism had won ‘some ten or twenty years ago. Unfortunately, we [that is the West] have been too slow.’ Which were the symptoms? The loss by England of her industrial monopoly, the industrial competition between France, Germany and England:

America [Engels wrote in 1893] bids fair to drive them all out of the world’s markets... The introduction of an, at least relative, free-trade policy in America is sure to complete the ruin of England’s industrial position and to destroy, at the same time, the industrial export trade of Germany and France; then the crisis must come...

Meanwhile capitalism still dominated the West, and Russia, too, must come within its orbit. This delay in the march of socialism was deplorable. But, said Engels, ‘we... are unfortunately so stupid that we never can pluck up courage for a real progress unless urged to it by sufferings that seem almost out of proportion’ to the goal to be achieved. [15]

It is now easy to see that in this controversy both sides were right and wrong at the same time. Engels, converted to the view of his young Russian disciples, was of course right when he said that Russia could not avoid becoming capitalist. But the old Narodnik Danielson was also right in his insistence that Russian capitalism would have little scope for development because the terrifying poverty of the Russian peasants would limit to a minimum its home market and because Russia was too weak to compete with other nations in foreign markets. It was precisely this weakness in Russian capitalism, a weakness not clearly seen either by Engels or by the early Russian Marxists, that led in the last instance to the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. It was this weakness that was to make of Russia, in Lenin’s words, the ‘weakest link in the chain of capitalism’.

Nevertheless, Engels had a strong premonition of the coming Russian revolution. Repeatedly he stated that ‘Russia was the France of the new age’. On his dying bed almost, in 1895, he watched the first moves of the new, and the last, Russian Tsar Nicolas II, and in a letter to Plekhanov he prophesied: ‘If the devil of revolution has taken anybody by the scruff of the neck then it is Tsar Nicolas II.’ But what Engels apparently expected to occur in Russia was ‘another 1789’, another anti-feudal, bourgeois revolution, not a socialist one.

Even towards the end of his life, after he had intellectually detached himself from the Narodniks, Engels still refused to criticise them in public. Plekhanov and Zasulich repeatedly urged him to do so and thus to further the cause of Russian Marxism. Engels then somewhat apologetically explained to Plekhanov his extremely delicate attitude towards the old Narodniks:

It is quite impossible to argue with Russians of that generation... who still believe in the spontaneously communistic mission, which allegedly distinguishes Russia, the true holy Russia, from all other infidel countries... Incidentally, in a country like yours... surrounded by a more or less solid intellectual Chinese Wall, erected by despotism, one should not be surprised by the appearance of the most incredible and queer combinations of ideas. [16]

With this note of an almost sorrowful understanding for the limitations of his old Narodnik friends, Engels’ correspondence came to an end.

1. Pavel Vasilyevich Annenkov (1812-1887) – liberal landlord and litterateur , personally acquainted with Marx in the 1840s – MIA.

2. Nikolai Ivanovich Sazonov (1815-1862) – member of Herzen’s student circle, publicist, subsequently in exile – MIA.

3. Nikolai Frantsevich Danielson (1844-1918) – economist and writer, ideologist of Narodnism – MIA.

4. Karl Marx to Friedrich Engels, 24 March 1870, available at – MIA.

5. Nikolai Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky (1828-1889) – revolutionary democrat and utopian socialist, scientist, novelist, literary critic, one of outstanding forerunners of Russian Social-Democracy – MIA.

6. Nikolai Alexandrovich Dobrolyubov (1836-1861) – revolutionary democrat, prominent literary critic, materialist philosopher, one of outstanding forerunners of Russian Social-Democracy – MIA.

7. Karl Marx To Nikolai Danielson, 9 November 1871, available at – MIA.

8. Friedrich Engels to Eugenie Papritz, 26 June 1884, available at . Yevgenia Edvardovna Papritz (1853-1919) – Russian singer, carried on research in Russian folk music, was connected with illegal Moscow Translators and Publishers Society (1882-84), which published Marx and Engels’ works in Russian – MIA.

9. Karl Marx to the Editor of the Otechestvenniye Zapisky , November 1877, available at – MIA.

10. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to the Chairman of the Slavonic Meeting, 21 March 1881, available at – MIA.

11. Karl Marx to Vera Zasulich, 8 March 1881, available at – MIA.

12. Karl Marx to Jenny Longuet, 11 April 1881, available at – MIA.

13. Friedrich Engels to Vera Zasulich, 6 March 1884, available at – MIA.

14. Advocatus diabolic – devil’s advocate – MIA.

15. Friedrich Engels to Nikolai Danielson, 24 February 1893, available at – MIA.

16. Friedrich Engels to Georgi Plekhanov, 26 February 1895, Marx – Engels Collected Works , Volume 50 (New York, 2004), pp 449-51.

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