The Theory of Rational Choice
- First Online: 15 May 2024
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- Alessandro Orsini 2
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After exposing the prisoner’s dilemma, this chapter will explore the thinking of four representatives of this school of thought and their approaches to studying society: James S. Coleman’s Internal Analysis of Systemic Behavior, George Homans’s and Peter Blau’s exchange theory, and Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. To explore Coleman’s theory further, the text will examine della Porta’s explanation through mechanisms of the birth, persistence, and decline of terrorist organizations. The text will also explore Kruglanski’s significance-quest theory and Petersen’s sociology of emotions to understand the limitations of the rational choice theory. The final section will be dedicated to Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism, which conceives states as rational actors.
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Orsini, A. (2024). The Theory of Rational Choice. In: Sociological Theory. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52539-1_13
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Published : 15 May 2024
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“Rational Choice Theory” is an umbrella term for a variety of models explaining social phenomena as outcomes of individual action that can—in some way—be construed as rational.
Rooted in classical criminology, rational choice theory assumes that all individuals freely choose to participate in crime as a result of a rational decision‐making process.
Abstract. Rational choice theory builds from a very simple foundation. To wit: individuals are presumed to pursue goal-oriented behavior stemming from rational preferences. Rational choice...
My central argument is that by assuming that self-interest is an empirically established component of human nature, rational choice theory supports and perpetuates a political life which is antithetical to important tenets of normative democratic theory.
In this chapter, we see how Boudon and Antiseri probed deeper into this position, which gained considerable space within the specific field of sociology, particularly among authors from Homans to Coleman who referred to the theory of rational choice.
The premise of rational choice theory as a social science methodology is that the aggregate behavior in society reflects the sum of the choices made by individuals. Moreover, the theory
Rational choice theory is a formal choice theory that starts from arguably widely accepted basic axioms and builds a logically consistent decision model for maximizing the objective of a decision-maker.
The rational choice theory posits that economic principles can be applied to explain non-economic phenomena. It views individuals as rational actors striving to maximize their utility.
I start with a simple model, the rational choice model. According to it, a citizen makes up her mind to vote or not through a simple calculus. She decides to vote if, in her view, the benefits of voting are greater than the costs; if, on the contrary, the costs are greater than the benefits, she decides not to vote.
For the most part, people view rational choice theory as a species of intentional explanation; on the best available understanding, however, it should be viewed as contributing to the construction of straightforward causal explanations.