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110 Aristotle Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

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When it comes to ancient philosophy, one name that stands out is Aristotle. Known as one of the greatest thinkers in history, Aristotle's ideas have influenced countless fields of study, from politics and ethics to physics and biology. If you're tasked with writing an essay on Aristotle, you might be wondering where to start. To help you out, here are 110 Aristotle essay topic ideas and examples that cover a wide range of his works and theories:

• The concept of virtue in Aristotle's ethics.
• Aristotle's theory of the mean and its relevance in modern society.
• The relationship between happiness and virtue according to Aristotle.
• Aristotle's views on the purpose and function of government.
• A comparative analysis of Aristotle's and Plato's political philosophies.
• The role of education in Aristotle's theory of the ideal state.
• Aristotle's theory of causality and its application in scientific methodology.
• The concept of teleology in Aristotle's philosophy.
• Aristotle's theory of substance and its implications for metaphysics.
• The significance of Aristotle's theory of potentiality and actuality in understanding change.
• Aristotle's views on the nature of the soul and its immortality.
• The role of pleasure in Aristotle's ethics.
• The concept of eudaimonia in Aristotle's ethical theory.
• Aristotle's theory of friendship and its importance in human relationships.
• The relationship between reason and virtue in Aristotle's ethics.
• Aristotle's views on the nature of art and its role in society.
• The concept of tragedy in Aristotle's Poetics.
• Aristotle's theory of rhetoric and its applications in persuasive communication.
• The significance of Aristotle's theory of catharsis in understanding the emotional impact of art.
• Aristotle's views on the nature of truth and knowledge.
• The concept of syllogism in Aristotle's logic.
• Aristotle's theory of four causes and its relationship to explanation.
• The role of habit in Aristotle's ethics.
• Aristotle's theory of justice and its implications for legal systems.
• The concept of natural slavery in Aristotle's political philosophy.
• Aristotle's views on the nature of women and their role in society.
• A comparative analysis of Aristotle's and Nietzsche's theories of ethics.
• The relationship between virtue and pleasure in Aristotle's ethical theory.
• Aristotle's theory of the golden mean and its application in moral decision-making.
• The role of emotions in Aristotle's ethics.
• The concept of tragedy in Aristotle's theory of literature.
• Aristotle's views on the balance between individual freedom and social order.
• The significance of Aristotle's theory of the unmoved mover in understanding the existence of God.
• The role of reason in Aristotle's theory of knowledge.
• Aristotle's theory of the self and its implications for personal identity.
• The concept of unity in Aristotle's metaphysics.
• Aristotle's views on the relationship between body and soul.
• A comparative analysis of Aristotle's and Descartes' theories of the mind-body problem.
• Aristotle's theory of education and its role in shaping character.
• The concept of tragedy in Aristotle's theory of drama.
• Aristotle's views on the relationship between nature and nurture.
• The significance of Aristotle's theory of the polis in understanding the origins of political society.
• The role of women in Aristotle's ideal state.
• Aristotle's theory of the good life and its implications for personal fulfillment.
• The concept of justice in Aristotle's ethical theory.
• Aristotle's views on the relationship between ethics and politics.
• A comparative analysis of Aristotle's and Kant's theories of ethics.
• The role of reason in Aristotle's theory of moral virtue.
• Aristotle's theory of the soul and its implications for the afterlife.
• The concept of chance in Aristotle's theory of causality.
• Aristotle's views on the relationship between art and morality.
• The significance of Aristotle's theory of tragedy in understanding human emotions.
• Aristotle's theory of rhetoric and its applications in public speaking.
• The role of pleasure in Aristotle's theory of aesthetics.
• Aristotle's views on the relationship between language and thought.
• A comparative analysis of Aristotle's and Hume's theories of ethics.
• The concept of happiness in Aristotle's ethical theory.
• Aristotle's theory of the divine and its implications for religious belief.
• The role of virtue in Aristotle's theory of political leadership.
• Aristotle's views on the concept of beauty and its role in art.
• The significance of Aristotle's theory of the soul in understanding human consciousness.
• Aristotle's theory of causality and its application in understanding natural phenomena.
• The concept of self-realization in Aristotle's ethical theory.
• Aristotle's views on the relationship between reason and emotion.
• A comparative analysis of Aristotle's and Mill's theories of ethics.
• The role of wisdom in Aristotle's theory of moral virtue.
• Aristotle's theory of the good and its implications for personal values.
• The concept of friendship in Aristotle's ethical theory.
• Aristotle's views on the relationship between ethics and religion.
• The significance of Aristotle's theory of tragedy in understanding human suffering.
• Aristotle's theory of rhetoric and its applications in political discourse.
• Aristotle's views on the relationship between language and reality.
• The concept of virtue in Aristotle's ethical theory.

These essay topic ideas provide a comprehensive range of areas in which you can explore Aristotle's philosophy. From ethics and politics to metaphysics and aesthetics, Aristotle's theories continue to be relevant and influential today. Choose a topic that interests you the most and delve into the fascinating world of Aristotle's ideas. Good luck with your essay!

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145 Aristotle Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

🏆 best aristotle topic ideas & essay examples, 👍 good essay topics on aristotle, 💡 most interesting aristotle topics to write about, ❓ questions about aristotle.

• Plato and Aristotle on Literature Compare & Contrast Essay The controversy over the effects of literature has made the great philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, to differ in their perceptions of the literature impacts on the society.
• Compare and Contrast: Plato and Aristotle Essay Aristotle was a “the son of a renowned physician from Thrace” and he began his philosophy studies at the Plato’s academy.
• Plato and Aristotle’s Views of Virtue in Respect to Education Arguably, Plato and Aristotle’s views of education differ in that Aristotle considers education as a ‘virtue by itself’ that every person must obtain in order to have ‘happiness and goodness in life’, while Plato advocates […]
• Aristotle as the First Political Scientist Although it is possible to consider Aristotle as the first political scientist with references to the aspects of discussing political science in the context of the political philosophy, a lot of researchers also determine the […]
• Philosophy: Plato’s Republic Versus Aristotle’s Politics Plato as well turns off the partition amid the private and the public and he contends for common kids and wives for the guardians in a bid to create a society amongst the rulers of […]
• Aristotle vs. Socrates: The Main Difference in the Concept of Virtue One of the main principles on which the ethical school is based is the notion of virtue as the representation of the moral perfectness of a man.
• Aristotle’s Views on Women Before the Greek physicians and philosophers of the Classical Age took up the question of the nature of women, the Greeks had serious attitudes toward women as revealed in their literature.
• Plato vs. Aristotle: Political Philosophy Compare and Contrast Essay Plato went further to associate all the parts of the soul to parts of the body with reason connected to the head, will connected to the heart and appetite connected to the abdomen and sensory […]
• Conflict Between Aristotle and Copernicus Copernicus continued his research and developed a new model of the universe which contradicted Aristotle’s paradigm since the Earth was not the centre, but one of the planets moving around the Sun.
• Epistemologies of Plato and Aristotle It is also worth mentioning the Allegory of the Cave, in which Plato explains the relationship between people and the world of the Forms.
• Plato on Death: Comparison With Aristotle Afterlife – Essay on Life After Death Philosophy On the other hand, religion has maintained that the soul is immortal and survives the death of the body. Plato argued that the soul is immortal and therefore survives the death of the body.
• Application of Aristotle’s Golden Mean The doctrine of the golden mean is a request for a realistic moral axiom. The word “virtue” is used in some cases to denote a personal quality and, in others, as a generalized indicator of […]
• Othello: A Tragic Hero Through the Prism of Aristotle’s Definition According to him, the prerequisite of a tragedy revolves around the plot of the play. Othello, who is the main character, is a perfect example of a tragic hero.
• “Man is a Political Animal” by Aristotle This is based on the fact that the philosophical ideas expressed by these scholars have proven to be greatly important in offering guidance to various facets of life-like cultural, social, political, and economic endeavors In […]
• Philosophy: Aristotle on Moral Virtue Both virtue and vice build one’s character and therefore can contribute to the view of happiness. Therefore, character education leads to happiness that is equal to the amount of wisdom and virtue.
• Aristotle, His Life and Philosophical Ideas Later on at the age of eighteen, he moved to Athens to study and this became his home for the next twenty years, after which he moved to Asia after the death of Plato where […]
• Aristotle’s and Plato’s Views on Rhetoric One of the points that Plato expresses in this philosophical work is that rhetoric should be viewed primarily as the “artificer of persuasion”. This is one of the similarities that can be distinguished.
• Tragic Hero in Aristotle’s “Poetics” According to Aristotle, the tragic error is the main manifestation of a tragic hero and it sets out the basis of his fate.
• Comparison of Plato’s and Aristotle’s Approaches to the Nature of Reality In contrast to Plato, Aristotle asserted that the senses were necessary for accurately determining reality and that they could not be used to deceive a person. Aristotle and Plato both considered that thoughts were superior […]
• Aristotle’s and Freud’s Motivational Theories The efficient cause is the trigger that causes a person to behave in a certain way. These biological instincts are the source of mental or psychic energy that makes human behavior and that it is […]
• Views on Writing Style by Plato, Aristotle and Dante In the end of a dialogue or a debate, the truth is supposed to emerge from the clash of the two opinions, and the defeated one is morally obliged to accept the force of a […]
• The Soul Ideas by Aristotle Their organization is such that the top in the rank consists of all properties of the one at the bottom. The rational soul’s ability to reason that is not in the other types of souls.
• Confucius, Plato, and Aristotle: Views on Society In the video, it is highlighted that both Plato and Confucius shared a commitment to reason and the value of the state.
• Aristotle’s Notion of Time and Motion It is also pertinent that the concept of Time is comprehended in relation to the concept of Motion. In an analysis of the nature of Time, it is most relevant to remember that Aristotle was […]
• Plato’s and Aristotle’s Theories of Human Nature Chapter five of Kupperman’s book “Theories of human nature” looks at great philosophers, namely Plato’s and Aristotle’s points of view in trying to define humanity. The writer tries to illustrate the complexity of defining a […]
• Observation and Theory in Aristotle’s Scientific Practice Aristotle focuses on the distinction between the unobservable and observables, the content and structure of observation reports, and the epistemic importance of observational evidence for the theories he aims to access.
• Plato and Aristotle Thoughts on Politics Aristotle emphasized that the lawgiver and the politician occupied the constitution and the state wholly and defined a citizen as one who had the right to deliberate or participate in the matters of the judicial […]
• Syllogism and Enthymeme in Aristotle’s Rhetoric One of the implications of syllogism to audiences is in regards to the possibility of creating offensive conclusions from an argument’s statements.
• Aristotle’s Ethical Theory and Nursing Therefore, the actions of an individual determine his happiness and the aspect of what is ethically good. This theory is directly related to the nursing professional code of ethics as indicated in the provisions of […]
• According to Aristotle, Is the Good Citizen the Same as the Good Human Being?? Why or Why Not?? Anticipating differentiation of human rights and the rights of citizen, issued in the corresponding Declaration of the period of the French revolution of the end of XVIII century, Aristotle is interested by a question – […]
• Morality and Politics: Aristotle and Machiavelli For a government to be effective, there must be a set of morals and virtues in place to ensure the people are happy.
• Being as Being: Aristotle vs. Aquinas The philosophical concept of being as being is concerned with the notion of existence, more specifically, that of the thing in and of itself.
• Classical Leadership Style and Aristotle’s Perspective He supported the ideas of Plato that the philosopher king has to be given a chance to exercise power while the soldiers were to provide the much-needed support by ensuring the citizens followed the law.
• Philosophy of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle Logic as understood by Socrates was to some extent influenced by the Pythagoreans since he practiced the dialectic methods in investigating the objectivity and authority of the different propositions.
• Philosophers: Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Marx The philosophical dilemma is how to do it, because in the overwhelming majority of cases, a human being is driven by the desire.
• Aristotle’s Virtue Theory vs. Buddha’s Middle Path The purpose of this paper is to review each of the two theories and develop a comparison between them. This term is in contrast to the paths of extremities described by eternalism and annihilationism that […]
• Plato and Aristotle: Criticisms of Democracy To speak of it in our present time, there are only a few people who are given the power of ‘sound judgement about what is right and what is wrong’ and should have the power […]
• Significance of Emotions in Aristotle’s Philosophy Additionally, the philosopher distinguishes two moralities, each with its interpretation of the cognitive role of emotions: a civic morality of judicial process in the Nicomachean Ethics and a contemplative ethics of theoretical study in Politics.
• Philosophy: Free Will of Aristotle and Lucretius The philosopher says that every action having place under the influence of the external force is not a free will, which comes from the inner desire and motivation of an individual. Moreover, the movie is […]
• Aristotle’s Ideologies Application in Practices The ideologies of philosophers have influenced the world and changed the perception and attitudes of people toward various issues. The peculiarity and popularity of Aristotle’s philosophy of life makes it easy for it to be […]
• Epicurus and Aristotle Philosophical Views on Emotions The two philosophers studied emotions to determine some of the common causes of this mental state, and the events that take place in the mind before one becomes emotional.
• Aristotle’s Understanding of Happiness If happiness is “wholeness”, then for a person to become happy, it is necessary to become “whole”. Thus, all a person has to do to become whole is lower goods.
• “Nicomachean Ethics” and “Politics” by Aristotle In his works, Aristotle enunciates that the meaning of being a good citizen is relative to the institution that one is a citizen of.
• “The Rhetoric & Poetics of Aristotle” Book This is necessary to feed more meaning to the language used and contributes to the ability of rhetoric in interpersonal communication. Human interaction is a continuous communication and going back and forth in the rhetoric […]
• Aristotle’s Concept of Happiness Aristotle’s concept of happiness is an expression of virtue that is similar to the flow state, happiness is a combination of the baseline level where basic needs are fulfilled and a broader area managed by […]
• Aristotle’s Views on Intellect and Soul However, Aristotle insisted that parts of the intellect may operate independent of the soul, in opposition to theorists such as Xenocrates and Plato.
• Ethical Decision-Making: Aristotle on the Sources of the Ethical Life In that way, the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, as well as Magna Moralia make up the central elements of Aristotle’s wise decision-making. The Nicomachean Ethics work emphasizes the role of achieving one main aim in […]
• Aristotle’s View on the Concept of Logic Thus, it was shown that logic is not just a specific doctrine of specific things or terms, but the science of the laws of syllogisms, such as modus ponens or modus tollens, expressed in variables. […]
• The Concept of Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics The essence of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is that virtue lies in between two extremes, none of which is virtuous on its own.
• Plato’s and Aristotle’s Works and Their Effects The first insight from these philosophical writings that shifted my viewpoint about this field was the distinctive role of the end goal and action in Plato’s and Aristotle’s works.
• The Bell Experience From Aristotle’s Perspective First, it is important for an idea to make sense in the minds of the audience. The idea of playing in the subway made sense to both Bell and the people.
• Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave” and Aristotle’s “High-Minded Man” The concept of a High-Minded man is close to Aristotle’s understanding of success and the contribution of different virtues to an individual’s happiness.
• Aristotle’s View of Ethics and Happiness Aristotle guarantees that to find the human great, we should recognize the capacity of an individual. He set forth the thought that joy is a delight in magnificence and great.
• Exegetical Paper on Aristotle: Meaning of Happiness It is in the balance, according to Aristotle, that the completeness of the human personality lies, and only through balance can a person find true self-satisfaction.
• Aristotle’s Philosophy and Views on Ethics In contrast, Aristotle believed that the purpose of ethics lies beyond the knowledge of what is good or evil, but rather focuses on the application and practice of the theory.
• Plato’s and Aristotle’s Concepts of Political Theory In The Republic by Plato and The Politics by Aristotle, two unique originations of the state, equity, and political investment introduce themselves.
• Aristotle’s Account of Pleasure Since Aristotle is trying to discern the goal of human life, he is inclined to think that pleasure is not a chief good.
• Aristotle’s and Socrates’ Account of Virtue This is manifested in their teachings where Aristotle speaks of virtue as finding a balance between two extremes while Socrates says that virtue is the desire for one to do well in one’s life.
• Greek Philosophies of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle It is argued that the origin of philosophy as a discipline owes its origin to the contribution of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.”Socrates’ contribution to the love of wisdom was manifested by the belief that philosophy […]
• Ancient Philosophy. Aristotle and Seneca on Anger Though there are conditions when anger is beneficial and useful, such as the feeling of anger that inspires the soldiers to fight abandoning hesitation and fear, Aristotle believes that the emotion of anger is constantly […]
• Plato’s and Aristotle’s Views on Oedipus People in the Oedipus play lived in the dark of the unknown meaning of the riddle; until Oedipus answered the riddle.
• Plato, Aristotle and Socrates: Knowledge and Government It appears that Socrates believed in an intellectual aristocracy, where those who had more education and had proven themselves in sophistry the “Socratic method” of exchange and analysis of ideas as a path to all […]
• Argument Between Philosophy Aristotle and Philosophy Locke Aristotle considers human beings to possess the understanding of these differences and apply them in their writings as well as conversations.
• Aristotle’s Influence on History of Rhetoric: Treatise Rhetoric and the Concept of the Rhetorical Triangle Aristotle has written works in a number of subjects, such as ethics, poetry, politics, music, biology, physics, etc, but among these, his contributions into rhetoric are the most valuable; within this field, Aristotle is known […]
• The Theme of Slavery in Aristotle’s “Politics” He notes that the fundamental part of an association is the household that is comprised of three different kinds of relationships: master to slave, husband to wife, and parents to their children.
• Aristotle, Selections From The Politics. Book I The growth of the movement towards the formation of states is, however, a gradual one; it is continuous, from the sixteenth century to our day, and while, throughout this period, and in almost every country […]
• Aristotle’s – The Ethics of Virtue Ethics is not a theory of discipline since our inquiry as to what is good for human beings is not just gathering knowledge, but to be able to achieve a unique state of fulfillment in […]
• Political Science: Aristotle’s View on Human Nature A citizen, for Aristotle, is an individual who has the capacity and the right to engage in the governance of a “polies”.
• Plato’s, Aristotle’s, Petrarch’s Views on Education To begin with, Plato believed that acquisition of knowledge was the way to being virtuous in life but he tended to differ with philosophers like Aristotle stating that education to be acquired from the natural […]
• “Political Animals” by Aristotle Review On the basis of argument I am in accordance to his views of thought in that the concept has clearly been attributed to the subjects in question Aristotle points out that in the first place […]
• Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics Analysis When faced with the option of an apple of a muffin, a good person would choose the apple, because the part of the soul that desired the muffin would be controlled by self-control, the part […]
• Aristotle on Practical vs. Theoretical Knowledge The second argument that should be discussed in Aristotle’s view of the idea of pleasure as the way to meet the key function of a person.
• Aristotle: Natural Changes and His Theory of Form The form of an object is the arrangement of the comprising components making up the object in focus. This is the counterpart of the subjects of predication in the Categories.
• Aristotle and His Definition of Happiness The best taste a person can have in his life is happiness because of success. But in my point of view, happiness is the main feeling that comes from the success of any useful act […]
• Aristotle’s “Knowing How” and Plato’s “Knowing That” The goal of Aristotle is knowledge in action and real knowing, which merge in the higher stratum of existence – the active mind.
• Happiness in “Nicomachean Ethics” by Aristotle The philosopher compares the life of gratification to that of slaves; the people who prefer this type of happiness are “vulgar,” live the same life as “grazing animals,” and only think about pleasure.
• Outlining Aristotle’s Ethics and Metaphysics As for one to be accorded the status of a professional he has to practice the skills required in that profession.
• Drama Elements Developed by Aristotle The sixth is a spectacle which is the visuals in the drama that include props, set, and actor’s costumes. An example of a tragic hero is King Macbeth in Shakespeare’s The Tragedy of Macbeth.
• Plato’s and Aristotle’s Philosophical Differences According to Plato, the functioning of every human being is closely linked to the entire society. Therefore, the major difference here is that for Plato, the function of every individual is to improve the entire […]
• Aristotle Philosophical Perspective To understand the connection established by Aristotle between a good life and a rational one, it is first necessary to discuss the concept of good used in the Nicomachean Ethics.
• Art and Media Censorship: Plato, Aristotle, and David Hume The philosopher defines God and the creator’s responsibilities in the text of the Republic: The creator is real and the opposite of evil.
• Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in Historical View Nicomachean Ethics is one of the most significant works of the prominent ancient philosopher, dedicated to the analysis of the moral purposes and virtues of a man.
• Book V in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics The central discussion of the document revolves around justice to provide a scrutinized analysis of money and exchange. This is because the fair exchange of things is the reciprocity of proportion and not equality.
• If Aristotle Ran General Motors: Moral Perspective In the current paper, the author will extrapolate on what Morris is saying and analyze the impacts of the arguments on the workplace.
• Isocrates and Aristotle Views on Rhetorical Devices I find it hard to believe that such an accomplished rhetor as yourself, would doubt that the main rules and principles of rhetorical persuasion are universally applicable, and that it is specified by the mean […]
• Aristotle’s Ethics Conception and Workplace Relations Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is one of the ethical writings that have spurred understanding of ethics of work place relations. A critical discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics provided by Aristotle is the argument and conversation over […]
• Aristotle on Civic Relationships It takes account of the happiness is an end and not a means. It is a way of thinking with the set intention in mind; deliberation determines the end and not the means.
• Aristotle’s Notion of Civic Relationships According to Aristotle, it is impossible to provide a complete account of conditions that lead to the attainment of the highest level of happiness or public good.
• Aristotle’s and Modern Views on the Masses of Citizens It is also important to add that these values are only declared in many countries while the power is still in hands of the rich.
• Aristotle and Plato: How Do They Differ? Generally, Aristotle’s philosophy differs with that of Plato because the latter’s is too shallow to establish definitions or sensibly create standards.
• Nature of Motion According To Lucretius and Aristotle Galileo utilized a number of scientific techniques to prove to the church that the earth was not the center of the universe.
• Aristotle’s Ideas on Civic Relationships Keeping law and order is thus essential in addition to evading things that are considered to be against the prospects of the society so as to be just, a virtue encouraged by Aristotle.
• What is Aristotle’s View on Trade? Aristotle argues that the art of exchanging goods or services in the pretext of trade is not good. Aristotle asserts that household management is necessary and honorable and therefore, families should never engage in retail […]
• Aristotle’s Definition of Virtue In particular, he writes that virtue is “a state that decides, consisting in a mean, relative to us, which is defined by reference to a reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference […]
• Aristotle With a Bust of Homer Rembrandt A careful study of the hair, the beards and the dress of Homer reveals that this is a painting of that era.
• Can Aristotle’s Theory of Happiness Be Achieved by Applying Friedman’s Ideas of Corporate Social Responsibilities? According to Aristotle, politics is the master of all arts since it is concerned with the end in itself. This is a central argument to the ideas of Aristotle and underscores his idea that politics […]
• Essence of Happiness of Indira’s Life According to Plato’s and Aristotle’s Views on Education She finds her inspiration in the languages and other subjects and, obviously, the girl knows that education is the best solution of solving a number of problems and difficulties that she may face during the […]
• Aristotle on Human Nature, State, and Slavery This should be done with restraint and caution in order not to compromise the validity of modern studies and to avoid bias, as evident in the studies of some historical philosophers in their quoting of […]
• Aristotle’s Ethics and Metaphysics He overlooks other important factors such as the act of feeling them in the most appropriate time, with special reference to the right objects, to the right individuals, with the right intention, and in the […]
• Ancient Political Theory: Plato and Aristotle Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s the Republic in Politics II focused on political regimes and cities by stating in general that it would be a dangerous activity to leave the governance of a city to a […]
• Aristotle vs. Scientific Cannons They had a hypothesis, given their argument, that the heavier the object, the faster it would move towards the center of the universe. That is, there was a degree of regularity given a similarity in […]
• Aristotle’s Ideas on Civic Relationships: Happiness, the Virtues, Deliberation, Justice, and Friendship On building trust at work, employers are required to give minimum supervision to the employees in an effort to make the latter feel a sense of belonging and responsibility.
• Impact on the Development of Natural Science a Aristotle’s Book “Physics” From Aristotle’s perspective, to know the purpose of nature is the most essential task of a philosopher and his strategies should be subjected to this task.
• Aristotle’s Fundamentals of Public Relationship The paper reviews the traits of the best working places and compares the ideas with those offered by Aristotle. In fact, through training, the employees are able to develop virtues that enhance interactions, and the […]
• How Aristotle Views Happiness Aristotle notes that “the attainment of the good for one man alone is, to be sure, a source of satisfaction; yet to secure it for a nation and for states is nobler and more divine”.
• Aristotle and Modern Work Relationships This is not the case in the contemporary work place where a myriad of factors contribute to the happiness of the employees.
• Sophocle and Aristotle For an individual to achieve the qualities of a tragic hero, his or her actions must be consistent. The qualities of a tragic hero are similar to the qualities exhibited by Oedipus.
• Aristotle and Relationship at Work: Outline The first level appeals to a part of the human soul that focuses on reason while the second part appeals to the part of the human soul that follows reason.
• Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle However, the fact that there are many actions that people engage in, Aristotle argues that their ends are countless. Aristotle concludes that happiness is the key principle that causes people to practice virtues such as […]
• Aristotle’s Ethical Theory The weakness of philosophical theories is that they are mere intellectual theories void actions or activities, which require habitual practice as a process of achieving moral virtues.
• Aristotle’s Philosophical Theories Aristotle argued that the understanding of nature could only be accomplished through the analysis of the aspects of nature as the first step in understanding the target object, and then processing the mental reaction of […]
• How Do Aristotle’s Ideas Show Him to Be an Ancient Philosopher?
• What Does Aristotle Identify as the Ultimate Human Good?
• How Closely Does Hamlet Match Aristotle’s Definition of a Tragic Hero?
• What Was Aristotle’s Thought on Friendship?
• How Did Aristotle Understand Bravery?
• What Would Aristotle Have Thought About a State Lottery?
• How Does Aristotle Address the Issue of Individual Rights?
• What Did Aristotle Mean by the Final Cause?
• How Are Ethics and Politics Related to Aristotle’s Philosophy?
• Did Aristotle Value Politics Less Than Materialism and Feelings?
• How Does Aristotle Define Happiness?
• Does Aristotle’s Function Argument Offer a Convincing Account of the Human Good?
• How Does Aristotle’s Ideas on Justice Influence the American Judicial System?
• Does Sophocles’ Antigone Fit Aristotle’s Definition of a Tragic Heroine?
• How Does Aristotle’s View of Politics Differ From That of Plato’s?
• Why Does Aristotle Believe That Morality Leads to Happiness?
• How Would Aristotle Respond to Utilitarianism?
• How Do Aristotle and Machiavelli Use the Middle Class and the Masses to Achieve Stable Political Organizations?
• Was Aristotle the First Physicist?
• How Does Aristotle Define the Good Life?
• What Did Aristotle Contribute to the Discipline of Logic?
• How Does Aristotle Oppose Platos Attack on Poetry?
• What Does Aristotle Define as Virtue?
• How Does Aristotle Understand the Human Being Through Virtue Ethics?
• What Were Aristotle’s Main Ideas?
• How Does Aristotle’s Anthropic Hylomorphism Relate to His Logical Hylomorphism?
• What Would Aristotle Think of Hannibal Lecter?
• How Does Aristotle Systematically Arrive at Eudemonia via a Concept of Function?
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Aristotle was one of the greatest philosophers who ever lived and the first genuine scientist in history. He made pioneering contributions to all fields of philosophy and science, he invented the field of formal logic , and he identified the various scientific disciplines and explored their relationships to each other. Aristotle was also a teacher and founded his own school in Athens, known as the Lyceum .

After his father died about 367 BCE, Aristotle journeyed to Athens, where he joined the Academy of Plato. He left the Academy upon Plato’s death about 348, traveling to the northwestern coast of present-day Turkey . He lived there and on the island of Lésbos until 343 or 342, when King Philip II of Macedonia summoned him to the Macedonian capital, Pella , to act as tutor to Philip’s young teenage son, Alexander, which he did for two or three years. Aristotle presumably lived somewhere in Macedonia until his (second) arrival in Athens in 335. In 323 hostility toward Macedonians in Athens prompted Aristotle to flee to the island of Euboea, where he died the following year.

Aristotle’s most famous teacher was Plato (c. 428–c. 348 BCE), who himself had been a student of Socrates (c. 470–399 BCE). Socrates, Plato , and Aristotle, whose lifetimes spanned a period of only about 150 years, remain among the most important figures in the history of Western philosophy. Aristotle’s most famous student was Philip II’s son Alexander, later to be known as Alexander the Great , a military genius who eventually conquered the entire Greek world as well as North Africa and the Middle East . Aristotle’s most important philosophical student was probably Theophrastus , who became head of the Lyceum about 323.

Aristotle wrote as many as 200 treatises and other works covering all areas of philosophy and science . Of those, none survives in finished form. The approximately 30 works through which his thought was conveyed to later centuries consist of lecture notes (by Aristotle or his students) and draft manuscripts edited by ancient scholars, notably Andronicus of Rhodes , the last head of the Lyceum , who arranged, edited, and published Aristotle’s extant works in Rome about 60 BCE. The naturally abbreviated style of these writings makes them difficult to read, even for philosophers.

Aristotle’s thought was original, profound, wide-ranging, and systematic. It eventually became the intellectual framework of Western Scholasticism , the system of philosophical assumptions and problems characteristic of philosophy in western Europe during the Middle Ages . In the 13th century St. Thomas Aquinas undertook to reconcile Aristotelian philosophy and science with Christian dogma, and through him the theology and intellectual worldview of the Roman Catholic Church became Aristotelian. Since the mid-20th century, Aristotle’s ethics has inspired the field of virtue theory, an approach to ethics that emphasizes human well-being and the development of character. Aristotle’s thought also constitutes an important current in other fields of contemporary philosophy, especially metaphysics, political philosophy, and the philosophy of science.

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Aristotle (born 384 bce , Stagira, Chalcidice , Greece—died 322, Chalcis , Euboea) was an ancient Greek philosopher and scientist, one of the greatest intellectual figures of Classical antiquity and Western history. He was the author of a philosophical and scientific system that became the framework and vehicle for both Christian Scholasticism and medieval Islamic philosophy . Even after the intellectual revolutions of the Renaissance , the Reformation , and the Enlightenment , Aristotelian concepts remained embedded in Western thinking .

Aristotle’s intellectual range was vast, covering most of the sciences and many of the arts, including biology , botany , chemistry , ethics , history , logic , metaphysics , rhetoric , philosophy of mind , philosophy of science , physics , poetics, political theory, psychology , and zoology . He was the founder of formal logic , devising for it a finished system that for centuries was regarded as the sum of the discipline; and he pioneered the study of zoology, both observational and theoretical, in which some of his work remained unsurpassed until the 19th century. But he is, of course, most outstanding as a philosopher. His writings in ethics and political theory as well as in metaphysics and the philosophy of science continue to be studied, and his work remains a powerful current in contemporary philosophical debate.

This article deals with Aristotle’s life and thought. For the later development of Aristotelian philosophy , see Aristotelianism . For treatment of Aristotelianism in the full context of Western philosophy, see philosophy, Western .

Aristotle was born on the Chalcidic peninsula of Macedonia, in northern Greece . His father, Nicomachus, was the physician of Amyntas III (reigned c. 393–c. 370 bce ), king of Macedonia and grandfather of Alexander the Great (reigned 336–323 bce ). After his father’s death in 367, Aristotle migrated to Athens , where he joined the Academy of Plato (c. 428–c. 348 bce ). He remained there for 20 years as Plato’s pupil and colleague.

Many of Plato’s later dialogues date from these decades, and they may reflect Aristotle’s contributions to philosophical debate at the Academy. Some of Aristotle’s writings also belong to this period, though mostly they survive only in fragments. Like his master, Aristotle wrote initially in dialogue form, and his early ideas show a strong Platonic influence. His dialogue Eudemus , for example, reflects the Platonic view of the soul as imprisoned in the body and as capable of a happier life only when the body has been left behind. According to Aristotle, the dead are more blessed and happier than the living, and to die is to return to one’s real home.

Another youthful work, the Protrepticus (“Exhortation”), has been reconstructed by modern scholars from quotations in various works from late antiquity. Everyone must do philosophy, Aristotle claims, because even arguing against the practice of philosophy is itself a form of philosophizing. The best form of philosophy is the contemplation of the universe of nature; it is for this purpose that God made human beings and gave them a godlike intellect. All else—strength, beauty, power, and honour—is worthless.

It is possible that two of Aristotle’s surviving works on logic and disputation, the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations , belong to this early period. The former demonstrates how to construct arguments for a position one has already decided to adopt; the latter shows how to detect weaknesses in the arguments of others. Although neither work amounts to a systematic treatise on formal logic, Aristotle can justly say, at the end of the Sophistical Refutations , that he has invented the discipline of logic—nothing at all existed when he started.

During Aristotle’s residence at the Academy, King Philip II of Macedonia (reigned 359–336 bce ) waged war on a number of Greek city-state s. The Athenians defended their independence only half-heartedly, and, after a series of humiliating concessions , they allowed Philip to become, by 338, master of the Greek world. It cannot have been an easy time to be a Macedonian resident in Athens.

Within the Academy, however, relations seem to have remained cordial. Aristotle always acknowledged a great debt to Plato; he took a large part of his philosophical agenda from Plato, and his teaching is more often a modification than a repudiation of Plato’s doctrines. Already, however, Aristotle was beginning to distance himself from Plato’s theory of Forms, or Ideas ( eidos ; see form ). (The word Form , when used to refer to Forms as Plato conceived them, is often capitalized in the scholarly literature; when used to refer to forms as Aristotle conceived them, it is conventionally lowercased.) Plato had held that, in addition to particular things, there exists a suprasensible realm of Forms, which are immutable and everlasting. This realm, he maintained, makes particular things intelligible by accounting for their common natures: a thing is a horse, for example, by virtue of the fact that it shares in, or imitates, the Form of “Horse.” In a lost work, On Ideas , Aristotle maintains that the arguments of Plato’s central dialogues establish only that there are, in addition to particulars, certain common objects of the sciences. In his surviving works as well, Aristotle often takes issue with the theory of Forms, sometimes politely and sometimes contemptuously. In his Metaphysics he argues that the theory fails to solve the problems it was meant to address. It does not confer intelligibility on particulars, because immutable and everlasting Forms cannot explain how particulars come into existence and undergo change. All the theory does, according to Aristotle, is introduce new entities equal in number to the entities to be explained—as if one could solve a problem by doubling it. ( See below Form .)

When Plato died about 348, his nephew Speusippus became head of the Academy, and Aristotle left Athens. He migrated to Assus , a city on the northwestern coast of Anatolia (in present-day Turkey), where Hermias , a graduate of the Academy, was ruler. Aristotle became a close friend of Hermias and eventually married his ward Pythias. Aristotle helped Hermias to negotiate an alliance with Macedonia, which angered the Persian king, who had Hermias treacherously arrested and put to death about 341. Aristotle saluted Hermias’s memory in “ Ode to Virtue,” his only surviving poem.

While in Assus and during the subsequent few years when he lived in the city of Mytilene on the island of Lesbos , Aristotle carried out extensive scientific research, particularly in zoology and marine biology . This work was summarized in a book later known, misleadingly, as The History of Animals , to which Aristotle added two short treatises , On the Parts of Animals and On the Generation of Animals . Although Aristotle did not claim to have founded the science of zoology, his detailed observations of a wide variety of organisms were quite without precedent. He—or one of his research assistants—must have been gifted with remarkably acute eyesight, since some of the features of insects that he accurately reports were not again observed until the invention of the microscope in the 17th century.

The scope of Aristotle’s scientific research is astonishing. Much of it is concerned with the classification of animals into genus and species; more than 500 species figure in his treatises, many of them described in detail. The myriad items of information about the anatomy, diet, habitat, modes of copulation, and reproductive systems of mammals, reptiles, fish, and insects are a melange of minute investigation and vestiges of superstition. In some cases his unlikely stories about rare species of fish were proved accurate many centuries later. In other places he states clearly and fairly a biological problem that took millennia to solve, such as the nature of embryonic development.

Despite an admixture of the fabulous, Aristotle’s biological works must be regarded as a stupendous achievement. His inquiries were conducted in a genuinely scientific spirit, and he was always ready to confess ignorance where evidence was insufficient. Whenever there is a conflict between theory and observation, one must trust observation, he insisted, and theories are to be trusted only if their results conform with the observed phenomena.

In 343 or 342 Aristotle was summoned by Philip II to the Macedonian capital at Pella to act as tutor to Philip’s 13-year-old son, the future Alexander the Great. Little is known of the content of Aristotle’s instruction; although the Rhetoric to Alexander was included in the Aristotelian corpus for centuries, it is now commonly regarded as a forgery. By 326 Alexander had made himself master of an empire that stretched from the Danube to the Indus and included Libya and Egypt. Ancient sources report that during his campaigns Alexander arranged for biological specimens to be sent to his tutor from all parts of Greece and Asia Minor .

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Aristotle - Contemporary Perspectives on his Thought

On the 2400th anniversary of aristotle's birth.

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Aristotle’s Rhetoric

Aristotle’s Rhetoric has had an unparalleled influence on the development of the art of rhetoric. In addition to Aristotle’s disciples and followers, the so-called Peripatetic philosophers (see Fortenbaugh/Mirhady 1994), famous Roman teachers of rhetoric, such as Cicero and Quintilian, frequently used elements stemming from Aristotle’s rhetorical theory. These latter authors, however, were not primarily interested in a meticulous interpretation of Aristotle’s writings, but were rather looking for a conceptual framework for their own manuals of rhetoric. This is one of the reasons why for two millennia the interpretation of Aristotelian rhetoric has been pursued by those concerned primarily with the history of rhetoric rather than philosophy. This association with the rhetorical rather than with the philosophical tradition is also mirrored in the fact that in the most influential manuscripts and editions, the text of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (for its transmission see Kassel 1971) was surrounded by rhetorical works and speeches written by other Greek and Latin authors, and was thus seldom interpreted in the context of Aristotle’s philosophical works. It was not until the last few decades that the philosophically salient features of the Aristotelian rhetoric have been acknowledged (e.g. in the collections Furley/Nehamas 1994 and Rorty 1996; for a more general survey of scholarship in the 20th century see Natali 1994). Most notably, scholars became aware of the fact that Aristotle’s rhetorical analysis of persuasion draws on many concepts and ideas that are also treated in his logical, ethical, political and psychological writings, so that the Rhetoric became increasingly perceived as well-integrated part of the Aristotelian oeuvre. For example, Aristotle’s Rhetoric is inextricably connected with the history of ancient logic (see Allen 2008 and, more generally, ancient logic ) and is often taken as an important inspiration for modern argumentation theory (see van Eemeren 2013 and, more generally, dialogical logic ). Some authors have stressed the Rhetoric ’s affinity to Aristotle’s ethical theory (see e.g. Woerner 1990), while others were attracted by Aristotle’s rhetorical account of metaphor (see e.g. Ricoeur 1996 and, more generally, metaphor ). Most significantly, philosophers and scholars began to turn their attention to the Rhetoric ’s account of the passions or emotions, which is not only richer than in any other Aristotelian treatise, but was also seen as manifesting an early example of cognitive, judgement-based accounts of emotions (see e.g. Nussbaum 1996, Konstan 2006 and, more generally, §5 of emotion ).

1. Aristotle’s Works on Rhetoric

2. the structure of the rhetoric, 3. rhetoric as a counterpart to dialectic, 4.1 the definition of rhetoric, 4.2 what rhetoric is useful for, 4.3 can aristotle’s rhetoric be misused, 4.4 is aristotle’s conception of rhetoric normative, 5.1 persuasion through the character of the speaker, 5.2 persuasion through the emotions of the hearer, 5.3 persuasion through the argument itself, 5.4 is there an inconsistency in aristotle’s rhetorical theory, 6.1 the concept of enthymeme, 6.2 formal requirements, 6.3 enthymemes as dialectical arguments, 6.4 the brevity of the enthymeme, 6.5 different types of enthymemes, 7.1 the (lacking) definition of ‘ topos ’, 7.2 the word ‘ topos ’ and the technique of places, 7.3 the ingredients and the function of topoi, 7.4 rhetorical topoi, 8.1 the virtue of style, 8.2 aristotelian metaphors, glossary of selected terms, translations, editions and commentaries, collections, monographs and articles, other internet resources, related entries.

• Judgemental and Non-Judgemental Accounts of Aristotelian Emotions
• The Thesis that Enthymemes are Relaxed Inferences
• The Brevity of the Enthymeme
• The Variety of Topoi in the Rhetoric

The work that has come down to us as Aristotle’s Rhetoric or Art of Rhetoric consists of three books, while the ancient catalogue of the Aristotelian works, reported e.g. by Diogenes Laertius, mentions only two books on rhetoric (probably our Rhetoric I & II), plus two further books on style (perhaps our Rhetoric III?). Whereas most modern authors agree that at least the core of Rhetoric I & II presents a coherent rhetorical theory, the two themes of Rhetoric III (style/diction and the partition of speeches) are not mentioned in the original agenda of Rhetoric I & II. The conceptual link between Rhetoric I & II and Rhetoric III is not given until the very last sentence of the second book, so the authenticity of this seeming ad hoc connection is slightly suspicious; we cannot rule out the possibility that these two parts of the Rhetoric were not put together until the first complete edition of Aristotle’s works was accomplished by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century. In Aristotle’s Poetics (1456a33) we find a cross-reference to a work called ‘ Rhetoric ’ which obviously refers only to Rhetoric I & II, but does not seem to include the agenda of Rhetoric III, suggesting that Aristotle at this time regards Rhetoric I & II as the complete work. Regardless of such doubts, the systematic idea that links the two heterogeneous parts of the Rhetoric — Rhetoric I & II on the one hand and Rhetoric III on the other— does make good sense: it is not enough, or so the linking passage says, to have a supply of things to say (the so-called ‘thought’); one should also know how to express or formulate those things (the so-called ‘style’), so that the project of Rhetoric I & II concerning what we say (or the ‘thought’) needs to be complemented by the peculiar project of Rhetoric III (i.e. a treatise on ‘style’).

The chronological fixing of the Rhetoric has turned out to be a delicate and controversial matter. At least the core of Rhetoric I & II seems to be an early work (see e.g. Düring 1966, 118–125, Rist 1989, 85–86, Rapp 2002 I, 178–184), written during Aristotle’s first stay in Athens (it is unclear, however, which chapters belong to that core; regularly mentioned are the chapters I.4–15 and II.1–17). It is true that the Rhetoric also refers to historical events that fall in the time of Aristotle’s exile and his second stay in Athens (see § 1 of Aristotle ), but most of them can be found in just two chapters, namely chapters II.23–24, and moreover such examples could have been updated, which is especially plausible if we assume that the Rhetoric formed the basis of a lecture course held several times. However, what is most striking are its affinities to the early work Topics (for the idea that the Topics is early see e.g. Solmsen 1929, 191–195; for a discussion of Solmsen’s theses in English see Stocks 1933); if, as is widely agreed nowadays, the Topics represents a pre-syllogistic stage of Aristotelian logic, the same is likely to be true of the Rhetoric , as we actually find only few or even no hints to syllogistic inventory in it. (Indeed, the Rhetoric includes two short passages that explicitly refer to the Analytics , which presents Aristotle’s syllogistic theory: I.2, 1357a22–1358a2, II.25, 1402b13–1403a16. Some authors — e.g. Solmsen 1929, 13–31, Burnyeat 1994, 31, Allen 2001, 20–40 — take this as evidence that at least in these two passages the Rhetoric makes use of the syllogistic theory, while others — e.g. Rapp 2002, II 202–204 — object to this inference.)

It seems that Aristotle was the author not only of the Rhetoric as we know it today, but of several treatises dealing with rhetoric. According to ancient testimonies, Aristotle wrote an early dialogue on rhetoric entitled ‘ Grullos ’, in which he put forward arguments for why rhetoric cannot be an art ( technê ); and since this is precisely the position of Plato’s Gorgias (see §4 of Plato: rhetoric and poetry ), the lost dialogue Grullos has traditionally been regarded as a sign of Aristotle’s (alleged) early Platonism (see Solmsen 1929, 196–208). But the evidence for the position defended in this dialogue is too tenuous to support such strong conclusions: it also could have been a ‘dialectical’ dialogue, simply listing the pros and cons of the thesis that rhetoric is an art (see Lossau 1974). We are in a similar situation concerning another lost work on rhetoric, the so-called ‘ Technê Sunagogê ’, a collection of previous theories of rhetoric that is also ascribed to Aristotle. Cicero seems to use this collection, or at least a secondary source relying on it, as his main historical source when he gives a short survey of the history of pre-Aristotelian rhetoric in his Brutus 46–48. Finally, Aristotle once mentions a work called ‘ Theodecteia ’ which has also been supposed to be Aristotelian; but more probably he refers to the rhetorical handbook of his follower Theodectes, who was also a former pupil of Isocrates. From these lost works on rhetoric we only have a meagre collection of scattered fragments (frg. 68–69 R 3 , 114 R 3 , 125–141 R 3 : see Rose 1886).

The structure of Rhetoric I & II is determined by two tripartite divisions. The first division consists in the distinction between the three pisteis , i.e. ‘persuaders’ or ‘means of persuasion’, that are technical in the sense that they are based on the rhetorical method and are provided by the speech alone. And speech can produce persuasion either through the character ( êthos ) of the speaker, the emotional state ( pathos ) of the listener, or the argument ( logos ) itself (see below § 5 ). The second tripartite division concerns the three species or genres of public speech (see de Brauw 2008 and Pepe 2013). A speech that takes place in the assembly is defined as a deliberative speech . In this rhetorical genre, the speaker either advises the audience to do something or warns against doing something. Accordingly, the audience has to judge things that are going to happen in the future, and they have to decide whether these future events are good or bad for the city or city-state ( polis ), whether they will cause advantage or harm. A speech that takes place before a court is defined as a judicial speech . The speaker either accuses somebody or defends herself or someone else. Naturally, this kind of speech treats things that happened in the past. The audience, or rather the jury, has to judge whether a past event actually happened or not and whether it was just or unjust, i.e., whether it was in accordance with the law or contrary to the law. While the deliberative and judicial genres have their context in controversial situations in which the listener has to decide in favour of one of two opposing parties, the third genre does not aim at such a decision: an epideictic speech (e.g. funeral speeches, celebratory speeches) praises or blames somebody, and tries to describe the affairs or deeds of its subject as honourable or shameful.

The first book of the Rhetoric treats these three genres in succession. Rhetoric I.4–8 deals with the deliberative, I.9 with the epideictic, I.10–14 with the judicial genre. These chapters are understood as contributing to the argumentative mode of persuasion ( logos ) or — more precisely — to that part of argumentative persuasion that is specific to the respective genre of speech. The second part of the treatment of argumentative persuasion ( logos ) that is common to all three genres of rhetorical speech is treated in chapters II.19–26. The second means of persuasion, the one that works by evoking the emotions of the audience ( pathos ), is described in chapters II.2–11. Although the following chapters II.12–17 treat different types of character ( êthos ), these chapters do not, as one might infer, develop the first means of persuasion, i.e. the one that depends on the character of the speaker. The underlying theory of this means of persuasion is rather unfolded in a few lines of chapter II.1. The aforementioned chapters II.12–17 rather account for different types of character and their disposition to emotional response, which can be useful for speakers who want to arouse the emotions of the audience. Why the chapters on the specific (in the first book) and the common (in the second book) argumentative means of persuasion ( logos ) are separated by the treatment of emotions and character (in II.2–17) remains a riddle, especially since the chapter II.18 tries to give a link between the specific and the common aspects of argumentative persuasion — as though this chapter follows directly upon the end of Rhetoric I. Rhetoric III.1–12 discusses several questions of style (see below § 8.1 ) while Rhetoric III.13–19 is dedicated to the various parts of a speech and their arrangement.

Owing to ambiguities like these, the structuring of the Rhetoric has always been somewhat controversial, since different attempts to structure the work manifest different interpretative decisions. By and large, though, the following structure seems to capture its main topics and divisions:

• Ch. 1: Rhetoric as a counterpart to dialectic — dialectically conceived rhetoric is centred on proofs — rhetorical proofs are ‘enthymemes’ — this is neglected by previous manuals of rhetoric that focus instead on emotions, slandering and on other techniques for speaking outside the subject — “speaking outside the subject” is forbidden in states with good legislation — the benefits of rhetoric.
• Through the speaker: credibility of the speaker ( êthos )
• Through the hearer: the emotional state of the audience ( pathos )
• Through the argument: proving or seemingly proving what is true ( logos )
• Judicial (or forensic) speech deals with accusation and defence about past events — aiming at the just/unjust.
• Deliberative (or political) speech deals with exhortation and dissuasion about future events — aiming at the advantageous/harmful.
• Epideictic speech deals with praise and blame primarily with regard to the present time — aiming at the honourable/shameful.
• Ch. 4–8: Premises or topoi specific to the deliberative speech: Types of advantageous/harmful things the speaker should be familiar with (Ch. 4) — Happiness ( eudaimonia ) (Ch. 5) — what is good/advantageous (Ch. 6) — what is better/more advantageous (Ch. 7) — the various constitutions (Ch. 8).
• Ch. 9: Premises or topoi specific to the epideictic speech: virtue and vice — the honourable and the blameworthy.
• Ch. 10–14: Premises or topoi specific to the judicial speech: wrong-doing and motives for wrong-doing (Ch. 10) — pleasure (Ch. 11) — the state of mind of the wrong-doers and characteristics of their victims (Ch. 12) — kinds of just and unjust deeds, unwritten laws (Ch. 13) — degrees of wrong-doing (Ch. 14).
• Ch. 15: Artless means of persuasion (i.e. means that cannot be invented by the art, but are just given — such as contracts, laws, witnesses, oaths, torture — and need to be used in one way or the other), mostly connected with judicial speech.

Rhetoric II

• Ch. 1: Why persuasion through logos is insufficient — how persuasion through êthos and pathos is supposed to work.
• Ch. 2–11: Particular types of emotions ( pathê ) and their counterparts: anger (Ch. 2) — mildness (Ch. 3) — loving/friendly affection ( philia ) and hating (Ch. 4) — fear and confidence (Ch. 5) — shame and lack of shame (Ch. 6) — gratefulness and lack of gratefulness (Ch. 7) — pity (Ch. 8) — indignation plus two nameless emotions (Ch. 9) — envy (Ch. 10) — emulation or ambition (Ch.11).
• Ch. 12–17: Different types of character ( êthos ): the character of young people (Ch. 12), of elderly people (Ch. 13), of people in the prime of their life (Ch. 14), of people of noble birth (Ch. 15), of wealthy people (Ch. 16) and of powerful people (Ch. 18).
• Ch. 18: Transition to generally applicable aspects of persuasion through logos :
• Ch. 19–25: Generally applicable aspects of persuasion through logos : topoi about the possible/impossible, past and future facts, significance and insignificance (Ch. 19) — examples: factual (report) and fictitious (the parable and the fable) (Ch. 20) — maxims (Ch. 21) — the enthymeme (Ch. 22) — topoi for the construction of enthymemes (Ch. 23) — topoi for the construction of merely apparent (i.e. fallacious) enthymemes (Ch. 24) — refutation (Ch. 25).
• Ch. 26: Amplification — transition to Rhetoric III.

Rhetoric III , Ch. 1–12: Style ( lexis ):

• Ch. 1: Delivery of a speech and why style/diction should be considered.
• Ch. 2–3: The virtue and the vices of prose style: the excellent prose style is neither too banal nor above the due dignity, but appropriate — the choice of words — the role of metaphors (Ch. 2) — Four deterrent factors (or vices) of style (Ch. 3).
• Ch. 4–11: Particular ingredients of prose style: the simile (Ch. 4) — linguistic correctness (Ch. 5) — stylistic voluminousness and its contrary (Ch. 6) — appropriateness in style (Ch. 7) — periodic style (Ch. 8) — rhythm (Ch. 9) — urbanity, bringing before the eyes, metaphors (Ch. 10–11).
• Ch. 12: Written and oral style.

Rhetoric III , Ch. 13–19: Arrangement ( taxis ):

• Ch. 13: Only two parts of the speech are necessary, namely the statement and the proof of the main claim — contemporary authors of rhetorical manuals make futile subdivisions of the parts of speech — introduction of a quadripartite scheme of the speech: (1) proem, (2) statement of the main claim, (3) proof of the stated claim ( pistis ), (4) epilogue.
• Ch. 14–19: Particular parts of the speech: the proem in the three genres of speech (Ch. 14) — topoi for slandering (Ch. 15) — narration (Ch. 16) — proof ( pistis ) (Ch. 17) — interrogation (Ch. 18) — epilogue/conclusion (Ch. 19).

Aristotle stresses right from the beginning of his Rhetoric that rhetoric is closely related to dialectic. He offers several formulations to describe the affinity between these two disciplines: in the first line of the book Rhetoric rhetoric is said to be a ‘counterpart’ ( antistrophos ) to dialectic ( Rhet. I.1, 1354a1); in the second chapter of the first book it is also called an ‘outgrowth’ or ‘offshoot’ ( paraphues ti ) of dialectic and the study of character ( Rhet. I.2, 1356a25f.); finally, Aristotle says that rhetoric is part of dialectic and resembles it ( Rhet. I.2, 1356a30f.).

In saying that rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic, Aristotle obviously wants to allude to Plato’s Gorgias (464bff.), where rhetoric is ironically defined as a counterpart to cookery in the soul. Since, in this passage, Plato uses the word ‘ antistrophos ’ to indicate an analogy, it is likely that Aristotle wants to express a kind of analogy too: what dialectic is for the (private or academic) practice of attacking and maintaining an argument, rhetoric is for the (public) practice of defending oneself or accusing an opponent.

The notion of ‘dialectic’ is prominent in the work of Aristotle’s teacher, Plato; Plato often labels his philosophical method, or certain parts of it, as dialectic. In his dialogue Gorgias (see §4 of Plato: rhetoric and poetry ), dialectic seems to be strictly opposed to rhetoric, the former aiming at the disclosure of truth, the latter allegedly aiming at ‘persuasion without knowledge’. In his Phaedrus Plato pictures the relation between dialectic and rhetoric in a different way (see §5.1 of Plato: rhetoric and poetry ); here he entertains the idea of a new philosophical rhetoric, quite different from the then contemporary style of speech writing, which rests upon dialectic, the genuine philosophical method, for acquiring genuine knowledge both of the subject matter of a speech and of the soul of the audience. When Aristotle speaks of dialectic, he certainly has his book Topics in mind, where he develops at some length an argumentative method for attacking and defending theses of any content (see §8 of Aristotle: logic ). Clearly, Aristotle’s dialectical method was inspired by Plato and by the debates in Plato’s Academy; however, while Plato often presents dialectic as a method for discovering and conveying truth, Aristotelian dialectic is strictly confined to examining particular claims or testing the consistency of a set of propositions (which in his view is different from establishing or proving the truth of a proposition). This is, in a nutshell, the context that must be kept in mind, when Aristotle presents — quite allusively — a new art of rhetoric by stressing its affinity to dialectic; obviously he plays upon his readers’ expectations concerning the meaning of dialectic and the relation between dialectic and rhetoric, as described by Plato. Those students of Plato’s Academy who were still suspicious about any engagement with rhetoric and public speech possibly received the opening of Aristotle’s Rhetoric with its postulated affinity between rhetoric and dialectic either as a provoction or as some sort of joke.

This purported analogy between rhetoric and dialectic (as conceived by Aristotle) can be substantiated by several common features of both disciplines:

• Both rhetoric and dialectic are concerned with things that do not belong to a definite genus or are not the object of a specific science.
• Both rhetoric and dialectic are not dependent on the established principles of specific sciences.
• Both rhetoric and dialectic have the function of providing arguments.
• Both rhetorical and dialectical arguments rely on assumptions or premises that are not established as true, but are only reputable or accepted by one group or the other ( endoxa ).
• Both rhetoric and dialectic are concerned with both sides of an opposition, dialectic by constructing arguments for and against any thesis, rhetoric by considering what is possibly persuasive in any given case.

This analogy to dialectic has extremely significant ramifications for the status of Aristotle’s supposedly new art of rhetoric. Plato argued in his Gorgias that rhetoric could not be an art ( technê ), since it is not related to a definite subject, while real arts are defined by their specific subjects, as e.g. medicine or shoemaking are defined by their products (health and shoes). By claiming that rhetoric and dialectic are similar or analogous, Aristotle suggests a quite different picture. The analogy is even meant to flesh out the thought that neither rhetoric nor dialectic are like ordinary arts ( technai ) or sciences with a limited, well-defined subject matter. However, this should not be seen as a drawback, or so the analogy suggests, since the alleged shortcoming, i.e. that they do not have such a definite subject matter, can be turned into a virtue, by entrusting to dialectic and rhetoric the practices that are common to all fields of rationality, namely the various practices of argumentation. For even though dialectic has no definite subject, it is easy to see that it nevertheless employs a consistent method (both in Plato’s and Aristotle’s understanding of dialectic), because dialectic has to grasp the ultimate reason why some arguments are valid and others are not. Now, if rhetoric is nothing but the counterpart to dialectic within the domain of public speech, it must be similarly grounded in an investigation of what is persuasive and what is not, and this, in turn, qualifies rhetoric as an art or, after all, as a discipline that is methodologically not inferior to dialectic.

As already indicated, it is crucial for both disciplines, dialectic and rhetoric, that they deal with arguments from accepted premises ( endoxa ). Dialecticians do not argue on the basis of established, scientific principles, but on the basis of only reputable assumptions, i.e. of what is accepted either by all or the many or the few experts. In a similar vein, rhetoricians or orators try to hit assumptions that are already accepted by their audience, because they want to persuade the addressees on the basis of their own convictions. Of course, owing to the different fields of application — philosophical–academic debates in the case of dialectic, mostly public speeches in the case of rhetoric — the situation is not quite the same. While e.g. the dialectician tries to test the consistency of a set of propositions, the rhetorician tries to achieve the persuasion of a given audience, and while dialectic proceeds by questioning and answering, rhetoric for the most part proceeds in continuous–monologic form. Still, and in spite of these differences, the method of both dialectic and rhetoric share the same core idea that they have to hit certain, accepted assumptions of their addressees — the dialectical disputant in order to get the explicit assent of the dialectical opponent, the rhetorician in order to base the rhetorical proofs on views the audience already finds convincing. Furthermore, just as the dialectician is interested in deductions and inductions for refuting the opponent’s claims, the rhetorician is interested in deductions and inductions that logically connect (or seem to connect) the audience’s existing convictions with certain other views that the rhetorician wishes to establish (see below § 6 ). For, indeed, Aristotle seems to think that arguments or proofs are central to any process of persuasion, for people are most or most easily persuaded, he says ( Rhet. I.1, 1355a3f.), when they suppose something to have been proven.

Hence the rhetorician who is willing to give a central place to arguments or (rhetorical) proofs — and this seems to be the peculiar approach to rhetoric that Aristotle suggests at the beginning of his Rhetoric — can base his or her method of persuasion to a significant extent on the method of dialectical argumentation, as expounded in Aristotle’s Topics (see Rapp 2016 and 2018). And since the notion of ‘dialectic’ is inextricably linked with a genuinely philosophical method, the implied message of this dialectical turn of rhetoric seems to be that philosophers, properly understood, have access to a method that is superior not only for internal academic discussions between philosophers, but also for the so-called ‘encounter with the many’ ( Rhet. I.1, 1355a29, Topics I.2, 101a35), i.e. for the purpose of addressing a mass audience with little or no education. As already indicated, Aristotle does not seem to have been the first to come up with the idea that ‘true’ rhetoric should become dialectical; however, while in Plato’s Phaedrus the dialectical turn of rhetoric remains a mere sketch, Aristotle’s Rhetoric does not hesitate to set this idea into operation, most notably by adapting most of the dialectical equipment developed elsewhere, especially in his Topics . In many particular instances he just imports technical vocabulary from his dialectic (e.g. protasis , sullogismos , topos , endoxon ); in many other instances he redefines traditional rhetorical notions by his dialectical inventory, e.g. the enthymeme is redefined as a deduction, the example is redefined as an induction, etc. Above all, the Rhetoric introduces the use of the so-called topoi (see below § 7 ) that is typical for the dialectical method and is otherwise only treated in Aristotle’s works on dialectic, i.e. in Topics and Sophistical Refutations .

4. The Nature and Purpose of Rhetoric

There are widely divergent views on the purpose of Aristotle’s Rhetoric . Ultimately, it is certainly meant to support those who are going to address a public audience in court, at assemblies of the people, or at certain festive events and who, to that end, have to compose speeches. But does this in itself render the Rhetoric a mere ‘manual’ or ‘handbook’ aiming at the persuasion of a given audience? Or does it rather aim at a specifically qualified type of persuasion (bringing about, e.g., conviction based on the best available grounds and without misunderstanding)? Influenced by the debate in the 20th century about ‘old and new rhetoric’ and by the work of authors such as I.A. Richards, Kenneth Burke and Wayne C. Booth on the one hand and Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur on the other, Aristotle scholars began to wonder whether his Rhetoric is an instruction manual offering guidance about how to change other people’s minds or has, rather, a philosophically more ambitious scope, such as e.g. human communication and discourse in general. This second approach is reflected in the statements of those contending that the “object of Aristotle’s treatise on rhetoric is ultimately an analysis of the nature of human discourse in all areas of knowledge.” (Grimaldi 1972, 1) or of those suggesting that it can be read as “a piece of philosophic inquiry, and judged by philosophic standards” (Garver 1994, 3). Others have diagnosed a most notable ambivalence in the Rhetoric (see Oates 1963, 335), as between its role as a practical handbook on the one hand and Aristotle’s attempt to connect it to his logic, ethics and politics on the other. Likewise, interpreters are divided on the questions of whether Aristotle’s Rhetoric is meant to be used for good and bad purposes alike or whether it is specifically tailored to implementing the good and virtuous goals delineated in Aristotle’s ethical and political writings; and whether, to that latter end, the speaker is entitled to deploy the whole range of persuasive devices, even manipulative and deceptive ones. In many instances, the text of Aristotle’s Rhetoric is open to several interpretations; however, it seems possible to restrict the range of plausible readings, e.g. by considering Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric and what he says about the internal and external ends of rhetoric.

Assuming that Aristotle’s Poetics gives instructions for how to compose good tragedies, shouldn’t we expect, then, that Aristotle’s Rhetoric is similarly meant to give instructions for how to compose good speeches? And does this, by the same token, render the art of rhetoric a sort of productive knowledge aiming at the fabrication of a speech (similar to the way the art of shoemaking aims at the fabrication of shoes)? This sounds plausible, as far as it goes (for a discussion of this issue see Leff 1993), and in a few passages (especially in Rhet. III: e.g. 1415b35, 1417a2, 1417a34f. and 36, 1418a10 and 12 and 39, 1420b1) Aristotle actually seems to directly address and instruct a speechwriter in the second person. However, these are rather exceptions to a broader tendency and it is striking that Aristotle never defines the art of rhetoric through the supposed product, the speech, nor the full command of the art of rhetoric through the perfection of the product, i.e. the excellent speech. Instead, Aristotle defines the rhetorician as someone who is always able to see what is persuasive ( Topics VI.12, 149b25); correspondingly, rhetoric is defined as the ability to see what is possibly persuasive in every given case ( Rhet. I.2, 1355b26f.). Indeed there are passages ( Rhet. I.1, 1355b15–17) in which the persuasive plays the same role in rhetoric as the conclusive plays in dialectic or logic. This is not to say that it is the defining function ( ergon ) of rhetoric to persuade, for the rhetoricians (the ones who possess the art of rhetoric) will not be able to convince people under all circumstances ( Rhet. I.1, 1355b10–14). Rather they are in a situation similar to that of physicians: the latter have a complete grasp of their art if and only if they neglect nothing that might heal their patients, although they are not expected to heal each and every patient. Similarly, rhetoricians have a complete grasp of their method, if and only if they are capable of seeing the available means of persuasion, although they are certainly not able to convince each and every audience — owing to factors that the art of rhetoric cannot alter (e.g. biases, partisanship, stubbornness or corruption of the audience). In light of this definition, it seems that the art ( technê ) of rhetoric is primarily concerned with the nature and the ingredients of persuasiveness and that the book Rhetoric is primarily concerned with elaborating the various ingredients of this art. It goes without saying that possessing such an art is useful for the composition of speeches, but might also be useful for other purposes, e.g. for assessing other people’s speeches, for analysing the persuasive potential of competing cases, etc.

For Aristotle, who defines rhetoric in terms of considering what is persuasive (see above § 4.1 ) and sees it as a branch of dialectic (see above § 3 ), rhetoric is clearly not a matter of finding or conveying knowledge. For Plato (see §4 of Plato: rhetoric and poetry ), by contrast, this would have been reason enough to become suspicious about the intentions of those who use rhetorical techniques. Isn’t any technique of persuasion that is negligent of knowledge useful only for those who want to outwit their audience and conceal their real aims? For, after all, someone who just wants to communicate the naked truth could be straightforward and would not need to employ rhetorical gimmicks. This, however, is not Aristotle’s point of view: Even those who are simply trying to establish what is just and true need the help of rhetoric when they are faced with a public audience. Aristotle points out that it is impossible to teach such an audience, even if the speaker has the most exact knowledge of the subject ( Rhet. I.1, 1355a24–29). Perhaps he is thinking of ordinary people attending a public speech who are not able to follow the kind of argument that, according to Aristotle’s theory of knowledge (see §6 of Aristotle: logic ), is apt to establish genuine knowledge. Moreover, he seems to doubt that the controversial, sometimes partisan and hostile, setting of political or judicial speeches is suitable for teaching and learning at all, since whoever wishes to learn has to presuppose that he or she won’t be cheated or deceived by the teacher. But why should one trust the intentions of the opposing party? This is why rhetorical arguments addressing public audiences should be taken from premises that are likely to be accepted by the given audience, from assumptions the audience is already convinced of, and not from the kind of principles (accepted mostly or only by the experts) through which one conveys and establishes knowledge.

More than that, one might wonder whether the typical subject of public speeches really allows of genuine knowledge. In court for example, the judges have to form a reasoned view about whether the accused person is guilty or not and whether the crime committed is minor or major; in political speeches the parties might contend about whether it is advantageous or not to invade the neighbour’s territory or to build a border wall (Aristotle’s examples), but none of these questions allow of precise knowledge. Aristotle says that in some questions treated in public speeches there is only amphidoxein , i.e. room for doubt and only divided opinions ( Rhet. I.2, 1356a8). From this perspective, rhetoric seems useful especially for controversies about contingent matters that cannot be fixed by appealing to what we unmistakably know, but only by appealing to widely shared convictions, to what happens (not necessarily, but) only for the most part and to what is likely to be the case (but not necessarily so). For all those reasons, affecting the decisions of juries and assemblies is a matter of persuasiveness, not of knowledge. It is true that some people manage to be persuasive either at random or by habit, but it is rhetoric that gives us a method to systematically disclose all available means of persuasion on any topic whatsoever.

When Aristotle speaks about the benefits of the art of rhetoric he also mentions that it is not only disgraceful when one is unable to defend oneself physically, but also when one is unable to defend oneself through rational speech, for rationality and speech are more peculiar to human beings than physical strength ( Rhet. I.1, 1355a38–b2). A certain familiarity with rhetoric is therefore required for sheer self-defence — in general and, perhaps, especially under the conditions of the extreme Athenian form of democracy with its huge courts of lay assessors (one of which sentenced Socrates to death) and with demagogues who would abuse the democratic rules for a coup d’état. Perhaps Aristotle is addressing fellow philosophers who find it beneath their dignity to engage with rhetoric: it is not sublime but naive and embarrassing if they do not gear up for political and legal battles. For those who are defeated in court when they try to defend what is true and just (due to the failure to speak persuasively) are to be blamed ( Rhet. I.1, 1355a20–24).

Possessing the art of rhetoric is useful then even for those whose sole intent is to defend what they take to be true and just. Still, can’t the same art of rhetoric be misused, e.g. when practised by people with malicious intentions? The short answer is: Yes, of course. Rhetoric in general and even Aristotle’s dialectic-based rhetoric can be misused depending on what people use it for what purposes. (And Aristotle himself is actually aware of the fact that demagogues of his time use a certain style of rhetoric for overthrowing the democratic order: Politics V.5, 1304b21–1305a15). The more elaborate answer that he gives is this. The art of rhetoric (if based on dialectic: see above § 3 ) is useful partly because it facilitates persuasive argument for the opposites, i.e. on either side of a question. This is first of all seen as an advantage in competence, for people who have full command of this art won’t miss any persuasive aspect of a given question, and this is also seen as a practical advantage, for it helps to detect what goes wrong in the opponent’s arguments (1355a29–38), especially if those opponents use it for objectionable purposes. That this peculiar feature of dialectic-based rhetoric opens the door for misuse is true, but this cannot be held against the art of rhetoric, since the same ambivalence (that something can be used for the better or for the worse) applies to most goods (e.g. wealth, beauty — the only non-ambivalent good is, on Aristotle’s view, virtue). Also, Aristotle downplays the risk of misuse by stressing that it is easier to convince someone of the just and good than of their opposites (especially when using the Aristotelian style of rhetoric).

Still, for many interpreters of Aristotle, from the times of the great Roman rhetoricians on, it is hard to embrace the thought that Aristotle — the famous author of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics — who in his ethical work praises the life in accordance with human virtue, could ever endorse a rhetorical project that is not meant to promote virtue and happiness in the city-state ( polis ). Is it, in other words, possible or likely that Aristotle, whose name in the history of moral philosophy stands for an ethics based on the sustainable development of moral virtues, endorses a technique of rhetoric that does not serve the purpose of promoting virtuous goals? This is a legitimate worry. It can be addressed by distinguishing internal from external ends of rhetoric (which is, to be sure, not Aristotle’s distinction; however, he uses a similar distinction between a thing’s proper function, corresponding to the internal end, and the question what something is useful for, corresponding to the external end). The internal end, i.e. the function that defines the art of rhetoric, is to consider what is persuasive (see above § 4.1 ), and since there might be persuasive aspects on both sides of a question, the art of rhetoric as such — i.e. according to its internal end — is neutral with regard to true and false, just and unjust, noble and wicked points of view. It can be equally used for promoting good or bad positions (even though, as Aristotle says, it is easier to promote the good ones). All this follows from the dialectical character of Aristotle’s art of rhetoric (see above § 3 ). If we are interested, by contrast, in the external ends of rhetoric, i.e. the question of what it is useful for (see above § 4.2 ) or the question of how Aristotle himself wants this art to be used, then it is easy to contrive a plausible story either based on Aristotle’s ethico-political writings or on hints given in the Rhetoric itself (see e.g. Dow 2015, 64–75, for such an attempt) about the morally desirable uses of a style of rhetoric that is based on arguments (sanctioning convicted offenders, defending innocent culprits, averting political decisions that are likely to do harm to the city-state, voicing the point of view of the decent citizens, defending the rule of law, standing up to insurrectionists and demagogues, etc.).

Obviously, Aristotle’s rhetoric is not thought to be normative in the moral sense that it would only provide the means for persuading people of what is true, just and noble (but not of their opposites; see section § 4.3 above). There is however the widespread intuition that Aristotle’s rhetoric crucially differs from manuals of rhetoric that recommend doing whatever it takes to win a case. This becomes clear already in the beginning of Rhet. I.1, where Aristotle criticizes his predecessors among other things for presenting techniques that are not derived from any art ( technê ), such as slander and the arousal of pity and anger. He accuses them of dwelling on methods that instruct how to speak “outside the subject” and to distract the attention of the hearers from the subject, while good legislation, he says, requires not speaking outside the subject at all (indeed, “speaking outside the subject” was a legal term in Athenian law of Aristotle’s time). This immediately suggests two senses in which Aristotle’s rhetoric is normative and does not advocate an ‘anything goes’-approach to persuasion: first, the rhetorical devices are required to flow from the art or method of rhetoric and, second, they must not be “outside the subject”. As for the first criterion, Aristotle requires that art-based means of persuasion must be provided by the speech alone and must rely on the systematic analysis of what is persuasive in a given case (see the definition of rhetoric in § 4.1 above). As for the second criterion, it is striking that Aristotle refers to judges or jurors who just “surrender to one of the litigants without really judging” ( Rhet. I.1, 1354b34–1355a1), which might be taken to mean that those people cast their votes in favour of the party they side with, but that their votes are not based on a judgement that really considers the case at hand. This formulates a minimally normative criterion for what the rhetorical art aims at, namely the formation of a judgement in the audience that deserves to be called a ‘judgement’, i.e. that it judges something , namely what the judges or jurors are asked to judge. And it seems that in rhetorical persuasion the use of rhetorical devices that are based on the art and are related to the case at hand are more apt to bring about judgements in this genuine sense of the word.

By all appearances, it seems then that Aristotle’s rhetoric is not indifferent with regard to the persuasive means deployed. The effect that speakers using the Aristotelian style of rhetoric can bring about in the audience is thus qualified by the limited range of techniques (based on the art of rhetoric) they use, which means that they do not try to bring the audience over to their side at any cost, but only on the basis of an argumentation that actually addresses the point at issue. In this sense one might say that Aristotle’s rhetorical method aims at something like ‘persuasion based on arguments’, ‘reasonable persuasion’ or a ‘reasoned judgment’ on the audience’s part.

Even if this much is agreed upon, there remains a lot of room for scholarly disagreement on what exactly this normative approach to rhetoric is meant to imply. Is this normativity grounded in the requirements of the art ( technê ) alone, e.g. what can and what cannot be achieved in a methodical way, or does it hinge on an envisaged effect, e.g. the best possible judgement on the hearer’s part? And which methods are approved by this normative approach and which definitely excluded? Does Aristotle’s art of rhetoric require, above all, that persuasion be centred on arguments and proofs (that are related to the thing at issue and are, thus, pertinent), while other art-based means of persuasion (see below § 5 ) are mostly thought to offer support to get one’s arguments through (see e.g. Rapp 2012)? Or does the art aim at enhancing only “well-founded” judgements or judgements that are “formed on the basis of good grounds for conviction”, requiring that each particular means of persuasion provide such a good ground for conviction (see Dow 2014 and Dow 2015)?

5. The Three Means of Persuasion

The methodical core of Aristotle’s Rhetoric is the theorem that there are three ‘technical’ pisteis , i.e. ‘persuaders’ or ‘means of persuasion’. Persuasion comes about either through the character ( êthos ) of the speaker, the emotional state ( pathos ) of the hearer, or the argument ( logos ) itself. The structure of Rhetoric I & II & is determined by this tripartition (see § 2 above). The attribute ‘technical’ seems to imply several things: (i) Technical persuasion must rest on a method or art ( technê ), and this, in turn, is to say that we must know the reason why some things are persuasive and some are not. (ii) Further, technical persuasion must rest on a complete analysis of what is possibly persuasive (see above § 4.1 ), and not on the random use of scattered persuasive factors. (iii) Technical means of persuasion must be provided by the speakers themselves and through the speech, whereas pre-existing facts, such as oaths, witnesses, testimonies, etc. are non-technical, since they cannot be brought about by the speaker. (iv) Given that Aristotle criticizes his predecessors, because they deal with non-technical persuasive devices instructing how to speak “outside the subject” (see section § 4.4 above), one might speculate whether the technical means of persuasion are required, vice versa, to actually address the things at issue .

Why just these three? And why only these three? Aristotle does not give an elaborate defence of this tripartition. However, he says in a different context that a speech consists of three things: the speaker, the subject that is treated in the speech, and the listener to whom the speech is addressed ( Rhet. I.3, 1358a37ff.). Probably, he thinks that each of these three ingredients of a speech contributes to persuasion in a specific way, in that persuasion either flows from the person of speaker, namely that he or she comes across as credible, or from the condition of the hearer, i.e. whether they are in an emotional state and which emotional state they are in or from the subject that is treated in the speech, i.e. from the arguments or proofs that are meant to support a suggested point of view. Summarizing the account of the three pisteis in a later section of the book, Aristotle actually insists that there can be no other technical means of persuasion:

It has already been spoken about the means of persuasion ( pisteis ), from how many things they are, namely that they are from three things, and what kind of things these are, and why there are only these three; for all people who are casting judgements are persuaded either because they themselves are affected, or because they assume that the speakers are a certain kind of person or because something has been proven. ( Rhet. III.1, 1403b10–13)

With regard to the speaker, persuasion is accomplished whenever the speech is held in such a way as to render the speaker worthy of credence. How is it exactly that the credibility of the speaker contributes to persuasion? Aristotle is not overly explicit on this issue. However, he says that people follow the trustworthy speaker more easily and more quickly on almost all subjects and completely so in affairs in which there are not exact criteria (to decide the case), but only wavering opinions ( Rhet. I.2, 1356a6–8). This might be taken to mean that in the absence of other criteria to decide a case, the audience will form the second-order judgment that suggestions put forward by a credible speaker are themselves received as trustworthy and acceptable. Also, according to this remark, the impact of what seems to be the speaker’s character comes in degrees; it is most important, if the point of issue is such that it leaves room for doubt and cannot be decided by conclusive proofs.

But how does the speaker manage to appear a credible person? Even though Aristotle says that the speaker’s character can have the greatest impact on the hearers’ judgement (especially in deliberative speeches that are about future states of affairs), he dedicates only fifteen lines to this question. ( Rhet. II.1, 1378a6–20). Speakers, he says, must display (i) practical intelligence, prudence or competence ( phronêsis ), (ii) a virtuous character, and (iii) good will; for, if they displayed none of them, the audience would doubt that they are able to give good advice at all. Again, if they displayed (i) without (ii) and (iii), the audience could doubt whether their aims or intentions are good. Finally, if he displayed (i) and (ii) without (iii), the audience could still doubt whether they are giving the best suggestion or whether they keep the best available suggestion for themselves due to their lack of benevolence. However, if they display all of them, Aristotle concludes, it cannot rationally be doubted that their suggestions are trustworthy. It should be stressed that the speakers must accomplish these effects by what they say in the speech; it is not necessary that they are actually virtuous persons: on the contrary, a pre-existing good character cannot be part of the technical means of persuasion. Also, even a person with outstandingly virtuous character would have to present herself as virtuous by what she says in the speech.

With regard to the hearer, persuasion comes about whenever the hearers are led by the speech to feel a certain emotion or passion that, in turn, has an impact on the judgement they are going to make. The underlying assumption of this persuasive technique is that people’s emotional states broadly conceived — i.e. whether they actually undergo an episode of emotion or not and what kind of emotion they feel — makes a difference for the formation of the judgement they are about to pass. Indeed, Aristotle even introduces the emotions or passions ( pathê ) in an important passage ( Rhet. II.1, 1378a20–30) by saying that they are “those things due to which people, by undergoing a change, differ in their judgements ...”. He illustrates this general assumption by pointing out that we do not judge in the same way when we grieve and rejoice or when we are friendly and hostile. It therefore seems that the speaker has to arouse emotions exactly because emotions have the power to modify our judgments: e.g. to a juror or judge who is in a friendly mood, the person about whom he or she is going to judge seems not to do wrong or only in a small way; but to the juror or judge who is in an angry mood, the same person will seem to do the opposite (see Rhet. II.1, 1378a1ff.). Since rhetoric aims at steering the hearers’ judgement and since emotions, thus, have a significant impact on the formation of judgements (on the various ways how emotions, according to Aristotle, can alter our judgements see Leighton 1982), the rhetorical method requires to address the emotional states of the hearers, if only in order to calm down adverse feelings or emotions that are likely to prevent the jurors or judges from forming their judgement in accordance with the presented evidence and arguments.

Some scholars writing on the rhetorical use of emotions take it to be significant that emotions also play a crucial role in Aristotle’s moral philosophy, for Aristotle defines the virtuous person not only by performing the right actions, but also by having and by being motivated through the appropriate sort of emotions. Applying this to the rhetorical situation, one might wonder whether in Aristotle’s art of rhetoric the speaker tries to arouse emotions, in order (i) to motivate the audience (e.g. motivate them to act in accordance with the judgement they pass) or (ii) to turn them into better persons (e.g. by providing and making them familiar with the appropriate emotions that are definitory of the virtuous persons). However, both options are not backed by the evidence given in the text of the Rhetoric . With regard to (i), it seems crucial to note that the aim of rhetorical persuasion is a certain judgement ( krisis ), not an action or practical decision ( prohairesis ), which would intrinsically involve a specific sort of desire and motivation (see e.g. Kontos 2021, 20–31). While the practical decision that Aristotle discusses in his ethical writings is always about things the agents themselves are able to do, the judgements of the hearers of a public speech are often about things to be done by other agents or about actions that took place in the past. With regard to (ii), one might be reluctant to accept that moral education might be the direct purpose of the kind of public speeches Aristotle has in mind. At least, no such moral purpose is mentioned when Aristotle addresses the purpose and use of rhetoric (see above § 4 ). It is also significant that the appropriateness of the aroused emotions (in accordance with Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean) is nowhere discussed in the Rhetoric . More than that, Aristotle seems to think that moral education requires individual habituation and habituation is a matter of gradually adjusting a person’s attitudes and hedonic responses, while the uneducated ones are not really responsive to disciplinary allocutions. For all these reasons, he is not too optimistic with regard to the pedagogical effect of public speeches: “Now if speeches were in themselves enough to make men good, they would justly, as Theognis says, have won very great rewards, and such rewards should have been provided; but as things are … they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness” ( EN X.9, 1179b4–10).

But how is it possible for the orator, in the first place, to lead the audience to feel a certain emotion? After all, the technical means of persuasion are restricted to what the speakers say in a speech. It is remarkable that Aristotle’s treatment of several types of emotions in Chapters 2–11 of Rhet. II is based on the definition of each type of emotion. Even though Aristotle mostly leaves it to the reader to infer how these definitions are useful for arousing a particular type of emotion, it seems safe to conclude that these definitions are meant to offer the key to the methodical arousal of emotions in the audience. Let, for example, anger be defined as “desire, accompanied with pain, for conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight that was directed against oneself or those near to one, when such a slight is undeserved.” ( Rhet . II.2 1378a31–33). According to such a definition, someone who takes it to be the case that he or she has suffered a slight from a person who is not entitled to do so, etc., will, all other things being equal, become angry. Obviously, this presupposes an account of emotions according to which emotions are closely related to what people think or take to be the case. Unfortunately and owing to the overall nature of Aristotle’s Rhetoric , this underlying account of emotion is nowhere explicitly unfolded and defended. What we can infer though is that Aristotle assumes at least a covariance between someone’s thought or opinion that she has been slighted undeservedly and her feeling of anger. If that much is granted and if the speakers have access to such definitions of each type of emotions, it is possible to deduce conditions under which a person is likely to feel this particular type of emotion. And if the speakers manage to make the hearers think — by what they say — that these conditions are given, it is likely, as far as this method goes, that the hearers will feel the corresponding emotion. Aristotle himself suggests the following example. If we take the above-mentioned definition of anger for granted, it is possible to deduce circumstances in which a person will become angry; most notably, we can deduce (i) in what state of mind people are angry and (ii) against whom they are angry and (iii) for what sorts of reason. If we want to make an audience angry, we have to address all three factors, making the hearers think (ii) that there are people who deserve their anger, (iii) that there is a reason for being angry (a slight, an insult, a belittlement, etc.) and (i) by bringing them into a state of mind in which they are prone to anger. Aristotle himself shows how to deduce these three factors for each particular type of emotion throughout chapters II.2–11. With this equipment, the speaker will be able, for example, to highlight such characteristics of a case as are likely to provoke anger in the audience. In comparison with the tricks of former rhetoricians (which, Aristotle thinks, are bound to speak “outside the subject”), this method of arousing emotions has a striking advantage: The speaker who wants to arouse emotions need not even speak “outside the subject” or distract from the thing at issue; it is sufficient to detect aspects of a given subject that are connected with the intended emotion and to make the addressee think that certain emotion-provoking aspects, in accordance with the three factors mentioned above, are given.

Supplement on Judgemental and Non-Judgemental Accounts of Aristotelian Emotions

With regard to the subject the speech is about, persuasion comes about through arguments, i.e. by proving (or seemingly proving) that something is the case. Most probably, this is meant to take up the idea mentioned above, i.e. that people are most or most easily persuaded, when they suppose something to have been proven ( Rhet. I.1, 1355a3f.). This third means of persuasion ( pistis ) is distinguished from the other two means of persuasion through being the only probative ( apodeiktikos ) device of persuasion; due to its argument-like structure, involving premises and a conclusion, it can directly argue for the point of view that the speaker wishes to establish. It does so by inferentially connecting the suggested conclusion with facts that are evident or with convictions already held by the audience. Probative persuasion is essential, since, at the end of the day, each speech necessarily involves a claim (i.e. the point of view the speaker suggests) plus the proofs that are given in support of this claim ( Rhet. III.13, 1414a30–36). For Aristotle, there are two species of arguments: inductions and deductions ( Posterior Analytics I.1, 71a5ff.). Induction ( epagôgê ) is defined as the proceeding from particulars up to a universal ( Topics I.12, 105a13ff.). A deduction ( sullogismos ) is an argument in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from the suppositions results of necessity through them ( Topics I.1, 100a25ff.) or because of their being true ( Prior Analytics I.2, 24b18–20). The inductive argument in rhetoric is the example ( paradeigma ); unlike other inductive arguments, it does not proceed from many particular cases to one universal case, but from one particular to a similar particular if both particulars fall under the same genus ( Rhet. I.2, 1357b25ff.). The deductive argument in rhetoric is the enthymeme (see below § 6 ). Indeed, most of Rhet. I & II is dedicated to the treatment of this third probative means of persuasion: After the second part of the long chapter Rhet. I.2 has introduced basic distinctions within the probative mode of persuasion, chapters Rhet. I.4–15 unfold argumentative devices that are specific to the three genres of speech, while chapters Rhet. II.4–26 discuss generally applicable aspects of proofs or arguments (see above § 2 ).

Aristotle repeatedly says that these rhetorical arguments persuade people either by proving or by (merely) seeming to prove ( Rhet. I.2, 1356a3–4 and I.2, 1356a19–20); accordingly, he lists topoi for real ( Rhet. II.23) and merely apparent enthymemes ( Rhet. II.24) (see below § 7 ). Obviously, Aristotle refers here to fallacious or deceptive arguments, for these arguments have a similar persuasive effect, if the fallacy or deception goes unnoticed by the audience (for people will think , i.e. take it to be the case, that something has been proven). One might wonder whether the inclusion of only seemingly probative arguments is compatible with Aristotle’s general tendency to base rhetorical persuasion on (real) proofs. However, the treatment of fallacious rhetorical arguments is strictly parallel to what happens in the case of dialectic. For dialectic too, includes a part dealing with sound or valid arguments (namely in Topics II–VII) and a part that analyses fallacious arguments (namely in the Sophistical Refutations ). It is part of the rhetorician’s competence also to know about fallacious arguments, if only in order to detect them, when they are used by opponents.

One of the most notorious debates about Aristotle’s Rhetoric concerns the second means of persuasion ( pistis ) that is said to proceed through the emotions of the hearer (see above § 5.2 ), for it seems to involve a major inconsistency in Aristotle’s approach to rhetorical persuasion: While in Rhetoric I.2 Aristotle is happy to accept emotions or the arousal of emotions as one of the three ‘technical’ pisteis , it seems that he has a much more reserved or even repudiating attitude to the rhetorical use of emotions in Rhetoric I.1. There, in the very first chapter of the book, Aristotle claims that the previous authors of rhetorical manuals have only covered a small part of the art of persuasion, for while only the proofs or means of persuasion ( pisteis ), such as the enthymeme, are a matter of technê , those authors mostly dealt with rhetorical devices that are merely supplementary and involve “speaking outside the subject”. Aristotle exemplifies this alleged tendency of his predecessors by adding that “slander, pity, anger and suchlike passions of the soul” are not about the things at issue, but are directed at the person of the juror or judge (1354a11–18). Briefly afterwards he adds that one “should not distort the juror or judge by arousing anger, fear or pity in him”, which, he says, would be like making the standard or yardstick crooked before using it (1354a24–26). Apart from the fact that Rhetoric I.2 endorses the rhetorical use of emotions, while Rhetoric I.1 seems to dismiss them, the remarks in Rhetoric I.1 seems to imply that the arousal of emotions is not or cannot be ‘technical’, while Rhetoric I.2 unequivocally introduces persuasion through the emotions of the hearer as one of three ‘technical’ means of persuasion.

Various strategies have been contrived to deal with this seeming inconsistency. In the early 20th century there was the tendency to think that the two chapters are simply incompatible and that either one of these two chapters was written by a different author (Marx 1900) or that the two chapters were put together by an inept editor (Kantelhardt 1911; in a similar vein, Barnes (1995, 262) argues that the two chapters are doublets, one of them originally written to supplant the other) or that the two chapters represent different stages in Aristotle’s philosophical development (Solmsen 1929). Even though Solmen’s developmental account has gone out of fashion, there are more recent authors who emphasize the alleged ‘Platonic’ character of Rhetoric I.1 (see e.g. Fortenbaugh 1986, 248 and Schuetrumpf 1994, 106f.), thus implying that Aristotle, when writing this chapter, was still under the influence of Plato, from which he gradually emancipated himself. However, one might wonder whether some of the strategies mentioned tend to exaggerate the alleged inconsistency of the two chapters, since, after all, it is obvious that the two chapters have different agendas (see above § 2 ) and that some of the differences might be due to these different agendas. Also, in the later chapter Aristotle is happy to refer back to the treatment of emotions in the previous chapter (1356a16–17), which indicates (provided that this back-reference is authentic) that he himself was not aware of any inconsistency. It has hence been suggested e.g. that the seeming inconsistency can be fixed just by identifying different meanings of the word pistis for the two chapters (Grimaldi 1957), which would solve the problem that in one chapter emotions are said to be a pistis in the ‘technical’ sense, while in the other chapter they are opposed to ‘technical’ pisteis . Sprute 1994 and, similarly, Schuetrumpf 1994 argue that the chapters are not inconsistent, but envisage different settings, in that Rhetoric I.1 considers the kind of rhetoric that is apt for a well-ordered city, while Rhetoric I.2 moves on to the style of rhetoric that is required and practiced under less ideal political circumstances. Rapp 2002 (I 364, II 32f., 109, 112) proposes that what Aristotle primarily criticizes in Rhetoric I.1 is not that those predecessors deal with emotions at all, but that they mostly deal with emotions and the like, which are merely supplementary, instead of dealing with the main point, i.e. the enthymeme, and that they use pre-fabricated formulae for the arousal of emotions, by which they are bound to speak outside the things at issue. Dow 2007 uses a similar idea of set-piece rhetorical devices, going however beyond the previous suggestion by saying that the critique of Rhetoric I.1 does not, as it may seem, refer to emotions strictly speaking, but only to such set-piece rhetorical devices aimed at manipulating emotions. On these accounts it is possible, at least, to reconcile the claims that there is a ‘technical’ and innocent (or, perhaps, even beneficial) use of emotions within the art-based process of persuasion, as maintained in Rhetoric I.2, and that there are non-‘technical’ uses of emotions in rhetoric with the potential to distort the judgement, as emphasized in Rhetoric I.1.

6. The Enthymeme

For Aristotle, an enthymeme is what has the function of a proof or demonstration in the domain of public speech. Since a demonstration is a kind of sullogismos , the enthymeme is said to be a sullogismos too (on the enthymeme and its relation to syllogistic theory see also Raphael 1974). The word ‘ enthymeme ’ (from ‘ enthumeisthai —to consider’) had already been coined by Aristotle’s predecessors and originally designated clever sayings, bon mots, and short arguments involving a paradox or contradiction. The concepts ‘proof’ ( apodeixis ) and ‘ sullogismos ’ play a crucial role in Aristotle’s logical-dialectical theory. In applying them to a term of conventional rhetoric, Aristotle appeals to a well-known rhetorical technique, but, at the same time, codifies and redefines the original meaning of ‘enthymeme’: properly understood, what people call ‘enthymeme’ should have the form of a sullogismos , i.e., a deductive argument.

A major scholarly debate concerns the question of whether the enthymeme is actually meant to be a genuine sullogismos , i.e. a deductive argument, or whether it is only a ‘ sullogismos of a kind’, i.e. a sullogismos in an attenuated sense, which would amount to saying that Aristotelian enthymemes, even though they are introduced as sullogismoi , are or include ‘relaxed inferences’, i.e. inferences that are not logically valid (see Burnyeat 1994, 1996). This suggestion has been widely accepted, presumably because it helps to solve the alleged paradox that, although Aristotle defines the enthymeme as a sullogismos , the logical form of the enthymemes that are actually given as examples in the Rhetoric does not seem to conform to that of the categorical syllogisms that we know from his Prior Analytics (a problem that, by the way, might also be addressed by assuming that the enthymeme corresponds to the form of deductive arguments we find in the Topics , not to the ones familiar from the Prior Analytics ). Others accepted this suggestion primarily in order to accommodate the non-necessary sign arguments from Rhetoric I.2 (see § 6.5 ), which are treated as a type of enthymeme (without being flagged as merely ‘seeming enthymeme’), but are said not to yield a sullogismos (see e.g. Allen 2001).

Supplement on the Thesis that Enthymemes are Relaxed Inferences

In general, Aristotle regards deductive arguments as a set of propositions in which some sentences are premises and one is the conclusion, and the inference from the premises to the conclusion is guaranteed by the premises alone. Since enthymemes in the proper sense are expected to be deductive arguments, the minimal requirement for the formulation of enthymemes is that they have to display the premise-conclusion structure of deductive arguments. This is why enthymemes have to include a statement as well as a kind of reason for the given statement. Typically this reason is given in a conditional ‘if’-clause or a causal ‘since’- or ‘for’-clause. Examples of the former, conditional type are: “If not even the gods know everything, human beings can hardly do so.” “If the war is the cause of present evils, things should be set right by making peace.” Examples of the latter, causal type are: “One should not be educated, for one ought not be envied (and educated people are usually envied).” “She has given birth, for she has milk.” Aristotle stresses that the proposition “There is no man among us who is free” taken by itself is a maxim, but becomes an enthymeme as soon as it is used together with a reason such as “for all are slaves of money or of chance (and no slave of money or chance is free).” Sometimes the required reason may even be implicit, as e.g. in the proposition “As a mortal, do not cherish immortal anger” the reason why one should not cherish mortal anger is implicitly given in the term “immortal,” which alludes to the rule that it is not appropriate for mortal beings to have such an attitude.

Aristotle calls the enthymeme the “body of persuasion”, implying that everything else is only an addition or accident to the core of the persuasive process. The reason why the enthymeme, as the rhetorical kind of proof or demonstration, should be regarded as central to the rhetorical process of persuasion is that we are most easily persuaded when we think that something has been demonstrated. Hence, the basic idea of a rhetorical demonstration seems to be this: In order to make a target group believe that q , the orator must first select a proposition p or some propositions p 1 … p n that are already accepted by the target group; secondly he has to show that q can be derived from p or p 1 … p n , using p or p 1 … p n as premises. Given that the target persons form their beliefs in accordance with rational standards, they will accept q as soon as they understand that q can be demonstrated on the basis of their own opinions.

Consequently, the construction of enthymemes is primarily a matter of deducing from accepted opinions ( endoxa ). Of course, it is also possible to use premises that are not commonly accepted by themselves, but can be derived from commonly accepted opinions; other premises are only accepted since the speaker is held to be credible; still other enthymemes are built from signs: see § 6.5 . That a deduction is made from accepted opinions—as opposed to deductions from first and true sentences or principles—is the defining feature of dialectical argumentation in the Aristotelian sense. Thus, the formulation of enthymemes is a matter of dialectic, and the dialectician has the competence that is needed for the construction of enthymemes. If enthymemes are a subclass of dialectical arguments, then it is natural to expect a specific difference by which one can tell enthymemes apart from all other kinds of dialectical arguments (traditionally, commentators regarded logical incompleteness as such a difference; for some objections against the traditional view, see § 6.4 ). Nevertheless, this expectation is somehow misguided: The enthymeme is different from other kinds of dialectical arguments insofar as it is used in the rhetorical context of public speech (and rhetorical arguments are called ‘enthymemes’); thus, no further formal or qualitative differences are needed.

However, in the rhetorical context there are two factors that the dialectician has to keep in mind if she wants to become a rhetorician too, and if the dialectical argument is to become a successful enthymeme. First, the typical subjects of public speech do not—like the subjects of dialectic and theoretical philosophy—belong to the things that are necessarily the case, but are among those things that are the goal of practical deliberation and can also be otherwise. Second, as opposed to well-trained dialecticians, the audience of a public speech is characterized by an intellectual insufficiency; above all, the members of a jury or assembly are not accustomed to following a longer chain of inferences. Therefore, enthymemes must not be as precise as a scientific demonstration and should be shorter than ordinary dialectical arguments. This, however, is not to say that the enthymeme is defined by incompleteness and brevity. Rather, it is a sign of a well-executed enthymeme that the content and the number of its premises are adjusted to the intellectual capacities of the public audience; but even an enthymeme that failed to incorporate these qualities would still be an enthymeme.

In a well-known passage ( Rhet. I.2, 1357a7–18; similar: Rhet. II.22, 1395b24–26), Aristotle says that the enthymeme often has few or even fewer premises than some other deductions ( sullogismoi) . Since most interpreters refer the word ‘ sullogismos ’ to the syllogistic theory (see the entry on Aristotle: logic ), according to which a proper deduction has exactly two premises, those lines have led to the widespread understanding that Aristotle defines the enthymeme as a sullogismos in which one of two premises has been suppressed, i.e., as an abbreviated, incomplete syllogism. But certainly the passages mentioned do not attempt to give a definition of the enthymeme, nor does the word ‘ sullogismos ’ necessarily refer to deductions with exactly two premises. Properly understood, both passages are about the selection of appropriate premises, not about logical incompleteness. The remark that enthymemes often have few or fewer premises concludes the discussion of two possible mistakes the orator could make ( Rhet . I.2, 1357a7–10): One can draw conclusions from things that have previously been deduced or from things that have not been deduced yet. The latter method is unpersuasive, for the premises are not accepted, nor have they been introduced. The former method is problematic, too: if the orator has to introduce the needed premises by another deduction, and the premises of this pre-deduction too, etc., one will end up with a long chain of deductions. Arguments with several deductive steps are common in dialectical practice, but one cannot expect the audience of a public speech to follow such long arguments. This is why Aristotle says that the enthymeme is and should be from fewer premises.

Supplement on The Brevity of the Enthymeme

Just as there is a difference between real and apparent or fallacious deductions in dialectic, we have to distinguish between real and apparent or fallacious enthymemes in rhetoric. The topoi for real enthymemes are given in chapter II.23, for fallacious enthymemes in chapter II.24. The fallacious enthymeme pretends to include a valid deduction, while it actually rests on a fallacious inference.

Further, Aristotle distinguishes between enthymemes taken from probable ( eikos ) premises and enthymemes taken from signs ( sêmeia ). ( Rhet . I.2, 1357a32–33). In a different context, he says that enthymemes are based on probabilities, examples, tekmêria (i.e., proofs, evidences), and signs ( Rhet . II.25, 1402b12–14). Since the so-called tekmêria are a subclass of signs and the examples are used to establish general premises, this is only an extension of the former classification. (Note that neither classification interferes with the idea that premises have to be accepted opinions: with respect to the signs, the audience must believe that they exist and accept that they indicate the existence of something else, and with respect to the probabilities, people must accept that something is likely to happen.) However, it is not clear whether this is meant to be an exhaustive typology. That most of the rhetorical arguments are taken from probable premises (“For the most part it is true that …” “It is likely that …”) is due to the typical subjects of public speech, which are rarely necessary. When using a sign-argument or sign-enthymeme we do not try to explain a given fact; we just indicate that something exists or is the case: “… anything such that when it is another thing is, or when it has come into being, the other has come into being before or after, is a sign of the other’s being or having come into being.” ( Prior Analytics II.27, 70a7ff.). But there are several types of sign-arguments too; Aristotle offers the following examples:

Sign-arguments of type (i) and (iii) can always be refuted, even if the premises are true; that is to say that they do not include a valid deduction ( sullogismos ); Aristotle calls them asullogistos (non-deductive). Sign-arguments of type (ii) can never be refuted if the premise is true, since, for example, it is not possible that someone has fever without being ill, or that someone has milk without having given birth, etc. This latter type of sign-enthymemes is necessary and is also called tekmêrion (proof, evidence). Now, if some sign-enthymemes are valid deductions and some are not, it is tempting to ask whether Aristotle regarded the non-necessary sign-enthymemes as apparent or fallacious arguments. However, there seems to be a more attractive reading: We accept a fallacious argument only if we are deceived about its logical form. But we could regard, for example, the inference “She is pregnant, since she is pale” as a good and informative argument, even if we know that it does not include a logically necessary inference. So it seems as if Aristotle didn’t regard all non-necessary sign-arguments as fallacious or deceptive; but even if this is true, it is difficult for Aristotle to determine the sense in which non-necessary sign-enthymemes are valid arguments, since he is bound to the alternatives of deduction and induction, and neither class seems appropriate for non-necessary sign-arguments.

7. The Topoi

Generally speaking, an Aristotelian topos (‘place’, ‘location’) is an argumentative scheme that enables a dialectician or rhetorician to construe an argument for a given conclusion. The first comprehensive and systematic collection of topoi is given in Aristotle’s treatise Topics . Still, the use of so-called topoi or ‘ loci communes ’ can be traced back to early rhetoricians such as Protagoras, Gorgias (cp. Cicero, Brutus , 46–48) and Isocrates. But while in earlier rhetoric a topos was mostly understood as a complete, pre-fabricated pattern or formula that can be mentioned at a certain stage of the speech to produce a certain effect, most of the Aristotelian topoi , in particular most of the dialectical topoi of the Topics , are general instructions saying that a conclusion of a certain form can be derived from premises of a certain form; and because of this ‘formal’, ‘semi-formal’ or, at least topic-neutral character of Aristotle’s dialectical topoi , one topos can be used to construe several different arguments or arguments about different contents. Aristotle’s treatise Topics lists some hundred topoi for the construction of dialectical arguments. These lists of topoi form the core of the method by which the dialectician should be able to formulate deductions on any problem that could be proposed. Most of the instructions that the Rhetoric gives for the composition of enthymemes are also organized as lists of topoi ; especially the first book of the Rhetoric essentially consists of topoi concerning the subjects of the three genres of public speech (See Rhet. I.5–14), while chapters 23–24 of the second book of the Rhetoric provide lists of generally applicable topoi .

It is striking that the work that is almost exclusively dedicated to the collection of topoi , the book Topics , does not even make an attempt to define the concept of topos . At any rate the Rhetoric gives a sort of defining characterization: “I call the same thing element and topos ; for an element or a topos is a heading under which many enthymemes fall” ( Rhet. 1403a18–19). By ‘element’ Aristotle does not mean a proper part of the enthymeme, but rather a general scheme under which many concrete enthymemes of the same type can be subsumed. According to this definition, the topos is a general argumentative scheme or pattern, and the concrete arguments are instantiations of the general topos . That the topos is a general instruction from which several arguments can be derived is crucial for Aristotle’s understanding of an artful method of argumentation; for a teacher of rhetoric who makes his pupils learn ready samples of arguments would not be imparting the art itself to them, but only the products of this art, just as if someone pretending to teach the art of shoe-making only gave samples of already made shoes to his pupils (see Sophistical Refutations 183b36ff.).

The word ‘ topos ’ (place, location) most probably is derived from an ancient method of memorizing a great number of items on a list by associating them with successive places one is acquainted with, say the houses along a street. By recalling the houses along the street we can also remember the associated items (on this mnemonic technique see Sorabji 2004, 22–34). Full descriptions of this technique from antiquity can be found in Cicero, De Oratore II 86–88, 351–360, Auctor ad Herennium III 16–24, 29–40 and in Quintilian, Institutio XI 2, 11–33. In Topics 163b28–32, Aristotle seems to allude to this technique: “For just as in the art of remembering, the mere mention of the places instantly makes us recall the things, so these will make us more apt at deductions through looking to these defined premises in order of enumeration.” Aristotle also alludes to this technique in On the soul 427b18–20, On Memory 452a12–16, and On Dreams 458b20–22.

But although the name ‘ topos ’ may be derived from this mnemotechnical context, Aristotle’s use of topoi does not rely on the technique of places. At least within the system of the book Topics , every given problem must be analyzed in terms of certain linguistic, semantic or logical criteria: Does the predicate of the sentence in question ascribe a genus or a definition or peculiar or accidental properties to the subject? Does the sentence express a sort of opposition, either contradiction or contrariety, etc.? Does the sentence express that something is more or less the case? Does it maintain identity or diversity? Are the words used linguistically derived from words that are part of an accepted premise? Depending on such criteria of the analyzed sentence one has to refer to a fitting topos . For this reason, the succession of topoi in the book Topics is organized in accordance with their salient linguistic, semantic or logical criteria; above all topoi presented in Books II–VII of this treatise are structured in accordance with the four so-called ‘predicables’, i.e. whether a predicate signifies the genus, an accident, a proprium (peculiar attribute) or the definition of the subject. This structure suggests that no additional mnemotechnique is essentially involved. Besides all this, there is at least one passage in which the use of the word ‘ topos ’ can be explained without referring to the previously mentioned mnemotechnique: In Topics VIII.1, 155b4–5 Aristotle says: “we must find the location ( topos ) from which to attack”, where the word ‘ topos ’ is obviously used to mean a starting point for attacking the theses of the opponents.

More or less the same might apply to the Rhetoric —except that most of its lists of topoi are structured by certain contents and not by linguistic, semantic or logical criteria; moreover, the system of the four ‘predicables’ that structured the topoi in the Topics is absent from the Rhetoric (see below § 7.4 ).

A typical topos in Aristotle’s dialectic runs as follows: “Again, if the accident of a thing has a contrary, see whether it belongs to the subject to which the accident in question has been declared to belong: for if the latter belongs, the former could not belong; for it is impossible that contrary predicates should belong at the same time to the same thing” ( Topics 113a20–24). Like most topoi , it includes (i) a sort of general instruction (“see, whether …”); further it mentions (ii) an argumentative scheme—in the given example, the scheme ‘if the accidental predicate p belongs to the subject s , then the opposed P * cannot belong to s too’. Finally, the topos refers to (iii) a general rule or principle (“for it is impossible, …”) which justifies the given scheme. Other topoi often include the discussion of (iv) examples; still other topoi suggest (v) how to apply the given schemes.—Though these are elements that regularly occur in Aristotelian topoi , there is nothing like a standard form with which all topoi conform. Often Aristotle is very brief and leaves it to the reader to add the missing elements.

In a nutshell, the function of a topos can be explained as follows. First of all, one has to select an apt topos for a given conclusion. The conclusion is either a thesis of the opponent that someone wishes to refute, or it is the assertion someone wishes to establish or defend. Accordingly, there are two uses of topoi : they can either prove or disprove a given sentence; some can be used for both purposes, others for only one of them. In Aristotle’s dialectic, most topoi are topic-neutral and need hence be selected by certain linguistic, semantic or logical features of the given conclusion; if, for example, the conclusion maintains a definition, one has to select a topos from a list of topoi pertaining to definitions, etc. Once the dialectician or rhetorician has selected a topos that is appropriate for a given conclusion, the topos can be used to construe a premise from which the given conclusion can be derived. If for example the argumentative scheme is ‘If a predicate is generally true of a genus, then the predicate is also true of any species of that genus’, we can derive the conclusion ‘the capacity of nutrition belongs to plants’ using the premise ‘the capacity of nutrition belongs to all living things’, since ‘living thing’ is the genus of the species ‘plants’. If the construed premise is accepted, either by the opponent in a dialectical debate or by the audience of a public speech, we can draw the intended conclusion. In the Rhetoric though the situation is slightly different (see below § 7.4 ), because here the topic-neutral type of topoi that was prevalent in the Topics seems to play a secondary role. Many topoi of the Rhetoric seem to be rather ‘material’ in the sense that they are only useful for establishing conclusions of a certain content; this is why the appropriate topos here cannot be selected by formal criteria, but must be chosen in accordance with the content of the envisaged conclusion—whether, for example, something is said to be useful or honourable or just, etc.

It has been disputed whether the topos (or, more precisely, the ‘if …, then …’ scheme that is included in a topos ) that we use to construe an argument must itself be regarded as a further premise of the argument. It could be either, as some say, the premise of a propositional scheme such as the modus ponens, or, as others assume, as the conditional premise of a hypothetical syllogism. Aristotle himself does not favour one of these interpretations explicitly. But even if he regarded the topoi as additional premises in a dialectical or rhetorical argument, it is beyond any doubt that he did not use them as premises that must be explicitly mentioned or even approved by the opponent or audience.

Even though there are good reasons for thinking that the nature and use of topoi in Aristotle’s Rhetoric are based on his elaborate account of dialectical topoi in the Topics (see above § 7.2 and § 7.3 ), commentators are faced with the difficulty that the use of the word ‘ topos ’ in Aristotle’s Rhetoric is much more heterogeneous than in the Topics . Beside topoi which do perfectly comply with the description given in the Topics , there is an important group of topoi in the Rhetoric that are not topic-neutral and hence do not contain instructions for arguments of a certain logical form, but rather with a certain predicate (for example, that something is good, or honourable, or just, or contributes to happiness, etc.). While those latter ‘material’ topoi so to speak are, after all, used to construe arguments, there are also mentions of so-called ‘ topoi ’ in the context of the non-argumentative means of persuasion, which might be taken as procedural instructions, but no longer seem to be concerned with the construction of arguments, which was the one and only function of dialectical topoi .

Supplement on the Variety of Topoi in the Rhetoric

In addition to the more heterogenous use of the word ‘ topos ’ in the Rhetoric (which might originate from Aristotle’s attempt to combine his own dialectical use of the term with more traditional rhetorical uses), there is the problem of the controversial distinction in Rhet. I.2, 1358a2–35 between topoi (which are understood to be general/common) on the one hand and certain specific devices ( idia ) on the other. While Aristotle seems inclined to call the general or common topoi simply ‘ topoi ’, he uses several names for the opposing, specific items (e.g. idiai protaseis , idia , eidê ). This distinction has a major impact on the structure of the Rhetoric as a whole (see above § 2 ), in that it is responsible for the occurence of ‘specific’ instructions, premises, ‘ topoi ’ or whatever in the bulk of the first book and the occurence of ‘common’ topoi in the second part of the second book. Traditionally, this distinction has been understood as a division between general/common topoi on the one hand and specific topoi on the other (the traditional view has been defended among others by Cope 1877 and Rapp 2002). However, it is unclear (i) what the opposition between general/common and specific refers to, (ii) where in the Rhetoric the common topoi can be found and (iii) whether the distinction is meant to be a distinction between topoi in the first place, since even though Aristotle distinguishes topoi that are common from specific ( idia ) rhetorical devices, he never explicitly uses the phrase ‘specific topoi ’, as one might expect on the traditional reading.

As for (i), Aristotle points out in Rhet. I.2 that some things are specific to physics, others to ethics, etc. This seems to suggest a distinction between topoi (or other building blocks of arguments) that are peculiar to the different sciences on the one hand and other topoi that are not, but are instead applicable to all sciences and fields of knowledge alike—just as (most of) the dialectical topoi of the Topics are. However, from Rhet. I.3 on, Aristotle makes the readers think, by contrast, that ‘specific’ refers to the different genres of rhetoric, so that some topoi are specific to deliberative, others to epideictic, and still others to juridical speech. Correspondingly, this would require a sense of being‘common’ that boils down to saying that they are not specific to one single species of speech, but that does not amount to the topic-neutrality of the dialectical topoi .

With regard to (ii), it is generally agreed that the specific topoi can be found in the first book of the Rhetoric and the common topoi in the second. Most commentators assume that all common topoi are listed in chapters II.23–24 (real enthymemes in II.23, fallacious enthymemes in II.24). However, it is less common to count the items listed in II.19 (about the possible/impossible, past and future facts, significance and insignificance) as common topoi , which might be due to the controversy mentioned in (i) about the required sense of being ‘common’, for the topoi in II.19 are applicable to all genres of speech, but are most probably not common in the way the dialectical topoi are. In addition, it is important to notice that even chapter II.23, which is undisputedly dedicated to common topoi , is a mixed bag, for it includes some topoi , especially in the first third of the chapter, that, being topic-neutral, thoroughly correspond to dialectical topoi and even might be generally applicable as the dialectical topoi are, while some other topoi mentioned in II.23 are quite different in style, as they are taken from extant historical speeches.

The most difficult debates are posed by (iii), as the traditional interpretation is based on some fragile assumptions. Not only does Aristotle never call the specific items ‘ topoi ’ by name, it is also significant that the specific items that are listed in Rhet. I.5-15 often have the form of mere propositions or premises rather than of topoi as we know them from the Topics (see above § 7.3 ). This is why several authors insist that the distinction between topoi , which are thought to be common, and idia is not a distinction between different types of topoi , but between topoi and something else, most notably premises, commonly accepted premises or premises established by the arts. This objection comes in several versions. (a) Several authors subscribed to the view of Solmsen 1929 that there are two types of enthymemes, respresenting different stages in the development of Aristotle’s logical thinking insofar as some are taken from topoi (deriving from Aristotle’s early- pre-syllogistic logic) and some are built from premises through the figures of the syllogism (thus presupposing syllogistic logic), not from topoi . According to this view, the specific topoi given in the first book of the Rhetoric are the premises of the latter type of enthymemes, and the enthymemes of the former type are taken only from common topoi . From this point of view, only common topoi would be topoi in the proper sense, while specific topoi would be, strictly speaking, nothing but premises. Accordingly, one would expect to find propositions of the form “All F are just/noble/good” in the first book of the Rhetoric ; with such propositions one could construe syllogisms like “All F are just/noble/good—This particular x is F —This particular x is just/noble/good.” Against Solmsen it has been objected that what one actually gets in the first book hardly fits Solmsen’s model. In some sense one finds more than the required premises in that Aristotle gives here not only isolated propositions, but also certain propositions together with a reason or a justification. Furthermore, chapters I.6–7 of the Rhetoric offer topoi which can also be found in the third book of Topics ; in the Topics they are clearly called ‘ topoi ’, so that there is less pressure to think that they are premises rather than topoi . (b) Grimaldi 1958 requires that in order to build a rhetorical argument one needs the logical form of an argument provided by the topoi plus the material (content) provided by the specific premises or idia . A more refined version of this ‘complementarity’-view has been suggested by Rubinelli 2009, who, however, also allows of the possibility that some enthymemes are taken only from the topoi , while others are only taken from the idia . Against Grimaldi’s view it is has been objected that many of the common topoi listed in chapters II.23–24 are not based on linguistic, semantic or logical categories as the topic-neutral topoi of the Topics are. Some of them only offer strategic advice, for example, to turn what has been said against oneself upon the one who said it. For this reason, it would be misleading to interpret the common topoi of the Rhetoric as providing logical schemes of inference. (c) Havrda 2019 has attacked the presuppositions of the traditional view, but does not settle for the alternatives suggested by Solmsen, Grimaldi or Rubinelli either. According to him, Aristotle never distinguishes between common and specific topoi . Rather, he distinguishes between two different sources of rhetorical deductions; one source, the dialectical one, uses topoi , while the other, which is based on definitions provided by arts and sciences, does not.

8. Style: How to Say Things with Words

Rhet. III.1–12 introduces the topic of lexis , usually translated as ‘style’. This topic was not announced until the final passage of Rhetoric II, so that most scholars have come to think of this section as a more or less self-contained treatise. The insertion of this treatise into the Rhetoric is motivated by the claim that, while Rhetoric I & II dealt with thought (dianoia), i.e., about what the orator should say, it remains to inquire into the various ways of saying or formulating one and the same thing. In the course of Rhetoric III.1–12 it turns out that Aristotle tackles this task by using some quite heterogeneous approaches. After an initial exploration of the field of delivery and style (III.1) Aristotle tries to determine what good prose style consists in; for this purpose he has to go into the differentiation and the selection of various kinds of nouns, one of which is defined as metaphor (III.2). The following chapters III.3–6 feature topics that are at best loosely connected with the theme of good prose style; among these topics is the opposite of good style, namely frigid or deterring style ( psuchron ) (III.3), the simile, which turns out to be connected with the metaphor (III.4), the issue of correct Greek (III.5), the appropriateness (III.7) and the means by which one’s style becomes long-winded and dignified (III.6). Chapters III.8–9 introduce two new approaches to the issue of style, which seem to be unrelated to everything that has been said so far: These are the topics of the rhythmical shaping of prose style and of periodic and non-periodic flow of speech. Chapters III.10–11 are dedicated to how the orator can ‘bring things before one’s eyes’, which amounts to something like making the style more vivid. Again metaphors are shown to play a crucial role for that purpose, so that the topic of metaphor is taken up again and deepened by extended lists of examples. Chapter III.12 seems to make a new start by distinguishing between oral and written style and assessing their suitability for the three genres of speech (see above §2 ). The philosophical core of Aristotle’s treatise on style in Rhetoric III.1–12 seems to be included in the discussion of the good prose style (see below §8.1 ), however it is the topic of metaphor (see below §8.2 ) that has attracted the most attention in the later reception up to the present day.

Originally the discussion of style belongs to the art of poetry rather than to rhetoric; the poets were the first, as Aristotle observes, to give an impulse for the study of style. Nevertheless he admits that questions of style or, more precisely, of different ways to formulate the same subject, may have an impact on the degree of clarity: “What concerns the topic of lexis , however, has some small necessary place in all teaching; for to speak in one way rather than another makes some difference in regard to clarity; although not a great difference…” ( Rhet. III.1, 1404a8–10). Clarity again matters for comprehension and comprehensibility contributes to persuasiveness. Indeed Aristotle even claims that the virtue or excellence ( aretê ) of prose style ultimately depends on clarity, because it is the genuine purpose of a speech is to make something clear. In prose speeches, the good formulation of a state of affairs must therefore be a clear one. However, saying this is not yet enough to account for the best or excellent prose style, since clear linguistic expressions tend to be banal or flat, while good style should avoid such banality. If the language becomes too banal it will not be able to attract the attention of the audience. The orator can avoid this tendency of banality by the use of dignified or elevated expressions and in general by all formulations that deviate from common usage. On the one hand, uncommon vocabulary has the advantage of evoking the curiosity of an audience. On the other hand the use of such elevated vocabulary bears a serious risk: Whenever the orator makes excessive use of it, the speech might become unclear, thus failing to meet the default requirement of prose speech, namely clarity. Moreover, if the vocabulary becomes too sublime or dignified in relation to prose’s subject matter (Aristotle assumes it is mostly everyday affairs), the audience will notice that the orator uses his words with a certain intention and will become suspicious about the orator and his intentions. Hitting upon the right wording is therefore a matter of being clear, but not too banal; In trying not to be too banal, one must use uncommon, dignified words and phrases, but one must be careful not to use them excessively or inappropriately in relation to prose style and the typical subject matter of prose speeches.

Bringing all these considerations together, Aristotle defines the good prose style, i.e. the virtue of prose style, as follows: “Let the virtue of linguistic form be defined as being clear, for since the logos is a (linguistic, sc.) sign, it would fail to bring about its proper function, whenever it does not make clear (whatever it is the sign of, sc.)—and neither banal/mean/flat ( tapeinên ) nor above the deserved dignity, but appropriate ( prepon )” ( Rhet. III.2, 1404b1–4; similar at III.12, 1414a22–26). According to this definition, the virtue of prose style has to avoid two opposed tendencies, both of which are excessive and therefore fallacious: The good style is clear in a way that is neither too banal nor too dignified, but appropriate (in proportion to the subject matter of prose speech). In this respect the definition of stylistic virtue follows the same scheme as the definition of ethical virtues in Aristotle’s ethical writings, insofar as both the stylistic virtue and the virtue of character are defined in terms of a mean that lies between two opposed excesses. If the virtue of style is defined as a mean between the banality involving form of clarity and overly dignified (and hence inappropriate) speech, it is with good reason that Aristotle speaks of only one virtue of prose style, and not of clarity, ornament (by dignified expressions) and appropriateness as three distinct virtues of style. However, from the times of Cicero and Quintilianus on, these three, along with the correctness of Greek or Latin, became the canonical four virtues of speech ( virtutes dicendi ). Reading Aristotle through the spectacles of the Roman art of rhetoric, scholars often try to identify two, three or four virtues of style in his Rhetoric .

Finally, if the virtue of style is about finding a balance between banal clarity, which is dull, and attractive dignity, which is inappropriate in public speeches, how can the orator manage to control the different degrees of clarity and dignity? For this purpose Aristotle equips the orator with a classification of words (more or less the same classification can also be found in Poetics chapter 21): First of all Aristotle distinguishes between the kuria onamata , the standard expressions, and the glôtta , the borrowed words, idioms or vernacular expressions. Most examples that Aristotle gives of this latter class are taken from the different Greek dialects, and most examples of this type are in turn taken from the language of the Homeric epos. Further classes are defined by metaphors and by several expressions that are somehow altered or modified, e.g., newly coined expressions ( pepoiêmena ), composite expressions (especially new or unusual compositions ( ta dipla )), and lengthened, shortened or otherwise altered expressions. Sometimes Aristotle also uses the term kosmos under which he collects all epithets and otherwise ornamental expressions. These different types of words differ in accordance with their familiarity. Most familiar are the usual or current words, the least familiar words are the glôtta or words that are newly coined. The metaphors are also unknown and unusual, because a usual, well-known word is used to designate something other than its usual designation (see below §8.2 ). The best established words, the kuria , make their subject clear, but do not excite the audience’s curiosity, whereas all other types of words are not established, and hence have the sort of attraction that alien or foreign things used to have. Since remote things are admirable ( thaumaston ) and the admirable is pleasant, Aristotle says, one should make the speech admirable and pleasant by the use of such unfamiliar words. However one has to be careful not to use inappropriately dignified or poetic words in prose speech. Thus the virtue of style is accomplished by the selection and balanced use of these various types of words: Fundamental for prose speech is the use of usual and therefore clear words. In order to make the speech pleasant and dignified and in order to avoid banality the orator must make moderate use of non-familiar elements. Metaphor plays an important role for prose style, since metaphors contribute, as Aristotle says, clarity as well as the unfamiliar, surprising effect that avoids banality and tediousness.

According to Aristotle Poetics 21, 1457b9–16 and 20–22, a metaphor is “the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion”. These four types are exemplified as follows:

Most of the examples Aristotle offers for types (i) to (iii) would not be regarded as metaphors in the modern sense; rather they would fall under the headings of metonomy or synecdoche. The examples offered for type (iv) are more like modern metaphors. Aristotle himself regards the metaphors of group (iv), which are built from analogy, as the most important type of enthymemes. An analogy is given if the second term is to the first as the fourth to the third. Correspondingly, an analogous metaphor uses the fourth term for the second or the second for the fourth. This principle can be illustrated by the following Aristotelian examples:

Examples (a) and (b) obey the optional instruction that metaphors can be qualified by adding the term to which the proper word is relative (cp. “the shield of Ares ,” “the evening of life ”). In example (c), there is no proper name for the thing that the metaphor refers to. In example (d) the relation of analogy is not, as in the other cases, indicated by the domain to which an item is referred to, but by a certain negation (for example “without name”); the negations make clear that the term is not used in its usual sense.

Metaphors are closely related to similes; but as opposed to the later tradition, Aristotle does not define the metaphor as an abbreviated simile, but, the other way around, the simile as a metaphor. The simile differs from the metaphor in the form of expression: while in the metaphor something is identified or substituted, the simile compares two things with each other, using words as “like,” “as”, etc. For example, “He rushed as a lion” is, according to Aristotle, a simile, but “The lion rushed” is a metaphor.

While in the later tradition the use of metaphors has been seen as a matter of mere decoration, which has to delight the hearer, Aristotle stresses the cognitive function of metaphors. Metaphors, he says, bring about learning ( Rhet. III.10, 1410b14f.). In order to understand a metaphor, the hearer has to find something common between the metaphor and the thing the metaphor refers to. For example, if someone calls the old age “stubble”, we have to find a common genus to which old age and stubble belong; we do not grasp the very sense of the metaphor until we find that both, old age and stubble, have lost their bloom. Thus, a metaphor not only refers to a thing, but simultaneously describes the thing in a certain respect. This is why Aristotle says that the metaphor brings about learning: as soon as we understand why someone uses the metaphor “stubble” to refer to old age, we have learned at least one characteristic of old age.

• Accepted opinions: endoxa
• Argument: logos
• Art: technê
• Character: êthos
• Counterpart: antistrophos
• Credible: axiopistos
• Decision (practical): prohairesis
• Deduction: sullogismos
• Emotions: pathê
• Enthymeme: enthumêma
• Example: paradeigma
• For the most part: hôs epi to polu
• Induction ( epagôgê )
• Judgement: krisis
• Location: topos (an argumentative scheme)
• Maxim: gnômê
• Means of persuasion: pistis (in pre-Aristotelian use this word also designates a certain part of the speech)
• Metaphor: metaphora
• Persuasive: pithanon
• Place: topos (an argumentative scheme)
• Practical intelligence: phronêsis
• Premise: protasis (can also mean ‘sentence’, statement’)
• Probable: eikos
• Proof: apodeixis (in the sense of ‘demonstrative argument, demonstration’)
• Proof: tekmêrion (i.e. a necessary sign or sign argument)
• Sign: sêmeion (can also mean ‘sign argument’)
• Style: lexis
• Specific topoi : idioi topoi (Aristotle refers to them also by ‘ idiai protaseis ’ or ‘ eidê ’)
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• Leff, Michael C., 1993. “The Uses of Aristotle’s Rhetoric ,” Argumentation , 7: 313–327.
• Lossau, Manfred J., 1974. “Der Aristotelische Gryllos antilogisch,” Philologus , 118: 12–21.
• Leighton, Stephen, 1982. “Aristotle and the Emotions,” Phronesis , 27: 144–174.
• –––, 2009. “Passions and Persuasion,” in G. Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Blackwell, 597–611.
• Madden, Edward H., 1952. “The Enthymeme. Crossroads of Logic, Rhetoric and Metaphysics,” Philosophical Review , 61: 368–376.
• Marx, Friedrich, 1900. Aristoteles Rhetorik (= Berichte der koeniglich saechsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig , Volume 52), Leipzig.
• McBurney, James H., 1936. “The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory,” Speech Monographs , 3: 49–74.
• Miller, Arthur B., and Bee, John D., 1972. “Enthymemes: Body and Soul,” in Philosophy and Rhetoric , 5: 201–214.
• Moss, Jessica, 2012. Aristotle on the Apparent Good. Perception, Phantasia, Thought, and Desire , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Natali, Carlo, 1990. “Due modi di trattare le opinioni notevole. La nozione di felicità in Aristotele, Retorica I 5,” Methexis , 3: 51–63.
• –––, 1994. “La ‘Retorica’ di Aristotele negli studi europei più recenti,” in W.W. Fortenbaugh and D.C. Mirhady (eds.), Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle , New Brunswick: Transaction, 365–382.
• Nussbaum, Martha C., 1996. “Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion,” in Amelie O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric , Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 303–323.
• Pearson, Giles, 2014. “Aristotle and the Cognitive Component of Emotions,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 46: 165–211.
• Pepe, Cristina, 2013. The Genres of Rhetorical Speeches in Greek and Roman Antiquity , Leiden: Brill.
• Primavesi, Oliver, 1996. Die aristotelische Topik , Munich: C. H. Beck.
• Rambourg. Camille, 2014. Topos. Les Premières Méthodes D’Argumentation Dans La Rhètorique Grecque des Ve–IVe Siècles , Paris: Vrin.
• Raphael, Sally, 1974. “Rhetoric, Dialectic and Syllogistic Argument: Aristotle’s Position in Rhetoric I-II,” Phronesis , 19: 153–167.
• Rapp, Christof, 2009. “The Nature and Goals of Rhetoric,” in G. Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Blackwell, 579–596.
• –––, 2011. “Aristotelische Grundbegriffe in der Theorie der juridischen Argumentation,” Rechtstheorie , 42: 383–415.
• –––, 2012. “Aristotle on the Moral Psychology of Persuasion,” in Ch. Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 589–611.
• –––, 2013. “Fallacious Arguments in Ancient Philosophy,” in Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy , 15: 122–158.
• –––, 2016. “Dialectic and Logic from a Rhetorical Point of View,” in J.B. Gourinat and J. Lemaire (eds.), Logique et dialectique dans l’Antiquité , Paris: Vrin, 161–192.
• –––, 2018. “Aristotle and the Dialectical Turn of Rhetoric,” in Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou (ed.), Aristotle — Contemporary Perspectives on his Thought. On the 2400th Anniversary of Aristotle’s Birth , Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter 223–236.
• Ricoeur, Paul, 1996. “Between Rhetoric and Poetics,” in Amelie O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric , Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 324–384.
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Dictionaries, understanding aristotle . . . (print resources), understanding aristotle . . . (electronic resources), biographical and background information (greek print sources), dvds which contain aristotle's works.

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These links contains background information for understanding Aristotle and his works from articles in encyclopedias (print and electronic).  The first two links are online encyclopedia articles (peer reviewed and open access) on Aristotle.

• Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy consists of peer reviewed articles on all aspects of philosophy including Aristotle. This encyclopedia provides information of scholarly quality freely on the web.
• Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an article by Christopher Shields on Aristotle which concludes with an extensive bibliography of translations, translations with commentaries, general works, and works cited.
• Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Craig, Edward (ed). London; New York: Routledge, 1998. B51 .R68 1998 (Religious Studies and Philosophy Library) more... less... This ten volume set contains extensive articles such as "Aristotelianism in Islamic Philosophy", "Aristotelianism in the 17th Century", "Aristotelianism, Medieval", "Aristotelianism, Renaissance", "Aristotle", and "Aristotle Commentators". Each of the articles is accompanied by a list of works (recommended editions and than translations of individual works) and references and further reading. The set is also located at the Reference Desk. The encyclopedia is also available as a CD-ROM in the Religious Studies and Philosophy Library).
• New Catholic Encyclopedia This link opens in a new window Catholic University of America. 2nd ed. Detroit: Thomson/Gale; Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 2003. BT 6 .N53 2003 (Religious Studies and Philosophy and Reference) New Catholic Encyclopedia (Volume 1) contains an article by J. Owens on Aristotle which concludes with a bibliography.
• Encyclopedia of Philosophy This link opens in a new window Edwards, Paul. New York : Macmillan: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan, 1967. B41 .E56 1967a (Religious Studies and Philosophy Library, Reference, and Stacks) This encyclopedia (available online and in print) is the English-language reference source for philosophy and has been the cornerstone of the philosophy reference shelf. The extensive article on Aristotle by Stephen Menn includes a comprehensive bibliography.
• Encyclopedia of Rhetoric This link opens in a new window This encyclopedia provides a comprehensive survey of the latest research and the foundational teachings in this broad field. It synthesizes a vast amount of knowledge from classics, philosophy, literature, literary theory, cultural studies, speech and communications, and discusses basic concepts and themes throughout rhetoric. Even though the encyclopedia does not have an article on Aristotle himself; this encyclopedia contains articles (such as Topics and Pathos) which mention Aristotle, his writings, and his influence. A search for Aristotle returns 104 results.
• Aristotle Dictionary Kiernan, Thomas P. (ed.). New York: Philosophical Library, 1962. PA3926 .Z8 1962 ( Humanities Greek and Latin) ~[132]~ ~[133]~ This book provides a lengthy overview of Plato's works and main ideas (more than 150 pages) as well as a dictionary of quotations from Aristotle's works.
• The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy Audi, Robert (ed.). 2nd ed. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. B41 .C35 1999 (Religious Studies and Philosophy Library) ~[132]~ ~[133]~ This dictionary consists of lengthy and comprehensive articles on Aristotle and other topics such as commentaries on Aristotle and virtue ethics.
• The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy Blackburn, Simon. 2nd ed. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. B41 .B53 2005 (Mullen Library stacks) ~[132]~ ~[133]~ This dictionary provides a shorter article on Aristotle and other topics such as arete and Aristotelianism than the article found in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy.
• Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion: Eastern and Western Thought Reese, William L. new and enl. ed. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996. B41 .R43 1996 (Religious Studies and Philosophy Library) ~[132]~ ~[133]~ This dictionary contains numerous cross-references in its articles. Even though the dictionary does not contain exhaustive information on topics, its article on Aristotle is rather lengthy.
• A Dictionary of Philosophy Mautner, Thomas. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Reference, 1996. B41 .M38 1996 (Religious Studies and Philosophy Library) ~[132]~ ~[133]~ This dictionary is for individuals who are new to studying philosophy - articles on important thinkers such as Aristotle and the vocabulary found in philosophy are included. The dictionary's article on Aristotle is shorter than the article found in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy.
• A Dictionary of Philosophy Lacey, A. R. 3rd ed. London: Routledge, 1996. B41 .L32 1996 (Religious Studies and Philosophy Library) ~[132]~ ~[133]~ This dictionary contains a short article on Aristotle.
• Dictionary of Literary Biography ~[392]~ . Provides nearly 16,000 biographical and critical essays on the lives, works, and careers of the world's most influential literary figures from all eras and genres such as Aristotle. Aristotle appears in Volume 176: Ancient Greek Authors. (A Bruccoli Clark Layman Book. Edited by Ward W. Briggs, University of South Carolina. The Gale Group, 1997, pp. 55-76).
• Oxford Classical Dictionary ~[392]~ . The Oxford Classical Dictionary has an article by Martha C. Nussbaum on Aristotle which concludes with a bibliography (text, translations, commentaries, and general).
• Oxford Handbook of Aristotle Christopher Shields, Oxford University Press, 2012.
• A Companion to Aristotle Anagnostopoulos, Georgios (ed.). Blackwell Companions to Philosophy Chichester, UK; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. B485 .C59 2009 (Stacks) more... less... This book contains 40 chapters which highlight central topics found in Aristotle's works as a whole (substance, essence, cause, etc.).
• The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle Barnes, Jonathan (ed.). Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. B485 .C35 1995 (Religious Studies and Philosophy Library) more... less... This book provides philosophical criticism on Aristotle's life and his works; the book's focus is Aristotle as a philosopher. The book concludes with suggestions for reading and a comprehensive bibliography (introductory, juvenilia, logic, philosophy of science, science, psychology, metaphysics, ethics, rhetoric and poetics, and politics).
• A Companion to Aristotle's Politics Keyt, David and Fred D. Miller. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, MA: B. Blackwell, 1991. JC71.A7 A75 1991 (Stacks) more... less... This book contains 15 chapters discussing aspects of Aristotle's Politics such as man, private property, distributive justice, oligarchy, and political change.
• Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle on Ethics Hughes, Gerald J. Routledge Philosophy Guidebooks London; New York: Routledge, 2001. B430 .H84 2001 (Stacks) more... less... This book provides a discussion of Aristotle's terminology, interpretation controversy of Aristotle's writings, and the impact of Aristotle's Ethics on contemporary moral philosophy.
• Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and the Metaphysics Politis, Vasilis. Routledge Philosophy Guidebooks London; New York: Routledge, 2004. B434 .P65 2004 (Stacks) more... less... This book provides an introduction to reading and understanding Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially the main arguments.
• Aristotle: a Guide for the Perplexed Vella, John A. Guides for the Perplexed London; New York: Continuum, 2008. B485 .V45 2008 (Stacks) more... less... This book contains Aristotle's key ideas and their influence on western philosophy in chapters such as science, being or substance, nature, soul, and success.
• Greek Philosophy A Collection of Texts with Notes and Explanations Volume II Vogel, C. J. De. 3rd ed. Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1967. B 165 .V87 v.2 1967 (Religious Studies and Philosophy Library) more... less... Volume II, Aristotle, the Early Peripatetic School and the Early Academy, contains actual Greek passages from Aristotle as well as notes in English. Book III is entirely on Aristotle (life, works, Physics, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric, Poetics, and much more). These books are also available in the Greek and Latin Reading Room and the Stacks.
• The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Honderich, Ted (ed.). 2nd ed. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. B51 .O94 2005 (Religious Studies and Philosophy Library) more... less... This book contains articles on most philosophical terms and provides articles on Aristotle and Aristotelianism.
• A Companion to the Philosophers Arrington, Robert L. (ed.) Blackwell Companions to Philosophy Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999. B 72 .C595 1999 (Religious Studies and Philosophy Library) more... less... This book contains 193 essays including an essay on Aristotle which concludes with a bibliography.
• A Companion to Ethics Singer, Peter (ed). Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Reference, 1991. BJ1012 .C62 1991 (Religious Studies and Philosophy Library) more... less... This book contains 47 essays on ethics which includes discussion on Aristotle and topics such as arete, practical reason, virtue, and Nichomachean Ethics.
• Greek Thought: a Guide to Classical Knowledge Brunschwig, Jacques and Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd (eds.). Translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000. DF78 .S2813 2000 (Stacks) more... less... This book contains an essay on Aristotle which concludes with a bibliography (texts and translations and studies) and related articles. Illustrations are included.
• People with online papers in philosophy David Chalmers maintains People with online papers in philosophy which provides links to online papers. Philosophy papers on Aristotle are found under "Ancient" (Ancient Greek Philosophy).
• Paideia Project On-Line The Paideia Project On-Line contains philosophy papers in its archives, including papers on Aristotle. You can look for Aristotle under "Ancient Philosophy" heading or type Aristotle's name in the search box. Not all of the papers are in English.
• Modern Interpretation of Ancient Logics Klaus Glashoff (former professor at the University of Hamburg, Germany) maintains this website. He provides papers (in PDF) on Aristotle and logic.
• Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics contains papers discussing Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, and others. more... less... Select "The Papers" Select "Classical Philosophy"
• Svidae Lexicon Adler, Ada. (ed.). Lipsiae: in aedibvs B. G. Tevbneri, 1928-38. PA5365 .A23 1928 (Greek and Latin Reading Room) more... less... This five volume set is the Suda in print. The Suda is in Greek while the Preface is in Latin. Volume 1 contains entries for Aristotle.
• Classical Greek Philosophy [videorecording] Viddisc. 00528 (Central Reserve Audiovisual) more... less... This program addresses core topics in ancient philosophy such as freedom and fate, permanence and change, happiness, the nature of the cosmos, and the immortality of the soul. Concepts are presented as articulated by key figures including Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and the Milesian and Eleatic philosophers -- in combination with quotations drawn from Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s Physics, and other influential sources -- make this program an excellent tool for building a solid understanding of Western philosophy.

Ask for these DVDs at the Circulation Desk.

• Ethics [videorecording] : what is right? Viddisc. 00111 (Central Reserve Audiovisual) more... less... Harvard University’s Frances Kamm, Rutgers University’s Larry Temkin, and Richard Sorabji, emeritus professor of philosophy at King’s College, London, describe the three major categories of ethics: metaethics, applied ethics, and normative ethics. Also included are virtue theory, divine command theory, utilitarian theory, and duty theory. Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and Kant’s Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals are considered along with the contributions of Epicurus, Hume, Bentham, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Max Weber, G.E. Moore, and John Rawls.
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Aristotle’s Research on Topics: The Foundation of the Study of Inference in Argumentation

• First Online: 11 December 2018

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• Eddo Rigotti 4 &
• Sara Greco 4  

Part of the book series: Argumentation Library ((ARGA,volume 34))

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Chapter 1 is devoted to Aristotle, the author we consider as the founder of the tradition of topics. The importance of Aristotle in relation to the study of inference in argumentation is immense: such is the finesse and richness of the Aristotelian analyses of argumentative procedures that they represent a source of copious theoretical and methodological suggestions for contemporary research on argument schemes. While presenting Aristotle’s approach, we discuss fundamental concepts concerning inference in argumentation that will be recurring in the volume, such as the definitions of inference, problem and premise, the distinction between knowledge-oriented and pragmatic argumentation, and the difference between constructive and destructive arguments. Within this network of definitions, the polysemic and central notion of topos in Aristotle’s work takes center stage.

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Speaking about scientific traditions, Zittoun et al. ( 2009 : 109) argue that they “designate the shared history and accumulated experience of an organised, bounded network, sharing an activity, institutions, artefacts and language. Hence traditions might offer the frame and the means for the exploration of new ideas and for dealing with new problems”. The Aristotelian tradition certainly exceeds this definition, as scholars who have been dealing with his Topica throughout time did not necessarily share institutions, artefacts, and language, nor were they an “organized” network. Nevertheless, they capitalized on “accumulated experience” to approach new problems and new ideas.

It will be clear, by now, that we consider Aristotle the founder of the tradition of the study of inference, in line with Kienpointner ( 1992 : 115). We are aware that Braet ( 2004 : 128) opposes this view, showing that although the notion of topos was introduced by Aristotle, there were previous accounts that dealt with the same problems and concepts. Braet ( 2004 ) focuses on the Rhetoric to Alexander in particular. Given the incommensurable importance that Aristotle acquires in the following tradition, however, we have decided to start our discussion with him and his work.

According to De Pater ( 1965 : 163), “Les lieux sont effectivement nombreux, et leur énumeration (liée par de simples ἕτι ou καὶ) donne un peu aux Topiques l’allure d’un annuaire de telephone”.

A few biographical notes about Aristotle might be of use to situate him within his time and to understand the dedication of his life to science and research. We will only offer a very sketched summary of the main events in Aristotle’s life, mostly based on Berti ( 1997 ), Kennedy ( 1991 ), Reale ( 1974 ), Shields ( 2016 ), and Amadio and Kenny ( 2018 ); for an accurate reconstruction of Aristotle’s biography and activities, see also Düring ( 1957 ). Kennedy ( 1991 : 3) notes that “Aristotle tells us almost nothing about the events of his life, though he reveals his mind and values fully, especially in Nicomachean Ethics ”. Aristotle was born in Stagira, in the North-East coast of Greece, near to Macedonia, in 384/3 B.C. (Berti 1997 : 4; Kennedy 1991 : 3). His father Nicomachus was the physician of Amyntas III, king of Macedonia. At about the age of seventeen, in 367/6 B.C., Aristotle moved to Athens to attend Plato’s Academy (Berti 1997 : 4; Kennedy 1991 : 4). He remained there for nearly twenty years, until Plato’s death in circa 348/7 B.C. At that point, he left Athens and went to the court of Hermias in Asia Minor. There, he traveled to the island of Lesbos with Theophrastus; together, they conducted empirical research in the botany and zoology of the island (see Amadio and Kenny 2018 ). During this time, Aristotle married Hermias’ niece Pythias. Soon after Hermias’ death, in 343/2 B.C., upon request of Philip II, king of Macedonia, Aristotle became the tutor of his son Alexander (Berti 1997 : 8; Shields 2016 ), who was later to become Alexander the Great. In 335/4 B.C., Aristotle returned to Athens (Reale 1974 : 38–39; Kennedy 1991 : 6), which had been conquered by Alexander. There he carried out teaching and research activities at the Liceum for the next twelve years; as it seems, these years were the apex of his scientific production. When Pythias died, Aristotle started a relationship with Herpyllis of Stagira, who bore him a son whom he named, after his father, Nicomachus (Shields 2016 ). Alexander’s death in 323 B.C. awoke political opposition against the Macedonian hegemony (Kennedy 1991 : 6). In this context, in 322 B.C., Eurymedon the Hierophant accused Aristotle of empiety. Aristotle took shelter on his mother’s family estate in Chalcis and then died of natural causes later that year in Euboea.

The works that have remained were written in the form of treatises; most of them were a support for students and were not intended for broad circulation. The non-extant exoteric works were often written in the form of “Platonic” dialogues (see Kennedy 1991 : 4–5).

The basic meaning of this highly polysemic term is “instrument”; it is also used in the sense of a biological instrument, i.e. an organ. This term was adopted to indicate all of Aristotle’s logical treatises by Andronicus of Rhodes (Berti 1997 : 17), one of the most prominent ancient Aristotelian commentators.

The relation of dialectic to rhetoric is characterized by Aristotle with the adjective ἀντίστροφος, which indicates a specular or converse relation.

We adopt a non-evolutionary perspective in the presentation of Aristotle’s contribution, for two main reasons. First, it allows us to keep the specific approach of the Topica and the perspective adopted by the following tradition in the foreground (see Irwin 1988 ). Second, the Topica plainly presupposes the conceptual framing established in other treatises of the Organon , mainly in Categoriae , De interpretatione , but also Prior and Posterior Analytics .

Unless indicated otherwise, these numbers are citations for the Topica . When we cite the Rhetoric , we will mention it.

In presenting the goals of his work, Aristotle equally talks about its limits. These are analogous to the limits of rhetoric and medicine: we completely possess dialectic “when we carry out our purpose with every available means. For neither will the rhetorician seek to persuade nor the physician to heal by every expedient; but if he omits none of the available means, we shall say that he possesses the science in an adequate degree” (101b 7-10 , translation by Forster 1960 : 279).

Rigotti and Cigada ( 2004 : 78) observe that the Greek term λόγος incorporates the meanings of discourse, reason, and calculus; and that it is translated by Cicero with the Latin “ratio et oratio” (reason and discourse) in the De officiis I 50-51 (see Winterbottom 1994 ).

In this case, we adapt the translation by Forster ( 1960 : 273) and replace “reasoning” with “inference”, because we interpret this paragraph by Aristotle as connected to argumentative inference. In particular, for Aristotle, there are two kinds of arguments (διαλεκτικοὶ λόγοι): deduction and induction. The latter is defined as going from particulars to universals and is characterized as more convincing, clearer, more familiar in perceptive terms, and more popular, while the former is considered more cogent and effective against argumentatively skilled people (105a 10-19 ).

Primary is to be intended as self - evident .

Inferences can also be contentious , if their premises appear to be generally accepted but are not so.

A very similar definition of inference is given in the Prior Analytics (I.2, 24b 18-20 ).

In this sense, the Aristotelian view differs from the contemporary notion of defeasible argumentation, whereby the term defeasible does not only apply to the premises, but also to the inferential process (for an example, see the discussion in Walton and Macagno 2010 ).

The Greek term πρότασις has often been translated with the more general English term proposition . However, Aristotle is clearly referring to those propositions that work as premises of reasoning. Moreover, in the Topica , as becomes clear below, he adopts for dialectical πρότασις exactly the same definition that he uses elsewhere for endoxa , i.e. for culturally shared premises. As for its lexical structure, πρότασις, being the nomen actionis of the verb προτείνω, suggests the idea of an act of “pre-tending” or “pre-mitting” and is coherent with the notion of premise .

See Boethius’s Latin translation 101b 33-35 (Minio Paluello 1969 ). In other cases, the same function is accomplished by the Latin conjunction “an”.

Cicero renders Aristotle’s concept of problem with the Latin word quaestio (see Chap. 2, Sect.  2.1 ). Quaestio is equivalent to two phrases used by Cicero and Boethius and throughout the Middle Ages (see Chaps.  2 and 3 ), notably: “id de quo agitur” and “res dubia”. In all cases, quaestio , like problem, indicates an open problem (a question or issue , in contemporary terms).

In Aristotle’s philosophical lexicon, essence and substance must be distinguished; throughout the history of interpretation of Aristotle, several hermeneutic controversies emerged regarding this distinction (see NETA 1559 : 12). Substance is one of the ten categories. Essence (τὸ τί ἐστιν) is the definition of a thing, or in other terms, what a thing is, whereby “thing” is understood in a wide sense (including beings and modes of being, see also Courtine and Rijksbaron ( 2004 )). Thus, in Aristotle’s view the definition of a thing is a phrase in a language that grasps the essence of a thing in reality. In modern philosophical terms, this Aristotelian concept has excited much debate about the relation between signs and objects (see the discussion in Vignaux 1970 : 33ff). One of our reviewers has suggested, for example, Quine’s ( 1963 [1953]: 22) critical remarks on the Aristotelian notion of definition, which brings Quine to suggest a divorce between definition (meaning) and essence of things: “The Aristotelian notion of essence was the forerunner, no doubt, of the modern notion of intension or meaning. For Aristotle it was essential in men to be rational, accidental to be two-legged. But there is an important difference between this attitude and the doctrine of meaning. […] Things had essences, for Aristotle, but only linguistic forms have meanings. Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word”. Whilst the various aspects of this discussion are beyond the scope of the present volume, it is important to mention this debate because the Aristotelian notions of definition and essence remain controversial (see also our observations in footnote 22).

Conversion is intended as the mutual replacement of the subject and the predicate in a proposition. For example, “A human being is an animal who can learn a grammar” → “An animal who can learn a grammar is a human being”. Thus, conversion is the operation by which, from one proposition, another proposition is obtained where the subject and the predicate are inverted without changing the truth-value of the resulting proposition.

In the medieval tradition, identifying an individual on the basis of a property will be called a process of description (and not a definition, see Chap.  3 ). Notably, modern approaches tend to rule out this type of “essentialist” view of definition; in contemporary accounts, definition and description often overlap. In this book, however, we have decided to maintain this traditional distinction, albeit we are aware of its possible limits. We note, in fact, that in some controversial contemporary debates, people are debating about the “essence” of things (see for example public debate on bioethics, human rights, and other controversial subjects). Such debates seem to require “essentialist-Aristotelian” definitions in order to make important juridical decisions, even if it is not straightforward to agree on what definition one should adopt. In our view, the fact that it is difficult to agree on what counts as evidence and what the “essentialist definition” of things are (or even on the existence of evidence in general, especially in intercultural debate) does not necessarily mean that we can do without it. One of our anonymous reviewers has observed that Ludwig Wittgenstein made some relevant remarks on this philosophical problem in his last work, devoted to the notion of certainty (Wittgenstein 1969 – 1975 ). Wittgenstein opens the important problem of the starting points of our thinking; he speaks about the necessity of holding some presuppositions as true because “the game of doubting itself presupposes certainty”. Some years before, Newman ( 1870 : 139ff) had discussed the difference between certitude and simple assent, describing certitude as assent founded on argumentation. For Newman it is possible for one to hold beliefs as true in an unjustified way but then, if asked to prove them, to start an argumentative process to verify (or falsify) them, thereby getting to genuine assent, as based on “an argumentative footing” (Newman 1870 : 141). This problem could certainly be the subject of further philosophical discussion, which is, however, clearly beyond the scope of this work. Rather, we highlight that, in the context of argumentation, van Eemeren and Grootendorst ( 2004 : 60) claim that “There is no point in venturing to resolve a difference of opinion through an argumentative exchange if there is no mutual commitment to a common starting point”. Freeman ( 2005 ) has discussed the problem of acceptability of premises in argumentation. This discussion is also linked to the problem of whether it is always possible to resolve disagreement through argumentation, or whether there are cases of deep disagreement (Fogelin 1985 ) that are not solvable because there are no common starting points (see the discussion in Zarefsky 2012 ; we are grateful to Michael Baumtrog for his suggestion to consider the discussion on deep disagreement).

Two further predicables, namely species and specific difference , are included within definition (see Sect.  1.4.5.1 ).

Note that destructive arguments should not be confused with refutations. In our interpretation of Aristotle, an arguer’s intervention represents a refutation (ἔλεγχος) when it sets out to demolish (ἀναιρέω) the counterparty’s standpoint, supported by an argument, by showing that this is contradicted by another statement also advanced by the counterparty.

In the first book of the Topica (104b 18 -105a 2 ), the term theses (θέσεις) is introduced to indicate statements that are contrary to accepted opinions and proposed by a renowned philosopher. Aristotle criticizes a generalized use of “theses” to mean “problems” (104b 35 ): “almost all problems are now called theses” (translation adapted from Forster 1960 : 301). Despite this criticism, in other passages, Aristotle does adopt the more generic meaning of thesis .

The term κριτής (plural κριταί) derives from the verb κρίνω (Latin cerno ), which means ‘to sieve’: a krités is one who sieves. In other words, a κριτής is a person in charge of verifying the reasons given by the arguer, and of making a decision (see Rigotti 1995 ).

As anticipated in the Preface of this volume, the clarification of the connection between inferential rules and factual premises is one of the distinguishing features of the Argumentum Model of Topics, which we will propose in Chap.  6 .

Even though the “heterogeneous nature of topical principles” (Braet 2005 : 75) has been noted by several authors, our interpretation of the polysemy of topos, based on our reading of the Topica , is partially divergent from previous accounts, such as those provided by De Pater ( 1965 , 1968 ), Slomkowski ( 1997 ), Braet ( 2005 ), Rubinelli ( 2006 ), and Tindale ( 2007 ). Therefore, we devote some space to explaining our interpretive proposal.

Eleonor Stump ( 1978 : 165) remarks that “One of the difficulties in understanding Aristotle’s Topics is that Aristottle devotes almost no attention to what a Topic ( in the sense of topos ) is”. The occurrence of the term “topos” itself is far from systematic. In the second chapter of the second book (109a 34ff. ), the list of topoi is initiated explicitly by “One topos is”. Later in the text the explicit mention of the term topos is infrequent (see, for example, 117b 10 and the first topos of the sixth book at 139b 19 ), because the term is replaced by various indicators like the anaphoric expression ἄλλος δέ (another one) or adverbs like ἔτι (furthermore), πάλιν (again), ἔπειτα (next) or, simply, by mentioning one inferential rule after the other.

In Boethius, “topoi from” and “inferential rules” correspond to locus differentia maximae and locus maxima, respectively (see Chap.  2 ). Other authors have noted and expressed, in different ways, that different concepts are present in Aristotle’s account. For example, De Pater ( 1965 : 115, 147–148; 1968 : 166) distinguishes between a “search formula” (French formule de recherche , or règle ), which we interpret as an inferential rule, and a “probative formula”, corresponding to the topos (French formule probative , or loi logique ). This same concept is present in the brief account by Vignaux ( 1970 : 29): “Les lieux peuvent donc se définir par une même structure fondamentale: chacun apparait comme une règle complétée par un procédé de construction et fondée sur une loi”. In our theoretical proposal—the Argumentum Model of Topics—we distinguish between locus and maxim and discuss how they are interrelated (see Chaps.  6 and 7 in this volume). Concerning the definition of topos, it is worth mentioning that De Pater ( 1965 : ch. II and, in particular, 117–127) introduces, similarly to other authors, a distinction between common topos (τόπος κοινός) and proper topos (ἴδιος, see De Pater 1965 : 94, 118), even though he explicitly claims that Aristotle is mainly interested in common topoi for dialectics (De Pater 1965 : 121). In De Pater’s opinion, Aristotle makes this distinction explicit mainly in a paragraph of the first book of the Rhetoric (1358a 17-20 ). This paragraph, which per se is obscure (“le texte est grammaticalement assez obscur”, see De Pater 1965 : 118), differentiates between the topoi (which, despite the differences of their subject-matters, are common to all enthymemes and syllogisms) and those premises that are “proper” (ἴδια), namely specific to the different subject-matters. However, in this volume, we do not interpret this paragraph as a distinction between common and proper topoi. In fact, in the authors’ view, if we consider the above-mentioned paragraph from the Rhetoric within its broader context ( Rhetoric 1358a 1-35 ), the interpretation of this paragraph change. This is particularly clear if we pay attention to the final sentences in this paragraph: “also here we have to distinguish in enthymemes the species and the topoi from which one has to reason. I name species the peculiar premises regarding each genus and topoi the ones that are common to all genera” ( Rhetoric 1358a 29-32 ; in this case we deviate from the translation by Kennedy 1991 ). Consequently, in our view, the constituents of argumentation that De Pater calls ἴδια are actually context-bound premises, which are peculiar to the different genera of the subject-matters but do not have the same nature as topoi. De Pater himself admits that in some texts Aristotle makes a clear distinction between ἴδια and τόποι (De Pater 1965 : 117).

Following the plan of the treatise presented in the first book, we would expect that the second and the third book be entirely devoted to topoi mostly regarding accidents in the strict sense of “predicates that may inhere or not inhere to a thing” (see Sect.  1.2.4 ). However, if one closely examines the contents of these books, it is clear that this is not the case. This is an incongruity within Aristotle’s text, which does not respond to his own plan for the treatise; as such, it has always posed problems of interpretation. For example, in order to justify the identification of the content of books 2 and 3 with problems of accident, noted commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias argues that the topoi considered in these two books concern accidents in the broad sense of “predicates” in general. This broad interpretation of accident as generic predicate , which contradicts what we have seen in Sect.  1.2.4 , seems to be confirmed by Aristotle at the beginning of the sixth book: “The question whether the defining is not also true of the defined must be examined on the basis of the topoi related to accident. For there (in the second and in the third book) also the question always asked is, ‘is it true or not?’. For, when we are arguing that the accident belongs, we assert that it is true; when we are arguing that it does not belong, we assert that it is untrue” (139a 36 -139b 3 , translation re-elaborated by the authors on the basis of Forster 1960 : 561–562). In sum, it is clear that the concept of accident in Aristotle’s Topica is attributed two different meanings: a broad meaning (equivalent to “predicate”) and a more restricted meaning of accident as a predicable, i.e. “a predicate that may inhere or not inhere” to a thing in a given situation (see the comments in NETA ( 1559 : 107–108), which refers to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ interpretation).

We say “partially” because this double-entry matrix model does not hold for the whole Topica . As mentioned above, book 2 largely deals with ‘topoi from’ as such; book 3 does not deal with predicables but with practical argumentation, whilst books 1 and 8 concern the general view of topoi. And even books 4, 5, and 6 do not completely fit this model. However, this interpretation at least contributes to solving the obscurity of the Topica generated by Aristotle’s polysemous interpretation of the concept of topos and to explaining books 4, 5, 6, and part of book 7. To our knowledge, previous accounts of Aristotle’s topoi, while acknowledging the multifaceted concepts of topos and at least some of its meanings (the accounts vary as to what meanings they consider), do not include this concept of a double-entry matrix to account for the intertwining between “topoi from” and “topoi around”.

Given the importance of Aristotle’s work for the development of the study of inference in argumentation, we make the choice to report and comment upon relatively lengthy parts of his work, as we feel that Aristotle’s pointed observations will be of use for contemporary argumentation theorists interested in inference and argument schemes. We do appreciate that at least some of our readers will be familiar with these contents, either because they read them directly, or because they are familiar with secondary literature on Aristotle’s approach to topoi (see for example Rubinelli 2009 ). However, we also feel that the relative obscurity of Aristotle’s Topica often makes it difficult to approach for scholars outside the classical domain and to understand its implications for contemporary argumentation studies. In this sense, our aim has been a cultural translation, so to say, of Aristotle’s remarks on inference, intending to show how much these are relevant to contemporary studies. If not indicated otherwise, the translation into English (which often includes some rephrasing of Aristotle’s original formulations) is ours, although, as mentioned, has always compared with authoritative translations such as, primarily, Foster ( 1960 ).

We translate Aristotle’s term προκείμενοv, which means “what is in front of the arguer” (or “what is stated”), with “state of affairs”.

A temporal dimension might be relevant to a correct application of this topos. For example, it is not true that what is nourished necessarily grows, because animals are always being nourished, but they are not always growing; in other words, the implication between nourishment and growing might be disputed on the basis of time-related considerations.

These four classes of opposites will remain as an acquisition in the following tradition of topics (see, for example, our consideration of Peter of Spain in Chap. 3 (Sect.  3.4.3 )). In contemporary argumentation, the fact that some argument schemes are based on opposition is often recognized; however, we devote some space to Aristotle’s distinction of these four classes because, in our view, this kind of precise semantic considerations would be of use for understanding different kinds of opposition in contemporary studies on inference in argumentation.

A further example is suggested in NETA ( 1559 : 50): the quality of a product entails the expertise of the craftsman, but a product of bad quality does not entail that the craftsman was unskilled (there might be alternative causes for bad quality).

In this example, friends and enemies are considered opposite and separate groups; and doing good to friends and doing good to enemies are incompatible actions. This principle is part of Aristotle’s cultural background, while it would be extraneous, for example, to the Christian authors that participate in the tradition of topics in the following centuries.

The topoi from inflective forms work in a similar fashion as the rules governing ontology-preserving syntactic transformations in S. K. Šaumjan’s model (see Šaumjan 1965 ).

Aristotle’s term γένεσις is often translated as “generation”. We nevertheless think that the term “setting up” is more appropriate because Aristotle refers to human actions and not to spontaneous phenomena. In general, the Greek γένεσις covers the process of coming into being or being set up. In Aristotle’s Greek, γένεσις is opposed to φθορά, often translated as “corruption”. The verb φθείρω means ruining, devastating, destructing, or annihilating; “termination” is a general term under which these notions could be comprised. The term corruption , which has acquired a strong moral connotation, is inadequate to render the Greek term φθορά.

In relation to white as a color, contemporary technologies contradict this topos. In fact, the products that are used to bleach fabrics and other substances may not be themselves white. However, considering domains other than chemical substances, this topos might still be acceptable in some cases.

The synonymy of στοιχεῖον and topos is also stated in Rhetoric 1396b 20-21 . Sometimes, also in the Topica , στοιχεῖον replaces topos (see for example, 142b 14 ). Slomkowski ( 1997 : 49) has already observed that στοιχεῖον and topos are used synonymically. Because element also translates as principle (ἀρχή), Slomkowski concludes that this makes us think that topos might be some type of principle (see our discussion in Sect.  1.3.1 on the interpretation of topos).

The verb ἐμπίπτω is used by Aristotle to indicate an element that belongs to a collection (e.g. a notion that belongs to a category, an individual who belongs to a species, or a species that belongs to a genus).

At the beginning of Chap. 22 of the second book of the Rhetoric , Aristotle concisely characterizes enthymemes in relation to syllogisms ( Rhetoric 1357a 7-33 ). Differently from the dialectical syllogism, rhetorical inference does not make all its premises explicit, because those premises that are already known to the audience do not need to be repeated. In this part of the Rhetoric , Aristotle also notes that enthymematic (i.e. partially implicit) reasoning should be preferred when dealing with contingent and individual matters instead of necessary and universal truths.

The examples provided in the Topica have an explanatory or didactic function. In the Rhetoric , the examples that illustrate the list of topoi often report fragments of culturally important debates.

Similar to the topoi in the Topica , the topoi in the Rhetoric are presented in different forms and include different concepts. Studying the topoi in the Rhetoric specifically, Braet ( 2005 ) identified four components: the name of the topos, an instruction/advice establishing the condition under which the topos is applied, an inferential rule (often expressed in an “if…then” form), and an example. Such components are not all together always present: from case to case one or more of the components may be missing (Braet 2005 : 69–70).

In Aristotle’s context, taxes were sub-contracted by public authorities to private citizens, who worked as tax-farmers. Needless to say, tax-farmers were not very much loved by their fellow citizens. In this example, a tax-farmer argues that, if it is not a shame for a community of citizens to “sell” their taxes to somebody who will collect them, then it is not a shame for tax-famers to “buy” them.

In ancient Greek, verbal adjectives ending in τóς, differently from those ending in τέος, express a weak prescription, like “x might be chosen or avoided”.

We have discussed about this distinction during the Amsterdam-Lugano colloquium on argumentation held in Lugano in January 2015. We are grateful to Frans van Eemeren for useful remarks on this point. See also Greco ( 2015 ) for further discussion on this point, as applied to the use of argumentation by analogy in practical argumentation.

Our aim in selecting these topoi is to give the reader a taste of Aristotle’s fine-grained and acute analysis of practical argumentation; for reasons of space, we only chose some of the topoi, leaving many others aside.

Accident as a predicable has been defined in the first book (102b 6 ), as it is repeated here (120b 34-35 ), as “something which can and also can not belong to something” (translation adapted from Forster 1960 ).

Contemporary argumentation scholars have proposed the term “functional genus” to refer to genera that are not part of the definition of a concept; for example, genera used in argumentation from analogy (see for example Macagno 2014 ).

More specifically, for Aristotle, there are three kinds of relational terms. The first encompasses relational terms like disposition , habit, and proportion , which cannot exist without their relata , i.e. the things in relation to which they are said. The second kind encompasses those relational terms that may exist even without their correlates. For example, as we might argue, an object of knowledge might exist even if it is not known (at least some philosophical orientations would accept this). The third kind is represented by those relational terms that cannot exist in relation to the thing of which they are said. This is the case of contraries, which cannot exist in one and the same possible world (125a 33 -125b 14 ).

Using the Argumentum Model of Topics, for example, Schär ( 2017 ) discusses an example of argument based on property used in ordinary conversations involving young children.

Temporary properties, thus, might be seen as overlapping with accidents; but there is an important difference, because temporary properties are still properties, i.e. they univocally identify the individual whom they inhere. For example, one could say that “Keith is the tallest member of his family” identifies Keith today and is, thus, a temporary property. However, it might not identify Keith in ten years’ time, when his young toddler will grow up and potentially become taller than him. Accidents inhere to individuals, but do not univocally identify them.

As the criteria considered tend to count as necessary, but not sufficient conditions, their constructive use is always accompanied by explicit restrictions of their use, introduced by κατὰ τοῦτο (“in this respect”).

Aristotle uses the term λόγος to refer to both property and definition. However, given the philosophical difference between essential definitions and properties, we propose translating λόγος with description in the case of property and with definiens in the case of definition.

This topos is also discussed in Sect.  1.4.7 .

We translate λόγος with definiens . See footnote 57 for the justification of this translation.

Aristotle’s use of the term accident is polysemous, as we discussed in footnote 31.

Rodolphus Agricola (see Chap.  4 in this volume) reconsiders the notion of priority and its division into “priority per se” and “priority versus us” when he speaks about the arrangement of arguments.

However, in the case of relative opposites (for example, father-son), recurring to relative opposites in their definition becomes unavoidable because their being coincides with the relation in which they stand to the other relative opposite (142a 28-29 ).

The adjective κύριος, from κῦρος (power, competence) is used in the grammatical tradition to indicate a literal (i.e. non metaphorical) use of words.

See Rhetoric 1405 a and 1410 b . We are grateful to one of our anonymous reviewers for suggesting these paragraphs in the Rhetoric , wherein Aristotle offers a more positive account of metaphors, based on their cognitive dimension and potential for learning.

Aristotle also warns the reader not to confuse essential and accidental aspects. Thus, medicine cannot be defined as “concerned with the production of disease and health”, even though sometimes it happens that it produces also disease, because this aspect is accidental (143a 1-11 , translation by Forster 1960 : 587).

No example is given at this point, but many might be drawn from other passages in the Aristotelian text, like “producing disease is not a definition of medicine”.

On the connection between certain topoi—loci and frame semantics, see Rocci ( 2017 : 54).

These topoi do not concern the predicables; they are topoi “around identity”.

In fact, in the tradition, predicables have been only considered in their argumentative function and not as sources of problems. In Boethius’s Latin translation of the Topica, περὶ τοὺς ὅρους is rendered by “quod est circa diffinitiones ” and ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τόπων is rendered by “ex his qui sunt ad accidens locis”.

This topos is correctly classified as destructive topos from contraries about property.

Moreover, the first move is vague at the level of denotation: Aristotle speaks of contraries and properties only in abstracto . For this reason, the example provided in the following of the paragraph, which we will discuss below, is very important to grasp what Aristotle means.

This kind of premise might recall what Peter Abelard will call assignatio loci (see Chap. 3, Sect.  3.5 ), i.e. the instantiation of a locus onto a specific factual-material domain.

A distinguishing feature of the Argumentum Model of Topics, which we will discuss starting from Chap.  6 , systematically distinguishes cultural and factual premises in the inferential configuration of arguments, showing how they interact with inferential rules depending on the locus (topos). These concepts are structurally combined, whilst in Aristotle—and other authors in the following traditions—they surface in a non-systematic fashion.

While speaking of topoi in the Rhetoric , Braet ( 2005 : 70) makes a comment about ‘topoi from’ (that he calls schema ) and inferential rules (that he calls advice ), which is very useful also for understanding the Topica : “…the schema that the advice and the principle imply one another. This means that Aristotle can make do with only one of the two components, since one can be derived from the other”. This might explain why these components are not always all present in the analysis of each topos and the inferential rule (or advice) is often prevailing.

As anticipated in the Preface to this volume, the core of this idea is at the basis of our theoretical proposal given in the Argumentum Model of Topics (see Chap.  6 for a discussion).

A similarly central role of a questioner is present in some modern approaches to argumentation, such as Toulmin’s ( 1958 ); although the general epistemological framework is certainly different.

We report this scenario as it is because it helps explain some of the topoi that Aristotle presents (see, for example, the rhetorical topoi in Sect.  1.4.1 ). We are indebted to Michael Baumtrog for observing that this is not necessarily the only scenario that contemporay argumentation theorists have in mind (see for example the discussion in Cohen 2015 ). This is also not how we see argumentation. On the contrary, elsewhere, one of us has explicitly argued for the hypothesis that argumentative discussion might be a means for solving disagreement and avoiding conflict (see in particular Greco Morasso 2011 ; Greco 2018 ).

In this paragraph, we deliberately use the modern term standpoint to indicate the statement that the arguer wants to prove. Of course, standpoint is a pragma-dialectical term and not an Aristotelian term; but, as we have discussed in Sect.  1.2.7 , we believe that the concept underlying Aristotle’s position is compatible with this contemporary notion. Also, consider that we use the word “premises” as part of the arguments that will eventually support an arguer’s standpoint. In the eight book of the Topica , Aristotle’s perspective is clearly interactional and dialectical.

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Rigotti, E., Greco, S. (2019). Aristotle’s Research on Topics: The Foundation of the Study of Inference in Argumentation. In: Inference in Argumentation. Argumentation Library, vol 34. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04568-5_1

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123 Aristotle Essay Topics

🏆 best essay topics on aristotle, ✍️ aristotle essay topics for college, 👍 good aristotle research topics & essay examples, 🎓 most interesting aristotle research titles, 💡 simple aristotle essay ideas.

• Plato and Aristotle Views on the Concept of Knowledge
• Aristotle and Virtue Ethics
• Plato and Aristotle Differences
• The Difference Between Socrates’s and Aristotle’s Prescriptions of Way of Life
• Aristotle Theory About Euthanasia – Ethics
• Plato’s and Aristotle’s Approaches to Metaphysics Comparison
• The Difference Between Plato and Aristotle’s Views
• Aristotle’s View on the Relationship Between Soul and Body Aristotle’s work called “De Anima” represents a study of the question of the soul and is phenomenal for the time of the thinker.
• Theories of Governance: Plato’s and Aristotle’s Theories This paper explores Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories of governance and their relevance to governance thought throughout history, as well as current gun issues.
• Philosophy: Aristotle’s View on Substance Metaphysics is the first philosophy in that it seeks to define the essence of being, whereas the other schools of philosophy and science seek to define the classes.
• Aristotle, Mills, and Kant on Ethical Dilemmas Aristotle, Mill, and Kant provide their approaches to solving ethical dilemmas. The paper compares the three theories.
• Odysseus Personality in Terms of Aristotle’s Ethics The purpose of the essay is to prove that Odysseus had crucial positive human characteristics described by Aristotle, and also, in the framework of practical philosophy.
• Plato’s and Aristotle’s Argument on Forms and Universals The article is a comparison of the theories of Plato and Aristotle concerning the explanation of the nature of forms and universal states.
• Plato’s and Aristotle’s Dualism and Theory of Forms The difference between the ways in which Plato and Aristotle approached the theory of forms offers background into how the philosophers chose their stances on different phenomena.
• Aristotle’s Teleological Understanding of Ethics as Virtue in Modern Society The described reasoning concerning Aristotle’s teleological understanding of ethics can be seen as a sensible platform for decision-making in the modern context.
• Plato’s Political Philosophy and Aristotle’s Political Science This essay will examine the reasons behind different perceptions of Plato’s and Aristotle’s works and their perspectives on government and politics.
• Plato’s and Aristotle’s Ideas of Ethics Plato and Aristotle were both two individuals who defiantly had brilliant ideas on how to make the world a good place to live.
• Citizenship and Civil Disobedience According to Aristotle and Sophocles Summarizing Aristotle’s ideas on this issue and applying them to a well-known play, “Antigone” by Sophocles, helps bring these concepts of Citizenship into clearer focus.
• Happiness in Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics” In the “Nicomachean Ethics,” Aristotle argues that there are different lives people tend to consider happiness; they include the life of political action, money-making, etc.
• Aristotle’s Views on the Concept of Friendship Friendship, in Aristotle’s understanding, refers to any kind of interpersonal relationship that is both affectionate and beneficial.
• Aristotle’s Concept of Virtue Ethics Aristotle attached particular importance to the moral ethics of the individual’s personality traits, rather than social duties and rules.
• Seneca’s Views on Anger Arguments of Aristotle Everyone gets annoyed at one time or the other. However, there are some people who are always angry. Both Aristotle and Seneca show that fury leads to varying reactions among different people.
• Confucius, Aristotle, and Plato: The Issue of Harmony Confucius states that harmony is an equilibrium. Aristotle describes harmony as a connection between different and even opposite people. For Plato, harmony is within a soul.
• Socrates in Aristotle’s and Plato’s Works This paper discusses the depiction of Socrates in Aristophanes Clouds, Plato’s dialogues, and how Aristophanes Cloud’s depiction differs from Plato’s dialogues.
• Aristotle’s Biography: Philosopher’s Teaching and Outlook The path Aristotle followed as a philosopher was by large predetermined by his family background and circumstances of early years.
• Aristotle’s Ethical Theory and Its Influences The essay describes the importance of Aristotle’s ethical theory to modern ethics and analyzes the key points of his most iconic writings.
• Comparing Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle Aristotle is a disciple of Plato. Aristotle believed that Plato’s theory of ideas was entirely insufficient to explain empirical reality
• Ethics and Morality as Philosophical Concepts: Definitions According to Aristotle, Dante, and Kant The work is aimed to tell about enlightenment according to Kant, Aristotle’s theory of ethics, moral philosophy and the arrangement of Dante’s hell and definition of justice.
• Aristotle’s Involvement in Social Issues Aristotle’s philosophy united several approaches and regarded a human being as a multidimensional creature, which accounts for his entirely new look at society.
• Aristotle’s Perspective on the Greek Tragedy Due to Aristotle’s concept of tragedy, modern audiences can examine a play and form a deep relationship with the protagonist.
• Plato’s, Aristotle’s, and Machiavelli’s Perspectives on the Ideal Form of Government Since Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli each single out a particular characteristic of human nature, their idea of a perfect political regime is tethered to it.
• How Kreon Is the Tragic Hero, Based on Aristotle’s Principles Kreon is the tragic hero based on Aristotle’s principles because he meets all the four characteristics that go with that title.
• Ideas of Plato and Aristotle as a Basis for Medieval and Early Modern Period Concept of Soul Depending on the solution to this problem, the emphasis is shifted either to the biological nature of a person or to their spiritual essence.
• Plato and Aristotle’s Philosophy on Common Interest While Aristotle strongly rejects Plato’s claim that there is no value in collective unity, this essay illustrates that both philosophers have a common view.
• Appropriation of Aristotle’s Ideas in Christian Philosophy It should be mentioned that the Christian faith first spread among the Greek elites who were educated in the thought of Aristotle, Plato, or Socrates.
• Plato’s and Aristotle’s Views on Philosophy It is worth noting that the two great philosophers Plato and Aristotle had polar views on the essence, and the philosophy in general.
• Aristotle’s and Machiavelli’s Views on the Virtue This paper aims at discussing the essence of virtue, its goals, and contradictions in terms of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Machiavelli’s Prince.
• Aristotle’s Views on Ethics Ethics for people’s lives viewed in Aristotle’s argument stating that all humans share a certain function in life. This paper will present an objection to Aristotle’s function argument.
• Plato’s vs. Aristotle’s Political Approaches Aristotle’s political approach is different from Plato’s approach in the sense that Plato’s approach is not applicable in the ideal society.
• The Happiness Concept in Aristotle’s Ethics The concept of Happiness presented by the Greek philosopher Aristotle lies beyond the traditional notion of Happiness that has developed in the collective consciousness.
• Plato’s, Aristotle’s, and Socrates’ Philosophical Ideas Despite the lack of similarity, the teachings of different philosophies are identified more easily, and their nature, as well as the similar concepts that appear in philosophy.
• Video Advertisement: The Efficiency of the Aristotle’s Rhetoric This essay examines the effectiveness of using Ethos, Pathos, and Logos as the persuasive tools in the “Jason Momoa Super Bowl Commercial 2020. Rocket Mortgage” advertisement.
• Aristotle and Plato Works Comparison Along with Socrates and Plato, Aristotle is believed to be one of the most ancient Greek philosophers. Being arguably the most educated man of those times, Aristotle had a wide range of interests.
• Aristotle and Augustine on Doing Wrong Aristotle, the Ancient Greek philosopher who lived in the 4th century BC and was a student of Plato, had a huge intellectual range and was involved in many different branches of science.
• Equality in “The Politics” by Aristotle One of the outstanding works that discuss the origins of political life and organization of society is “The Politics” by Aristotle.
• “The Nicomachean Ethics” Book by Aristotle The work “The Nicomachean Ethics” by Aristotle is a major guiding force in academic and political ethics, which is a fundamental factor for human existence.
• St. Thomas’s Natural Law Teaching and Aristotle’s Teaching in Ethics Jean-Jacques Rousseau criticized all prior natural law theories by stating that it was impossible to understand the laws of nature without understanding real nature.
• Discussion of Aristotle Rhetoric The reading discusses the idea of rhetoric as a means of persuasion because Aristotle argues effective persuasion depends on the successful use of ethos, logos, and pathos.
• Han Fei and Aristotle: Interpret of the Passage by Confucius The primary aim of the current work is to interpret the passage by Confucius and analyze it from the philosophical perspectives of Han Fei and Aristotle.
• Explaining Aristotle’s Understanding of Virtue For Aristotle and his followers, virtue is not a simple term connected to positive levels of morality in a human being.
• Virtue: Views of Aristotle and Machiavelli The paper discusses Aristotle and Machiavelli had divergent perspectives on the concept of virtue, as it is a balanced approach to life in both civic and moral aspects.
• Aristotle and His Vision of the Virtues of Man This work provides a brief description of Aristotle’s ideas about the virtues of character, virtues, and moral behavior of a person.
• Analysis of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics In this article, Aristotle’s concept of Nicomachean ethics is based on the philosophical view that happiness is the only justifiable ultimate end that people pursue.
• Connections Between Aristotle’s Views of the Universe and Aquinas’s Aristotle inspired many philosophers and thinkers with his ideas of how the universe functions. One of the people who built on the ideas of Aristotle was Aquinas.
• Cicero’s and Aristotle’s Friendship Notions In contrast to Aristotle, Cicero believes that there are some qualities that make a good friend and a bad friend.
• Aristotle’s Ideas of Persuasion in Advertising The analysis of modern advertising campaigns from the point of view that decision-making is not based on logical thinking, but on emotional motivation, as Aristotle proved.
• Plato, Aristotle and Preferable Response to Literature The main task of the present paper is to analyze Aristotle and Plato’s points of view concerning art and to choose the one that is the most appropriate to reading literature.
• Aristotle’s Discussion in Nichomanchean Ethics Aristotle’s discussion in Nichomanchean Ethics provides a perfect definition of an ethical society and the meaning of such ethics.
• Kant’s and Aristotle’s Ethical Philosophy Kant claims that a person who helps others, with pleasure, from motives of natural sympathy displays no moral worth. It is helpful to take a look at Aristotle.
• Philosophy. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics This paper will discuss and analyze the importance of friendship, virtue, and endurance and the way Aristotle presents these concepts.
• Virtue Perception by Aristotle and Today’s Society By analyzing Aristotle’s view of virtue, as well as its relevance in today’s society, one may comprehend its critical aspects and crucial impact on humanity.
• Aristotle and Aquinas on Happiness In his most renowned work, Nicomachean Ethics, the philosopher Aristotle explored the idea of a supreme good of people.
• Morality in Kant’s, Mill’s, Aristotle’s Philosophies This paper compares the positions of Kant, Mill, and Aristotle on the nature of morality and its relationship with reason or intellect, and with feelings.
• Aristotle and His Views on Political Success
• Aristotle and the Irony of Guilt
• Aristotle and Plato’s View of Slavery
• Antigone and Creon Appreciated From Aristotle’s Theory of Poetics
• Aristotle and Adam Smith on Reason and Sentiment
• Nature and Biology According to Aristotle
• Aristotle and Human Origins
• Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the Ethics of Modern Advertising
• Aristotle and Plato’s Views on Knowledge
• Aristotle & Alchohol Abuse
• Aristotle’s Most Ideal Social and Political Good
• Aristotle and Charles Darwin: Two of the Great Biologist of All Time
• Human Reproduction and the Views of Aristotle
• Aristotle and Plato’s Views on Reality
• Plato and Aristotle’s Impact on Rhetoric
• Aristotle and the Development of Value Theory
• Aristotle and Citizenship Intellectual Virtue
• Friendship and Marriage According to Barbara Whitehead and Aristotle
• Happiness and the Good in Humanity in Nichomachean Ethics, a Book by Aristotle
• Aristotle’s Distinction Between Tragedy and Epic Poetry
• Goodness, Happiness, and Virtues in Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle
• Aristotle and Buddhism: Comparing Philosophies
• Aristotle and the Canadian Political System
• Ethics and Religion According to Augustine and Aristotle
• Aristotle’s Definition and Description of Human Function
• Ethics and Psychology Theories of Aristotle
• Aristotle and His View of Women
• Plato and Aristotle’s Life-Blood Philosophy of Dialect Discussion
• Aristotle and the Philosophy of Happiness
• Oedipus and Othello Exemplify Aristotle’s Definition of a Tragic Hero
• Aristotle’s Life and Contributions to Western Civilization
• Aristotle: Substance, Demonstrative Knowledge, Luck, and Chance
• Alfarabi and Aristotle: The Four Causes and the Four Stages of the Doctrine of the Intelligence
• Philosophy: Aristotle and Medical Knowledge
• Aristotle’s Ethical Theory and How It Conflicts
• John Stuart Mill and Aristotle‘s Opposing Argumentative Theories
• Man’s Final Good and Methods of Determination in Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle
• Aristotle and the Four Causes of the End Purpose of an Object or Action
• Aristotle’s Three Motivations for Friendship
• Aristotle and Juvenile Delinquency
• Comparing and Contrasting the Philosophers Aristotle and Plato
• Aristotle and His Basic Philosophies
• Ethics and Morals According to Kant and Aristotle
• Aristotle and the Correspondence Theory of Truth
• Aquinas vs. Aristotle: Justice as Virtue
• Aristotle and the Appeal to Reason
• Aristotle and His Idea of the Ideal Constitution
• Aristotle and Open Population Thinking
• Human Nature and the Views of Augustine and Aristotle
• Ethics and Morality According to Aristotle in the Legal Defense of a Guilty Man
• Aristotle and His Followers of the Aristotelian Tradition
• Similarities Between Aristotle and Aquinas
• Aristotle and Freud and the Theory of Tragedy
• Happiness and Morality According to Aristotle
• Aristotle’s Poetics: Catharsis and Rasas
• Aristotle and Epicurus Debate on Pleasure and Politics
• Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli on Democratic Rule
• Ancient Political Thought: Aristotle and Plato
• Aristotle and His Ethical Beliefs
• Abortion and the Philosophies of David Hume and Aristotle

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Results of 2020 PhilPapers Survey posted 2021-11-01 by David Bourget We've now released the results of the 2020 PhilPapers Survey, which surveyed 1785 professional philosophers on their views on 100 philosophical issues.  Results are available on the 2020 PhilPapers Survey  website and in draft article form in " Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey " . Discussion is welcome in the PhilPapers Survey 2020 discussion group .

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100+ Philosophy Research Paper Topics

One of the most difficult tasks philosophy students faces each year is in having to come up with a philosophy topic to write a paper on. Students can get notifications of big projects months ahead of time and then spend weeks trying to figure out whether their philosophy essay topics are good enough to earn a good grade.

We get it. It’s hard to pull this task together with schedules and responsibilities. This is why we work to find philosophical topics that are current and relatable. We stick to important issues that are at the forefront of the discipline and bring them to you in one convenient philosophical topic for the essay list.

Finding the right philosophy topics can turn regular assignments into A+-winning assignments and we’ve done the work to help you and hundreds of other students get started with these philosophy paper topics. Here are our top 100 philosophy topics for the current school year:

Argumentative Philosophy Research Paper Topics

• Do people naturally have good and bad qualities?
• Do we need family support to find happiness?
• How humans can be happy without reproduction?
• What is the definitive explanation of happiness?
• Do most people feel they aren’t living their full lives?
• Would you marry for money if it meant you could never be happy?
• Would you like to live your life more than once?
• Would you rather work vocationalation job or a high-paying job?
• Are personalities unique or are they just template?
• Do you think that it is moral to follow all the rules?

Good Philosophy Paper Topics for All Levels

• Does one need to lead a moral life to achieve happiness?
• Why do people find life harder than expected?
• Which is the better teacher? Experience or learning?
• Do people always do what they want at that moment?
• Is truth universal or does it change because of perspective?
• Do animals have a better sense of morals than humans?
• Can people gain an education without proper schooling?
• Does one need to be literate to understand philosophy?
• Which ie preferable? Determinism or Free Will?
• Is capital punishment ethical in today’s world?

Controversial Topics in Philosophy

• How does society shape a person’s life and beliefs?
• Do you need a lot of money to live a rich life?
• Why are some people living without actually experiencing things?
• Is spiritual power more important than free will?
• Do genetics play a bigger role in the way people behave?
• What impact does the word “love” have on positivity?
• What is the real reason we live our lives?
• Is it possible to form a perfect world?
• Do religion and philosophy contradict one another?
• Can a world exist without laws or regulations?

Fun Philosophy Paper Topics for High School

• What would be your form ideal government?
• What are the different ways in which humans understand each other?
• How is the concept of happiness defined by different philosophers?
• Is existence simply a dream experienced by a larger being?
• If you can spend a week in any period, which would it be?
• Are we alone in our galaxy or are there other intelligent life forms?
• What does it mean to have free will versus determinism?
• If you can change one thing from your past, what would it be?
• Does religion limit our abilities to explore the meaning of life?
• What does it mean to be loved or to love others?

Topics for Philosophy Paper on the Classics

• What does it mean to understand our universe?
• Does happiness come from our actions toward others?
• Are our thoughts evidence that we exist?
• What is the definition of evil as it relates to the modern world?
• Could societies exist without laws and regulations?
• Are people born good or evil or are they raised to be one or the other?
• Is torture a justifiable form of punishment?
• How can past leaders influence today’s youth positively?
• Is beauty truly in the eye of the beholder?
• Can we refocus our minds to think more positively?

Easy Philosophy Paper Topics for High School

• What does it mean to be moral in today’s world?
• Can wars be justified if it supports the greater population?
• What does it mean to be a postmodern philosopher?
• What are today’s most important life values?
• What is the current perspective on the definition of loneliness?
• How does one prepare for life after death?
• Would you like to repeat your life with full knowledge of the prior?
• Does something better than nothing always lead to benefits?
• Do people choose to suffer or is it a feeling beyond our control?
• Should people have to right to die by suicide?

Philosophy Topics to Write About Quickly

• Do we exist in some form after death?
• Do supernatural entities exist in the world?
• Are video games negatively impacting people’s moral values?
• How does one boost his or her ability to be creative?
• Is it important to spend your entire life learning?
• What does it mean to be mentally conscious?
• What is the definition of loneliness and have you experienced it?
• What are the most important character traits for leaders to have?
• Does one need a lot of money to be considered rich?
• Are we alone in the universe or is there another life?

Philosophical Topics for Essays on Current Issues

• Are parents responsible for how their children behave?
• Are the U.S. and U.K. meritocratic societies?
• Has social media had an impact on people’s morals?
• Do you agree with the notion that love only exists for 3 years?
• Are humans more likely to cause trouble because of boredom?
• Is capital punishment morally justified in modern society?
• Do humans have the same ideas about what is right and what is wrong?
• How does death affect how humans view life?
• Is it complicated to live a life of happiness?
• Should teenagers be given the responsibility to make their own choices?

Philosophy Thesis Topics for a Big Project

• Do religion and the belief in God change a person’s behavior?
• Are Machiavellian ideals still relevant in today’s government?
• Is animal experimentation ever justified to protect humans?
• What are the pros and cons of a utilitarian society?
• What are the pros and cons of a communist government?
• Why are humans the only species to be violent?
• Is economic justice more important than legal justice?
• Should women have univerabortion rightstion?
• What impact did the 20th-century wave of philosophy have on the U.S.?
• How do you know that you are different from other people?

Philosophy Research Paper Topics

• What are the tendencies we see most in humans?
• Are our morals connected to or influenced by culture?
• Would you live your life a second time?
• Should religion have a voice in a nation’s government?
• What do you think makes for an ideal society?
• Are truths relative to specific situations or circumstances?
• What is the most important aspect to gain human knowledge?
• What is something that veritably upsets you?
• What is something in your life that you would like to change?
• What is the most effective way to increase one’s IQ?

Getting a good grade on a philosophy research paper requires you to consider several different options and narrow down those options to a topic you feel you can conduct complete philosophy research on. The topic should also be something that interests you and verges into new areas in the discipline and area of study. This can be a difficult task for many students, so we create custom philosophy research topics to suit every situation. If you can’t find a topic you like from this list, just give us a call, email us, or send us a message via chat. We can direct you to a qualified philosophy expert writer to create a custom list of philosophical ideas to fit your assignment needs.

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• What motivates people to run for office?
• Quality of recent political candidates
• In elections, is there usually at least one candidate who shares your views?
• What the public sees as most important in political candidates
• Impressions of the people who will be running for president in 2024
• Views about presidential campaigns
• How much of an impact does who is president have on your life?
• Whose priorities should the president focus on?
• How different are the Republican and Democratic parties?
• Views of how well the parties represent people’s interests
• What if there were more political parties?
• Would more parties make solving problems easier or harder?
• How likely is it that an independent candidate will become president?
• Americans who feel unrepresented by the parties have highly negative views of the political system
• Views of the Electoral College
• Should the size of the U.S. House of Representatives change?
• Senate seats and population size
• Younger adults more supportive of structural changes
• Politics in a single word or phrase: An outpouring of negative sentiments
• Negative emotions prevail when Americans think about politics
• Americans say the tone of political debate in the country has worsened
• Which political topics get too much – and too little – attention?
• Majority of Americans find it stressful to talk politics with people they disagree with
• Acknowledgments

The public sees a number of specific problems with American politics. Partisan fighting, the high cost of political campaigns, and the outsize influence of special interests and lobbyists are each seen as characteristic of the U.S. political system by at least 84% of Americans.

Yet 63% also say that “ordinary Americans care about making the political system work well” is a good description of U.S. politics today. Still, when asked to describe a strength of the political system in their own words, more than half either say “nothing” (22%) or decline to give an answer (34%).

Americans view negative statements as better descriptions of the political system than positive ones

More than eight-in-ten adults say that each of the following is at least a somewhat good description of the U.S. political system today:

• Republicans and Democrats are more focused on fighting each other than on solving problems (86%);
• The cost of political campaigns makes it hard for good people to run for office (85%);
• Special interest groups and lobbyists have too much say in what happens in politics (84%).

About six-in-ten (63%) think ordinary Americans want to make the political system work well. This is the rare positive sentiment that a majority views as a good descriptor of the political system.

Fewer than half of adults hold the view that the government deserves more credit than it gets: Majorities say that “the federal government does more for ordinary Americans than people give it credit for” (59%) and “Congress accomplishes more than people give it credit for” (65%) are both bad descriptions of the political system.

Nearly seven-in-ten adults express frustration with the availability of unbiased information about politics: 68% say the statement “it is easy to find unbiased information about what is happening in politics” is not a good description of the political system.

And just 22% of Americans say that political leaders facing consequences for acting unethically is a good description of the political system. They are more than three times as likely to say that this is a bad description (76% say this).

Many critiques of the political system are bipartisan

Partisans have similar views of many of the descriptions of the political system included in the survey.

Overwhelming majorities in both parties think there is too much partisan fighting, campaigns cost too much, and lobbyists and special interests have too much say in politics. And just 24% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents and 20% of Republicans and Republican leaners say that political leaders face consequences if they act unethically.

The widest partisan gap is over a description of the federal government. Democrats are roughly twice as likely as Republicans to say “the federal government does more for ordinary Americans than people give it credit for” (54% vs. 26%).

There is a narrower gap in views of Congress’ accomplishments: 37% of Democrats and 28% of Republicans say it accomplishes more than people give it credit for.

Democrats are also more likely to say, “It is easy to find unbiased information about what is happening in politics” (36% of Democrats and 25% of Republicans say this is a good description of the political system today), while Republicans are slightly more likely than Democrats to view ordinary Americans as wanting to make the political system work well (67% of Republicans and 61% of Democrats say this is a good description).

When asked to describe in their own words the biggest problem with the political system in the U.S. today, Americans point to a wide range of factors.

Negative characteristics attributed to politicians and political leaders are a common complaint: 31% of U.S. adults say politicians are the biggest problem with the system, including 15% who point to greed or corruption and 7% who cite dishonesty or a lack of trustworthiness.

The biggest problem, according to one woman in her 50s, is that politicians are “hiding the truth and fulfilling their own agendas.” Similarly, a man in his 30s says, “They don’t work for the people. They are too corrupt and busy filling their pockets.”

Explore more voices: The political system’s biggest problems

What do you see as the biggest problem with the political system in the U.S. today?

“An almost total lack of credibility and trust. Coupled with a media that’s so biased, that they’ve lost all objectivity.” –Man, 70s

“Lying about intentions or not following through with what elected officials said they would do.” –Woman, 20s

“Blind faith in political figures.” –Woman, 50s

“Our elected officials would rather play political games than serve the needs of their constituents.” –Woman, 50s

“Same politicians in office too long.” –Woman, 30s

“Extremism on both sides exploited by the mainstream media for ratings. It is making it impossible for both parties to work together.” –Man, 30s

“It has become too polarized. No one is willing to compromise or be moderate.” –Woman, 40s

“Too much money in politics coming from large corporations and special interest.” –Man, 30s

“The people have no say in important matters, we have NO representation at all. Our lawmakers are isolated and could care less what we want.” –Man, 60s

About two-in-ten adults cite deep divisions between the parties as the biggest problem with the U.S. political system, with respondents describing a lack of cooperation between the parties or among elected leaders in Washington.

“Both of the political parties are so busy trying to stop the other party, they are wasting their opportunities to solve the problems faced by our nation,” in the view of one man in his 70s.

Even as some blame polarization, others (10% of respondents) identify the other party as the system’s biggest problem. Some Republicans say that the biggest problem is “Democrats” while some Democrats simply say “Republicans.”

Smaller but substantial shares of adults name the media and political discourse (9%), the influence of money in politics (7%), government’s perceived failures (6%), specific policy areas and issues (6%) or problems with elections and voting (4%) as the biggest problem with the political system today.

Far fewer adults name a specific strength of the political system today when asked to describe the system’s biggest strength in their own words. More than half either say that the system lacks a biggest strength (22%) or decline to answer (34%). As one woman in her 60s writes, “I’m not seeing any strengths!”

Among those who do identify strengths of the U.S. political system, the structure of political institutions and the principles that define the constitutional order are named most frequently (by 12% of respondents). Many respondents specifically point to the Constitution itself or refer to the separation of powers or the checks and balances created by the Constitution.

A man in his 20s believes that the “separation of powers and federalism work pretty well,” while one in his 30s writes that the system’s greatest strength is “the checks and balances to make sure that monumental changes aren’t made unilaterally.”

Explore more voices: The political system’s biggest strengths

What do you see as the biggest strength of the U.S. political system today?

“Everyone getting a say; democracy.” –Woman, 40s

“The right to have your opinions heard.” –Man, 60s

“In spite of our differences, we are still a democracy, and I believe there are people within our government who still care and are interested in the betterment of our country.” –Woman, 50s

“The freedom of speech and religion” –Woman, 50s

“If we have fair, honest elections we can vote out the corruption and/or incompetent politicians.” –Man, 70s

“The Constitution.” –Man, 50s

“The checks and balances to control the power of any office. The voice of the people and the options to remove an official from office.” –Man, 60s

“New, younger voices in government.” –Woman, 40s

“If we can’t get more bipartisanship we’ll become weaker. Our biggest strength is our working together.” –Woman, 60s

“The way that every two years the people get to make their voice heard.” –Man, 30s

About one-in-ten (9%) refer to individual freedoms and related democratic values, while a similar share (8%) discuss the right to vote and the existence of free elections. A woman in her 70s echoes many similar comments when she points to “the possibility of change in upcoming elections.”

However, even some of the descriptions of positive characteristics of the system are couched in respondents’ doubts about the way the system is working today. One woman in her 50s adds a qualification to what she views as the system’s biggest strength, saying, “Theoretically every voter has a say.”

Smaller shares of the public point to the positive characteristics of some politicians (4%) or the positive characteristics of the American people (4%) as reasons for optimism.

The public remains roughly evenly split over whether there are clear solutions to the biggest issues facing the country. Half of Americans today say there are clear solutions to most of the big issues facing the country, while about as many (48%) say most big issues don’t have clear solutions.

There are relatively modest demographic and political differences in perceptions of whether the solutions to the nations’ problems are clear or not.

While both men and women are relatively divided on this question, women are 6 percentage points more likely to think the big issues facing the country don’t have clear solutions.

Race and ethnicity

While 43% of Hispanic adults and about half of Black (50%) and White (48%) adults say there aren’t clear solutions for most big issues, that rises to 62% among Asian adults.

Age differences on this question are modest, but those under 30 are slightly more likely than those 30 and older to say most big issues have clear solutions.

Partisanship and political engagement

Both Republicans and Democrats are relatively split on this question, though Republicans are slightly more likely to say there are clear solutions to most big issues.

Those with higher levels of political engagement are more likely to say there are clear solutions to most big issues facing the country.

About six-in-ten adults with high levels of political engagement (61%) say there are clear solutions to big issues today, compared with half of those with medium levels of engagement and 41% of those with lower engagement.

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Chimpanzees understand that they are sometimes relying on luck when making guesses, research suggests

by Bob Yirka , Phys.org

Psychologists Benjamin Jones and Josep Call at the University of St Andrews, in the U.K., have found via behavioral experiments that chimpanzees know that they rely on luck when making guesses about certain things. Their paper is published in the journal Biology Letters .

Prior research has shown that most people rely on luck when making guesses about things they are not certain about. Until now, it has not been clear if other animals do the same. In this new effort, the researchers sought to find out by testing the closest human relative, chimpanzees, at the Edinburgh Zoo.

They designed an experiment to show whether a given chimp understood when it relied on luck to get the right answer regarding a food reward.

The experiment involved showing a test chimp two cups—one hid a delectable snack, while the other contained nothing. The subjects had to choose which one they thought contained the treat.

In some trials, the chimp was shown which cup contained the food. While in others, it was not. After making a choice , the same chimp was then offered another choice, this time between the cup that had not been chosen and a secondary, smaller dummy cup, which the chimp knew for certain contained a smaller snack.

The researchers found that most chimps were more likely to choose the smaller cup if they had not been shown which cup was hiding the food.

In the next step, the researchers changed the scenario, adding more cups, which reduced the chances of picking the right cup. As they did so, they found the chimps' choices depended on their success rate on the first run of the experiment.

If they initially chose the wrong cup, the chimp was still more likely to pick the smaller cup in the second part of the experiment. But if they chose correctly on the first go-round, they were more likely to choose the second cup over the dummy cup—a finding suggesting the chimps felt they might be on a lucky streak.

Journal information: Biology Letters

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Determining the maximal length of MDS codes with certain dimension is one of the central topics in coding theory and finite geometry. The MDS Main Conjecture states that the maximal length of a non-trivial |$q$| -ary MDS code of dimension |$k$| is |$q+1$| except when |$q$| is even and |$k=3$| or |$k=q-1$|⁠ . We prove that the maximal length of non-trivial |$q$| -ary MDS elliptic codes is close to |$\frac{q}{2}$|⁠ , which gives an affirmative answer to a conjecture of Li, Wan, and Zhang. Moreover, we apply our result to derive an answer to a question on subset sums in finite abelian groups from elliptic curves.

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Philosophy of Religion Research Paper Topics

This page provides a comprehensive list of philosophy of religion research paper topics , delving into the nuanced relationship between philosophical inquiry and religious beliefs. Students and researchers will find insights into the profound connections and debates that have shaped both religious and philosophical traditions throughout history. Additionally, with the guidance and expertise of iResearchNet, learners can embark on a detailed exploration of these themes, promoting a deeper understanding and appreciation of the myriad ways in which philosophy and religion intersect and influence each other.

100 Philosophy of Religion Research Paper Topics

In the vast panorama of human inquiry, the philosophy of religion holds a unique and seminal place. It sits at the crossroads of existential questioning and spiritual exploration, offering a deep reservoir of topics for those seeking to delve into the nature of divinity, humanity, and the universe. Choosing the right philosophy of religion research paper topics is essential, not only for academic achievements but also for personal growth, critical understanding, and fostering inter-religious dialogue in a globalized world.

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• Ancient Egyptian religious beliefs and their philosophical underpinnings.
• Greek philosophy: From polytheism to monotheism.
• The merging of Roman political ideology with Christianity.
• Medieval scholasticism and the fusion of reason with faith.
• The Enlightenment and the challenge to religious orthodoxy.
• Romanticism’s spiritual revival against materialism.
• Eastern philosophy: From Vedanta to Zen Buddhism.
• Abrahamic faiths: Philosophical interpretations of monotheism.
• Indigenous religious beliefs and their philosophical depth.
• The modern-day revival of ancient pagan philosophies.
• The monotheistic traditions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
• Dharmic paths: Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism.
• Philosophical Taoism versus religious Taoism.
• Confucianism’s moral ethics and its societal impact.
• Shamanism and animism: Connecting with the natural world.
• Zoroastrianism and its influence on Western monotheism.
• The Baha’i faith and its universalist approach.
• The indigenous spiritual traditions of Africa.
• Australian Aboriginal Dreamtime philosophy.
• The Raelian movement and other modern religious philosophies.
• Cosmology: Creation myths versus the Big Bang theory.
• Evolutionary theory and religious interpretations of human origin.
• Quantum mechanics: Where science meets mysticism.
• Neuroscience, consciousness, and the soul.
• Artificial intelligence, robotics, and theological implications.
• Environmentalism as a religious and scientific imperative.
• The moral considerations of genetic engineering.
• Medical ethics: Euthanasia, abortion, and religious perspectives.
• Extraterrestrial life: Religious implications of discovering “others”.
• The fine-tuning argument and the existence of a Creator.
• Kierkegaard’s leap of faith and existential Christianity.
• Nietzsche’s proclamation: “God is dead.”
• Camus, the Absurd, and the quest for meaning without divinity.
• Sartre’s atheistic existentialism and the essence of humanity.
• Heidegger’s “Being” and religious interpretations.
• Dostoevsky’s exploration of faith in The Brothers Karamazov .
• Kafka and the religious undertones of alienation.
• Religious overtones in Beckett’s Waiting for Godot .
• The existential search for authenticity and religious identity.
• Tillich’s concept of the “God above God.”
• The religious roots of morality: Is God necessary for ethics?
• Comparing the moral codes of world religions.
• Just war theory in Christianity and Islam.
• Buddhist ethics: The Middle Path and compassion.
• The challenge of religious extremism and its ethical ramifications.
• Religious perspectives on capital punishment.
• Vegetarianism and non-violence in Jainism and Hinduism.
• Charity, almsgiving, and social justice in religious traditions.
• The problem of evil: Theodicy across religions.
• Asceticism and its ethical implications in different religious paths.
• Revisiting Eve: Feminist readings of religious origin stories.
• Goddess worship and matriarchal traditions.
• The role of women in organized religious hierarchies.
• Mary Daly and the concept of a post-Christian feminism.
• Islamic feminism: Reinterpreting the Quran.
• Feminist critiques of Buddhist monasticism.
• Ecofeminism and the sacred feminine.
• Women mystics in the Christian tradition.
• Feminine symbolism in Kabbalistic teachings.
• Liberation theology’s focus on women’s rights.
• Theocracy versus secularism: Philosophical implications.
• Render unto Caesar: Christianity’s evolving stance on state power.
• Islamic governance: From Caliphates to modern nation-states.
• Confucianism and its influence on Chinese statecraft.
• Religion’s role in the American political landscape.
• Hindu nationalism in contemporary India.
• The Dalai Lama and Tibetan theocratic governance.
• Secularism, laïcité, and European politics.
• Liberation theology and Marxist movements in Latin America.
• The rise and impact of political Zionism.
• The nature and experience of mystical states across religions.
• Sufism: The mystical heart of Islam.
• Christian mystics: From St. John of the Cross to Meister Eckhart.
• Kabbalah: Jewish esoteric traditions and their universal messages.
• Advaita Vedanta and the non-dual reality.
• Zen Buddhism: Satori and sudden enlightenment.
• Gnostic traditions and the search for hidden knowledge.
• Native American vision quests and transcendental experiences.
• The role of psychedelics in religious and mystical experiences.
• Modern scientific interpretations of mystical experiences.
• The cross in Christianity: Interpretations and symbolism.
• The significance of the Kaaba in Islam.
• Sacred geometry and religious symbolism.
• Myths of creation and apocalypse across traditions.
• Rituals of passage: Birth, adulthood, marriage, and death.
• The ritual use of music and dance in spiritual practices.
• Sacred texts: Their role and interpretation in religious traditions.
• Pilgrimage: Seeking the divine in sacred spaces.
• Religious festivals and their philosophical meanings.
• Carl Jung’s interpretation of religious symbols.
• The Future of Religion: Postmodern and Contemporary Views
• The rise of secularism and the “nones.”
• Interfaith dialogue in a globalized world.
• Postmodern critiques of organized religion.
• Spirituality versus organized religion in the modern age.
• Neo-paganism and the revival of ancient religious practices.
• The intersection of technology and spirituality.
• Transhumanism and its challenge to traditional religious beliefs.
• New religious movements in the digital age.
• The role of meditation and mindfulness in contemporary spirituality.
• The prospects of universalist religious philosophies.

The tapestry of philosophy of religion research paper topics is both diverse and profound, offering myriad avenues for exploration. It represents an ever-evolving dialogue between human beings and the mysteries of existence, pushing us to question, reflect, and understand more deeply. We encourage scholars, students, and curious minds to immerse themselves in these topics, fostering both academic excellence and a richer understanding of the multifaceted nature of human belief.

The Range of Philosophy of Religion Research Paper Topics

Introduction

Religion has always played a pivotal role in the lives of humans, influencing cultures, politics, and personal choices. However, it is the philosophy of religion that critically assesses and shapes religious thought and practices. Like a mirror, it allows adherents and scholars to reflect upon the core tenets, beliefs, and implications of religious traditions.

Expansive Nature of Topics in Philosophy of Religion

The philosophy of religion offers a vast expanse of topics, each probing deep into the questions of existence, deity, morality, and human purpose. From the age-old debate on the existence of God and the problem of evil to the ethical implications of religious doctrines and the feminist interpretations in religious philosophies, the terrain is broad and deep. It’s not just about understanding individual religions, but about grappling with questions that transcend individual beliefs: How does religion intersect with science or politics? What is the nature of the divine? How do symbols, myths, and rituals anchor the human understanding of the cosmos?

Evolution of Religious Philosophies Through Time

Historically, religious philosophies have evolved in tandem with the socio-cultural and scientific developments of their times. Ancient Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle laid the groundwork for many discussions about the divine, ethics, and the nature of the good life. Their dialogues and debates shaped much of early Christian philosophy and continue to be pivotal in theological seminaries and philosophy departments.

Centuries later, during the medieval period, scholars like Thomas Aquinas and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) would further refine and challenge classical views, synthesizing them with the revelations of the Abrahamic faiths. The Renaissance and Enlightenment periods ushered in a new wave of skepticism and humanism, leading to modern and postmodern critiques and defenses of religious beliefs.

Each era has brought with it fresh perspectives, challenges, and revisions to religious philosophies, demonstrating the dynamic nature of this field.

How Global Religious Systems Have Been Shaped by Philosophical Ideas

The global religious landscape has been immensely influenced by philosophical postulations. Take, for instance, the Buddhist doctrine of anatta or non-self, a profound philosophical stance that challenges the very notion of persistent identity. This idea shapes not just individual meditation practices but also how societies understand the self and its relationship to the world.

Similarly, the Islamic concept of Tawhid, the oneness of God, is not just a theological assertion but a philosophical stance on the nature of reality, affecting everything from art (like the avoidance of depicting living beings in many Islamic art forms) to ethics and law.

In the West, Christian notions of love, redemption, and Trinity have been the subject of philosophical scrutiny and interpretation, influencing everything from art and literature to politics and social structures.

Even secularism, often seen in opposition to religious belief, has its roots in philosophical discussions about the nature of belief, the state, and individual rights.

Importance of Philosophy of Religion Research Paper Topics

Diving into philosophy of religion research paper topics is more than just an academic exercise; it’s a journey into the deepest questions of human existence. For students and scholars, these topics offer a chance to engage with these questions in a structured, critical manner.

Such research fosters critical thinking, a deeper appreciation for the diversity and richness of global religious traditions, and an understanding of the profound ways in which religious beliefs shape, and are shaped by, the broader cultural and philosophical milieu. Furthermore, by engaging deeply with these topics, students can also explore their beliefs, confront doubts, and refine their understanding of their religious traditions or the traditions of others.

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The state of AI in 2023: Generative AI’s breakout year

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The latest annual McKinsey Global Survey  on the current state of AI confirms the explosive growth of generative AI (gen AI) tools . Less than a year after many of these tools debuted, one-third of our survey respondents say their organizations are using gen AI regularly in at least one business function. Amid recent advances, AI has risen from a topic relegated to tech employees to a focus of company leaders: nearly one-quarter of surveyed C-suite executives say they are personally using gen AI tools for work, and more than one-quarter of respondents from companies using AI say gen AI is already on their boards’ agendas. What’s more, 40 percent of respondents say their organizations will increase their investment in AI overall because of advances in gen AI. The findings show that these are still early days for managing gen AI–related risks, with less than half of respondents saying their organizations are mitigating even the risk they consider most relevant: inaccuracy.

The organizations that have already embedded AI capabilities have been the first to explore gen AI’s potential, and those seeing the most value from more traditional AI capabilities—a group we call AI high performers—are already outpacing others in their adoption of gen AI tools. 1 We define AI high performers as organizations that, according to respondents, attribute at least 20 percent of their EBIT to AI adoption.

The expected business disruption from gen AI is significant, and respondents predict meaningful changes to their workforces. They anticipate workforce cuts in certain areas and large reskilling efforts to address shifting talent needs. Yet while the use of gen AI might spur the adoption of other AI tools, we see few meaningful increases in organizations’ adoption of these technologies. The percent of organizations adopting any AI tools has held steady since 2022, and adoption remains concentrated within a small number of business functions.

Table of Contents

• It’s early days still, but use of gen AI is already widespread
• Leading companies are already ahead with gen AI
• AI-related talent needs shift, and AI’s workforce effects are expected to be substantial
• With all eyes on gen AI, AI adoption and impact remain steady

About the research

1. it’s early days still, but use of gen ai is already widespread.

The findings from the survey—which was in the field in mid-April 2023—show that, despite gen AI’s nascent public availability, experimentation with the tools  is already relatively common, and respondents expect the new capabilities to transform their industries. Gen AI has captured interest across the business population: individuals across regions, industries, and seniority levels are using gen AI for work and outside of work. Seventy-nine percent of all respondents say they’ve had at least some exposure to gen AI, either for work or outside of work, and 22 percent say they are regularly using it in their own work. While reported use is quite similar across seniority levels, it is highest among respondents working in the technology sector and those in North America.

Organizations, too, are now commonly using gen AI. One-third of all respondents say their organizations are already regularly using generative AI in at least one function—meaning that 60 percent of organizations with reported AI adoption are using gen AI. What’s more, 40 percent of those reporting AI adoption at their organizations say their companies expect to invest more in AI overall thanks to generative AI, and 28 percent say generative AI use is already on their board’s agenda. The most commonly reported business functions using these newer tools are the same as those in which AI use is most common overall: marketing and sales, product and service development, and service operations, such as customer care and back-office support. This suggests that organizations are pursuing these new tools where the most value is. In our previous research , these three areas, along with software engineering, showed the potential to deliver about 75 percent of the total annual value from generative AI use cases.

In these early days, expectations for gen AI’s impact are high : three-quarters of all respondents expect gen AI to cause significant or disruptive change in the nature of their industry’s competition in the next three years. Survey respondents working in the technology and financial-services industries are the most likely to expect disruptive change from gen AI. Our previous research shows  that, while all industries are indeed likely to see some degree of disruption, the level of impact is likely to vary. 2 “ The economic potential of generative AI: The next productivity frontier ,” McKinsey, June 14, 2023. Industries relying most heavily on knowledge work are likely to see more disruption—and potentially reap more value. While our estimates suggest that tech companies, unsurprisingly, are poised to see the highest impact from gen AI—adding value equivalent to as much as 9 percent of global industry revenue—knowledge-based industries such as banking (up to 5 percent), pharmaceuticals and medical products (also up to 5 percent), and education (up to 4 percent) could experience significant effects as well. By contrast, manufacturing-based industries, such as aerospace, automotives, and advanced electronics, could experience less disruptive effects. This stands in contrast to the impact of previous technology waves that affected manufacturing the most and is due to gen AI’s strengths in language-based activities, as opposed to those requiring physical labor.

Responses show many organizations not yet addressing potential risks from gen AI

According to the survey, few companies seem fully prepared for the widespread use of gen AI—or the business risks these tools may bring. Just 21 percent of respondents reporting AI adoption say their organizations have established policies governing employees’ use of gen AI technologies in their work. And when we asked specifically about the risks of adopting gen AI, few respondents say their companies are mitigating the most commonly cited risk with gen AI: inaccuracy. Respondents cite inaccuracy more frequently than both cybersecurity and regulatory compliance, which were the most common risks from AI overall in previous surveys. Just 32 percent say they’re mitigating inaccuracy, a smaller percentage than the 38 percent who say they mitigate cybersecurity risks. Interestingly, this figure is significantly lower than the percentage of respondents who reported mitigating AI-related cybersecurity last year (51 percent). Overall, much as we’ve seen in previous years, most respondents say their organizations are not addressing AI-related risks.

2. Leading companies are already ahead with gen AI

The survey results show that AI high performers—that is, organizations where respondents say at least 20 percent of EBIT in 2022 was attributable to AI use—are going all in on artificial intelligence, both with gen AI and more traditional AI capabilities. These organizations that achieve significant value from AI are already using gen AI in more business functions than other organizations do, especially in product and service development and risk and supply chain management. When looking at all AI capabilities—including more traditional machine learning capabilities, robotic process automation, and chatbots—AI high performers also are much more likely than others to use AI in product and service development, for uses such as product-development-cycle optimization, adding new features to existing products, and creating new AI-based products. These organizations also are using AI more often than other organizations in risk modeling and for uses within HR such as performance management and organization design and workforce deployment optimization.

AI high performers are much more likely than others to use AI in product and service development.

Another difference from their peers: high performers’ gen AI efforts are less oriented toward cost reduction, which is a top priority at other organizations. Respondents from AI high performers are twice as likely as others to say their organizations’ top objective for gen AI is to create entirely new businesses or sources of revenue—and they’re most likely to cite the increase in the value of existing offerings through new AI-based features.

As we’ve seen in previous years , these high-performing organizations invest much more than others in AI: respondents from AI high performers are more than five times more likely than others to say they spend more than 20 percent of their digital budgets on AI. They also use AI capabilities more broadly throughout the organization. Respondents from high performers are much more likely than others to say that their organizations have adopted AI in four or more business functions and that they have embedded a higher number of AI capabilities. For example, respondents from high performers more often report embedding knowledge graphs in at least one product or business function process, in addition to gen AI and related natural-language capabilities.

While AI high performers are not immune to the challenges of capturing value from AI, the results suggest that the difficulties they face reflect their relative AI maturity, while others struggle with the more foundational, strategic elements of AI adoption. Respondents at AI high performers most often point to models and tools, such as monitoring model performance in production and retraining models as needed over time, as their top challenge. By comparison, other respondents cite strategy issues, such as setting a clearly defined AI vision that is linked with business value or finding sufficient resources.

The findings offer further evidence that even high performers haven’t mastered best practices regarding AI adoption, such as machine-learning-operations (MLOps) approaches, though they are much more likely than others to do so. For example, just 35 percent of respondents at AI high performers report that where possible, their organizations assemble existing components, rather than reinvent them, but that’s a much larger share than the 19 percent of respondents from other organizations who report that practice.

Many specialized MLOps technologies and practices  may be needed to adopt some of the more transformative uses cases that gen AI applications can deliver—and do so as safely as possible. Live-model operations is one such area, where monitoring systems and setting up instant alerts to enable rapid issue resolution can keep gen AI systems in check. High performers stand out in this respect but have room to grow: one-quarter of respondents from these organizations say their entire system is monitored and equipped with instant alerts, compared with just 12 percent of other respondents.

3. AI-related talent needs shift, and AI’s workforce effects are expected to be substantial

Our latest survey results show changes in the roles that organizations are filling to support their AI ambitions. In the past year, organizations using AI most often hired data engineers, machine learning engineers, and Al data scientists—all roles that respondents commonly reported hiring in the previous survey. But a much smaller share of respondents report hiring AI-related-software engineers—the most-hired role last year—than in the previous survey (28 percent in the latest survey, down from 39 percent). Roles in prompt engineering have recently emerged, as the need for that skill set rises alongside gen AI adoption, with 7 percent of respondents whose organizations have adopted AI reporting those hires in the past year.

The findings suggest that hiring for AI-related roles remains a challenge but has become somewhat easier over the past year, which could reflect the spate of layoffs at technology companies from late 2022 through the first half of 2023. Smaller shares of respondents than in the previous survey report difficulty hiring for roles such as AI data scientists, data engineers, and data-visualization specialists, though responses suggest that hiring machine learning engineers and AI product owners remains as much of a challenge as in the previous year.

Looking ahead to the next three years, respondents predict that the adoption of AI will reshape many roles in the workforce. Generally, they expect more employees to be reskilled than to be separated. Nearly four in ten respondents reporting AI adoption expect more than 20 percent of their companies’ workforces will be reskilled, whereas 8 percent of respondents say the size of their workforces will decrease by more than 20 percent.

Looking specifically at gen AI’s predicted impact, service operations is the only function in which most respondents expect to see a decrease in workforce size at their organizations. This finding generally aligns with what our recent research  suggests: while the emergence of gen AI increased our estimate of the percentage of worker activities that could be automated (60 to 70 percent, up from 50 percent), this doesn’t necessarily translate into the automation of an entire role.

AI high performers are expected to conduct much higher levels of reskilling than other companies are. Respondents at these organizations are over three times more likely than others to say their organizations will reskill more than 30 percent of their workforces over the next three years as a result of AI adoption.

4. With all eyes on gen AI, AI adoption and impact remain steady

While the use of gen AI tools is spreading rapidly, the survey data doesn’t show that these newer tools are propelling organizations’ overall AI adoption. The share of organizations that have adopted AI overall remains steady, at least for the moment, with 55 percent of respondents reporting that their organizations have adopted AI. Less than a third of respondents continue to say that their organizations have adopted AI in more than one business function, suggesting that AI use remains limited in scope. Product and service development and service operations continue to be the two business functions in which respondents most often report AI adoption, as was true in the previous four surveys. And overall, just 23 percent of respondents say at least 5 percent of their organizations’ EBIT last year was attributable to their use of AI—essentially flat with the previous survey—suggesting there is much more room to capture value.

Organizations continue to see returns in the business areas in which they are using AI, and they plan to increase investment in the years ahead. We see a majority of respondents reporting AI-related revenue increases within each business function using AI. And looking ahead, more than two-thirds expect their organizations to increase their AI investment over the next three years.

The online survey was in the field April 11 to 21, 2023, and garnered responses from 1,684 participants representing the full range of regions, industries, company sizes, functional specialties, and tenures. Of those respondents, 913 said their organizations had adopted AI in at least one function and were asked questions about their organizations’ AI use. To adjust for differences in response rates, the data are weighted by the contribution of each respondent’s nation to global GDP.

The survey content and analysis were developed by Michael Chui , a partner at the McKinsey Global Institute and a partner in McKinsey’s Bay Area office, where Lareina Yee is a senior partner; Bryce Hall , an associate partner in the Washington, DC, office; and senior partners Alex Singla and Alexander Sukharevsky , global leaders of QuantumBlack, AI by McKinsey, based in the Chicago and London offices, respectively.

They wish to thank Shivani Gupta, Abhisek Jena, Begum Ortaoglu, Barr Seitz, and Li Zhang for their contributions to this work.

This article was edited by Heather Hanselman, an editor in the Atlanta office.

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