sydney opera house project management case study

• Recomendaciones

Cristina Garcia-Ochoa Martin

The sidney opera house construction: a case of project management failure.

The Sydney Opera House is one of the best-known iconic buildings, recognized around the world as a global symbol of Australia. The Danish architect Jørn Utzon won the architecture competition set out by the New South Wales government for the new building in 1957, and the construction started in 1959. The project was originally scheduled for four years, with a budget of AUS $7 million. It ended up taking 14 years to be completed and cost AUS $102 million.

The Sydney Opera House could probably be seen as one of the most disastrous construction projects in history not only from the financial point of view but also for the whole management plan. Lets analyze the main reasons that led to it.

First of all, at the beginning of any project goals and objectives have to be clearly defined by the client to provide a guideline for what the project must complete. There are three main factors: time, cost, and quality. In the case of the Sydney Opera House the last one was the most important, as it was an almost unrestricted goal of the project and the reason why it was launched. No indications regarding time or cost limits were either provided for the competition. Thus, the architects were allowed total freedom in their designs.

After Utzon was selected, he presented his “Red Book” in March 1958, which consisted of the Sydney National Opera House report. It comprised some indications such as plans, sections, reports by consultants, etc. The funds came almost entirely from a dedicated lottery, so the project was not a financial burden for the government. Regarding time planning the goal was to complete the construction at the end of 1962 and have the grand opening at the start of 1963. The project should have lasted four years.

The main stakeholder was the architect, but Utzon was much more concerned with the design aspect rather than time and costs objectives, which proved problematic. During the project, Utzon collaborated with Ove Arup, who was in charge of the structure and the engineering. With some other subcontractors, the team was in charge of mechanics, electrics, heating and ventilating, lighting and acoustics. There was no real project manager, but rather collaboration between Utzon and Arup.

The other main stakeholder was the client, the state of New South Wales. This encompassed the Australian government, which launched the competition for the project, and especially the Labor Premier, Joe Cahill. A part-time executive committee was created to provide project supervision but the members had no real technical skills. The government eventually became an obstacle to the project team by inhibiting changes during the progress of the operations and thus contributed to cost overrun and delays. Finally, the public was an indirect stakeholder because they were concerned with the projects success.

There appeared to be problems from the start of the project that was divided into three stages: Stage 1 was the podium, stage 2 was the outer shells, and stage 3 was the interiors and windows. Apparently Utzon protested that he had not completed the designs for the structure, but the government insisted the construction had to get underway. In addition, the client changed the requirements of the design after the construction was started, moving from two theatres to four, so plans and designs had to be modified during construction.

Regarding the project’s budget the initial estimation was drawn on incomplete design drawings and site surveys which later lead to disagreements. The contractors for the first stage successfully claimed additional costs of AUS $1,2 million in 1962 due to design changes. When it was completed in 1963, it had cost an estimated AUS $5.2 million and it was already 47 weeks over schedule for the whole project.

Stage two became the most controversial stage of the entire construction. As costs were rising a new government stepped in and monitored all payments being requested by the Opera House. By the end of stage one, Utzon submitted an updated estimate of the projects total cost as AUS$12.5 million. As more payments were being delivered and no visible progress was seen, the government began withholding payments to Utzon. Stage two slowed down and in 1966 Utzon felt he was forced to resign from the project as his creative freedom was restricted, and therefore could not bring his perfect idea to fruition.

This came as a shock and nearly an insult to Utzon who had been fending off the Government from rising costs for years. The news that they had agreed to that budget, which was more than four times Utzon’s original estimate, was evidence that he had been unjustly treated.

Queen Elizabeth II inaugurated the Sydney Opera House in 1973, after 17 years of redesigns, underestimates and cost overruns. By 1975, the building had paid for itself, thanks mainly to the lottery system that was created to help its funding. Utzon was never to return to Australia, never to see the final result of his work that was recognized as an incredible feat of architecture. In 2003 the architect was honored with the Pritzker Prize for architecture, the most renowned architectural prize in the world.

Comentarios ( 4 )

[…] シドニー・オペラハウスの建設も、当初は4年しかかからない予定でしたが、結局14年もかかりました。 […]

[…] for Windows 10, before quietly axing it altogether. Even construction of the Sydney Opera House was only supposed to take four years. It ended up taking […]

[…] تالار اپرای سیدنی قرار بود ۴ سال طول بکشد، اما در نهایت پس از ۱۴ سال به پایان رسید. چرا این اتفاق‌ها می‌افتد؟ چرا تیم‌ها از ریل خارج […]

[…] the world of design and construction maybe one of the most famous cases in the 20th century is a Sydney Opera House. 76 million US dollars of budget overrun and decades of delays should be a strong lesson to our […]

• A Hombros de Gigantes
• Digitalizando
• Energía y clima
• EOI en abierto
• Gestión Pública
• Herederos de Pacioli
• Internacionalización
• Reputación
• Servicios digitales a PYMEs
• Show me the MKT
• Sostenibilidad e Innovación Responsable
• Un café con...

Blogosfera EOI

• Blogs EOI desde dentro
• Blogs EOI Claustro
• Blogs EOI Alumnos

Administrar

Este sitio web utiliza cookies para que usted tenga la mejor experiencia de usuario. Si continúa navegando está dando su consentimiento para la aceptación de las mencionadas cookies y la aceptación de nuestra política de cookies , pinche el enlace para mayor información. plugin cookies

Project Accounting

• Project Invoicing

Project Resources

Time and Expense

• Business Intelligence
• Architecture
• Contractors
• Engineering
• Management Consulting
• Software Development
• Strategic Consulting
• Technology Consulting
• About Beyond

Customer Resources

Partner Resources

Beyond Software Blog

Sydney Opera House Failed Project - What Can You Learn?

Project Profitability , Failed Project Series

This post is the first in a series of posts discussing some of the most prominent failed projects and how you can avoid the same pitfalls.

Every project, regardless of its subject matter, starts with an idea and ends (if successful) with a functioning reality of the idea's intent. Projects that fail are sometimes considered losses, but, most often, they also offer excellent lessons on how to avoid repeating the failures in the future. The Sydney, Australia Opera House is a notable example.

A Lesson in Project Failure: Sydney's National Opera House

You can't tell from looking at it, but Sydney Australia's iconic Opera House is actually a study in a project failure . Its original plan had a four-year timetable and an AU $7 million budget, but in the end, it took AU $102 million and 14 years to complete.

The Opera House project failed because it did not follow any of the processes that normally signify proper project management and accounting processes:

• Inadequate resource management planning resulted in no one dedicated person responsible for project activities, and the budget was at best a suggestion.
• No management and no accounting expectations lead to excessive and wasteful materials costs.
• No resource scheduling lead to delays at all stages of the project's development.

What were the circumstances?

In 1957, Australia's government (the client) held a contest to select an architect to design its future " National Opera House ." The client's primary focus was to showcase Australia's creative and technical capacities, and it set almost no parameters on the building's cost or construction timeframe.

In 1958, the winner of the competition, Jorn Utzon , presented his "Red Book" of the project, which contained details of some but not all of the elements of the overall project, such as designs, consultant reports, and varied plans. The "Red Book" was not a comprehensive working document for strategizing the construction of the building.

And, despite the fact that Utzon clearly stated he hadn't finished the structural design, the client insisted on immediately beginning work on the project anyway. From there, things went from bad to worse, with contributions to the growing debacle amassing over time.

No Clearly Defined Project Plan or Leadership

Not only did the project launch with no finalized plans to follow, but the client also changed the floor plan from two theaters to four shortly after construction began. Compounding the chaos that followed was the lack of a project manager. Instead of a single person to whom to turn with questions and for direction, an ad hoc "partnership" between Utzon and the engineer, Ove Arup , handled "management" of the project, assisted by a hastily assembled "team" of electrical, mechanical, and HVAC subcontractors.

Since each separate "management team" member had different goals and perspectives from the others, it's not surprising that finding consensus among them was often an elusive goal.

No Defined Project Budget

Not having a finalized design also meant not knowing how much the project would cost. Almost immediately upon its start, costs began escalating, first with the change orders, and then with the discovery that the site surveys were wrong. The budget went uphill from there. Utzon's vision divided the construction project into three segments: the podium; the outer shells, and the interiors and windows. By the end of stage one, a government monitoring committee was overseeing payments and had to withhold a few until it received proof of completion of actual work.

No Set Time Frame

By 1966, seven years from the time it started and four years after the proposed completion date, the Opera House had not yet completed phase two. Utzon left in frustration, taking his designs and plans with him. "Management" of the rest of the project fell to a committee of three Australian engineers, who did complete phase two by the end of 1967.

However, because the next phase required an entirely new set of plans, the budget to fill out the construction then soared to AU $85 million. Another four years and an additional AU $17 million went by before the Opera House was finally completed in 1973 when Queen Elizabeth inaugurated it.

Typical Causes of Failed Projects

Despite being such an excellent example of "what not to do," project management professionals continue to follow the dubious lead of the people who built the Opera House. In a 2015 survey by Raconteur , the top three reasons for failed projects within the previous 12 months were:

• Changes in organizational priorities;
• Inaccurate estimates of project requirements , and
• Changes in the project's objectives.

Andy Soanes, CTO of Bell Integration, commented that shifting deadlines, adding or modifying features, and unforeseen risks are the typical reasons for cost overruns and escalating costs.

Technology Addresses the Problem

Fortunately, today's project management professionals have advanced technology available to prevent cost, timing, and personnel challenges in the first place, or to circumvent those issues that do arise to reduce their impact on the overall project. Software designed to manage project resources such as materials, subcontractors, or other critical elements can help overseers avoid missing the minute details that can derail the production process. Professional Services Automation (PSA) is particularly useful for comprehensively evaluating project processes over time and helps to keep Key Performance Indicators and other metrics on task and on track.

Perhaps if the Australians had had the opportunity to access today's project management software capabilities, they would have been enjoying the world's most iconic Opera House a decade earlier.

Related Blog Post

Failed Project Series - The Aurora CO VA Administration Hospital

For additional information on Beyond Software please contact:

Nicole Holliday [email protected] 866-510-7839

Topics: Project Profitability , Failed Project Series

Subscribe to Our Blog

Recent posts.

© 2023 Beyond Software

BEYOND SOFTWARE is a registered trademark of Beyond Software, Inc. in the U.S.

Privacy Policy

PSA Software

Financial Management

Project Billing

Reports and Dashboards

Integrations

Partner Program

What is resource management?

News & Events

In Praise of Paradox Persistence: Evidence from the Sydney Opera House Project

• Project Management Journal

• Umeå University

• University of Technology Sydney

• Nova School of Business and Economics

Discover the world's research

• 25+ million members
• 160+ million publication pages
• 2.3+ billion citations

No full-text available

To read the full-text of this research, you can request a copy directly from the authors.

• INT J OPER PROD MAN

• Nonhlanhla Dube

• Int J Proj Manag

• Julien Pollack
• Patrick Sailer

• Aníbal López
• Aline Rodrigues Fernandes
• Gail T. Fairhurst

• Creativ Innovat Manag

• Stewart R Clegg

• Ella Miron-Spektor

• MANAGE LEARN

• J Appl Behav Sci
• Leslie A. Baxter
• SCAND J MANAG

• Dedong Wang

• Peter Murray

• Fangwei Zhu

• Eur Manag J

• Goodall, H.L., Jr
• Peter M. Kellett

• Sebastian Raisch
• David Shepherd
• M. M. Bakhtin
• Caryl Emerson
• Vern W. McGee
• STRATEG ORGAN

• George I. Kassinis

• Kathleen M. Eisenhardt
• A.M. Huberman

• Robert J. Marshak

• Paul Watzlawick

• Don D. Jackson
• Pratima (Tima) Bansal

• Roy Suddaby

• Recruit researchers
• Join for free
• Login Email Tip: Most researchers use their institutional email address as their ResearchGate login Password Forgot password? Keep me logged in Log in or Continue with Google Welcome back! Please log in. Email · Hint Tip: Most researchers use their institutional email address as their ResearchGate login Password Forgot password? Keep me logged in Log in or Continue with Google No account? Sign up

• Call to +1 (844) 889-9952

Sydney Opera House Project Management Case Study

Introduction

Sydney opera house project: the background, standard criteria for project success evaluation, criteria identification and justification, sydney opera house case study, conclusion and recommendations, reference list.

This essay is the Sydney Opera House project management case study aiming to clarify if the Sydney Opera House was a failure or a successful project. It is not a description of the building’s history, construction details, or architecture. Instead, this Sydney Opera House essay focuses on the challenges met by the project and the way these challenges were overcome.

Sydney Opera House is one of Australia’s landmarks and one of the most famous art performance centres in the world. The need for existence of such a magnificent building came about when the Sydney Town Hall, which was the common venue, could not suit the demand for modern times in theatrical productions. The structure was designed under the watch of a “Danish architect, Jorn Utzon, who won the design contest in 1957 out of the 233 entries made” (Utzon 2002, p.11). The Sydney Opera House was to be designed and built to house 4200 people. The project started in 1957. Its completion was anticipated in1963. However, the construction was finished in 1973, which was ten years later than anticipated, but with a high degree of delivery of anticipated quality and glamour.

The delay and drag of the Sydney Opera House project was attributed to the government’s pressure, which forced early commencement. This move made the construction to begin even before the designing process was concluded. Weather changes, alteration of contract deeds, and unanticipated challenges on diverting storm water during construction posed a great challenge against time and finance.

Sydney Opera House was estimated to cost 7 million dollars at its completion in 1963, but by its formal completion time in 1973, the cost had escalated to 102 million dollars, which was fourteen times in excess of the original financial plan (Utzon 2002, p.20). The project implementation by the Hornibrook Group and Civic & Civic Pty Ltd was greatly pressed by criticism emanating from both political and civil societies. Fortunately, the criticisms were eventually outshined by the glamour and ability of the building to present an iconic symbol for Australia in the global arena. Critics turned into considering the project a major success.

Projects constitute temporally endeavours instituted to solve specific problems, and they are normally constrained by financial and time resources. The execution processes have different requirements depending on the industry in which a project is being implemented. For instance, in the IT industry based projects, they are executed with the aid of information and technology systems. These systems help in the decision-making processes. In the industry projects, standard evaluation takes the form of algorithmic constructs aimed at answering differing questions based on project progress in relation to established scope and anticipated end goals (Turner & Müller 2011, p.225).

Through algorithmic decision constructs, IT dependent organisations collect information defining the planned project execution processes, variation in the processes, and information on why such variations take place, and mechanisms of improving projects in the context of the desired long-term and short-term outcomes. This process allows project managers to identify and address various challenges hindering achieved of anticipated outcomes coupled with prescribing measures that would aid in enhancing the sustainability of the projects upon completion.

The above arguments suggest that outcomes constitute one of the major standard approaches to evaluation of projects. Outcome refers to the ability of a project to achieve and deliver the desired glamour. Consequently, when the anticipated glamour and quality of the project are delivered on completion of the project, irrespective of whether the project runs out of time or completed under inflated budget, then it is successful. Extending similar argument to the Sydney Opera House Project, after delaying for ten years and utilising 14 times the budgeted financial resources, the project was completed, but it delivered the much-desired glamour for which it was incepted to deliver. Should then a Sydney Opera House Project evaluation team consider it successful or a failure?

From the project management perspective, failure of a project initiates at the time when it gets out of time and financial resources budgetary allocation. For instance, apart from the Sydney Opera House Project, the Victorian Desalination Project also ran out of time. The timeframe for operation of the project was set to be December 2011, which was upon completion of the project between September 2010 and June 2011.

Unfortunately, this preset target was not achieved due to a number of factors such as bad weather and impacts of economic crunch experienced in 2009 coupled with technical difficulties in the construction process. Nevertheless, from project management point of view, any project remains a temporal endeavour and it is subject to time constraints. Therefore, there were needs to review the anticipated completion dates, which prompted the extension of the completion date by one year. However, even today the project has not been fully completed.

One of the fundamental concerns of evaluating a project from the criteria of time resources is putting in place mechanisms of ensuring that all the activities constituting the entire project are precisely accomplished within the set timeframes. For the case of the Victorian Desalination Project, these activities have not been achieved as anticipated. Similar challenges were also experienced in the case of Sydney Opera House Project.

While it is vital to appreciate that projects are subject to delays at times, for multibillion projects such as the Victorian Desalination Project and the Sydney Opera House Project, an immense drawback is faced. This aspect is critical especially bearing in mind the contractual terms for projects. For instance, the Victorian Desalination Project required the Victorian population to incur additional water charges as part of the cost of the project passed to them (Heibuch 2009).

Therefore, the failure of a project to complete in time not only fails to deliver the desired outcomes, but also disadvantages the population targeted to benefit from it. For the case of the Sydney Opera House Project, although it was completed late and under escalated budget, the project delivered glamour to its target population. These two arguments establish an important paradigm for evaluation of success or failure of projects. Apart from considering a project to have failed for it was not completed within the stipulated time and financial budgets, it is crucial to also consider the implication of the failure to complete the project in time and within financial budget to the stakeholders.

Experience in execution of many projects across the globe reveals that many projects often consume financial and time resource than initially planned, due to the necessity to make continuous changes. For instance, the Sydney Opera House Project underwent several changes including the addition of library, theatre, and cinema. Changes were also made on materials and interior designs. While these changes were meant to improve the original design in the effort to ensure that the project delivered optimal glamour desired by its idea creators, it also meant delaying the completion date and escalation of financial resources required in executing the project. The chief interrogative arising here is whether consideration of success or failure of a project on the grounds of surpassing time and budget is appropriate.

In the effort to provide a response to the above interrogative, various project management scholars have developed alternative criterion for evaluation of projects. For example, Thomas and Fernandez (2008) suggest that actual response to a project upon its completion constitutes an important paradigm for evaluation of failure or success of a project even though it may have gotten out of schedule or budget plans. The Sydney Opera House Project is perhaps a good example of a project that can be considered successful under this criterion. In contrast, the Millennium Dome project in London was unsuccessful under this criterion since it failed to generate its expected glamour, though it was completed within budget and schedule.

Duncan (2004) argues that product success in terms of outcomes, service quality, and compliance to critical aspects defining project in project management are essential attributes for consideration in the evaluation of success of a project. From the context of this criterion, the Millennium Dome project, the Victorian desalination project, and even the Sydney Opera House Project failed. Since projects are characterised by myriads of problems leading to delay, escalation of budgets, and even deterioration of quality and glamour expected, Duncan (2004) approach to evaluation introduces the dilemma whether indeed any successful project has ever been completed.

After the inception of a project, changes that make the project deliver optimal performance and glamour in relation to the desired outcomes on the creation of its inception idea should not be negated even if it means running out of time schedule and budget plans. This assertion implies that although time and financial resources are important in the evaluation of success or failure of a project, they ought not to form the basic criterion for its evaluation.

The functionality attributes of a project matters. For instance, why should an IT project be implemented within fixed budget and time constraints, yet posses poor functionality attribute such as poor user interfaces and poor navigation among other aspects. Should it have been better to reconsider addressing these challenges when discovered than declaring project complete in the extent that it has meet time and budget constraints?

A ‘yes’ response to the above queries highlights the importance of basing the criterion of evaluation of projects on outcomes and long-term sustainability, availability, and reliability. The justification for this approach is perhaps well explained using cases of project evaluation in the IT based organisations. In such organisations, the implementation of IT and IS projects require incredible consideration of planning for risks mitigation. Such projects are prone to a variety of risks including failure of the project upon its completion or even later, after use in the short term (Anantatmula 2008). This assertion underlines the significance of risks re-evaluation in the due process of project implementation even though the practice may result in increased project costs and time for completion.

The focus of risks re-evaluation is to ensure that all the efforts of project execution focus on “maximising the probability and consequences of positive events and minimising the probability and consequences of adverse events to project objectives” (Tolbert 2008, p.57). The risk of failure of software and hardware applications presents situations in which the operation of an organisation may come to a halt as the operations of IT dependent organisations depend wholly on computer-based platforms (Anantatmula 2008). Consistent re-evaluation of risks of failure of IS and IT projects, both in the short term and long term during the process of execution of the project, increases the time for completion and financial resource requirement, but it ensures reliability and availability of the systems developed in the long term.

The Sydney Opera House Project was characterised by many challenges. From the context of project management standard approaches of evaluation of projects, these challenges presented the projects as failed since it failed to meet time and budget constraints. The Sydney Opera House Project is perhaps one of the most important images representing Australia on global space. As aforementioned, Jorn Utzon, a Danish architect, won the construct for development of the projects. This win followed placement of request for bids by the South Wales government for the project in 1957.

The project’s actual construction was initiated in 1959. Initially, the plan was to have the “project completed within a period of four years and consumption of financial resources amounting to AUS $102 million” (Garcia & Ochoa 2012, Para. 9). Basing the evaluation of the success or failure of projects from the perspectives of time and financial constraints, the project is in this extent is arguably best considered as a failed project.

Drawing from the above arguments, the Sydney Opera House Project is perhaps amongst the worst projects of the past in terms of planning and resources management as defined by PMBOK. PMBOK entails “a collection of processes and knowledge areas generally accepted as best practice within the project management discipline” (IEEE 2008, p.33). Through PMBOK, project management fundamental information is provided with the type of project under consideration notwithstanding. According to the PMBOK, a project is a “temporal endeavour undertaken to create a unique product, service, or result” (IEEE 2008, p.34). In this regard, the Sydney Opera House Project is the unique product referred in here.

The PMBOK body prescribes nine knowledge areas necessary for consideration in any project evaluation. These knowledge areas are scope management, cost management, time management, risk management, integration management, procurement management, and communication management. For the Sydney Opera House Project, conformance to these nine areas was vital for determination of whether the project was a success or not. In essence, the Sydney Opera House Project encountered many risks, failed plans, and failed ability to manage costs and time. In the approach of PMBOK, the project was an immense failure.

From the identified project success evaluation criteria identified and justified before, three important aspects should be considered in the process of evaluation of failure or success of any project, viz. quality (result), time, and cost. According to the criterion, the relative importance of costs and time in relation to quality is important in the evaluation of the project success or failure. Right from the design phase, for the case of the Sydney Opera House Project, quality was the paramount aspect of basing the success or failure of the project. Indeed, “no indications regarding time or cost limits were either provided for the competition” (Garcia & Ochoa 2012, Para.3). This observation implies that architects were offered all flexibilities in terms of time constraints to develop a design that would deliver the most desired glamour.

The Sydney Opera House Project is a case of project success while failing to comply with project management principles for evaluation of success or failure of a project. This assertion means that even though the Sydney Opera House Project was a failure from the perspective of the project management personnel charged with design and implementation, from the clients’ perspective, viz. the South Wales government, the project was a big success. It delivered the quality and results anticipated.

This position is perhaps well justified by the view that Utzon was awarded an architectural Pritzker Prise (Garcia & Ochoa 2012) in recognition of design of a successful project. Queen Elisabeth II also inaugurated the project in 1973 with immense confidence on its success in terms of delivering the expected results. In fact, excessive time and financial resources do not attract the attention of the public and other stakeholders in comparison to the quality and glamour exhibited by the project.

Standard approach to evaluation of success or failure of projects preoccupies itself with concerns of time and financial resources and budgetary constraints. Through analysis of the case of the Sydney Opera House Project, this case analysis paper proposes the capacity of a project to deliver desired results, quality, and glamour as an alternative paradigm necessary for evaluation of project success or failure. Projects may fail to deliver the expected results as evidenced by the case of the inability of the Millennium Dome project in London to deliver the anticipated glamour, though completed within the stipulated time and budget.

In this light, this paper recommends that even if the Sydney Opera House Project were to be initiated again, the extra time and financial resources consumed in redesigns and mitigation of other challenges encountered during the process of the execution of the project remain valid to the extent that the project delivered quality and glamour perceived by its idea creators.

Anantatmula, V 2008. ‘Project Management Performance evaluation Model in IT projects’, Project Management Journal, vol.39 no.1, pp. 34-48.

Duncan, W 2004. Defining and Measuring Project Success. Web.

Garcia, C & Ochoa, M 2012. The Sidney Opera House Construction: a Case of Project Management Failure . Web.

Heibuch, J 2009, New Australian Desalination Plant. Web.

IEEE 2008, A Guide To The Project Management Body Of Knowledge , Project Management Institute, New York.

Thomas, G & Fernandez, W 2008, ‘Success in IT Projects: A Matter of Definition’, International Journal of Project Management, vol.26 no.5, pp. 733-742.

Tolbert, L 2008, ‘Nine knowledge areas’, Journal of community academy, vol. 2 no. 2, pp. 56-59.

Turner, J & Müller, R 2011, ‘The Project Manager’s Leadership Style as a Success Factor on Projects: A Literature Review’, Project Management Journal , vol.7 no.3, pp.219-234.

Utzon, J 2002, Sydney Opera House: Utzon Design Principles , Sydney Opera House Trust, Sydney.

Cite this paper

Select style

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

Premium Papers. (2024, February 14). Sydney Opera House Project Management Case Study. https://premium-papers.com/sydney-opera-house-project-management-and-analysis/

"Sydney Opera House Project Management Case Study." Premium Papers , 14 Feb. 2024, premium-papers.com/sydney-opera-house-project-management-and-analysis/.

Premium Papers . (2024) 'Sydney Opera House Project Management Case Study'. 14 February.

Premium Papers . 2024. "Sydney Opera House Project Management Case Study." February 14, 2024. https://premium-papers.com/sydney-opera-house-project-management-and-analysis/.

1. Premium Papers . "Sydney Opera House Project Management Case Study." February 14, 2024. https://premium-papers.com/sydney-opera-house-project-management-and-analysis/.

Bibliography

Premium Papers . "Sydney Opera House Project Management Case Study." February 14, 2024. https://premium-papers.com/sydney-opera-house-project-management-and-analysis/.

Project Management Nerd

Project Management and Productivity

Project Failures – Sydney Opera House

Today we know the Sydney Opera House as one of the most recognised architectural pieces in the world. It is located on Bennelong Point at the foot of the beautiful Sydney Harbour and adjacent to the Sydney Botanical Gardens and it has hosted many iconic moments.

In project management there are three significant aspects of any project that need to be considered. These are the triple constraints of time or scheduling, the cost of the project and the scope. The scope of a project is its deliverables. Essentially it provides the vision for the project. Unfortunately, in the case of the Sydney Opera House there was no defined scope. No clear deliverables in place led to a massive blow out in both time and cost..

We are getting ahead of ourselves. Let’s start at the beginning….

The idea of an Opera House was first floated by Sir Eugene Goossens an English composer who felt that Sydney deserved an Opera House measurable to any others in the World. He had been living the previous 20 years in America with purpose-built halls for orchestras. The Sydney Symphony Orchestra in contrast was performing in the 1889 Sydney Town Hall.

The vision for the Sydney Opera House gained traction through the 1950s. It was a transformational time in Australia and it was during this time that enough political support was gained in order for the idea to be a reality.

Sir Eugene received support from the newly elected NSW Premier Joseph Cahill who believed that no matter the class or background of a person they had the right to enjoy fine music.

There was a conference that was convened in 1954 for the purpose of building support for the project. In a moment that gave a glimpse into the future of Sydney, then Premier Joseph Cahill said “ Surely it is proper in establishing an opera house that it should not be a ‘shadygaff’ place but an edifice that will be a credit to the State not only today but also for hundreds of years.”

It was in 1955 that Bennelong Point was declared the site for the proposed Opera House and in February of 1956 Premier Cahill commissioned an international competition for the building of a National Opera House.

Of the 233 entries there were a set of twelve drawings sent in by a Danish architect by the name of Jorn Utzon. He submitted these drawings in December of 1956. Jorn’s entry was numbered 218. Judging began in January of 1957 with a panel of four men charged with the responsibility of finding a winner.

The winner was decided in a less than transparent way. Nevertheless, Premier Cahill announced the winning design on January 29, 1957, as entry number 218, Danish architect Jorn Utzon. It was initially forecast to cost 3.5 million pounds (around $7 million) and expected to take 4 years to build.

The Sydney Opera house is a case study on how not to build a construction project. Numerous research has taken place on why the Sydney Opera House project was a failure. There are four critical factors which can largely explain this.

There was no cooperative project team

Communication was extremely poor between Jorn and the engineers for the project. Going as far as refusing to install a phone in his office in order to avoid talking with them. There was also a lack of oversight by the client (NSW Government) with the responsibility of driving the project given solely to Jorn.

A lack of competency and commitment

The question must be asked whether Jorn was indeed the right person to project manage the Sydney Opera House. Although his drawings were good enough to win the design competition this was not accompanied with the competency to oversee the project. No recognition of stakeholders led to poor communication, lack of clarity on the scope of the project led to significant delays and a blow out in costs. This led eventually to Jorn’s position being terminated and him returning to his home country of Denmark.

Poor risk assessment

The identification of risk was lacking form the project documentation. This means there were no mitigation or contingency strategies in place. The thought process at the time was that this was such a bold architectural piece that mistakes would occur, and issues would have to be fixed as the project went along. Unfortunately, this brought conflict to the project as different teams were blaming each other for the blow-out of time and cost.

Continuity issues related to movement of key personnel

Once the problems with the project became apparent the Government stepped in and stopped Jorn’s payments as Chief Architect. Jorn left soon after and never returned to Australia to see his finished project.

In 1966 another architect Peter Hall was appointed to take over the project. The transition and complex designs and a lack of documentation accounted for further delays and costs as Peter and his team needed to be updated on the project.   The Sydney Opera House was officially opened by Queen Elizabeth II on October 20, 1973. This was ten years later than originally forecast and at a final cost of $102 million was almost 15 times more than originally budgeted.

A large crowd were in attendance for the grand opening which included a large firework display and a performance of Beethoven’s Symphony No. 9.

Jorn Utzon was not invited to the opening and in fact he never returned to Australia again.

Share this:

One thought on “project failures – sydney opera house”.

• Pingback: The 5 Biggest Abandoned Megaprojects in the World - Project Management Nerd

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Discover more from project management nerd.

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Type your email…

Continue reading

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

• We're Hiring!
• Help Center

The Sidney Opera House construction: A case of project management failure

Related Papers

Informes de la Construcción

Juan Rey Rey

PPA. Proyecto. Progreso. Arquitectura.

Laura Lizondo-Sevilla , José Santatecla Fayos

The article showcases the Crown Hall building in the educational and architectural context of Mies van der Rohe. It reviews his beginnings in the Bauhaus with his first intervention in an educational space for the Bauhaus of Berlin in 1932, as well as his sojourn to the United States, and the architectural approaches to the IIT campus and the Crown Hall project. The text touches on the study of the planning process for the Crown Hall, analysing the evolution of its architectural conception, through the different versions of the project. The article covers the transition from the first architectural approaches for the IIT campus buildings, planned by Mies, to the approach of the large unitary space of the Crown Hall. This project can be appreciated from the increasing importance of the structure, the clarity of construction and the use of steel and glass as the only materials that form the image of the building, and the flexible and unitary character of the space. Finally, reference is made to the concept of the “universal space” in the architecture of Mies, as an abstract concept that surpasses those of flexibility of use

Alejandro Sanchez

Nicolás Ramirez Hernández

Gabriela Glez

Harold Kerzner

Luis Lombardo Bertolini

Santiago Gala-Aguilera

Created in 1943 by one of Roosevelt's brain trust, Rexford Guy Tugwell, as an emergency agency in during World War II, the Committee on Design of Public Works was not only in charge of preparing the plans and specifications for the vast construction projects to be carried out in Puerto Rico once the conflict ended. It would also become a paradigmatic and influential design laboratory on tropical modernism.

Cristhian Garcia Villacorta

DIRECCIÓN DE PROYECTOS

Antoni González Moreno-Navarro

Loading Preview

Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.

RELATED PAPERS

Diego Alejandro Montaldo

Perla fabela victoria

Demián Arancibia Zeballos

La Scaenae Frons del teatro romano de Mérida. Anejos de Archivo Español de Arqueología

Pedro Mateos Cruz

Pablo Pachón García

SSRN Electronic Journal

Edgardo Zablotsky

Revista Ean

Gimena Ramos

Revista Anàlisi

ZARCH: Journal of Interdisciplinary studies in Architecture and Urbanism, nº 13, 2019, pp. 50-61 (ISSN: 2341-0531)

Carlos Montes Serrano

Diplomado Calidad

Cuadernos De Economia

Alex Smith Araque solano

Pediatric Surgery International

SILVIA VALVERDE

American journal of mental retardation : AJMR

Performance Studies in Motion

Dariusz Kosiński

Carmen Expósito Castro

Jose L U I S Arévalo Salas

Netto Rendon

Ines Załęska

Alba de Juana

Libro de Actas IN-RED 2018: IV Congreso Nacional de Innovación Educativa y Docencia en Red

Vicente López Mateu

Genett Jimenez Delgado

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024